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Abstract 
 
The objective of this thesis is to explore how a systems approach can be used to provide 
an insight into patient safety in NHS hospitals in England. Healthcare delivers 
considerable benefits yet there remains a relatively high rate of harm and death for 
patients through adverse events occurring during the process of treatment. The extant 
patient safety literature acknowledges the influence of organisational or system factors 
on patient safety. However, the literature is weak in explaining how system factors 
affect patient safety. To provide an insight into the interactions within healthcare 
systems, this research explores the characteristics of NHS hospitals, regarded as 
complex socio-technical systems, using concepts from resilience, systems, accident and 
social theory. 
 
A theoretical Safe Working Envelope (SWE) model (Rasmussen, 1997) is developed 
and contextualised for use in the NHS. The case study field work was carried out in two 
NHS hospitals during consecutive winter months at times of high demand for inpatient 
services. A third case study uses secondary data about patient safety failures in the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.  
 
The original SWE model has three failure boundaries. The model is developed by 
introducing an additional boundary to take account of Government targets. Social 
theory and system dynamics are used to include the dialectic feedback of social actors 
and the dynamics of workload. The model depicts the competing pressures, constraints 
and the workload associated with the need to meet the financial, target, staff workload 
and patient safety requirements. Three interacting construct sets are explored. These are 
the constraints within which the system operates, the pressures from the context, and the 
system dynamics of demand, capacity and decision making. Insights into system 
behaviours of the hospitals are derived from examining the construct set interactions. 
The proposition is made that there are five system behaviour archetypes which create 
the conditions that influence patient safety. The archetypes are derived from the system 
dynamics and in particular the relationship between reinforcing and balancing feedback 
loops. The five archetypes are safe practice, drift, tip, collapse and transition towards 
failure. As hospitals become overcrowded the complexity increases and the reinforcing 
feedback loops dominate the system and potentially increase the risk to patients. An 
element of risk arises from staff normalising to the drift in standards of care. 
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Glossary 
 
A&E Accident & Emergency department of hospitals where 
emergency patients are first seen and treated before admission 
or discharge. Also known as the Emergency Department (ED). 
 
Accident Theory Theories and concepts derived from the study of accidents and 
disasters 
 
Adverse event “an unintended injury or complication resulting in prolonged 
hospital stay, disability at the time of discharge or death 
caused by healthcare management rather than by the patient’s 
underlying disease process.” De Vries E.N. et al (2008).  
 
Boundaries Boundaries of the Safe Working Envelope (SWE) that depict 
the constraints within which the hospital works. 
 
Buffer The capacity to absorb and or adapt to disruption or continuous 
stress. The SWE model depicts the buffer capacity as the 
‘marginal zone’. 
 
Complex socio-
technical system 
Systems with a large number of elements (technical and social) 
which interact in a non-linear way with feedback loops and are 
open to their environment. 
 
Department of Health Government department responsible for developing health 
policy and the management of the NHS in England. 
 
Feedback Loop Feedback from one element of a system to another – often non 
linear. 
 
Gradient Within the SWE model the gradient depicts the pressure being 
exerted on the Operating Point of the system. 
 
Marginal zone Within the SWE model the area close to the failure boundary 
depicted by a marginal zone boundary (dotted line). 
 
National Health 
Service 
 
Publically funded and run healthcare organisation in the UK. 
Operating Point (OP) Within the SWE model the OP depicts the performance of the 
system in relation to boundary constraints. 
 
Patient safety There are few definitions found in the literature. The one used 
is “The avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse 
outcomes or injuries stemming from the process of 
healthcare.” (Vincent, 2010, p.31) 
 
Redundancy Sources which are not used except to cover gaps or failure in 
normal operations. 
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Resilience ‘…the ability of an organisation (system) to keep, or recover 
quickly to, a stable state, allowing it to continue operations 
during and after a major mishap or in the presence of 
continuous significant stresses.’ (Wreathrall, 2006) 
 
 
Social Structure “…patterns of institutions and relations are the results of 
actions on the part of individuals who are endowed with the 
capacities or competencies that enable them to produce these 
structures by acting in organised ways. …Embodied structures 
are found in the habits and skills inscribed in human bodies 
and minds. These embodied structures allow them to produce, 
reproduce and transform their institutional and relational 
structures.” (Scott, 2001. p.84) 
 
Structure (system 
dynamics) 
That structure consists of the feedback loops, stocks and flows, 
and nonlinearities created by the interaction of the physical 
and institutional structure of the system with the decision-
making processes of the agents acting within it.’ (Sterman, 
2000, p.107) 
 
System Checkland (1981) suggests that a system:  
‘…embodies the idea of a set of elements connected together 
which form a whole, this showing the properties which are 
properties of the whole, rather than properties of its component 
parts’ (p.3).  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets the context, rationale and scope of this research and provides an 
overview of the contribution to knowledge. There are two main motivations for 
conducting the research. The first is the previous personal experience of the researcher 
working as a manager in National Health Service (NHS) hospitals where significant 
harm and deaths of patients occurred. The second is to take a systems perspective to 
contribute to the patient safety literature. Undertaking this study has been a journey of 
both discovery and consolidation. It has been a process of discovery by finding new 
ideas in the literature and during the research process. The consolidation has occurred 
through times of reflection on previous experience in the light of new learning from the 
literature. The thesis reflects the combination of academic rigour and practical 
requirements, borne out of experience, to improve safety for patients. The structure of 
the thesis is presented and short summaries provided of the content of each chapter. 
 
1.2 Context of the research 
Healthcare is one of the basic needs in any society to help save life, overcome disease 
and relieve suffering. The provision of healthcare faces a number of challenges. In 
developed countries these include increasing costs, an expanding older population, new 
disease patterns associated with wealth, and an increasingly complex and sophisticated 
means of delivering treatment through teams of professionals using new techniques and 
equipment. Alongside these challenges are the ethical principles underpinning the 
delivery of healthcare. The ethical concepts of nonmaleficence (do not cause harm) and 
beneficence (contribute to a persons welfare) are key underlying principles for 
clinicians (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989). Patients expect that the delivery of 
treatment will be conducted safely and that the process of care will not endanger their 
wellbeing beyond the disease process itself. 
 
Florence Nightingale was one of the first to note that hospitals can be dangerous places 
for patients. She pointed out that the rate of death in certain hospitals was far higher 
than should be expected. Introducing her ‘Notes on Hospitals’ in 1863, she wrote: 
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“It may seem a strange principle to enunciate as the very first requirement in a 
Hospital that it should do the sick no harm. It is quite necessary, nevertheless, to 
lay down such a principle, because the actual mortality in hospitals, especially in 
those of large crowded cities, is very much higher than any calculation founded 
on the mortality of the same class of diseases amongst patients treated out of 
hospital would lead us to expect.” (Sharpe and Faden, 1998)  
 
The term ‘iatrogenic disease’ was introduced in the 1920s as a term to describe the 
harmful effects of medical treatment (Vincent, 2010). Writing in 1970s, a critic wrote of 
iatrogenic disease having reached epidemic proportions (Illich, 1997). The book 
commences with the statement: “The medical establishment has become a major threat 
to health.” The threats were known but few studies were undertaken into the scale and 
reasons for the rate of harm associated with medical treatment. One of the first 
prospective studies conducted was in the early 1960s at Yale University Hospital by 
Elihu Schimmel (Vincent, 2010). The research, involving a 1000 patients, found that 
‘20% of the patients admitted to the medical wards suffered one or more untoward 
episodes and 10% had a prolonged or unresolved episode.’ (quoted in Vincent, 2010). 
Sixteen fatalities were noted in the study. In the early 1980s research sought to reassess 
the situation (Steel et al., 1981). The study involved 815 patients and 36% were found 
to have suffered an iatrogenic illness with 9% classified as threatening to life or causing 
major disability. 
 
The lack of wide reaching research in this area during this period is claimed to be 
negligent (Vincent, 1989). In the UK attitudes changed after the events at Bristol Royal 
Infirmary where paediatric heart surgery death rates where judged to be excessive. It 
took a number of years for the problem to come to light and the subsequent inquiry 
shone a powerful light into, not just the performance of the surgeons but also the culture 
and wider systemic influences (Kennedy, 2001). In the USA the publication by the US 
Institute of Medicine’s report ‘To err is human’ awoke professional and public interest 
in the scale of preventable harm and death occurring in healthcare and hospitals in 
particular (Kohn et al., 2000). The report claims that more people die from medical 
errors in the USA in any one year than from car accidents, breast cancer or AIDS. 
 
The scale of harm is not easy to define or measure. Researchers employ different 
methods with a range of strengths and weaknesses. Studies where the researchers 
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retrospectively review the patient case notes for adverse events have been used in a 
number of countries (Vincent, 2010). Whilst researchers set different criteria as to what 
constitutes an adverse event, the typical rate appears to be between 8 – 12% of patients 
admitted to hospital suffer one or more adverse events (de Vries et al., 2008). In the UK 
a government report on patient safety suggests the rate of 10% of inpatients suffer an 
adverse event in NHS hospitals (Department of Health, 2000b). The report emphasises 
the need to learn from incidents and proposes setting up a reporting and learning system 
(Department of Health, 2001). A later review indicates that progress is not as good as 
expected and further reforms of the structure supporting patient safety in the NHS is 
needed (Department of Health, 2006c). In the USA, a review ten years after the Institute 
of Medicine report, highlighting the scale of the problem, found improvement to be 
‘frustratingly slow’ (Leape et al., 2009). 
 
In summary, it is clear that whilst healthcare can provide significant benefit there is a 
considerable rate of preventable harm and death. It is only comparatively recently that 
governments, professions and academia have given the subject the attention it deserves. 
There is a growing realisation that improving patient safety is not easy despite seeking 
to learn about safety through reporting mechanisms and from other industries. The 
complexities of the process of treatment alongside the pathway of disease is very 
different to keeping an aeroplane from falling out of the sky (Vincent, 2010, Walshe and 
Boaden, 2006). The lack of visibility to the wider society of the scale of the problem in 
healthcare, compared to the obvious causalities of transport crashes for example, means 
that there is not the same emotional and political drive to improve. 
 
1.3 Scope of the research 
Keeping patients safe is a complex and large scale undertaking (Vincent, 2010). This 
thesis seeks to address the broad conceptual challenge of how to improve the 
understanding of organisational and operational influences on patient safety. The 
research brings a systems thinking approach to the task. 
 
The assumption is often made that things go wrong due to ‘human error’. It is easy to 
blame the individual clinician as being a ‘bad apple’ (Dekker, 2007). However, there is 
a growing realisation of wider system issues that contribute to failures, which requires a 
different approach to learning and improvement (Vincent et al., 1998, Cook et al., 1998, 
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Woods et al., 2007, Woods et al., 2010, Vincent et al., 2004, Vincent, 2004, Dekker, 
2011). The move towards a more holistic approach to patient safety is summarised by 
Woods et al (2010) in the contrasting two approaches to failure. 
 
First stories – individual ‘bad apple’ 
theory 
Second stories – system vulnerability 
Human error (by any other name: 
violation, complacency) is seen as the 
cause of failure 
 
Saying what people should have done is a 
satisfying way to describe failure 
 
 
Telling people to be more careful will not 
make the problem go away 
Human error is seen as the effect of 
systemic vulnerabilities deeper inside the 
organization 
 
Saying what people should have done 
does not explain why it made sense for 
them to do what they did 
 
Only by constantly seeking out its 
vulnerabilities can organizations enhance 
safety 
 
 
Table 1.1: The contrast between human error and system vulnerability to failure  
(adapted from Woods et al, 2010) 
 
The understanding is that the failure to keep patients safe is connected to the wider 
system, which is influenced by its context (Katz and Kahn, 1966, Cummings et al., 
2001). Taking the context into account widens the consideration of factors that need to 
be considered when seeking to make improvements (Boaden and Burnes, 2009). An 
underlying assumption made in this thesis is that systems are made up of interacting 
parts from which safety or failure is an emergent process (Checkland, 1981, Hollnagel, 
2004, Woods et al., 2010, Boaden and Burnes, 2009, Forrester, 1969, Dekker, 2011). 
Dekker (2011) argues that the theories used in the extant literature and practice to 
understand why failures occur, are not up to the task of fully explaining how complex 
socio-technical systems create unforeseen consequences. Current theories rely on 
reductionist and linear ideas to help explain what goes wrong. However, ‘the world is 
not linear’ (Meadows, 2008). To improve our understanding of how to improve patient 
safety, it is therefore necessary to explore the characteristics of the dynamic interactions 
of the parts and their contribution to the behaviour of the whole. To take account of the 
requirement to investigate the interactions, this thesis takes a systems thinking 
approach. The relationship of the systems approach adopted in this thesis to the extant 
literature is outlined in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: Outline approach of the thesis 
 
Taking a systems approach to improve our understanding about patient safety is a broad 
canvas. There are multiple perspectives on what constitutes patient safety, such as 
debates about where it sits in the quality agenda and how improvements can be made 
(Walshe and Boaden, 2006). This thesis focuses on a high level view of the 
characteristics of hospitals rather than examining specific components.  
 
The definition of patient safety used for this thesis is: 
“The avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries 
stemming from the process of healthcare.” (Vincent, 2010, p.31) 
 
The extant patient safety literature widely recognises the systemic influences on patient 
safety. However, it is argued in Chapter 2 that the system frameworks and models found 
in the literature have limited explanatory power. In particular the patient safety literature 
does not engage with systems theory or the nature of complexity to fully explore the 
influence of the interaction of the parts of a system on safety. Systems theory can assist 
in developing theoretical models to examine the dynamic interactions that occur 
between the parts of the system and thereby strengthen the theoretical basis of the 
literature on safety failures (Dekker, 2011). 
 
Therefore, it is argued that exploratory research is required to examine the 
characteristics of healthcare systems in relation to patient safety. The resilience 
literature provides an appropriate theoretical foundation as it links systems theory with 
Patient safety / failure is 
an emergent property of 
the interaction of the parts 
of the healthcare system. 
Healthcare occurs in 
complex systems with many 
parts that dynamically 
interact with each other. 
Extant literature does not fully 
explain how patient safety is 
influenced by ‘the system’. 
This thesis explores the 
characteristics of hospitals 
using systems and other 
theories to improve the 
explanation of how ‘the 
system’ influences patient 
safety. 
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safety. A model, derived from the literature, is developed and used as the basis to 
conduct the exploratory research. 
 
1.4 Research aims and objectives 
The overall aim of the research is to explore some of the characteristics of complex 
socio-technical healthcare systems that can influence patient safety. The literature 
review, presented in Chapter 2 and 3, identifies a number of gaps in knowledge to 
provide a narrower focus. The most significant gaps in the patient safety literature are 
the limitations of the current theoretical models. First, extant models are weak at being 
able to explain the influence from the interaction of the parts in complex socio-technical 
systems, such as hospitals, on the safety of patients. This may partly be due to the 
apparent lack of systems thinking being applied to the problem. Second, they are limited 
in using insights from accident theory to enhance the theoretical framework of patient 
safety. To provide a practical focus within the literature and for the empirical research, 
hospitals are used as an example of a complex socio-technical healthcare system. The 
gaps identified provide the basis for the objective of the research, which is: 
To explore, in NHS hospitals, how a systems approach can inform the development 
of patient safety theory. 
 
The limitations of the current theoretical models are addressed through a process of 
synthesising concepts and models from the systems theory and resilience literature. The 
research takes an empirical theory development approach (Meredith, 1998). Such an 
approach leads to the development of propositions for testing in future research. 
 
To operationalise the research objective a theoretical Safe Working Envelope (SWE) 
model is developed from a synthesis of the patient safety, systems, accident theory, and 
resilience literature, which is presented in Chapter 3. The foundation of the model is the 
SWE proposed by Rasmussen (1997). The envelope model takes account of safety 
within the competing pressures of complex socio-technical systems. A resilient system 
is one that can operate within the boundaries of the envelope in the face of disruption. It 
is argued that resilience is part of the same continuum as vulnerability and hence 
appropriate for exploring patient safety. The model is further developed and 
contextualised in Chapter 5. A key assumption made in the research, supported by the 
literature, is that overcrowded hospitals, and those under workload pressure, are 
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associated with patient safety failures (Fatovich et al., 2005, Sprivulis et al., 2006, 
Trzeciak and Rivers, 2003, Wears et al., 2008, Weissman, 2007, Cameron, 2006, Kc 
and Terwiesch, 2009). Therefore, the empirical investigation explores hospitals at a time 
of pressure and overcrowding, to gain insights into some of the characteristics of the 
interactions and their impact on system behaviours that may influence patient safety. 
 
The empirical phase of the study focuses on NHS hospitals in England. The structure of 
the NHS across the UK is different in each nation. In England there are particular 
policies and structures in place that influence the operating conditions and 
characteristics of hospitals (Klein, 1995, Ham, 2009). The researcher has considerable 
experience of working in NHS hospitals in England, providing both a depth of 
knowledge but also the potential for bias. The potential for bias is recognised and 
methods are employed to minimise its influence. Hospitals are chosen to study rather 
than the wider healthcare system as they provide clearly definable organisational 
systems that interact with a wider context. Most of the extant patient safety literature 
focuses on hospitals, although it is argued that the theoretical systems perspective is 
weak. 
 
Three NHS Trust hospitals form the case study part of the research. Case study design, 
the case selection process and collection methods are justified in Chapter 4. The two 
case studies (CS 1 and 2) where primary data was collected are chosen to provide 
contrasting internal characteristics, whilst having the same local Primary Care Trust 
(PCT) and Strategic Health Authority (SHA). The selection reduced the external 
differences and allowed the research to focus on how the internal interactions and 
systemic characteristics responded to disruptive events (perturbations) and periods of 
continuous stress. The hospitals were studied over the winter period to provide 
examples of difficult operational situations. The examples amplify the competing 
pressures, the ability of hospitals to adapt to them, and display the vulnerable and 
resilient characteristics.  
 
The third case study (CS 3) is an example of significant patient safety failure 
(Healthcare Commission, 2009a). Mid Staffordshire Hospital NHS Foundation Trust is 
chosen as there are publicly available inquiry reports into how the competing demands 
of saving money, meeting targets, staffing the hospital and patient safety were managed. 
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The third case study is used to supplement the primary data collected from the other two 
studies.  
 
The case study data and analysis is presented in Chapters 6 – 8 and the conclusions 
drawn about the characteristics of NHS hospitals in England and how they influence 
patient safety are discussed in Chapter 9. An overview of the research process and 
chapter contents is present in Figure 1.2 in Section 1.5 below. 
 
1.5 Significance of the study  
The contribution to knowledge is in three areas. The first is how the system 
characteristics influence patient safety, second, the proposals for improvement and 
third, the development of the literature on resilience and the SWE model (Rasmussen, 
1997) in particular. These are summarised in Section 9.5 
 
First, is the contribution to the patient safety and resilience literature through the 
incremental development of the SWE model. The development of the model through the 
synthesis of the literature provides insights in the exploration of some of the interactive 
characteristics found in NHS hospitals that influence patient safety. The case study 
evidence adds to the literature that uses the SWE model. For example, empirical 
evidence of both the chronic and sudden exhaustion of adaptive capacity to prevent 
patient safety failure is found in the case studies, provides clearer insight as to how that 
occurs. 
 
Second, from the analysis of the case studies three interacting construct sets are 
identified which create key system characteristics. The interactions of the construct sets 
create emergent system behaviour effects, some of which are problematic for patient 
safety. Five archetypes of system behaviour are identified, four of which increase the 
risk to the safety of patients. The construct sets and system behaviour archetypes adds a 
different perspective to the extant patient safety literature. In particular the analysis 
using the synthesis of concepts from systems thinking, resilience and accident theory 
provides a new approach to considering how the ‘system’ influences patient safety. 
 
Third, theory building propositions are made about how to reduce the risk associated 
with the system archetypes. A key outcome of this exploratory research is that tight 
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coupling between the parts of hospitals and the lack of buffer capacity makes them 
vulnerable to patient safety failure. Hence the proposition is made that hospitals must be 
able to accommodate the net difference in rates of flow into and out of the hospital to 
avoid medical patients being accommodated on surgical wards. The case studies show 
evidence of the gradual deterioration of standards of care that can occur when hospitals 
are under continuous pressure to meet targets and save money. The proposition is made 
that the safety standards have to be made more explicit and judged against high 
performing organisations and not internal past performance. Building on the extant 
literature, which suggests that aspects of resilience can be measured, a range of 
variables are proposed (set out in Table 9.3), to measure the adaptive capacity of 
hospitals relating to finance, targets, staff workload and patient safety. It is argued that 
the measures provide a means to assess the resilience of a hospital and the balance made 
by decision makers between production pressures and the need to protect patients and 
staff. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the thesis  
This thesis is presented in ten chapters. The layout of the thesis is illustrated in Figure 
1.2. A short summary of the content of each chapter is set out below. 
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Figure 1.2: Overview of research process 
 
 
 
 
Literature 
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understanding 
Extend and 
contextualise 
conceptual model 
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through empirical 
case studies 
Discussion & 
conclusions drawn 
about the model 
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influence patient safety 
Research design and 
methods to explore 
RQ & collect data 
on model constructs 
Research 
objectives & 
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Identify systemic 
concepts and model 
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Implication, limitations 
and future research 
Chapters 2 and 3 
Chapter 4 
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Chapter 9 
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1.6.1 Chapter 2 – Patient Safety and Systems Thinking 
This chapter explores the current literature relating to patient safety. Concepts in patient 
safety are informed from a number of disciplines and perspectives. It is argued that 
healthcare operates within a complex socio-technical system. The influence of 
‘organisational’ and or ‘system’ factors on patient safety is widely acknowledged. 
Models and frameworks that take account of system factors are found in the literature. 
However, there is little engagement with systems theory to assist in explaining how the 
dynamic and interactive characteristics of healthcare systems influence patient safety. It 
is concluded that the extant literature does not have a clear understanding of the key 
characteristics of a ‘system’. Therefore, the second part of the chapter reviews the 
systems thinking literature. The review defines what a ‘system’ is and draws out from 
the literature certain features of complex socio-technical systems. Complexity theory 
provides some insights. However, it is argued that system dynamics (SD) concepts 
incorporate key constructs of healthcare systems. These include the flow of work, the 
linkage (coupling) and feedback between the parts, the role of decision makers and the 
resulting behaviour of the whole. 
1.6.2 Chapter 3 – Developing a system resilience approach 
Having recognised the lack of systems theory in the extant patient safety literature, this 
chapter reviews the wider accident theory literature. The underlying tension between 
production pressures and safety are noted along with the dominance of barrier and 
component failure approach to safety failure. Insights from High Reliability Theory and 
Normal Accident Theory are derived before considering the concept of resilience.  
 
System-wide and organisational perspectives of safety are explored in the resilience 
engineering literature. A system level SWE model (Rasmussen, 1997) is identified and 
developed to explore the influence of system characteristics on patient safety. The 
review of core themes and the subsequent synthesis of the literature inform the 
development of the SWE model to operationalise the research objective. The gaps in 
knowledge are summarised and the research objective is identified. 
1.6.3 Chapter 4 – Research philosophy, design and methodology 
This chapter sets out some of the philosophical assumptions of the thesis, the research 
design and the methods employed to investigate the research objective. The chapter has 
six sections. The basis for understanding what constitutes knowledge and reality is 
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explored in Section 4.2. The argument is made that taking an objective stance is not 
possible in complex socio-technical situations. Equally to take a subjective position 
leaves us with an entirely relative position. The dualistic subjective or objective 
approach to knowledge and reality is limited and therefore, the dialectic position of 
‘pragmatic critical realism’ (Johnson and Duberley, 2000) is followed.  
 
Section 4.3 looks briefly at the philosophical assumptions found in the literature 
examined in Chapter 2 and 3. Section 4.4 addresses the methodological options 
available. It is argued that case studies provide the best design to explore the concepts 
identified in the SWE model. The strengths and weaknesses of using case studies are set 
out. The selection criteria and details of the cases chosen are given. Section 4.5 sets out 
the data collection and analysis methods used and how they are employed. The ethical 
issues are identified the position and influence of the researcher in the research process 
is acknowledged. 
 
1.6.4 Chapter 5 – Developing the Conceptual Model 
This chapter presents the development and contextualisation of the SWE model. The 
weaknesses of the model identified in Chapter 3 are addressed by synthesising concepts 
from SD and social theory. The model is then contextualised for use in research within 
the NHS. 
 
The contextualisation is achieved through a hermeneutical and content analysis of NHS 
policy documents and the examination of the literature about performance measurement 
and targets. The results show the importance of performance targets for NHS hospitals, 
which necessitates the inclusion of an additional ‘target failure’ boundary construct 
within the model. In addition to the ‘boundary’ construct, four other constructs are 
identified. The additional insights into the system constructs derived from the SD 
literature are illustrated. The chapter concludes by arguing that the SWE constructs and 
the concepts from the safety literature create a theoretical version three of the SWE 
model, which can be used to explore the systemic characteristics of NHS hospitals and 
how they influence patient safety. The SWE (v3) constructs are identified as the 
envelope ‘boundaries’, ‘gradients’, ‘operating point’, ‘structure’ and ‘feedback’. 
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1.6.5  Chapter 6 – Investigating the Boundaries of the Safe Working Envelope 
This chapter explores the ‘boundary’ construct of the SWE (v3) model developed in 
Chapter 5. The boundary construct depicts the constraints within which the system is 
designed to operate. Each conceptual failure boundary is considered in terms of how 
staff themselves describe or explain the competing constraints that they work with. The 
data from the interviews and observations (CS 1 and 2) and Inquiry Reports (CS 3) is 
supplemented with analysis of documentation, such as reports and policy papers from 
the Department of Health. The hospitals are studied during times of high demand for 
their inpatient services where staff manage complex interactions to keep the hospital 
functioning. Such situations provide insights into how the prioritisation of competing 
interactions is managed. While the boundaries are not an observable phenomenon in 
themselves, observable data relating to the articulation, measurement, and prioritised 
actions of staff relative to each boundary theme is studied.  
1.6.6 Chapter 7 – Investigating the Gradient and Operating Point 
This chapter explores the characteristics of the ‘gradient’ and the ‘operating point’ (OP) 
constructs of the SWE (v3) model. The OP depicts the operating conditions of the 
system in relation to the boundary constraints. There is a gradient related to each 
boundary. The gradients depict the pressure exerted on the OP from the internal and 
wider context to keep it away from the related boundary. The exploration of the 
characteristics is conducted through the analysis of three events from case study CS 1 
and 2. The first event from CS 1 is an outbreak of a sickness virus in the hospital which 
closed a number of wards for just over a week. Conceptually this event depicts a sudden 
perturbation when the OP breaches the patient safety boundary, which generated actions 
and interrelationships between the competing gradients. The second event, from CS 1, is 
a peak in emergency demand that lasted more then two weeks, which created significant 
operational problems. This event illustrates ‘continuous stress’ on the hospital, the shift 
of the marginal zone boundary and the movement of the OP towards the patient safety 
failure boundary. The third event, from CS 2, is the flow of emergency patients through 
the Emergency Department (ED) and Medical Assessment Unit (MAU). The event 
provides an insight into how the dynamics of the gradients and OP movement, at a 
hospital system level, impact at the micro patient experience.  
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1.6.7 Chapter 8 – Investigating the Structure and Feedback 
This chapter explores the ‘structure’ and ‘feedback’ constructs of the SWE (v3) model. 
These two constructs are used to gain insights into the characteristics of the dynamics 
that occur in the SWE, which influence the OP. SD is used to investigate the ‘structure’ 
and ‘feedback’ loops that occur in the case study hospital systems.  
 
A Stock Flow Diagram (SFD) is used in section 8.2 to illustrate the planned design of 
the patient flow in and out of CS 1 and 2 hospitals. The planned design is then amended 
in Section 8.3 to reflect the reality of the situation when the hospitals face either a 
perturbation, or the continuous stress of high levels of demand for inpatient beds. Two 
changes in the design are shown. Causal Loop Diagrams (CLDs) are used to show the 
feedback loops that result from the increased coupling between the parts of the system 
when the stocks become full and the flows change. From the analysis of the data 
presented in the diagrams the importance of bottleneck resources to accommodate the 
net difference in the flow rates of patients in and out of hospital is identified.  
 
1.6.8 Chapter 9 - Discussion 
This chapter summarises and discusses the results, assessing them in relation to the 
literature and draws out the contribution to knowledge. Insights into the characteristics 
of the case study hospitals are developed using the constructs of the SWE model and 
concepts from accident theory. The proposal is made that there are three construct sets, 
which interact to create five archetype system behaviours. The behaviours interact with 
the resilient capacity of the hospitals to influence the safety for patients. 
 
The development of the current patient safety literature that uses the Ramussen (1997) 
SWE model is set out. Propositions are made about the key points of intervention to 
improve the resilience of the case study hospitals and potential measures of adaptive 
capacity are identified. The contribution to knowledge is summarised. 
 
1.6.9 Chapter 10 - Conclusions, Implications and Limitations 
This chapter summarises the conclusions about how the characteristics of the NHS 
hospitals examined influence patient safety. Conclusions about the development of the 
SWE (3) are also made. The implications of the conclusions for theory, policy and 
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practice are presented. The limitations of the research are noted and proposals for future 
research are suggested. 
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Chapter 2 – Patient Safety and Systems Thinking 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the current literature relating to patient safety and 
systems thinking. A feature of patient safety literature is that, unlike tightly defined 
academic disciplines with an accepted core literature, concepts are informed from a 
number of disciplines and perspectives. Section 2.2 identifies the concepts and 
perspectives and determines pertinent themes for further exploration. Specifically, 
system-wide and organisational perspectives of patient safety are explored in Section 
2.3. The literature emphasises the influence of the ‘system’ on patient safety. However, 
the characteristics of systems that impact on safety, such as the dynamic interaction of 
the parts, are not well explored. It is therefore argued that the system frameworks found 
in the extant patient safety literature lack explanatory power. Patients are treated in 
often large and complex organisations which display features of complex socio-
technical systems. Those features need to be included in any explanation of how the 
‘system’ influences patient safety. 
 
To develop the explanation a review of the systems thinking literature is presented in 
Section 2.4. This defines what a ‘system’ is and draws out from the literature certain 
features of complex socio-technical systems. Complexity theory provides some insights. 
However, it is argued that SD concepts incorporate key characteristics of healthcare 
systems. These include the flow of work, the linkage (coupling) and feedback between 
the parts, the role of decision makers and the resulting behaviour of the whole. 
Connections between systems thinking and the wider safety literature are then explored 
in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2 Patient Safety – the influence of the ‘system’ 
The publication of seminal reports highlighted the scale of the unintentional harm and 
death occurring within healthcare organisations in the USA (Kohn et al., 2000, Brennan 
et al., 1991, Leape, 1994). The findings presented in these reports initiated a number of 
similar studies in other countries, confirming that it is an international problem (Wilson 
et al., 1995, Baker et al., 2004, Davis et al., 2001). Within the UK, the Department of 
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Health issued reports drawing on the international evidence in an effort to galvanise 
improvement in patient safety within the NHS, (Department of Health, 2000b, 
Department of Health, 2001).  
 
Patient safety is not only wide ranging in terms of international relevance, but it is also 
broad conceptually.  For example, in a paper developing ‘A Taxonomy of Error in 
Health Policy’ Joyce et al (2005), refer to the phenomenon of ‘medical error’,  but also 
mention a wider range of phenomena such as ‘adverse events’ ‘safety in the healthcare 
system’ and ‘patient safety’. It is possible that ‘patient safety’ is an umbrella term under 
which sits a number of approaches. The Report ‘To Err Is Human: Building a Safer 
Health System’ (Kohn et al, 2000) sets out definitions of ‘accident’ and ‘error’ and then 
states that ‘safety is defined as freedom from accidental injury.’ (p.58) It continues by 
making the point that: ‘Ensuring patient safety, therefore, involves the establishment of 
operational systems and processes that increase the reliability of patient care.’ This 
quote raises the question about the meaning of the word ‘reliability’ in this context, 
which opens a debate beyond the scope of this research.  The Report also acknowledges 
that safety is only one aspect of quality in healthcare. 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, Vincent (2010) defines patient safety as being: “The avoidance, 
prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from the process 
of healthcare.”  This definition is used in this research as it relates directly to the 
‘process of healthcare’ and includes the broader aspects of prevention, avoidance and 
amelioration rather than just ‘freedom from accidental injury’ (Kohn et al , 2000). 
However, there is often a debate in the literature as to what constitutes adverse events 
(Brennan et al., 1991, Chang et al., 2005, de Vries et al., 2008, Leape, 2002, Vincent et 
al., 2001, West, 2000). A question can therefore be asked where is the line drawn 
between an avoidable adverse outcome and the outcome generated by the risks 
associated with treatment? It is therefore acknowledged that the definition used from 
Vincent (2010) may change in the future as the literature develops.  
 
The breadth of factors in patient safety is reflected in the literature and the academic 
disciplines that inform both theory and practice. Examples of practice range from, but 
are not limited to, the design of packaging and equipment, the management and 
prevention of healthcare acquired infection, and the reduction of drug errors, through to 
understanding organisational safety culture. The major academic disciplines that 
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contribute to the literature are: medicine; applied psychology; engineering; management 
and sociology. Examples of the main themes found in the literature are provided in 
Table 2.1. Each theme has been categorised using a taxonomy of approaches to medical 
error proposed by Joyce et al (2005). It is suggested that such a taxonomy is ‘emergent’ 
but can provide an insight into the ‘rationales/ideologies that underlie the various 
approaches found in the literature. 
 
Theme Examples of the literature Categorisation 
after (Joyce et al., 
2005) 
 
Ergonomics: design of 
equipment and training of 
staff from a human factors 
perspective 
 
(Carayon et al., 2007, Carayon et 
al., 2006, Friesdorf et al., 2007, 
Tonks, 2008, Lowe, 2006, Flin et 
al., 2008, Flin and Patey, 2009) 
Organisational 
Rationalists 
Organisational : leadership 
of teams and organisations 
 
(McFadden et al., 2009, Mohr et 
al., 2002, Weingart and Page, 2004, 
Nembhard and Edmondson, 2006) 
 
Organisational 
Rationalists 
Safety: culture, reporting 
and learning 
 
(Carroll and Quijada, 2004, 
Ginsburg et al., 2006, Stock et al., 
2007, Waring et al., 2007, Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2003, Ursprung et al., 
2005, Waring, 2005, Vincent, 
2004); 
Organisational 
Rationalists 
Micro: clinical team view (Mohr et al., 2004, Brodbeck, 
2002) 
Professional culture 
promoters 
High risk procedures or 
event such as medicines 
management, surgery and 
anaesthesia, patient falls 
(Gauthereau, 2004, Shah and 
Roberson, 2008, Vincent et al., 
2004, Cameron and Kurrle, 2007, 
Healey et al., 2008, Oliver et al., 
2008, Reason, 2005); 
 
Organisational 
Rationalists and 
Professional culture 
promoters 
Mortality and Adverse 
events studies 
 
(Brennan et al., 1991, Chang et al., 
2005, de Vries et al., 2008, Leape, 
2002, Vincent et al., 2001, West, 
2000 
 
Empiricists 
Organisational and capacity 
issues 
Gaba, 2000, Proudlove et al., 2003, 
Sprivulis et al., 2006, Trzeciak and 
Rivers, 2003, Richardson, 2006, 
Weissman, 2007, Hoff et al., 2004) 
 
Organisational 
Rationalists 
 
Table 2.1 : Overview of main themes in the patient safety literature 
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A recent review of patient safety research by the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
identified fifty topics relating to patient safety (Bates et al., 2009). A Delphi process of 
prioritisation reduced these topics to twenty three major topics which were then 
categorised further into ‘structure’(8), ‘process’ (5) and ‘outcome’ (10), although no 
clear definitions are given for these categories (Jha et al., 2010). It is also recognised 
that patient safety is often multi-factorial and therefore difficult to understand.  
 
It is identified that developed countries have different priorities from those of 
developing and transitional countries and that this is reflected in the emergent research 
areas. The context for this thesis is within developed countries. In this context, the ‘lack 
of communication and co-ordination’ followed by ‘latent organisational failures’ (Bates 
et al, 2009) are identified as the most important issues to be addressed. Jha et al (2010) 
explore in more detail the sub-categories of ‘structure’, ‘process’ and ‘outcome’. The 
‘structural’ factors include the ‘breakdown of complex systems’ where problems occur 
at various levels of the system and may involve failures that are not immediately 
apparent. These can be described as ‘latent’ or ‘hidden’ failures.  For example, the 
shortage of staff, long hours of work leading to fatigue, production pressures, poor 
communication and the poor design of work processes or equipment can all lead to 
patient safety issues.  
 
From the wide ranging literature it is noted that there is much more to patient safety 
than just what happens at the interface between patient and clinician (Degos et al., 2009, 
Walshe and Boaden, 2006, Vincent, 2010, Woods et al., 2010). As Walshe and Boaden 
(2006) point out, a common theme in the patient safety literature is the ‘system or the 
organisation’ contribution to creating error or harm for patients. The common theme 
within the patient safety literature, that there is a ‘system’, or ‘organisational’, as well as 
a ‘human’, or ‘individual’ aspect to safety, is also found in the accident theory literature 
(Reason, 1990, Reason, 1997, Vincent et al., 1998, Morath and Turnbull, 2005, Leape, 
1994, Woods et al., 2010). 
 
It is noted that much of the current literature uses the terms ‘system’ or ‘organisation’ 
interchangeably to convey a variety of concepts with little, if any, underlying theoretical 
discussion (Table 2.2). This inconsistent use of the terms, combined with the lack of 
theoretical discussion, means that attributing patient safety failures to system or 
organisational characteristics has limited explanatory power.  
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Literature ‘System’ terms used Concepts depicted 
Reason (1990, 1997) System or 
organisational factors 
‘complex organisations such as 
nuclear power or air traffic control; 
control systems; human-system 
relationship; safety system; complex 
systems 
(Walshe and Boaden, 
2006) 
System or organisation Culture; process design; 
management systems 
(Vincent et al., 2004) Systems approaches Organisational aspects such as 
communication, equipment, 
teamwork, work environment. 
(Vincent, 2006) System model Human actions have to be 
understood in ‘relation to context’ 
(Vincent, 2010) System Clinical teams as ‘micro systems’; 
hospitals as ‘complex adaptive 
systems’. 
(Friesdorf et al., 2007) System ergonomics Clinical pathways (macro); standard 
operating procedures (micro) 
(Mohr et al., 2004) System ‘microsystem unit’; ‘opaque 
systems’ 
(Lowe, 2006) Systems Interacting elements (six only) 
(Carthey et al., 2001) System; organisation; 
institution 
A healthcare organisation 
 
Table 2.2: Variety of ‘system’ concepts found in the literature 
 
It is concluded that the terms system and organisation are widely used in the patient 
safety literature. However, there appears to be a range of understanding as to what a 
system in particular means. The term system is often used interchangeably with 
organisation. There is little theoretical exploration of what constitutes a system or how 
key concepts from systems thinking might influence the debate about patient safety in 
healthcare. For example, an important concept about the characteristic of a system is the 
interaction between the parts and the relationship with the wider environment (Forrester, 
1969). Much of the literature does not explore the implication of the dynamic 
interactions within the system for the safety of patients. There are, however, some 
models which take an organisational perspective in understanding patient safety, which 
are considered next. 
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2.3 System models in the patient safety literature 
There are a variety of frameworks in the literature that seek to take account of the 
organisational factors influencing patient safety. Four in particular are reviewed. These 
models demonstrate an increasing breadth in setting the boundary around what is meant 
by ‘system’ or ‘organisation’. The consequence is that more and more ‘organisational 
factors’ are included in the frameworks. 
 
Reason (1990) developed the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model that uses the slices of cheese to 
convey the idea of a series of barriers which are designed to prevent accidents (Reason, 
1997). Like Swiss cheese, the slices have holes in them. When the holes in each slice 
line up with each other, it represents a series of failures that occur in the defensive 
barriers, allowing an accident to occur. This model has been widely adopted in the 
safety literature and applied in healthcare (Reason, 2000, Reason, 2004, Mooney, 2010, 
Morath and Turnbull, 2005, Wachter, 2008). For example, Wachter (2008) describes the 
‘Swiss Cheese’ model as the widely accepted mental model for ‘system safety’. 
 
The complexity of the healthcare ‘system’ is recognised by Reason (Reason, 2004). 
However, the theory about the dynamic non-linear nature of hazards and defences is not 
explored at a conceptual ‘systems thinking’ level by Reason (1990, 1997, 2000, 2004, 
2005, 2008) or by those who draw on his work (Wachter, 2008, Morath and Turnbull, 
2005, Mooney, 2010). Instead the Swiss Cheese model appears to rely on the ‘direction 
of causality’, or linear model of accident occurrence (Dekker, 2011, Hollnagel, 2004)). 
The Swiss Cheese model also focuses on the function of the parts rather than the 
dynamic function of the whole (Hollnagel, 2006). Critical examination of the 
weaknesses of the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model recognise that it cannot apply, or be 
understood, in all situations due to the dynamic nature of accident causation (Reason et 
al., 2006, Perneger, 2005, Roelen et al., 2010, Hollnagel, 2006, Dekker, 2011). 
 
Vincent et al (1998) make a link between difficult working conditions and the 
likelihood of making an error in clinical practice. They set out a framework with seven 
types of ‘factors’ that impact on patient treatment. These are the institutional context, 
organisation and management, work environment, team and individual, task factors and 
patient characteristics. These ‘factors’ have many sub-factors but the idea of dynamic 
interactions between all these ‘factors’ is not explored.  
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Donabedian (1966) proposed a simple framework of quality assurance in healthcare. It 
comprises the categories of ‘structure’, ‘process’ and ‘outcome’ (Donabedian, 1966, 
Donabedian, 2003). He uses the term ‘system design’ to mean ‘structure’. Structure 
appears to include among many others, the recruitment of staff, the number of hospitals, 
drug testing, finance and legal protection of participants (Donabedian, 2003). The terms 
‘process’ and ‘outcome’ are equally wide ranging and inclusive, but the potential 
interactions between the categories are not explored.  
 
In the Donabedian and Vincent frameworks, which seek to take an ‘organisational’ view 
of safety in healthcare, the dynamic interactions between the wide range of ‘factors’ or 
‘categories’ that they identify are not explored. Therefore, the safety implications of 
those dynamics are not included, which weakens the explanatory power of both 
frameworks. 
 
Carayon et al (2006) proposes a ‘systems engineering’ approach to develop a patient 
safety framework. He argues that such an approach explains how the ‘design of the 
work system can impact on, not only the safety of patients but also employee and 
organizational outcomes.’ (Carayon et al., 2006). He defines the ‘work system’ as 
comprising five components: person; tasks; tools and technologies; physical 
environment; and organizational conditions which interact and influence each other. 
Whilst the interactions are recognised and the consequent influences between the 
components noted, how the interactions influence safety is not fully explored.  
 
Walshe and Boaden (2006) argue that models and frameworks that relate to the 
organisational aspects of patient safety may not always take account of the ‘structures 
and culture’ that are specific to healthcare. They argue that healthcare institutions are 
unique because of their dominance by the medical profession, the lack of defined 
processes of treatment, and the close relationship between harm generated by the 
disease and harm caused by the process of treatment. The argument is made that simply 
transferring system or organisational models from outside healthcare may not work. 
This argument is reasonable, but they do not go on and explore the implications for 
patient safety created by the dynamics of healthcare organisations arising from the 
unique features they identified. 
 
This review of the literature illustrates that: 
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• the influence of the ‘system’ or ‘organisation’ on patient safety is widely 
acknowledged; 
• the terms ‘system’ and ‘organisation’ are used inconsistently and 
interchangeable in relation to patient safety; 
• the patient safety frameworks that take a ‘system’ perspective have an 
increasingly wide scope of ‘factors’ to be taken into account, which assumes a 
linear and reductionist approach of component failure to explain accidents; 
• the exploration of the dynamic interrelationship of the parts of a ‘system’ or 
‘organisation’ has not been adequately explored as an influence on patient 
safety. 
 
Much of the patient safety research takes a reductionist perspective and concentrates on 
parts of the patient care pathway where many of the systemic issues and interactions are 
disregarded or marginalised. This can lead to solutions being found for sub-systems, 
without regard for the interaction with other parts of the wider system. This means that 
solutions can often be sub-optimal and can produce unintended outcomes. 
 
A key point is that the explanatory power of the assertion of system or organisational 
influence on patient safety is limited. It is limited because it does not fully explore, at a 
theoretical level, the dynamic interrelationships that occur between the many parts of 
any complex system and how they can influence safety. The models and frameworks in 
the patient safety literature do not fully explore the deeper conceptual issues that arise in 
complex socio-technical systems (Gilbert et al., 2007, Dekker, 2011). There is strong 
evidence to suggest that healthcare operates within a dynamic complex socio-technical 
system (Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001, Plsek and Wilson, 2001, Braithwaite et al., 2009, 
Sweeney and Griffiths, 2002). 
 
Given the significance of the characteristics of systems, such as dynamic interactions, 
on the safety of patients, it can be argued that the literature needs a stronger conceptual 
basis about ‘systems’ to inform future research and practice. It may be argued that the 
literature on systems thinking better informs the development of patient safety theory.. 
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2.4 Systems Thinking 
This section draws out the underlying principles of systems thinking, which is that the 
interactions between the parts of a system contribute to the dynamic of the whole 
(Forrester, 1961). Whilst there is a wide ranging literature on system thinking, it is 
argued that SD provides the necessary insights to extend the explanatory power of how 
the ‘system’ influences patient safety. Complexity theory is considered briefly to 
provide a background to the idea of complex adaptive systems and emergence. SD 
provides a means to consider the interactions within the system of the ‘elements and 
functions’ (Hollnagel, 2006) by considering what constitutes the ‘structure’ of the 
system. The use of ‘causal loop diagrams’ (CLDs) and ‘stock flow diagrams’ (SFDs) 
are explored as a means to incorporate the constructs of ‘coupling’ and ‘feedback’ that 
are characteristic of systems. Within SD the interaction of the decision makers is taken 
into account through the concept of ‘bounded rationality’. That concept seeks to explain 
the cognitive limitations of humans in the face of complex situations.  
2.4.1  What is a system? 
The underlying assumption within general systems theory is that the whole is greater 
than the sum of the parts. The nature of the whole cannot be understood from just 
studying the parts and that the parts are dynamically interacting (Checkland, 1981, 
Skyttner, 2005, Forrester, 1961). As noted earlier, when considering safety from a 
systems perspective it is necessary to look beyond the failure of single components and 
regard safety as an emergent property of complex systems (Hollnagel et al., 2006). 
 
There are many definitions of systems. Checkland (1981) suggests that a system:  
‘…embodies the idea of a set of elements connected together which form a 
whole, this showing the properties which are properties of the whole, rather than 
properties of its component parts’ (p.3).  
 
Meadows (2008) defines a ‘system’ as ‘an interconnected set of elements that is 
coherently organized in a way that achieves something’ (p.11). She argues that a 
‘system’ must contain three types of things: ‘elements, interconnections and a function 
or purpose’ (p.11 original emphasis).  
 
The common theme in defining ‘systems’ is the idea that it is the interaction of the parts 
which creates the whole (Forrester, 1961). What is of interest from a patient safety 
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perspective is to gain an insight into the non-linear and dynamic nature of the 
interactions that create the whole. Complex socio-technical systems have multiple 
interactions leading to different levels of linking and feedback between the parts 
(Sterman, 1994, Braithwaite et al., 2009, Carayon, 2006, Reiman and Oedewald, 2007, 
Lane, 2001a). Another key feature of systems found in healthcare is that they are 
opened to their environment. Therefore, part of the contribution to the behaviour of the 
whole is the interaction with the context within which a system operates (Cummings et 
al., 2001).  
 
Another way of describing systems is as ‘complex adaptive systems’ (Holling, 2001). 
The basis of much of the complexity science is that of an individual agent. Complexity 
theory studies the behaviour at the micro or individual level as a way to explain the 
working of the wider system. It is the interaction of the agents that create the emergence 
and the coherence that might be described as a system. Often a set of simple rules 
generate the behaviour. For example, flocking birds keep a certain distance from other 
birds and fly in the same direction (Lewin and Regine, 1999). It is argued that 
underlying any complex system there are a few simple controlling rules or processes 
(Holling, 2001).  
 
Chaos and complexity theory provide a number of helpful metaphors that can apply to 
organisations and systems (Lewin and Regine, 1999). Using the metaphors provides a 
means to recognise systems less as mechanistic constructs and more like living entities 
where relationships, attractors and fuzzy boundaries are at the core of understanding the 
dynamics (Lewin and Regine, 1999, Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001). Complexity science 
has been applied to a variety of healthcare settings in an effort to gain an understanding 
of the adaptive nature of people and organisations (Sweeney, 2006, Plsek and 
Greenhalgh, 2001, Plsek and Wilson, 2001, Sweeney and Griffiths, 2002, Kernick, 
2004, Sweeney and Williams, 2010). The insights from complexity theory about the 
nature of systems being more like living entities rather than mechanical, is regarded as 
helpful in understanding adaptive and emergent behaviour. 
 
Complex systems have emergent properties (Hollnagel, 2004). This means that the 
relationship between the parts in a system create properties, which are more than just 
the sum of the parts (Dekker, 2011). Therefore, to understand safety by taking a linear 
or reductionist approach is limited to providing a component based answer as to why 
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things go wrong. A systems thinking approach to complex systems considers the 
interaction of the parts and their emergent properties in providing an explanation of the 
behaviour of the whole system. As Dekker (2011), argues, a systems approach to 
complex systems is to ‘go up and out, not down and in’. 
 
There are some key characteristics of complex systems which differentiate them from 
complicated ones (Dekker, 2011, Cilliers, 1998). These are summarised as being: 
 
• Complex systems have a large number of parts which interact physically or 
through the passing of information. 
• The interactions are non-linear and produce direct or indirect feedback onto the 
interaction activity. Such feedback can introduce a multiplier effect. 
• Complex systems are open in that they interact with and influence their 
environment. Establishing the boundary of any complex system is therefore a 
matter of judgement. 
• Within complex systems each part is unaware of the behaviour of the system as 
a whole and the full consequences of its actions. Parts respond to locally 
available information. Complexity arises from the patterns of interaction 
between the many parts. 
• Complex systems are a product of their history. The dimension of time is 
important in providing a deeper understanding of the diachronic processes at 
work.  
• Complex systems operate under conditions where there is a constant flow of 
energy. Systems that experience equilibrium do not survive. 
 
A system thinking approach can therefore provide a means to develop the understanding 
about the dynamic processes within complex socio-technical systems, which potentially 
impact on patient safety. Complexity theory does provide some helpful metaphors, but 
is limited in explaining the detail of the interactions. To help us consider the interactions 
of a complex socio-technical system, the contribution from the SD literature is 
considered in the next section. 
2.4.2 System Dynamics 
SD starts with the assumption that systems are complex with multiple interactions. 
Rather than regarding complexity as being unknowable, SD claims to be able to model 
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the complexity to a greater extent than other system approaches (Rodriguez-Ulloa and 
Paucar-Caceres, 2005). Jackson (2003) places SD in the functionalist category in his 
assessment of system thinking methods. However, there are others who argue that SD 
has built bridges towards a more interpretive and pluralist paradigm (Lane, 2001b, 
Rodriguez-Ulloa and Paucar-Caceres, 2005, Lane, 2000a, Senge, 1990, Lane, 2001a). 
SD is therefore linked to social theory that takes a dialectical approach to agency and 
structure. That means the decision making agents are not passive in the presence of the 
structures they work within. Rather, there is a dynamic interrelationship between the 
agent and the structure. The agent is influenced by the structure and, in turn, the agent 
influences the structure (Lane, 1999). It is important to note that SD focuses on the 
aggregate pattern of behaviour rather than the individual actions of agents. SD treats 
‘causes as pressures which produce aggregate patterns of behaviour’(Lane, 2000a). 
 
SD takes the view that the ‘structure’ is a key factor on the overall behaviour of the 
system (Jackson, 2003). There are many variables in the ‘structure’ that interact. The 
interactions within the system itself contribute to the dynamics, which are either 
sustaining or destructive, through either positive or negative feedback (Forrester, 1958, 
Forrester, 1961, Forrester, 1969). These ideas have been developed and are used in 
modelling a wide range of complex systems (Sterman, 2000, Sterman, 2001, Morecroft, 
2007, Meadows, 2008, Senge, 1993). The underlying theory is that non-linear dynamics 
and feedback control can be applied to the behaviour of physical, technical and human 
systems (Sterman, 2000). Sterman (2000) argues that the behaviour of the system is 
derived from the interaction of the structure of a system with the human decision 
making process: 
 
‘The behaviour of a system arises from its structure. That structure consists of 
the feedback loops, stocks and flows, and nonlinearities created by the 
interaction of the physical and institutional structure of the system with the 
decision-making processes of the agents acting within it.’ (Sterman, 2000, 
p.107) 
 
Meadows (2008) describes the ‘structure’ of a system to consist of ‘the interlocking 
stocks, flows and feedback loops’ (p.89). It is the structure that determines the hidden 
behaviours in the system. For Meadows (2008) the behaviours appear over time and can 
be analysed using time graphs. Meadows (2008) suggests that when taking a systems 
thinking approach, it is trying to understand the relationship between an ‘event’, the 
resulting ‘behaviour’ (e.g. oscillation) and the ‘structure’ of the system. 
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Sterman (2000) argues that it is the ‘stocks’ that depict the character of the system and 
provide the information on which many of the decisions are taken. Stocks collect the 
effects of past events and decisions. ‘Stocks’ are the accumulations in the system; 
usually derived from the difference between the ‘flow’ into the process and ‘flow’ out. 
Differences in flow rates can create backlogs or scarcity in a system. For example, the 
‘stock’ of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is a result of previous production of those 
gases (inflow). They can only be reduced by the rate of outflow being greater than the 
rate of inflow.  
 
A key feature of ‘stocks’ is that they can ‘decouple rates of flow and create 
disequilibrium dynamics’ (Sterman, 2000, p.196). In effect the stocks act as a buffer to 
the differences in flow rates. Each rate of flow may be governed by different decision 
making processes. The state of the stock acting as a buffer is part of the feedback loop 
mechanism (Sterman, 2000). In applying this method to hospitals the ‘flow’ relates to 
patients being admitted treated and discharged, and the ‘stocks’ are the wards or 
departments.  
 
SD studies have two ways to illustrate and model system behaviour. These are SFDs 
and CLDs (Lane, 2008). SFDs can be used to illustrate the flow of work through a 
system. The notion of a system boundary is important when modelling a system using 
feedback loops, stocks and flows. When building a model, the decision of where to set 
the boundary is a judgement depending on the purpose of the analysis (Midgley, 2000, 
Meadows, 2008). When depicting a model using an SFD or CLD there are a number of 
conventions that have evolved (Lane, 2008) which are presented in Appendix 2.1.  
 
Senge (1990) and Meadows (2008) set out a series of system archetypes which suggest 
common dynamics that occur in systems. The identified archetypes provide potential 
levers for changing the dynamics. Sterman (2000) similarly sets out ‘modes of dynamic 
behaviour’ ranging from ‘exponential growth’, ‘oscillation’ to ‘overshoot and collapse’. 
Oscillation occurs when the performance of the system fluctuates considerably. Sterman 
(2000) points to the idea of ‘local stability’ where perturbation on a system will cause it 
to oscillate and then return to the same point of equilibrium. However, when there is 
‘local instability’ small disturbances can move the system further away from the 
original point of equilibrium. Sterman (2000) illustrates his point suggesting that a ball 
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balanced on top of a hill is in local unstable equilibrium. A slight breeze pushes the ball 
off the top of the hill where positive feedback occurs and the ball accelerates down the 
hill until eventually coming to rest at the bottom in a new state of equilibrium. There are 
therefore different states of equilibrium to be considered.  
 
CLDs can depict the influences and the linkage, known as ‘coupling’, between the parts 
of a system. CLDs also show whether the system is in balance or whether there is a 
reinforcing loop dominating, which causes the system to lose equilibrium. CLDs can 
therefore depict the changes in the ‘coupling’ of the parts and the overall impact this has 
on the whole system 
 
Concluding this review of SD the following points are noted: 
• the origins of SD are in the hard and determinist paradigm. However, bridges 
have been built towards combining human agent and structural concepts that 
allows SD to contribute to interpretive social theory (Lane, 2000a); 
• the working definition of a system is that it ‘…embodies the idea of a set of 
elements connected together which form a whole, this showing the properties 
which are properties of the whole, rather than properties of its component parts’ 
(Checkland, 1981)  
• Meadows (2008) argues that a system thinking approach seeks to understand the 
relationship between an ‘event’, the resulting ‘behaviour’ (e.g. oscillation) and 
the ‘structure’ of the system; 
• the ‘structure’ of a system ‘…consists of the feedback loops, stocks and flows, 
and nonlinearities created by the interaction of the physical and institutional 
structure of the system with the decision-making processes of the agents acting 
within it.’ (Sterman, 2000) This definition brings together the structural and 
human agent aspect of complex systems; 
• two diagrammatic methods are used to model the dynamics of systems; SFDs 
and CLDs;  
• a number of system archetypes have been identified in the literature, which 
suggests points of intervention to change the behaviour; 
• there can be different points of dynamic equilibrium in a system; 
• SD has limitations based on the ability of the user to understand the problem 
situation, conceptualise and build the model and interpret the results. 
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It is argued that concepts derived from system thinking literature, and SD in particular, 
can assist in developing the understanding about how the ‘system’ influences patient 
safety. A key feature of healthcare is the human agents. Sterman (2000) argues that it is 
possible to include decision makers in SD modelling. Therefore, the final area to 
consider is the concepts used by SD to depict the decision making agents and process 
within a system.  
2.4.3 Decision Making 
As noted in SD, the ‘structure’ of the system is defined as being the stocks, flows and 
feedback interacting with the decision making agents. SD seeks to take account of the 
interaction with decision makers in the modelling through the concept of ‘bounded 
rationality’ (Sterman, 2000).  
 
The nature of human cognitive capacity is that it is soon overwhelmed by complex 
problems and is unable to make objectively rational decisions (Simon, 1957). The 
limited ability to process all the information arising, particularly in dynamic complex 
situations, is known as the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1982, Morecroft, 
1983, Sterman, 1989, Meadows, 2008). This means that there are clear limits to the 
rational capabilities of decision makers. 
 
Decision makers adopt a number of techniques to manage the cognitive workload in 
dynamic complex situations (Sterman, 2000). These include habit and routines where 
there is little cognitive effort or simplified rules for making decisions, such as check 
lists (Loukopoulos et al., 2009, Gawande, 2010). Another technique is setting specific 
goals or targets which then focus the attention of decision makers towards certain 
information with the consequence of potentially ignoring other issues (Crilly and Le 
Grand, 2004, Barber, 2008). A similar method is to sub-divide the problem into 
manageable parts. The parts are passed down the line, within clear parameters, with the 
idea that the cumulative effort of many decision makers will solve the problem. 
Decisions are often made on the assumption that there are no time delays, undesired 
consequences, feedbacks or non-linear interactions. This behaviour has been termed 
‘intended rationality’ (Sterman, 2000) and is characteristic of a reductionist approach to 
problem solving. 
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Meadows (2008) describes how people make rational decisions based on the 
information they have. Decision makers often have limited information. For example, 
those taking decisions in complex systems are not always aware of what other decisions 
are being made at the same time. Meadows (2008) suggests that:  
‘We misperceive risk, assuming that some things are more dangerous than they 
really are and others much less. We live in an exaggerated present – we pay too 
much attention to recent experience and too little attention to the past, focusing 
on current events rather then long-term behaviours.’ (p.107) 
 
 
Meadows (2008) argues that ‘bounded rationality’ is often caused by system archetype 
structures as people fail to see the wider SD which leads to unforeseen and unhelpful 
consequences.  Bounded rationality influences the world view, or mental model, that we 
hold which affects our approach and decision making (Kuhn, 1970, Senge, 1990, 
Argyris, 1999, Doyle and Ford, 1998). The literature provides a range of insights in this 
area. Snowden and Boone (2007) see the world as having three types of systems: 
ordered (simple and complicated), chaotic and complex. They developed this into what 
is known as the Cynefin Model. The agents in an ordered system are constrained by 
rules and procedures. Within a chaotic system agents are unconstrained and act 
independently of each other. In a complex system agents are lightly constrained, they 
interact with each other and modify the system (Snowden and Boone, 2007). 
 
The inclusion of decision making agents in SD is an important feature in seeking to 
understand the behaviour of systems. The concept of ‘bounded rationality’ depicts the 
limitations of human decision makers and their inability to comprehend all the 
information and feedback that occurs in complex situations. Humans have a number of 
techniques and predetermined world views that help them make sense of their 
environment.  These techniques and mind-sets can lead to decisions being taken without 
due regard to feedback, delay and unintended consequences that are common in 
complex socio-technical systems. Capturing the decision making process in an SD 
model is not easy. However, in modelling a system it may assist decision makers in 
seeing where and how their interventions influence the behaviour of the whole as well 
as the parts of the system. 
2.4.4 Summary of systems thinking contribution 
The underlying principles of systems thinking is that the interactions between the parts 
of a system contribute to the dynamic of the whole (Forrester, 1961). An SD approach 
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to understanding systems focuses on the dynamics that occur between the feedback 
loops, stock and flows interacting with the decision making processes.  
 
SD provides insights into the dynamics interactions within systems by taking account 
of: 
• the flow of work;  
• the accumulations of work (stocks);  
• the information and decision making that influences the stock and flows; 
• the feedback and coupling between the parts of the system; 
• the equilibrium of the feedback dynamics for the system. 
 
The features identified above are found in complex healthcare systems. The argument 
from the patient safety literature is that ‘system’ factors are regarded as a major 
contributor to failures. It is argued that the insights from SD about the key 
characteristics help to develop the explanatory power of how the ‘system’ influences 
patient safety. 
 
However, SD has only been used to study the operational management of hospitals 
(Lane et al., 2000, Lane and Husemann, 2008b). It has not been applied previously to 
consider the implications of the system behaviour for patient safety. Other approaches 
have considered the influence on safety of the systemic features of organisations, such 
as ‘feedback’ and ‘coupling’, which are reviewed in the next chapter. 
 
2.5 Summary  
The extant literature takes account of ‘system’ or ‘organisational’ factors that influence 
patient safety. However, the underlying theory to explain the influence of system factors 
is weak. Organisational and systems models used in the literature have been reviewed. 
Weaknesses in the explanatory power of those models are evident as there is little 
exploration of the dynamic interactions between the parts that creates the behaviour of 
the whole. Those interactions are characteristic of complex systems. It is argued that the 
weakness can be addressed by developing the conceptual framework about patient 
safety from the systems thinking literature. 
 
The definition of a system used is from Checkland (1981), who argues that a system:  
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‘…embodies the idea of a set of elements connected together which form a 
whole, this showing the properties which are properties of the whole, rather than 
properties of its component parts’ 
 
The nature of healthcare organisations is that they operate in complex socio-technical 
environments (Plsek and Wilson, 2001). Therefore, the characteristics of such 
environments and the implications for systems have to be included when considering 
patient safety. There are some key points derived from the review of the systems 
literature which have application when considering the safety of patients: 
 
• complex systems have a large number of parts which interact and are open to 
their environment. The interactions create feedback which influences the 
behaviour of the system as a whole;  
 
• social systems include human agents as decision makers who interact with other 
agents, the technical and work flow parts of the system and the environment. 
The interactions are dynamic; 
 
• the ‘structure’ of a system ‘…consists of the feedback loops, stocks and flows, 
and nonlinearities created by the interaction of the physical and institutional 
structure of the system with the decision-making processes of the agents acting 
within it.’ (Sterman, 2000, p.107) This definition brings together the structural 
and human agent aspect of complex systems; 
 
• insights can be gained from using systems thinking into the relationship between 
an event, the resultant system behaviour and the ‘structure’. 
 
The extant literature is limited in taking account of these key points when considering 
the system factors that influence patient safety. In the next chapter the wider safety, or 
accident theory, literature is reviewed to establish how concepts from systems thinking 
are incorporated and how they can help inform the patient safety literature. 
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Chapter 3 – Developing a system resilience approach 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The extant patient safety literature makes the clear point that the ‘system’ creates risk 
for patients. However, the system based models used lack explanatory power. The main 
reason for that weakness is the failure to synthesis concepts from the systems thinking 
literature. The wider safety literature does make some use of systemic concepts. This 
chapter reviews the accident theory literature before examining the concept of 
resilience. Whilst resilience has been developed for use in a number of academic 
disciplines, it is increasingly being considered to provide insights into safe practice in 
complex systems. The resilience engineering literature has developed this approach and 
in particular the model of a SWE. The model is conceived as a means to depict a system 
operating within the constraints of the envelope boundaries whilst subject to competing 
pressures. A synthesis of concepts from accident theory with the SWE model is 
suggested. There are some weaknesses with the model in being able to capture all of the 
key characteristics of systems identified in Chapter 2. However, it is argued that using 
such a model will assist in expanding the explanatory power of how the ‘system’ 
influences patient safety. 
 
3.2 Concepts from Accident Theory 
There are a number of key concepts from accident theory that can contribute to 
informing a systems level understanding of patient safety. The literature is wide 
ranging, with a variety of academic disciplines contributing. The field is more mature 
than patient safety and has often developed theory from the detailed study of major 
accidents or disasters (Dekker, 2011). This review is not exhaustive, but seeks to 
identify those concepts which help to inform a systems based theoretical framework to 
improve the understanding of how the ‘system’ influences patient safety. 
 
Reason argues that there are three aspects to accidents: ‘universals’, ‘conditions’, and 
‘causes’. ‘Universals’ describe the tension between production and safety that is 
frequently found in organisations. Within the literature on error in organisations there is 
a wide recognition of the often conflicting priorities of production and safety (Flin et al., 
2008, Reason, 1997, Dekker, 2005).  Reason (1997) argues that, on the one hand, to 
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focus on safety at the expense of production is the route to bankruptcy. On the other 
hand, to concentrate on production without adequate attention to safety will lead to 
catastrophe. The methods of production in an organisation are usually well understood, 
measured and managed. The safety functions, however, tend to be less well defined and 
measured (Reason, 1997). A consequence of this difference, argues Reason (1997), is a 
tendency to for managers to favour production goals over safety. 
 
Woods (2006) describes the production requirement as an ‘acute goal’ which has to be 
balanced with the ‘chronic goal’ of safety. A factor underlying this bias is that safety is 
a ‘dynamic non-event’ (Weick, 1987).  What this means is that there is work constantly 
being done to maintain safe operations. The outcome is that no accidents happen. Due 
to the lack of safety incidents, managers assume that their decisions, for example, to 
increase production, will not impact upon safety. What is often not realised by decision 
makers is the continuous and sometimes increasing effort made by staff to achieve 
ongoing safety. 
 
Reason (2008) argues that it is the ‘universal’, (the favouring of production over safety), 
which create the second aspect of accidents - ‘conditions’. These ‘conditions’ have also 
been described as ‘latent factors’ which weaken the defences against safety failures. It is 
argued that the ‘conditions’ create the situation where the third aspect of accidents can 
occur -‘causes’. An accident can be ‘caused’ when various factors combine to breach 
the safety defences. This is illustrated by the holes lining up in the slices of the Swiss 
Cheese model (Reason, 2008). 
 
Figure 3.1: Reason’s Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1997) 
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Reason (1997) suggests that to achieve improved safety, attention has to be paid to the 
sharp and blunt ends of the system (Figure 3.2).  Those at the sharp end are those people 
delivering patient treatment.  They are human and are likely to make mistakes (Reason, 
1990).  Equally those managers with responsibility for the organisation make decisions 
at the blunt end (removed from direct delivery), which can create ‘conditions’ at the 
sharp end that are more susceptible to error. The decision, for example, to increase 
production, can create ‘conditions’, that combine with local workplace factors at the 
sharp end making staff more likely to make an error. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Blunt and sharp end of an organisation  
(adapted from Woods et al, 2010) 
 
It is argued that Reason (1990, 1997) takes a fundamentally linear approach with the 
Swiss Cheese model. The same criticism can be made to the sharp and blunt end 
concept, which appears to simplify an ongoing dynamic relationship.  
 
In further developing the conceptual basis for patient safety from a ‘systems’ 
perspective it is necessary to use concepts that emphasise the interactions of the parts of 
a system (Forrester, 1969), noted in Chapter 2.  Within the accident theory literature 
there is a growing body of work that seeks to build a theoretical framework to help 
explain the influence of the ‘system’ on safety. Researchers who use a systemic model 
Sharp end: 
interface directly 
with patients 
Blunt end: decisions made on strategy, production 
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to understand the ‘functional characteristics of the system’ (Hollnagel, 2004) use the 
concepts of ‘coupling’ and ‘feedback’ between the parts of a system.  
 
The concept of ‘coupling’ is used to describe how closely linked together parts of a 
system are (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005, Perrow, 1984, Perrow, 1999, Paté-Cornell, 
1993, Beekum and Glick, 2001, Rijpma, 2001). Systems that are loosely coupled have 
different departments with very little, if any, interaction between them. Where there is 
tight coupling the parts of a system interact extensively. In Normal Accident Theory 
(NAT), Perrow (1984, 1999) argues that where complex technological systems are 
interactively tightly coupled, accidents are an inevitable and should therefore be 
regarded as ‘normal’. One of his cited examples of an interactive tightly coupled system 
is the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant accident.  Perrow (1984) describes such 
failures as ‘normal’ or ‘system’ accidents.  He suggests that such accidents should be 
expected, and there is little that can be done to reduce their likelihood. He does 
however, make suggestions to reduce the vulnerability of such complex systems 
(Perrow, 1999, Perrow, 2007). The point made from a safety perspective, is that where 
there are more dynamic interactions between the different parts of the system, the risk 
of an accident increases. This increased risk is due to the dynamic and sometimes 
unpredictable ‘feedback’ that occurs between the parts creating unforeseen conditions 
that can cause accidents (Diehl and Sterman, 1995, Meadows, 2008, Sterman, 1989, 
Lane and Husemann, 2008a, Senge, 1990).  
 
‘Feedback’ is where an interaction between the parts creates a situation which 
influences future interactions of the same or other parts in a system (Sterman, 2000). 
There are two types of feedback: ‘reinforcing’ and ‘balancing’. These two types of 
feedback will be explored in more detail below. Where the systems are complex, with 
many feedback loops combined with tight coupling of the parts, then the risks of a 
system accident are much higher (Perrow, 1984).  
 
As noted earlier, Walshe and Boaden (2006) argue that healthcare is a system made up 
of many parts with both social and technical complexity. The concepts of ‘coupling’ 
and ‘feedback’ will therefore help to inform the conceptual basis for patient safety at a 
systemic level. Other studies, taking a High Reliability or Normal Accident approach, 
have sought to understand how complex organisations have reduced the risks to safety 
that result from tight coupling and multiple feedback (La Porte, 1996, Roberts and Bea, 
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2001, Schulman et al., 2004, Weick, 1987, Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001, Perrow, 1994, 
Rijpma, 2001, Sagan, 1993). 
 
One key aspect arising from High Reliability Theory (HRT) and NAT is the use of 
‘redundancy’. Redundancy can also be thought of as ‘buffer capacity’ where resources 
(people and equipment) are available, if needed, to prevent unexpected failure. 
Resources are termed ‘redundant’ because they are there just in case they are required, 
and have no other function. In HRT studies, such as those conducted on naval aircraft 
carriers, it was found that there is a high use of ‘redundancy’ in the form of people, 
equipment and processes to ensure that any error or failure by one part, is caught and 
corrected by an otherwise unused (redundant) resource (Roberts, 1990). Conversely, 
NAT theorists argue that redundancy can add to the complexity of the system design 
and potentially lead to complacency in an organisation (Sagan, 2004). Complacency 
arises when people in one part believe, that with multiple layers of protection against 
failure, some other part will prevent anything going wrong, so their vigilance drops. It is 
argued that the use of redundancy is ineffective in reducing accidents (Sagan, 2004). 
Both HRT and NAT views about the use of redundancy have their validity, and need to 
be considered in the context of specific organisational design and operation.  
 
The ethnographic study of the Space Shuttle Challenger mission that exploded on take-
off, proposed the ‘normalisation of deviance’ concept (Vaughan, 1996). Vaughan 
(1996) explains how, within a complex technically orientated organisation, processes 
were established that recategorised the degree of risk to one which was deemed 
acceptable. The revised view of risk therefore became the ‘normal’ in such a situation. 
Studies in healthcare have found ‘normalisation’ by staff to inpatient falls in hospital 
(Williams et al., 2010) and errors in operating theatre in hospitals (Waring, 2005, 
Waring et al., 2007). The process of normalisation results in low levels of reporting of 
incidents, as staff regard error or harm to patients as part of the process of treatment. For 
example, high mortality rates in certain surgical procedures are explained as being due 
to treating more ‘difficult’ cases (Boseley et al., 2010). The apparent high death rates 
for emergency patients in a particular hospital being explained initially as a data 
collection problem and not reflecting reality (Healthcare Commission, 2009a). 
 
The research into the shooting down of two American Black Hawk helicopters in a 
‘friendly fire’ incident in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq (Snook, 2000) provides an 
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insight into why written procedures, designed to ensure safety, are deviated from over 
time. From his analysis, Snook (2000) developed the concept of ‘practical drift’ to 
explain how people in the work place slowly, over time, departed from the written 
procedures. The ‘drift’ from written procedures is driven by practical necessity. The 
‘drift’ occurs over a period of time and without adverse consequences. The a point is 
reached when tight coupling is rapidly re-established due to unforeseen events, and a 
failure comes as a surprise. This concept of ‘drift’ also applies to the process of 
normalisation (Dekker, 2011). As Vaughan (1996) argues, the process of recategorising 
risk happens slowly over time. When nothing disastrous goes wrong, the new category 
of safe becomes the norm. This process can then be repeated with the consequent ‘drift’ 
towards unsafe practice. The movement towards unsafe working has also been termed 
violations and migrations from the standard procedures (Amalberti et al., 2006). 
 
 
Further insights into systemic concepts that can underpin patient safety are available 
from the literature that takes a ‘human factors’ perspective when looking at complex 
organisations (Carayon, 2006, Mooney, 2010, Reason, 1995, Woods et al., 2007, 
Dekker, 2006). There are helpful points for us to consider, which include the multiple 
interfaces between people, technology, and goals. As Dekker (2006) argues, safety is 
not the only goal and has to be achieved when staff are pressured, in situations of 
ambiguity and often with unreliable technology. People in dynamic complex socio-
technical systems are often in a position where ‘trade-offs’ decisions have to be made 
between doing their job efficiently or thoroughly (Hollnagel, 2009a, Woods et al., 
2010). 
 
In summary, there are a number of concepts used in the accident theory literature which 
are of interest when thinking about patient safety at a system level: 
• production verses safety  
• blunt / sharp end 
• latent or hidden conditions 
• safety as a dynamic non-event 
• coupling and feedback of interacting parts of a system 
• redundancy / buffer capacity 
• normalisation 
• practical drift (migration) 
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• trade-offs 
 
These concepts help to inform a ‘system’ based understanding of patient safety where 
the dynamic interaction of the parts is taken into account. A recent development in the 
literature, that seeks to encompass many of these concepts, is the idea of ‘resilience’. 
Resilience itself is a broad concept which is beginning to be used in the safety literature 
and has been applied in a limited way to healthcare (Carthey et al., 2001, Jeffcott et al., 
2009). The next section explores ‘resilience’ as a means to provide a unifying model for 
many of the identified concepts from accident theory and systems thinking. The aim is 
to identify a model that takes account of the conceptual issues underlying the dynamic 
interrelationship of the parts in the systemic approach to better understand patient 
safety. 
 
3.3  Resilience 
‘Resilience’ is increasingly being used in the literature in relation to safety (Smith and 
Fischbacher, 2009, Sheridan, 2008). The aim of this section is to review the literature on 
resilience and to identify the main themes that take account of dynamic interactions 
between the parts of a system. ‘Resilience’ as a concept is defined as being both 
proactive and reactive. It is regarded as part of a continuum that includes the concept of 
vulnerability. To take account of the dynamic and socio-technical nature of healthcare 
systems, the approach of resilience engineering is used, and in particular, the model of a 
SWE within which a system operates. It is argued that the SWE model can unify many 
of the concepts that are identified from the accident theory literature. However, the 
model does have limitations that are identified.  
 
The concept of ‘resilience’ is studied in a number of academic disciplines including: 
child development (Luthar et al., 2000), disaster management (Somers, 2009) and 
ecology (Cropp and Gabric, 2002, Adger, 2000, Holling, 1973). Each field defines 
‘resilience’ differently and therefore undertakes research from different perspectives 
(Manyena, 2006). Much of the literature defines ‘resilience’ as a characteristic that 
allows for recovery from a perturbation, such as a natural disaster or an abused 
childhood (Berkes, 2007, Boin and McConnell, 2007, Cropp and Gabric, 2002). Masten 
(2007), writing in the child development literature, regards ‘resilience’ as referring to 
the ‘capacity of dynamic systems to withstand or recover from significant disturbances’. 
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She suggest that such a concept can be studied at different levels; from the global to 
micro and over different time periods (Masten, 2007). 
 
A contrasting view is that ‘resilience’ refers to the ability to absorb a disturbance, rather 
than just recover from one (Adger, 2000) (see Figure 3.3). Woods (2006) defines 
resilience in relation to patient safety as ‘a work system’s ability to buffer, adapt to, 
absorb and prevent adverse patient outcomes in the face of disruption.’ Again this 
proposes the idea of ‘resilience’ being more than just recovering from a perturbation. 
Similarly, Hollnagel defines a resilient system as being able ‘to continue to perform as 
required’ before during or after a disruption or continuous stress (Hollnagel, 2009b). 
 
 
Resilience – two alternatives
t
Resilience
t
Resilience
R = rate of recovery 
from disturbance
R = disturbance that can be 
absorbed before state change
 
Figure 3.3: Two views of ‘resilience’  
(adapted from Adger (2000)) 
 
 
It is argued that it is possible to view ‘resilience’ as being both / and, rather than one or 
the other. In other words, ‘resilience’ can refer to the ability to absorb or adapt to a 
disturbance, as well as the more traditional idea of recovering after a perturbation. There 
are many definitions of ‘resilience’ in the literature (Amin and Horowitz, 2008, Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2001, Luthar, 2003, Holling, 1973, Sheridan, 2008, US Government 
Accountability Office, 2009, Dalziell and McManus, 2004).  
 
The definition of resilience used in this research is:  
‘…the ability of an organisation (system) to keep, or recover quickly to, a stable 
state, allowing it to continue operations during and after a major mishap or in the 
presence of continuous significant stresses.’ (Wreathrall, 2006) 
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This definition uses the idea of ‘a stable state’ as being a core requirement for an 
organisation or system to function. It also includes the view that resilience is about the 
ability to absorb a disturbance. By anticipating a disturbance, it becomes easier to 
maintain a stable state during a disruption or stress, as well as to recover from such an 
event. The definition allows for both types of resilience identified by Adger (2000). The 
Wreathrall (2006) definition also allows for not just perturbations, but also ‘continuous 
significant stresses’. Placing an organisation or system under continuous pressure can 
create ‘latent conditions’ and cause a ‘drift to danger’ (Rasmussen, 1997), or ‘practical 
drift’ (Snook, 2000).   
 
‘Resilience’ as a concept looks at the characteristic of a system in terms of its ability to 
withstand disruption or stress. It may also help to consider the characteristic of a system 
in terms of the inability to adapt and continue in a stable state. The concept of 
‘vulnerability’ in parts of the literature is associated with ‘resilience’; often being 
regarded as the different sides of the same coin (Vogel et al., 2007, Dalziell and 
McManus, 2004, Luthar, 2003). However, both ‘resilience’ and ‘vulnerability’ are 
concepts with multiple definitions (Manyena, 2006).  
 
Writing from the child development field, Luthar and Zelazo (2003) debate, without 
arriving at a clear conclusion, whether the constructs of ‘protection’ (resilience) and 
‘vulnerability’ are on the same continuum or whether they are distinct entities (Luthar 
and Zelazo, 2003). Manyena (2006), in considering ‘resilience’ and ‘vulnerability’ in 
the context of disaster management, argues that they are separate entities rather like job 
satisfaction and job dissatisfaction. ‘The absence of job dissatisfaction does not mean 
that you have job satisfaction’ (Manyena, 2006 p.443). However, it is suggested that the 
logic of this argument, that there are separate entities, can apply equally the other way. 
The presence of job dissatisfaction does mean that you will not have job satisfaction; 
where there is job satisfaction there will not be job dissatisfaction. So a logical case can 
be made, (with suitable definitions) that where there is ‘vulnerability’ to perturbations 
then ‘resilience’ is weak or not present. Where there is ‘resilience’ to perturbations then 
the ‘vulnerabilities’ will be minimal or non-existent.  Manyena (2006) does concede 
that when ‘vulnerability’ is defined in a way which relates to ‘the degree of capacity, 
then vulnerability is closely associated with the level of resilience’ (Manyena, 2006 
p.440). The position adopted within the thesis is that ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’ are 
on the same continuum.  
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The definition of ‘vulnerability’ used is: 
‘Vulnerability is the degree to which a system acts adversely to the occurrence 
of a hazardous event. The degree and quality of the adverse reaction are 
conditioned by a system’s resilience (a measure of the system’s capacity to 
absorb and recover from the event).’ (Timmerman, 1981 quoted in Manyena, 
2006, p.441.) 
 
Most definitions only deal with vulnerability at a component level. This definition takes 
a higher level perspective, which is consistent with this thesis. It also makes the link 
explicit between the nature of the adverse reaction and the ‘resilience’ of the system to 
both absorb and recover from a perturbation. 
 
Writing about resilience from an ecological perspective, Holling (2001) synthesises the 
idea of hierarchies and adaptive cycles to create the theory of ‘panarchy’. Hierarchies 
are used to describe the ‘semi-autonomous levels’ of adaptive cycles that interact rather 
than a method of top-down control. The lowest level is the individual; the highest is the 
political and cultural. The higher levels adapt at a slower speed than the lower levels. 
The model depicts a dynamic hierarchy where the levels pass on information or material 
to enhance the ability to adapt in the face of change. The term ‘panarchy’ is used to 
overcome the inflexible associations with the word ‘hierarchy’. Panarchy is used as a 
‘representation of a hierarchy as a nested set of adaptive cycles’ (Holling, 2001). 
 
The key point to take from Holling (2001) is the idea of different levels of adaptive 
cycles that have a dynamic interrelationship. When experiencing perturbation, each 
level may exploit their properties of adaptive capacity in different ways, which may 
either compliment or conflict with other levels. 
 
The main points to draw from this section on resilience are: 
• ‘resilience’ is a concept studied by many academic disciplines with different 
definitions; 
• ‘resilience’ as defined for this thesis relates to the ability of the system to both 
absorb and recover from perturbations or significant continuous stress; 
• ‘resilience’ in relation to patient safety is about the ability to prevent harm to 
patients when the system experiences perturbations or significant continuous 
stress; 
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• ‘resilience’ is unlikely to be present where there are aspects of the system which 
are ‘vulnerable’ to losing their stable state in the face of perturbations or 
significant continuous stress; 
• ‘resilience’ can be modelled as ‘panarchy’ - a nested set of adaptive cycles. 
 
The concepts of ‘resilience’ and ‘vulnerability’ have been developed in relation to 
concepts about ‘systems’ in the literature on ecology (Cropp and Gabric, 2002) and 
more interestingly, for the purpose of this thesis, in ‘resilience engineering’, which are 
considered next. 
 
3.3.1 Resilience Engineering and the Safe Working Envelope 
‘Resilience engineering’ explores a systemic perspective of ‘resilience’.  It includes the 
ability to anticipate, absorb, mitigate and recover from a disturbance (Woods, 2006). 
Hollnegal (2006) argues that to understand accidents it is necessary to look at the 
dynamic concurrences which take place ‘amongst events and functions rather than 
among components’ (Hollnagel, 2006).  This means looking beyond the failure of single 
components in a system and regarding safety as an emergent property of complex 
systems (Hollnagel et al., 2006).  The challenge is to find out why a system may lose its 
dynamic stability and become unstable.  Woods (2006) suggests that ‘resilience 
engineering’ is an approach to safety that ‘focuses on how to help people cope with 
complexity under pressure to achieve success.’  It is not about just counting error and 
then acting to reduce that count, but rather putting safety as a core value in an 
organisation (Woods, 2006). 
 
Resilience is a proactive approach to safety which, if successful, means that the system 
can keep operating in what resilience engineering theorists describe as an ‘operating 
envelope’, within which the system is designed to be competent (Rasmussen, 1997; 
Woods, 2006).  The SWE is a conceptual model based on assessments of uncertainty 
and the ability of the system to manage the resulting change. Resilience is about 
‘monitoring the boundary conditions of the current model of competence’ (Woods, 
2006).  The aim is to assess the adaptive capability of the system to remain within the 
safe operating envelope. The ability of the system to remain within the envelope is 
described as ‘system resilience’.  
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There are a number of models of ‘system resilience’(Woods et al., 2009). These include 
the ‘ball and cup’ metaphor and the ‘stress-strain state space’(Woods and Wreathrall, 
2008, Woods et al., 2009). The latter model is used in material science and is applicable 
to those situations where a material, individual or organisational capacity is stretched to 
a point beyond which it cannot recover. Whilst this model does provide some insights 
into resilience properties, such as critical breaking points, it is limited in taking account 
of the complex socio-technical aspects of healthcare. The ball and cup model provides 
insights into the amount of disturbance a system can survive. Again this model appears 
limited in taking account of the interactions and competing pressures found in complex 
systems and it is not widely used in the resilience engineering literature. It may 
therefore be argued that these models are  underdeveloped in comparison with the work 
of Rasmussen (1997). Rasmussen’s (1997) use of the safe working envelope (SWE) 
model takes account of the wider social context as well as the competing dynamic 
interactions. Safety is influenced by the wider context within which a system operates, 
from government, through regulators and organisations to workers (Rasmussen, 1997). 
This suggests that safety is embedded within a complex adaptive socio-technical 
system, with many stakeholders and interactions. As such, safety is more complicated 
than just setting out rules to be followed and behaviour to be controlled.  
 
Rasmussen (1997) is widely cited in the literature on safety, risk and control theory 
across industries ranging from shipping to information technology. Some of the safety 
literature relating to healthcare cites Rasmussen (1997), for example, (Miller and Xiao, 
2007, Jeffcott et al., 2009a, Jeffcott et al., 2009b, Armitage, 2009, Dekker et al., 2011, 
Wears, 2005, Wears, 2004, Wears and Cook, 2010, Wears et al., 2008, Amalberti et al., 
2006, Sittig and Singh, 2010, Karsh and Brown, 2010, Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). 
Resilience is considered in a particular clinical practice of handover (Jeffcott et al., 
2009b) but the paper does not make specific use of the SWE model. Works found in the 
literature that make direct use of the SWE model in relation to patient safety are those 
reviewed below (Amalberti et al., 2006, Cook and Rasmussen, 2005, Miller and Xiao, 
2007).   
 
 
Rasmussen’s (1997) argument is that safety has to be modelled at a higher conceptual 
level than safety rules and procedures, which leads him to suggest the SWE. There are 
three constructs to the envelope model: the ‘boundaries’, the ‘operating point’ and the 
  Mike D Williams 
 63
‘gradients’. The envelope has three boundaries: ‘Economic Failure’, ‘Unacceptable 
Workload’ and ‘Unacceptable Performance’, otherwise described as ‘Safety Failure’ 
(see Figure 3.4). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Safe working envelope model 
(adapted from Rasmussen, 1997) 
 
Part of Rasmussen’s (1997) argument is the need to move away from considering risk at 
the level of tasks. This can be done ‘by making the boundaries explicit and known and 
by giving opportunities to develop coping skills at boundaries.’ (Rasmussen, 1997, 
p.191 original emphasis) Therefore, he argues that the envelope boundaries have to be 
made ‘visible’. 
 
A ‘marginal zone’ is depicted in the model as an area close to the safety failure 
boundary. The zone depicts the system’s ability to cope. Therefore, the further away the 
marginal boundary is from the failure boundary, then there is an increased capacity to 
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respond to pressures on the system (Miller and Xiao, 2007). From this explanation it is 
suggested that the marginal zone can be described as the ‘buffer capacity’ of the system. 
The resilience of a system is therefore depicted by the buffer capacity. It is argued that 
the ‘location’ of the ‘marginal zone’ boundary is established over time as an 
organisation sets the limit of what is an acceptable level of risk (Cook and Rasmussen, 
2005). Crossing the marginal boundary breaches the social norms of the organisation.  
 
The marginal boundary can ‘move’. Inquiries into accidents that breach the 
unacceptable performance boundary can reposition the marginal boundary inwards 
(Miller and Xiao, 2007). This is done to provide greater protection (more buffer 
capacity) to the boundary of unacceptable performance. Equally, over a period of time 
without accidents, the marginal boundary can ‘creep outwards to form a new normal’ 
(Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). The ‘boundary’ construct dimensions that can be derived 
from the literature are: ‘visibility’, ‘location’, ‘buffer capacity’ and ‘movement’. 
 
The OP depicts the operating conditions of the system in relation to the boundaries 
(Figure 3.4). The location of the OP in relation to the ‘safety failure’ boundary does 
provide an insight into the characteristics of a system. From a conceptual perspective 
Cook and Rasmussen (2005) identify three types of system:  
 
(1) stable low risk where the OP moves in small steps and is located well away 
from the safety failure boundary;  
(2) stable high risk systems (e.g. so called high reliability organisations [HROs]) 
where the OP is much closer to the safety failure boundary but where safety is 
achieved by knowing the location of the OP and ensuring any movements are 
small; and  
(3) unstable systems (low reliability organisations [LROs]) where the location of 
the OP is less visible and there are large shifts in location both towards and away 
from the safety failure boundary.  
 
There are two dimensions about the OP construct that can be derived from this 
literature. They are the ‘location’ and ‘movement’ of the OP. 
 
Cook and Rasmussen (2005) point out that there is little if any research ‘characterizing 
the location or movement of the OP of the system or reducing the size of the OP 
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motions.’ They also suggest that further research into the ‘factors influencing the 
marginal boundary location’ is needed. 
 
Rasmussen’s (1997) argument is that we need to move beyond the focus on human 
errors and violations to the rules of work. The SWE model of system behaviour depicts 
‘the mechanisms generating behaviour in the actual, dynamic work context,’ 
(Rasmussen, 1997, p.190) (original emphasis). To represent the ‘mechanisms 
generating behaviour’, Rasmussen’s model (1997) uses the boundaries within which the 
system operates and the influences (known as gradients) on the OP. The influences are 
conceptualised as gradients exerting ‘pressure’ on the OP. For example, the gradient 
towards ‘efficiency’ forces the OP away from the ‘economic failure’ boundary. 
Likewise the gradient of the staff towards ‘least effort’ drives the OP away from the 
‘unacceptable workload’ boundary (Figure 3.4).  
 
The model conceptualises the combined pressure from the two influences of ‘efficiency’ 
and ‘least effort’ forces the OP towards the safety failure (unacceptable performance) 
boundary and therefore a potential accident (Figure 3.5). The two pressure gradients are 
met by a ‘counter gradient’ that influences adherence to safety standards. The OP can 
also be held within the SWE by compensating actions taken by staff (Figure 3.6). The 
idea of compensating actions that counteract the pressure on the OP towards creating 
unsafe conditions will be explored further below. The literature points to the gradient 
construct having a ‘pressure’ dimension. 
 
Another way of thinking about the gradients and boundaries would be to regard them as 
setting the ‘conditions’ within which the performance of the system takes place. Such 
conditions are rarely static and therefore, through the movement of the OP, the model 
depicts the dynamic concurrences that occur (Hollnagel, 2006). 
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Figure 3.5: Gradients of pressure on the operating point  
(adapted from Miller and Xiao, 2007)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Counter gradient to hold the operating point in safe position   
(adapted from Miller and Xiao, 2007)  
  
 
The OP can be held within the envelope or moved back out of the marginal zone by the 
compensating actions or strategies that are in place (Miller and Xiao, 2007). There can 
be rapid acting compensating actions which return the OP within the SWE. ‘De-
compensation’ is what happens when the buffer capacity that has maintained the OP 
inside the marginal zone, has been exhausted (Woods and Cook, 2006).  There are 
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examples in the literature of where de-compensation occurs quickly and the OP then 
breaches a failure boundary (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). This is described by Miller 
and Xiao (2007) as ‘acute de-compensation’ which is defined as ‘the short-term 
exhaustion of compensatory mechanisms’. It can cause a rapid change in the dynamics 
when parts of the system become more tightly coupled and generate new feedback loops 
and increase vulnerability (Perrow, 1984, Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). 
 
There is another type of de-compensation which is linked to the concept of ‘drift’.  In 
this situation the OP moves closer to the boundary of safety failure slowly over time, as 
new ‘norms’ are established under financial and production pressures. Miller and Xiao 
(2007) describe the concept of ‘chronic de-compensation’ where there is a ‘long-term 
erosion of buffering capabilities at all levels of management’. Where erosion occurs it is 
depicted as the marginal zone boundary moving closer to the boundary of safety failure 
leaving little, if any, buffer capacity.  
 
Woods and Cook (2006), suggest that there is a two-stage pattern of de-compensation.  
The first stage is an automated loop response to the disturbance being experienced.  For 
example, increasing patient admission demand can be regarded in certain situations as a 
‘disturbance’ to a hospital system.  A number of actions can be taken by staff to 
compensate for the increase. Such actions include diverting admissions which reduce 
the continuous pressure on the system (Fatovich et al., 2005, Cook and Rasmussen, 
2005).  However, the success of that initial response can hide the impact of the 
disturbance. Such a disturbance may occur repeatedly over a prolonged period leading 
to chronic de-compensation, to which staff ‘normalise’ (Vaughan, 1996).  The second 
stage occurs when the initial response fails to continue to deal with the disturbance. This 
stage requires non-automated decision making and new actions to be taken to control 
the location of the OP relative to the safety failure boundary.  Woods and Cook (2006) 
argue that the success of the first stage can mask how the adaptive capacity is being 
stretched and the buffers are being exhausted.  
 
Compensating actions are undertaken by staff working in a situation of competing and 
dynamic pressures. These are conceptualised by the gradients and boundaries in the 
model (Rasmussen, 1997). Woods (2006) describes part of the dynamic as ‘scale 
interactions’. His argument is that resilience is influenced either by a ‘downward scale’, 
where the organisational context create problems for operational staff, or by an ‘upward 
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scale’. An ‘upward scale’ is where operational staff adaptations/workarounds and 
compensating actions influence the more strategic intentions of management.  In other 
words, there are complex dynamics created between the blunt and sharp end of a system 
that can impact on the OP within the SWE. Therefore, the conditions represented by the 
gradients provide some insight into the ‘pressure’ on the OP (downward scale) but the 
response of staff in the system to those gradients will generate their own ‘feedback’. 
That type of internal feedback (upward scale) is not accounted for in the Rasmussen 
(1997) model. Such dynamics will influence the resilience of the system. The model 
therefore needs to be extended to address the impact of the internal feedback dynamics 
(Hollnagel, 2006) represented by the downward and upward scale interactions. The 
gradient dimension of ‘scale’ is therefore derived from the literature. 
 
Woods (2006) argues that we need to identify the different ‘classes of dynamic that 
undermine resilience and result in organisations that act riskier than they realise’.  
Decision makers are continually confronted with a problem of conflicting goals with 
many consequential dilemmas and trade-offs to deal with (Hollnagel, 2009a).  To 
choose one side of a dilemma (e.g. production) can create hidden conditions in the 
system on the other side of the dilemma (e.g. safety) (Reason, 1997). Decision makers 
do not always examine the consequence, or sacrifice, of their decisions before making 
them.  It is difficult to accurately predict what the result might be, even if time were to 
be given to such consideration.  When a decision is made to increase production the 
consequences in terms of safety may not be immediately apparent.  However, the parts 
of the system may become more tightly coupled with increased numbers of interactions. 
The performance of the system, depicted by the OP, may well have moved closer to the 
boundary of safety failure where a new ‘normal’ way of working is established.   
 
This moving in an unseen way towards the boundary is a concept that has been termed 
‘drift to danger’ (Rasmussen, 1997) or ‘practical drift’ (Snook, 2000). Part of this ‘drift’ 
is the process of ‘normalisation’. Staff can ‘normalise’ to changes in their working 
situation. These can include the parts of the system becoming more tightly coupled, 
having to work harder and faster to meet new production targets. From a safety 
perspective, ‘drift’ can be conceptualised as either the OP moving into the marginal 
zone and therefore closer to an accident, or the marginal unacceptable performance 
boundary being redefined and moved outwards. When the marginal boundary is moved 
further out to make the envelope bigger, then it reduces the buffer capacity to deal with 
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pressure on the OP. Such a movement of the marginal boundary would therefore make 
the system more vulnerable. The reverse would also apply, where more rigorous safety 
standards were applied moving the boundary inwards.  
 
Amalberti et al (2006) develops the Rasmussen (1997) model to explain the violation 
and migration from the designed standard within systems. They argue that the reality of 
operations create pressures to increase performance leading to individuals cutting 
corners. The system of operations migrates to an acceptable degree of violation from the 
designed standards. This situation is termed ‘borderline tolerated conditions of use’ 
(BTCUs). It is argued that BTCUs have four features. First, they are regarded as being 
of benefit rather than a risk. Second, that they improve system performance or help an 
individual. Third, they are accepted and at times required by managers. Fourth, they are 
linked to informal rather than formal safety procedures. The social context, it is argued, 
shifts away from the original design of the system. Over a period of time the violations 
become custom and practice leading to the ‘normalisation of deviance’ (Vaughan, 
1996). 
 
The migration model is used to derive some key points about safety management in 
health care (Amalberti et al., 2006). The first is that violations are common, although 
not many lead to substantial harm. Therefore, they become seen as part of routine work 
and often become undetectable as violations. Second, violations are poorly understood, 
difficult to measure and there is little research evidence about their impact. Third, staff 
can change the social acceptance of the violations and migrate back towards operating 
to standard procedures. Fourth, violations often occur due to ‘trigger conditions’ such as 
over ambitious targets. Staff in such a situation often make a choice between 
compliance and non-compliance to the standards, as they adapt to the conflicting 
demands of production and safety requirements. 
 
Cook and Rasmussen (2005) make the point that it is normal for healthcare systems to 
work at the limit of their capacity, and for Hirschhorn’s ‘law of stretched systems’ to 
apply:  
‘every system always operates at its capacity.  As soon as there is some 
improvement, some new technology, we stretch it…’ (Cook and Rasmussen, 
2005).  
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Cook and Rasmussen’s (2005) argument is that, when systems are under resource and / 
or performance pressures, the benefits of change are taken in increased productivity or 
efficiency.  The pressure on the OP from the efficiency gradients is described as the 
system moving back to the ‘edge of the performance envelope’ (Woods and Cook, 
2002).  
 
The key concepts that arise from our review of resilience engineering literature and the 
SWE in particular are: 
 
• safety is part of a wider socio-technical context which requires a conceptual 
model to take account of the dynamic interaction of the whole and not just a 
linear of reductionist view of failure due to faulty component parts of a system;  
• a ‘SWE’ takes account of the wider context and some of the competing 
dynamics depicted by the three failure boundaries and gradients that influence 
the OP of the system; 
• resilience is conceptualised as the ability of the system to achieve a stable state 
and remain within the boundaries of the SWE; 
• the concepts of ‘drift’, ‘normalisation’ and ‘trade-offs’ can be used in explaining 
the movement of the OP towards the boundary of safety failure; 
• the idea of ‘compensating actions’ and ‘de-compensation’ provide an insight 
into the use of buffer capacity to adapt to a perturbation or continuous stress; 
• the location and movement of the OP in relation to the safety failure boundary 
provides a way to describe the characteristics of the performance of a system; 
• there are influences on the OP created not just by the gradients but also the 
response of staff to the competing dynamics thereby creating upward scale 
interactions. Those responses create further dynamic interactions that require the 
Rasmussen (1997) model to be extended. 
 
The SWE has the following constructs: 
• ‘boundaries’ – depicts the constraints within which the system is designed to 
work; 
• ‘operating point’ – depicts the performance of the system in relation to the 
boundaries; 
• ‘gradients’ – depict the competing pressures on the OP. 
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These are theoretical concepts that are not explicitly recognisable for staff working in 
complex systems. Part of Rasmussen’s (1997) argument is that the boundaries need to 
be made visible to staff. Therefore, a part of this research is to explore the dimensions of 
these concepts to establish how feasible it is to find ways to depict boundaries, the OP 
and gradients. The literature points to several dimensions associated with each construct 
which are summarised in Table 3.1: 
 
Construct Dimensions quotes from the literature 
 
Boundaries Visibility  
 
 
Movement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Location 
 
 
 
Marginal zone 
(buffer capacity) 
 
‘making the boundaries explicit and known’ 
(Rasmussen, 1997) 
 
marginal boundary ‘creeps outwards to form a 
new normal’ (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005) 
‘…IT applications will move the unacceptable 
performance boundary outwards. The marginal 
boundary is malleable, however and these gains 
maybe offset by marginal boundary creep.’ 
(Cook and Rasmussen, 2005) 
 
‘The location of the marginal boundary is 
determined by sociotechnical processes.’ (Cook 
and Rasmussen, 2005) 
 
‘…the marginal zone as a system’s capacity to 
cope.’ (Miller and Xiao, 2007) 
Operating Point Location 
 
 
Movement 
‘…its distance from the marginal boundary’ 
(Cook and Rasmussen, 2005) 
 
‘At the moment there is little or no work 
directed at characterizing the location or 
movement of the OP of the system’ (Cook and 
Rasmussen, 2005) 
 
Gradients Scale 
 
 
Pressure 
 
downward and upward scale interactions 
(Woods, 2006) 
 
‘continuous pressure’ of the safety counter 
gradient ‘compensating the functional pressure 
of the work environment.’ (Rasmussen, 1997) 
 
Table 3.1: Dimensions of the SWE constructs 
 
 
A summary of how the SWE from resilience theory relates to the concepts derived from 
accident theory is presented in the next section. 
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3.4 Synthesis of Resilience and Accident Theory 
The definition of ‘resilience’ being used includes the ability of a system to anticipate, 
adapt and recover from both perturbations and continuous stresses. Resilience and 
vulnerability are considered to be part of a continuum. In considering resilience in 
relation to safety of patients within complex socio-technical systems, the three boundary 
model of a ‘SWE’ is used. Resilience is conceived as the ability of the system in times 
of disruption, to maintain a stable state and for the OP not to breach the boundaries of 
the envelope. Such a model provides a means to consider the dynamic nature of 
complex socio-technical systems as it can take account of external and internal 
influences. The model moves beyond the simple production / safety trade-off to theorise 
about the other influences on the performance of the system. Gradients can be linked to 
the idea of the blunt end influencing the sharp end and potentially creating latent 
conditions that combine to move the OP through the ‘safety failure’ boundary. 
However, a limitation of the model is that it does not take account of the potential non-
linear responses of staff in the system to the gradient pressures. In other words, the 
sharp end can exert influence on the blunt end. 
 
The movement of the OP depicts the operating conditions of the system and the 
relationship to the envelope boundaries. The model includes the concept of ‘drift’ and 
the idea that people ‘normalise’ to violations, which can be depicted as working close to 
the ‘safety failure’ boundary. The ideas of compensating actions and the de-
compensation of buffer or redundant capacity in relation to the OP, introduces some 
helpful insights when considering the dynamic nature of safety in relation to other goals 
in a system. When the OP is held within the envelope, it depicts safety as a ‘dynamic 
non-event’ (Weick, 1987) where considerable effort goes into avoiding accidents.  
 
The model of a ‘SWE’ provides a system resilience perspective for many of the 
concepts identified from accident theory. In particular the model can incorporate the 
concepts of: 
 
• production verses safety – through the boundaries and gradients; 
• blunt / sharp end – through the pressures generated by the gradients on front line 
staff (downward scale interaction); 
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• latent or hidden conditions – through the ‘conditions’ created by the competing 
pressures on the OP; 
• safety as a dynamic non-event – through the idea of compensating actions 
holding the OP within the envelope; 
• redundancy / buffer capacity – through de-compensation of capacity to hold the 
OP within the envelope; 
• normalisation – through staff accepting the shift in the position of a marginal 
zone boundary or the OP; 
• practical drift – through the gradual movement of the OP or small movements of 
a boundary; 
• trade-offs – through making the boundaries and the location of the OP explicit to 
decision makers. 
 
The model does not provide a means to explore in depth the concepts of coupling and 
feedback that result from the conditions generated by the competing pressures on the 
OP. It is noted that compensating actions and de-compensation can change the 
dynamics of the system through making the parts more tightly coupled. With tighter 
coupling the subsequent increasing interactions of the parts generate feedback which in 
turn changes the dynamic, and potentially, the stability of the OP. Therefore, the 
concepts of coupling and feedback need to be taken into account by extending the 
Rasmussen (1997) SWE model. This is done in Chapter 5 using insights from the 
systems thinking literature. 
 
3.5 Summary 
Concepts from the accident theory and systems thinking literature are synthesised with 
ideas from resilience engineering, and in particular, the SWE model proposed by 
Rasmussen (1997). It is argued that the SWE can be used as the basis for 
conceptualising safety within a complex socio-technical system. A resilient system is 
depicted as one where the OP can remain within the boundaries of the envelope during a 
disruption or in the face of continuous stress. By using such a system resilience model 
to guide the empirical data collection of this research, insights are gained about the 
characteristics of NHS hospitals and how they influence patient safety. 
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However, there are some weaknesses in the Rasmussen (1997) model that require 
further developments to be made. It is argued that the model has to be contextualised to 
assist in understanding the degree of importance given to the boundaries by decision 
makers. The context also provides insight into the pressure on the OP from the 
gradients. The internal dynamics associated with the ‘structure’ (Sterman, 2001) of 
systems also has to be taken into account. 
 
3.6 The research objective 
The literature review identified the need to examine how the ‘system’ characteristic of 
healthcare organisations influence patient safety. The result of the review has led to 
examining the issue from a systemic and resilience perspective. The following gaps in 
the literature have been identified in ascertaining a system perspective of patient safety: 
 
a) The exploration of the underlying concepts from systems thinking of what 
constitutes a ‘system’ has not been well developed in relation to healthcare 
organisations.  
 
b) The extant literature is weak in providing a conceptual model to consider how 
the dynamics of a socio-technical system can influence patient safety. 
 
c) The conceptual models used in healthcare situations, such as the Swiss Cheese 
model (Reason, 1997), are limited as they are do not fully take account of the 
dynamic non-linear feedback that occurs in complex socio-technical systems. 
The models therefore lack explanatory power. 
 
d) The conceptual model of a SWE (Rasmussen, 1997) does provide a means to 
take account of the competing constraints and pressures on a system. However, 
it does not take account of the ‘structure’ or ‘feedback’ that occurs in systems 
operating inside the envelope. 
 
e) The SWE model has had limited empirical exploration. 
 
These gaps provide the basis for the objective of the research, which is: 
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To explore, in NHS hospitals, how a systems approach can inform the development 
of patient safety theory. 
 
  
The research takes an empirical theory development approach (Meredith, 1998) to this 
objective, which includes the development of propositions about improving hospital 
systems to reduce the risk to patient safety. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the philosophical assumptions and research methodology adopted to 
operationalise the research. In Chapter 5 the model is developed as a means to guide the 
data collection and analysis which follows in Chapters 6-8. 
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Chapter 4 - Philosophical Assumptions and Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the philosophical assumptions of this thesis, the research design 
and the methods employed in pursuit of the research objective. The chapter has six 
sections. The basis for understanding what constitutes knowledge and reality is explored 
in Section 4.2. The argument is made that taking an objective stance is not possible in 
complex socio-technical situations. Equally to take a subjective position leaves an 
entirely relative position. The dualistic subjective or objective approach to knowledge 
and reality is limited and therefore, the dialectic position of ‘pragmatic critical realism’ 
(Johnson and Duberley, 2000) is preferred. The consequence of taking a pragmatic-
critical realist stance is explored in relation to the ‘structure / agency’ debate, which is at 
the core of social theory. It is argued that ‘structure’ does influence ‘agency’ in a 
dynamic rather than deterministic manner.  
 
Section 4.3 looks briefly at the philosophical assumptions found in the literature 
examined in Chapter 2 and 3. Section 4.4 addresses the methodological options. It is 
argued that case studies provide the best design to explore the constructs identified in 
the SWE model identified in Chapter 3. The strengths and weaknesses of using case 
studies are set out. The selection criteria and details of the cases chosen are given. 
Section 4.5 sets out the data collection and analysis methods used and how they are 
deployed to operationalise the research. The ethical issues are identified in Section 4.6 
and finally in Section 4.7 the position and influence of the researcher in the research 
process is acknowledged. 
 
4.2 Philosophical Reflexivity 
There are many arguments in the literature about the underlying philosophy of 
knowledge and reality (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, Kuhn, 1962). One argument 
emphasises the requirement to set out the research assumptions to provide a basis on 
which to judge the reliability of the results (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). The context 
of this research is within what has been described as a ‘complex socio-technical system’ 
(Rasmussen, 1997). Therefore, in addition to the technical element, the social and 
systemic aspects of inquiry have to be taken into account. It is argued that social theory 
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provides the underpinning philosophical position. Various philosophical approaches that 
seek to explain the nature of social science are explored briefly. The philosophical 
approach of ‘pragmatic critical realism’ is argued for and applied to the structure / 
agency debate in social theory. 
 
4.2.1 The nature of social science and management research 
Kuhn (1962) argues that a paradigm provides the rules and standards for a particular 
way of conducting research. A paradigm sets out the assumptions used by researchers 
about what the world is like (Bryman and Bell, 2007, Guba and Lincoln, 1994, Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979, Guba and Lincoln, (1994)). Part of Kuhn’s (1962) argument is that 
research is a ‘strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into conceptual boxes 
supplied by professional education.’ Whilst those boxes, known as paradigms, can 
provide helpful frameworks for the development of science, they can also blind 
researchers to the possibility of paradigm breaking discoveries (Kuhn, 1962). 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that there are four key assumptions that are helpful 
when studying organisations. These relate to ontology, epistemology, human nature and 
methodology. They examine these assumptions across the subjective – objective 
dimension as illustrated in Figure 4.1: 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Assumptions about the nature of social science –  
from Burrell and Morgan (1979) p.3. 
 
Nominalism Realismontology
Anti-positvism Positivismepistemology
Voluntarism Determinismhuman nature
Ideographic Nomotheticmethodology
The subjective-objective dimension
The subjectivist
approach to
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‘Ontology’ is ‘the general theory about what there is’ (Mautner, 2000). The ‘realist’ 
position is that there are phenomenon in the world that exist independent from the 
human mind (Archer et al., 1998, Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The ‘nominalist’ position 
is that only humans are real and that the social world is a product of the human mind 
that describes and names the structures and entities in the world (Lane, 1999, Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). Others argue that social reality is made up of both items that are 
human constructs, such as money, and facts. For example the fact that hydrogen atoms 
have one electron is independent from human minds (Searle, 1995).  
 
Epistemology is ‘the theory of knowledge’ and the ‘scope and limits of human 
knowledge’ (Mautner, 2000). The ‘positivist’ view of knowledge is that is can only be 
acquired by objective observation examining reality for generalisable laws (Prasad, 
2005). At the other extreme the ‘anti-positivist’ approach is that human interpretation, 
or personal experience is the basis for knowledge. Knowledge is not revealed through 
objective observation, rather is it created by the involvement of humans (Prasad, 2005, 
Lane, 1999). 
 
‘Human nature’ concerns the relationship that humans have with their environment 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The relationship is also known as the ‘structure / agency’ 
debate which is at the core of modern social theory (Giddens, 1979). The ‘deterministic’ 
perspective is that the behaviour of human agents’ is ‘determined’ by their environment 
or the ‘social structure’. The ‘voluntarist’ position emphasises the free will of humans 
and their ability to create and adapt their environments. Some argue that social 
structures therefore do not exist, seeing them rather as social networks (King, 2004). 
 
The ‘methodological’ strand refers to how knowledge can be obtained. The 
‘nomothetic’ approach is to search for generalisable laws with clear concepts that can be 
measured and tested. The ‘ideographical’ or ‘phenomenological’ perspective is 
interested in the individual experiences and understanding of the world (Prasad, 2005). 
 
In summary the ‘objective’ end of the continuum of the ‘strands of theory’, lead to a 
more ‘positivist’ or ‘functionalist’ approach. The ‘subjective’ approach takes a more 
‘interpretative’ or phenomenological perspective to social science (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979).  
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Guba and Lincoln (1994), provide a comprehensive review of the different schools of 
thought. In summary, there are the two approaches of positivist and phenomenology. 
Within phenomenology they suggest three paradigms: realism, constructivism and 
critical theory (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). When considering research approaches to 
theory building, Perry (1998) points to the differences between deductive and inductive. 
His argument is that positivism takes a deductive approach whilst the phenomenological 
paradigms use inductive logic to create theory (Perry, 1998). Table 4.1 summarises the 
position: 
 
Paradigm Deduction / 
induction 
Objective / 
subjective 
Commensurable / 
incommensurable 
Positivism Deduction Objective Commensurable 
Critical theory Induction Subjective Commensurable 
Constructivism Induction Subjective Incommensurable 
Realism Induction Objective Commensurable 
 
Table 4.1: Categorising the implications for research of the four paradigms 
 
When considering the different assumptions used in management research, Johnson and 
Duberley (2000) set out a framework of the different schools of thought (Figure 4.2). 
They highlight the limitations of any such framework particularly drawing attention to 
the simple binary conditions which are often much more complicated in reality. 
 
  Mike D Williams 
 80
 
Figure 4.2: Two axis framework depicting schools of management research 
 (from Johnson and Duberley (2000) p.180.) 
 
As noted above, ‘positivism’ is grounded in the belief that it is possible for researchers 
to be independent and objective observers of facts that constitute reality. It is argued 
that ‘positivists’ use ‘theory neutral language’. Therefore, reflexivity is confined to the 
‘technical’ aspects of the research methods and not to the underlying theoretical 
assumptions that justify those methods (Johnson and Duberley, 2000, Brannick and 
Coghlan, 2006). Positivism has a strong background in the natural sciences. Positivism 
is also criticised by allowing the question ‘what can we know?’ to restrict ideas of what 
exists (Bhaskar, 1978). Prasad (2005) argues that when studying the social world it is 
necessary to take account of the ‘capacity for self-reflection and cultural production.’ It 
is argued that the human ability to interpret differentiates social science from natural 
sciences (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
 
‘Postmodernism’ takes a very different approach, although there is little agreement as to 
what is meant by the term (Mautner, 2000). According to Prasad (2005), 
‘postmodernism’ is a radical stance against rationality and meta-narratives that seek to 
explain reality. It views the world as plural, fragmented and indeterminate. Language is 
regarded as the source of truth and that images can provide an insight into reality 
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(Prasad, 2005). What constitutes knowledge is therefore potentially highly 
individualistic and contextualised (Johnson and Duberley, 2000).  
 
The schools of thought that take the objective ontological and subjective epistemology 
(bottom left quadrant in Figure 4.2) seek to overcome the weaknesses of both positivism 
and postmodernism. In simple terms, those schools of thought accept that there is a 
reality independent of humans but that gaining knowledge about that reality, involves 
the reflective capacity of researchers. Therefore, a central part of this paradigm is the 
role of the human agent in relation to their interaction with the independent reality. The 
critical realist position within this quadrant is explored in further detail below. 
 
It is argued that the realism paradigm is most suitable for this research for reasons that 
are set out below. In the next section the ‘realist’ position is refined through considering 
the ‘critical realist’ approach and how that is complimented by ‘pragmatism’. 
 
4.2.2 The Pragmatic-Critical Realist approach 
Critical realism takes the view that there is a reality that is independent of human 
knowledge. As an approach it seeks to understand the ‘enduring structures and 
generative mechanisms underlying and producing observable phenomena and events’ 
(Bhaskar, 1989). It is ‘critical’ in that understanding the underlying mechanisms that 
create observable phenomenon, can lead to changes in the status quo (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). The critical realist takes account of the difference between natural and social 
sciences by recognising that human understandings will vary (Johnson and Duberley, 
2000). This recognition requires an interpretive or phenomenological approach.  
 
A detailed study of critical realism is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, there are 
some key points about critical realism summarised by Johnson and Duberley (2000), 
which provide the philosophical assumptions underpinning this research. 
 
a) Critical realists emphasise a metaphysical ontology which states that social and 
natural reality consists of entities which exist independently of our human 
knowledge. 
  Mike D Williams 
 82
b) The entities may not be observable and different people may apprehend different 
realities according to varying paradigmatic, metaphorical or discursive 
conventions deployed through their human agency. 
c) The perceived epistemic role of human agency means that critical realism rejects 
the possibility of a theory-neutral observational language and a correspondence 
theory of truth. 
d) Critical realism entails an epistemological defence of causal explanation – 
causation is not solely expressed through a constant conjunction of events as in 
positivism. Rather critical realists identify causation by also exploring the 
mechanisms of cause and effect which underlie regular events.  
 
(adapted from Johnson and Duberley, 2000, p.154) 
 
Critical realism is criticised in a number of ways (Archer et al., 1998, Collier, 1994, 
Klein, 2004, Lopez and Potter, 2001, Mingers, 2004, Monod, 2004, Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000). One criticism is that the subjective approach to epistemology makes it 
hard to justify knowledge claims about processes that are thought to be unobservable, 
except for examination of their effects in observable events (Johnson and Duberley, 
2000). The solution, argues Johnson and Duberley (2000) is for critical realism to adopt 
aspects from ‘pragmatism’. 
 
‘Pragmatism’ is briefly described as the ‘theory that a proposition is true if holding it to 
be so is practically successful or advantageous’ (Mautner, 2000). Pragmatists take the 
view that there is a reality independent of human minds as well as there being a reality 
within the mind (Creswell, 2007). For example, glass in a window can be observed; 
‘glass’ and ‘window’ are linguistic terms that refer to nothing beyond themselves. So it 
can be argued that the external reality of glass in the window is the product of social 
discourse. By changing the social construction of language, then it would be possible to 
deny the existence of glass and the window. Pragmatists argue that there are pragmatic 
limits to that approach. The pragmatic reality is to try stepping through the window 
without opening it first, to see if the social construction argument is valid (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000).  
 
In summary, Johnson and Duberley (2000) argue that there is a reality that can exist that 
is beyond our socially constructed discourse: 
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“…pragmatic-critical realism would argue that while agents socially construct 
versions of reality through language (interpretative processes from which there 
is no immunity), the structures of social reality constitute a practical order which 
acts independently of these constructions so as to constrain or enable our 
practical actions and interventions.” (p.166) 
 
The practical reality of, for example, glass in a window, constrains the social 
construction of language to describe that reality. Agreement might be reached to use a 
different discourse to describe the glass in the window, but the reality remains the same.  
The pragmatic approach allows critical realism to argue that observing the effect of a 
directly unobservable phenomenon is a legitimate means of accessing knowledge. 
  
There are two arguments for methodological pluralism that arise from pragmatic-critical 
realism (Johnson and Duberley, 2000, McLennan, 1995, Creswell, 2007). The first is 
that different research methods may be required to investigate the structural relations 
and the human subjective meanings of those relationships. The second argument, based 
on epistemological subjectivism, suggests that no one method can be regarded as 
superior. Each method is partial and provides different insights into the reality under 
examination. 
 
4.2.2.1 Appropriateness of the pragmatic-critical realism  
The pragmatic-critical realism is regarded as a subset of the realism paradigm and it is 
argued to be the most appropriate paradigm for this research. The justification for this 
position is set out following the categorisation of the different research paradigms 
(Perry, 1998).  
 
Inductive approach to theory building  
A SWE model is developed from the work of Rasmussen (1997), which provides the 
basis for the data gathering. As noted in the review of the literature, there is little 
theoretical basis for understanding how and why the dynamic interrelationship in 
complex socio-technical systems influence patient safety. Therefore, the research seeks 
to build theory using the SWE model, which describes the phenomenon but is limited in 
explaining how and why the dynamic interactions occur (Meredith, 1993). To address 
the research objective it is necessary to examine the interaction between the parts of the 
  Mike D Williams 
 84
system to find out the characteristics of the hospitals. To conduct the investigation 
requires the operational definition of key constructs, such as the boundaries of the SWE. 
How this is done is explored later in Chapter 5. Inferences are drawn from the 
investigation of social systems with open and fuzzy boundaries rather than hypothesis 
testing where the concepts can be controlled (Bhaskar, 1979). Therefore, inductive 
theory building derived from pragmatic-critical realism is regarded as an appropriate 
approach to study social systems (Riege, 2003, Healy and Perry, 2000).  
 
Objective reality 
As noted above, pragmatic-critical realism takes the view that there is a reality that is 
independent of human knowledge. Unlike positivism, it is accepted that there are 
aspects of reality that cannot be directly observed and that there will be different 
perspectives of the same reality. The realist approach to such a situation is to collect 
data from a number of sources and compare the different perceptions through a process 
of triangulation (Healy and Perry, 2000, Hammersley, 2008). Therefore, it is argued that 
researching relationships and their influences in complex social systems from a 
pragmatic-critical realist position does produce ‘observable’ data. The data is about the 
effects of phenomenon that are not directly observable, which produces knowledge 
(Healy and Perry, 2000). The production of knowledge is the goal of research (Melnyk 
and Handfield, 1998). 
 
Commensurable 
Commensurability requires there to be a common method of measurement (Mautner, 
2000). Common measures are required in order to assess the knowledge claims made by 
the research (Perry, 1998). Perry (1998) argues that the realist paradigm can achieve 
commensurability by ensuring that the methodology used meets the tests for validity 
and reliability required for scientific research. These issues are dealt with in Section 
4.4.2.1 below. 
 
Practical 
The final argument for the appropriateness of the pragmatic-critical realist approach is 
that it provides a way to engage with the issues faced by practitioners. It is argued that 
there is a considerable gap between research and practice and that the realism paradigm 
may assist in providing solutions to problems found in the workplace (Riege, 2003, 
Bartunek, 2007). 
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These four arguments justify the basis for taking a pragmatic-critical realist approach to 
this research. In the next section, the implications of this approach are applied to the 
debate within social science of the relationship between social structure and agency. 
4.2.3 Structure / Agent debate 
Before considering the methods employed in this research, it is worth reflecting further 
on the structure / agency debate in contemporary social theory. This is necessary to 
understand what is meant by ‘social structure’ at a conceptual level which will have 
relevance to the application of the SWE model in the case studies. 
 
Giddens (1979) has been at the centre of efforts to reconstitute the idea of social 
structure with his ‘theory of structuration’. The idea is to move beyond the dualism of 
structure and action. Giddens attempts to provide a theory that interweaves structure and 
action in the ongoing activity of social life (Held and Thompson, 1989). Structure is 
conceptualised as ‘rules and resources’ which provide a framework within which 
actions take place (Giddens, 1979). There are many critics of Giddens’ approach 
ranging from his failure to detail what is meant by ‘rules’ (Thompson, 1989), that the 
rules only provide for ‘cultural’ and not ‘social structuring’ (Porpora, 1998), through to 
what is perceived as ‘ontological dualism’ (King, 2004). 
 
The social science literature shows no agreement on what is meant by structure or 
whether such an entity exists beyond social construction (Scott, 2001). An inclusive 
approach to the analysis of social structure has been advocated by Scott (2001). He 
argues that social structure is ‘institutional’, ‘relational’ and ‘embodied’. Each of these 
is explained briefly: 
 
‘Institutions’ form the framework of society through which: 
“…practices become culturally standardised and that actions are guided, 
regulated and channelled. They regulate actions by defining social positions that 
people can occupy and the behaviour that is associated with them” (Scott, 2001. 
p.82) 
Institutions are cultural phenomena that do not exist in reality. However, structural 
patterns do exist in ‘the same way as the squareness of a box “exists”’ (Scott, 2001. 
p.83.) 
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‘Relational’ depicts the network of social relations between individuals. Specific 
relationships can be observed, such as a boss to a subordinate. Relationships are 
dynamic and a process rather than a thing. Scott (2001) suggests that the relationship 
develops ‘persistent and regular patterns of behaviour’ (p.81).  
 
‘Embodied’ is the term given by Scott (2001) to the work of Giddens (Giddens, 1976, 
Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984) and Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1977). Embodied structure 
means that: 
“…patterns of institutions and relations are the results of actions on the part of 
individuals who are endowed with the capacities or competencies that enable 
them to produce these structures by acting in organised ways. …Embodied 
structures are found in the habits and skills inscribed in human bodies and 
minds. These embodied structures allow them to produce, reproduce and 
transform their institutional and relational structures.” (Scott, 2001. p.84) 
 
Scott (2001) argues that social structure can be viewed from the three different 
perspectives of institutional, relational, and embodied as each provides different 
insights. Such an approach fits with the critical realist position of methodological 
pluralism and it therefore adopted in this thesis. A summary of the philosophical 
assumptions used are set out next. 
 
4.2.4 Summary of philosophical assumptions 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into the structure and agency debate in 
more depth. For the purposes of this research, social structure and agency is regarded as 
having a dialectic relationship; the agent and the structure are influenced by each other 
in a dynamic and ongoing manner. By making this assumption the notion that it is the 
structure that determines the actions of agents is rejected. Equally, the view that 
structure is purely the product of human agents is not accepted. ‘Structure’ is assumed 
to have the three aspects of ‘institutional’, ‘relational’ and ‘embodied’ (Scott, 2001). 
 
The philosophical assumptions are based on pragmatic-critical realism. For this research 
these assumptions are made: 
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• Objective ontology – there is a reality independent of human knowledge some of 
which is not directly observable 
• Subjective epistemology – there are different interpretations of reality 
• Human nature – a tendency towards voluntarism rather than determinism 
• Methodology – there are subjective interpretations of reality that require 
multiple methods to investigate 
The pragmatic position is adopted, which is that the key interest is in addressing the 
research objective rather than on maintaining paradigm purity. 
 
4.3 Philosophical assumptions in the current literature 
The philosophical assumptions used in the literature on patient safety, accident theory, 
resilience and SD is rarely made explicit. There are some clear examples of an 
‘interpretive’ approach using case study based qualitative research (Vaughan, 1996, 
Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001, Snook, 2000). Interestingly, the debate between ‘normal 
accident theory’ (NAT) and ‘high reliability theory’ (HRT) may have more to do with 
the underlying philosophical assumptions of the advocates of each theory, than 
differences in reality. HRT has been derived from an assumption by the researchers of 
‘voluntarism’ on the part of the agents who can influence the structure in complex 
systems. NAT researchers appear to take a more ‘determinist’ position – the complexity 
of the structure determines the outcome. 
 
Rasmussen (1997) appears to have an objective ontology in setting out a SWE model of 
a socio-technical system. What is less well developed is the underlying assumption 
about the role of agents in setting the boundary conditions or maintaining the OP within 
the envelope. Agents take compensating actions to avoid the OP breaching a boundary. 
Conceptually these actions appear to be reactive and ‘determined’ by the pressures from 
the ‘structure’. However, there is dynamic relationship between ‘structure’ and ‘agent’. 
This means that the ‘agents’ as well as ‘social structure’ are active in determining the 
location of the boundaries and the pressure on the OP. Agents achieve this through the 
dynamic feedback relationship with the ‘social structure’.  
 
The assumptions underlying SD are not usually stated. However, some detailed work 
has shown that if SD is considered to be a ‘method’ rather than a theory, then most 
applications of SD fit within the ‘functionalist sociology’ paradigm from Burrell and 
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Morgan’s (1979) framework (Lane, 1999). However, a number of papers develop the 
argument that SD does not fit well within the framework and needs to be situated in 
social theory (Lane, 2000b, Lane, 2001a, Lane, 2001b). One of Lane’s arguments 
(1999, 2001b), is that SD fits well with the contemporary social theory of the dialectic 
rather than dualistic relationship between structure and agency. For example, the 
concept of ‘feedback’ is core to the dialectic relationship and is a major feature of SD. 
The assumption is made in this research, following Lane (2001b), that the underlying 
social theory of SD is the contemporary dialectic relationship between structure and 
agency, discussed above. 
 
4.4 The research design and methodology 
The research design and methods of data collection are dependent on the question to be 
investigated. From the study of the literature it was recognised that there are a number 
of gaps in the understanding about the implications for patient safety of the system 
characteristics such as the dynamic interactions between the parts. At the end of Chapter 
3 the following research objective is stated: 
 
To explore, in NHS hospitals, how a systems approach can inform the development 
of patient safety theory. 
 
 
To investigate this objective an exploratory and empirical theory building approach 
(Meredith, 1998, Wacker, 1998) is taken to identify, explain and understand some of the 
system behaviours of hospitals and their influence on patient safety. There are a number 
of potential research designs which are briefly outlined. However, it is argued that case 
study is the most appropriate. 
 
The case studies are used to provide data that is abstracted to populate the SWE. The 
data provides insights into the context, the planned system design of the hospital, the 
actual design during perturbations and rich pictures about events, actions and decisions. 
Inferences and conclusions are drawn about the patterns of system behaviour which 
provide evidence about the systemic characteristics of the hospitals and how those 
influence patient safety. Conclusions are also drawn about the development of the SWE 
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model and the contribution to theory. This high level research process is illustrated in 
Figure 4.3: 
 
 
Figure 4.3: High level overview of empirical research process 
 
4.4.1 Research design 
The research design sets out the framework for collecting, analysing and discussing the 
data required in relation to the research objective. There are five main types of design: 
experimental; cross sectional; longitudinal; comparative; and case study. These designs 
should not be confused with data collection methods (Bryman and Bell, 2007). These 
designs are briefly examined to establish the most applicable to the research objective. 
 
Experimental: the basis of this design is to test whether an independent variable makes a 
difference to a dependent variable. Usually this involves establishing an experimental 
group and a control group. As Bryman and Bell (2007) point out this type of design is 
rarely used in organisations due to the difficulty of controlling the many independent 
variables. This design is not thought suitable for this research. 
 
Cross sectional: this is often referred to as a survey design but other data collection 
methods can be used. The design entails collecting data at a point in time from a number 
Patterns of system 
behaviour 
Systemic 
Characteristics 
SWE Model constructs (v3) 
Context: constraints, demands 
Planned system design 
Actual system design 
Case 
Studies 
 
 
Data 
sources 
Rich picture; 
events, 
actions, 
decisions 
Theory 
development 
Influence on 
patient safety 
Increasing abstraction 
  Mike D Williams 
 90
of cases (people, organisations) about two or more variables in such a way as to 
examine and detect patterns from the data (Bryman and Bell, 2007). It requires that the 
researchers are clear about the variables under investigation and develop suitable data 
gathering instruments to draw out relational associations. The variables associated with 
the dynamic interrelationships are not easily determined prior to conducting field work 
to create a suitable data gathering instrument. This approach excludes the possibility for 
rich data arising from qualitative methods of interviewing and observation which can 
provide the means to triangulate the data. Therefore this design is not regarded as the 
most the most appropriate. 
 
Longitudinal: the object being investigated is studied over a period of time with more 
than one data collection point. It is often a cross sectional design applied to cases that 
are repeated. Although there are aspects of this research undertaken over a number of 
months, the revisiting of data sources is not a key requirement to explore the research 
question. Additionally, due to the time constraints of this research, this type of design is 
not considered feasible. 
 
Comparative: the study is conducted using the same data collection methods in two or 
more contrasting cases. The point is to draw the comparison between the cases 
investigated. As this research was not seeking to learn from comparisons between 
hospitals, this design is not considered suitable. 
 
Case study: is an in depth study conducted on one or more cases. Cases can be 
individuals, organisations, events or locations (Bryman and Bell, 2007, Gerring, 2007). 
Case studies can be used longitudinally or for comparison between cases. A case study 
is defined by Yin (2003) as: 
“…an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.”  (Yin, 2003) p.63. 
 
The case study design is thought to be the most suitable for this research. The 
justification for this choice is set out below. 
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4.4.2  Justification for the use of case study design 
A case study is thought to be the most appropriate for this research for the following 
reasons: 
 
First, the research into the dynamic interactions between the parts of hospital systems 
requires an understanding of the context within which the complex socio-technical 
system operates. The case study design is suitable where there is complexity in the 
subject matter (Stuart et al., 2002). Empirical investigation of cases can provide the 
richness of understanding that is often not available through other means (Wacker, 
1998, Yin, 2003, Rynes, 2007, Voss et al., 2002). 
 
Second, the relationship of the phenomenon being examined to the context of the case 
study is not known prior to the commencement of data gathering. Yin (2003) argues that 
case studies are suitable in such circumstance providing that there is a theoretical 
background to guide the data collection and analysis. The SWE model (Rasmussen, 
1997) provides a theoretical basis for this research. 
 
Third, the research takes an inductive empirical approach to theory building (Wacker, 
1998). Case study is regarded as a suitable design to answer the what, how and why 
questions associated with building or developing theory (Meredith, 1998, Yin, 2003, 
Riege, 2003). 
 
Fourth, there is a desire for the research to have practical application. Using a case study 
design allows for direct engagement with practitioners and the opportunity for them to 
comment on the findings and to provide insights that will help them apply the learning 
arising from the study (Melnyk and Handfield, 1998, Rynes, 2007, Voss et al., 2002). 
 
Therefore, case study design is regarded as an appropriate framework through which to 
gather data to explore the research objective. Before detailing the case studies, data 
collection and analysis methods used, the issues of the validity and reliability of case 
studies are reviewed. 
4.4.2.1  Judging the quality of case studies 
Yin (2003) suggests four tests that can be applied to case studies to judge their quality. 
These are: construct validity; internal validity; external validity; and reliability. The 
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objectivist philosophical assumptions behind the need to be explicit on these issues of 
validity is not always shared by others who take a more subjectivist ontology and 
epistemology (Stake, 1995, Flyvbjerg, 2006). However, it is helpful to have a means of 
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the case study design and to meet the 
requirement for commensurability (Riege, 2003, Perry, 1998). Yin (2003) suggests a 
number of tactics about how to conduct a case study that contribute to achieving the 
necessary validity and reliability, which are summarised in Table 4.2: 
 
Test Case study tactic Phase of research in 
which the tactic occurs 
Construct 
validity 
• Use multiple sources of evidence 
• Establish chain of evidence 
• Have key informants review draft 
report 
data collection 
data collection 
 
composition 
Internal 
validity 
• Do pattern matching 
• Do explanation building 
• Address rival explanations 
• Use logic models 
data analysis 
data analysis 
data analysis 
data analysis 
External 
validity 
• Use theory in single case studies 
• Use replication logic in multiple 
case studies 
research design 
 
research design 
Reliability • Use case study protocol 
• Develop a case study database 
data collection 
data collection 
 
Table 4.2: Case study tactics to meet the four design tests  
(Yin, 2003, p.34) 
 
The validity of research is concerned about the accuracy of the report of what has been 
studied (Silverman, 1993). The criticism of case studies is that researchers are too 
subjective and can lack consistency in establishing what data collection should be 
undertaken (Yin, 2003). A tactic to improve the construct validity is to use multiple 
sources of evidence which can then be triangulated (Healy and Perry, 2000). Few other 
research designs can bring multiple sources of data together on a particular phenomenon 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007). Therefore, the use of multiple sources can improve both the 
validity and reliability of the outcome (Hammersley, 2008). Yin (2003) also advises 
building a ‘chain of evidence’ and asking key informants from the case study to review 
the conclusions. 
 
Internal validity is a concern for case studies seeking to make causal explanations (Yin, 
2003) . Often in qualitative case studies inferences of causation are made. Riege (2003) 
  Mike D Williams 
 93
argues that case studies, to be internally valid, must not just find patterns but try to show 
the components which might explain those patterns. Yin (2003) argues that for 
inferences to have validity, alternative explanations as to why patterns occur, should be 
considered and the evidence converged. 
 
External validity relates to the generalisable nature of case studies (Riege, 2003, Yin, 
2003). Critics often see case studies from the perspective of quantitative research and 
therefore suggest that the sample size is too small to generate generalisable results. It is 
often argued that case studies suffer from the weakness of being context specific and 
therefore transferability of findings to other situations is problematic (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). Those arguments misunderstand case study design, which is not a sample from a 
population (Meredith, 1998, Flyvbjerg, 2006). A small number of cases can raise issues 
that have wider scale application. For example, Charles Darwin’s small scale 
comparative case study of the differences between the finches in the South American 
mainland and those on the Galapagos Islands, created a theory on causal mechanism 
that had wide spread applicability (George and Bennett, 2005)  
 
Flyvbjerg (2006) defends case studies against a number of criticisms. He suggests that 
properly selected and conducted case studies can be generalisable. He uses the example 
of the proposition that ‘all swans are white’, which can be refuted by the observation of 
one black swan. Flyvbjerg’s point is that case studies are excellent at finding ‘black 
swans’, as they are often hidden in the detail. Finding ‘black swans’ can have general 
significance. He adds that 
“…formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, 
whereas ‘the force of example’ is underestimated.” (Flyvbjerg, 2006) p.228. 
 
Yin (2003) suggests one means to improve external validity is having a strong 
theoretical base for the study or to use the same conceptual framework when doing 
more than one study. However, as noted above, there are other reasons why case studies 
can have validity beyond the context of their conduct (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
 
Reliability seeks to provide evidence of a well conducted study that has minimal errors 
and biases and could be repeated by another investigator on the same case with the same 
findings (Yin, 2003). Researching social systems makes any repetition unlikely to 
produce the same results, but the research procedures should be made explicit (Healy 
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and Perry, 2000, Riege, 2003). The tactic to help achieve reliability is to create an audit 
trail setting out the data collection methods used and creating a case study database 
(Yin, 2003).  
 
The next two sections set out the unit of analysis used and the selection and justification 
of the case studies. 
4.4.2.2 The Unit of analysis   
A key principle in the design of case studies is in clearly defining what constitutes the 
‘case’ as a unit of analysis (Gillham, 2000). The research objective is related to 
hospitals. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the whole hospital as a system. To build a 
picture of the wider hospital an embedded approach (Yin, 2003), a stratified purposeful 
method (Miles and Huberman, 1994), is used to examine three within case units of 
analysis.  The reason for choosing an embedded approach is to overcome the weakness 
of a holistic case study design.  Yin (2003) argues that a holistic approach may mean the 
study is conducted at an abstract level as the researcher may not get into the operational 
detail.  One of the reasons behind selecting three embedded areas is to cover both the 
formal and informal actions that occur. This assists in understanding the macro context, 
along with the managers and individual team members (micro) response. The three units 
are: 
Organisational: Trust Board and hospital wide operational processes 
Sub unit:  Division of Medicine 
Team:   Ward / Consultant Team / Department members 
 
The departments of paediatrics and obstetrics are excluded from the study as access to 
those areas was not permitted. Whilst the unit of analysis is the hospital, it is accepted 
that any hospital works within a wider context that creates influences and responses (see 
Figure 5.4). The open boundary of socio-technical systems to their context is an 
important feature that has to be taken into account (Cilliers, 1998). In Chapter 5 the 
SWE model is developed to include the impact of the context on the operational 
performance of the hospital and how that might influence patient safety. 
4.4.3.1  Selection and justification of the case studies 
Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that cases can be selected for a number of reasons. 
Cases are not a sample from a population. Rather they are selected to provide particular 
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insights. In this research, having chosen hospitals to be the unit of analysis, purposeful 
selection (Patton, 2002) was made on the basis of NHS hospitals that provided some 
contrasting internal characteristics (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The hospitals were 
also selected within the same Strategic Health Authority (SHA) and Primary Care Trust 
(PCT) area. This meant that the some of the external context is consistent. A further 
case study was selected from a different part of England, which provided particular 
insights into significant patient safety failures. The cases selected are: 
 
Case study 1 (CS 1) was chosen as an example of a high performing large hospital 
which is a NHS Foundation Trust (FT). In 2007/08 it achieved the highest rating of 
‘Excellent’ for financial management and ‘Excellent’ for quality of care by the Care 
Quality Commission (Care Quality Commission, 2009). It has a stable leadership team 
where the externally validated track record (Healthcare Commission, 2006a) suggests 
an ability to manage both the external and internal competing pressures. A period of 
intense pressure on bed capacity during the period October 2008 to February 2009 was 
studied. This period included episodes of a sickness virus that closed bed capacity and a 
sustained peak in demand early in January 2009. The points of high demand on bed 
capacity were examined as a means of magnifying the competing pressures, the staff 
actions in response to those pressures and the implications for patient safety.  
 
Case study 2 (CS 2) is a small NHS general hospital serving a large rural area. It has a 
history of financial and operational difficulties with a number of interim chief 
executives. In 2005/06 it had been ranked the lowest of the four ratings, being ‘Weak’ 
for both financial management and quality of care (Care Quality Commission, 2009). In 
2007 a new chief executive and chairman were appointed and the financial and 
operational situation was stabilised. In 2008/09 the Trust was rated second highest out 
of four possible ratings, being ‘Good’ for financial management and third highest, being 
‘Fair’ for quality of care (Care Quality Commission, 2009). The Trust seeks to become 
a FT but has not yet been recommended by the Strategic Health Authority. The period 
of observation and interviews took place in December 09 – January 10. 
 
Case study 3 (CS 3) is the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. This case was 
selected as there were known patient safety problems and publically available reports 
about what happened in the hospital. In 2007/08 and 2008/09 it had been rated ‘Good’ 
for financial management and ‘Weak’ for quality of care (Care Quality Commission, 
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2009). It is a small NHS general hospital that shortly after becoming a FT was 
investigated by the Healthcare Commission for an apparently higher than expected level 
of mortality (Healthcare Commission, 2009a). The results of that investigation led to an 
Independent Inquiry chaired by Robert Francis QC (Francis QC, 2010a, Francis QC, 
2010b). The independent regulator of FTs, ‘Monitor’, also commissioned an audit 
report of their processes leading up to the approval of the Trust to become an FT 
(KPMG, 2009). The management team at Monitor then responded to that audit 
(Monitor, 2009). The data about CS 3 was derived from the secondary sources listed in 
Appendix 4.1. 
  
The next section presents the research methods used to gather and analysis the data. 
4.5 Research methods 
Bryman and Bell (2007) argue that the separation of qualitative and quantitative 
methods is often over emphasised. The qualitative and quantitative methods often share 
the subject matter of investigation. As such the clear dividing line between them is 
questioned when the complicated process of research is taken into account (Bergman, 
2008). As noted previously, the context for this research is the complex socio-technical 
hospital system.  Social systems are multi-dimensional (Mason, 2006). It is argued that 
mixed methods can assist in developing the understanding of complex social worlds. 
Different methods can provide an insight into both the micro social experience and the 
macro contextual explanations (Mason, 2006).  
 
Mixing research methods has raised the debate about whether the underlying paradigms 
can allow such an approach (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003, Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
There are ‘purists’ who argue that such a mix is not possible and ‘pragmatists’ who take 
the underlying assumption that, to gain a wider understanding of the phenomenon, a 
range of epistemological perspective can be used (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007).  
Bryman and Bell (2007) suggest that qualitative and quantitative research do not 
constitute paradigms given the overlap between them. Yin (2003) argues that by using 
multiple sources of information it is possible to triangulate the data relating to a 
phenomenon thereby strengthening the ‘construct validity’ of the research.  
 
A concurrent approach to gathering data through quantitative and qualitative means is 
employed to allow different perspectives to be obtained about the hospital being 
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studied. This helps to increase the validity of the findings (Creswell, 2003).  The 
collection of quantitative data about the changing number of patients in the hospital 
during peaks in demand informs the wider qualitative study (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007). The data analysis is an ongoing process of data reduction, display and drawing 
conclusions (Miles and Huberman, 1994). A summary of the data sources and methods 
is provided in Table 4.3. Further details relating to each method are set out below 
(paragraph numbers are referenced in the Tables). 
 
Para 
Ref 
Case Source of data  Data collection method 
4.5.1 All Documents from: Department of 
Health; Monitor; Healthcare 
Commission; Case study hospitals; 
Primary Care Trust commissioning 
services from the hospitals; Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust Inquiries. 
Hermeneutical analysis 
4.5.1 All Documents from: Department of 
Health; Case Studies 1 & 2 Risk 
Assurance Reports  
Content analysis 
4.5.2 1 & 2 Hospital staff – purposefully 
selected 
Semi-structured interviews 
4.5.3 1 & 2 Hospital staff working – 
purposefully selected 
Non-participant observation 
4.5.4 1 & 2 Patient Administration System 
(PAS); Bed Mgt database 
Descriptive statistics 
4.5.5 1 & 2 
 
Interviewees Questionnaire 
4.5.6 1 & 2 
 
Interviews; observations;  Casual Loop Diagrams 
4.5.7 1 & 2 
 
Interviews; observations;  Stock Flow Diagrams 
 
Table 4.3: Summary of sources of data and data collection methods 
 
The data collected by the various methods is coded and reduced into themes. Table 4.4 
details the data collection methods which are used to generate the themes and the 
paragraph numbers providing further detail below. The details of which data collection 
method contributed to the themes is also set out in Table 4.4. 
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Para 
ref 
Data collection 
method 
 Theme Data used 
4.5.1 1. Hermeneutical 
 
 Context 1,2 
4.5.1 2. Content analysis  Planned 
design 
1,4,8 
4.5.2 3. Interviews  Actual 
design 
3,4,5,7,8 
4.5.3 4. Observations  Rich 
pictures 
3,4 
4.5.4 5. Statistics 
 
   
4.5.5 6. Questionnaire 
 
   
4.5.6 7. CLDs 
 
   
4.5.7 8. SFDs 
 
   
 
Table 4.4: Summary of data sources and their application to themes 
 
The data sources used to populate the SWE model constructs and identified 
characteristics are set out in Table 4.5. 
 
Construct Characteristics Data method source used 
Boundaries Visibility  
 
Movement 
 
Location 
 
Marginal zone 
(buffer capacity) 
 
1,2,3,4,5,6 
 
3,4,5,7,8 
 
1,2,3,4,5 
 
3,4,5,7,8 
Operating Point Location 
 
Movement 
3,4,5,7,8 
 
3,4,5,7,8 
Gradients Scale 
 
Pressure 
 
1,2,3,4 
 
1,2,3,4,5,6 
Structure 
 
Coupling 3,4,5,7,8 
Feedback 
 
Type 3,4,5,7,8 
 
Table 4.5: Summary of data sources used to establish the characteristics of the SWE 
constructs 
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In the next section further detail is provided about each data collection method set out in 
Table 4.3 and 4.4 above. The paragraph numbers used below relate to those used in the 
Tables. 
4.5.1 Analysis of Documents 
In this research, texts are regarded as part of the reality being studied (Tew, 2001, Flick, 
2006). Initially there was a hermeneutical analysis of documents to provide the 
contextual overview. Hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation and meaning of 
texts. There are a number of philosophical positions related to hermeneutics (Prasad, 
2005). The assumption made in this research is that to understand the text (‘the part’) it 
is necessary to learn about the context (‘the whole’). In turn the ‘whole’ can only be 
understood from the interaction with and of the ‘parts’ (Prasad, 2002). This is referred 
to as the ‘hermeneutic circle’ in which the readers understanding of the context 
influences their interpretation of the text and vice versa. Prasad (2005) suggests that 
such a method can broaden the understanding of an organisation being studied. It is 
argued that corporate reports or policy documents indicate less about the author than 
about the concerns of the powerful stakeholders that influence the creation of the text 
(Prasad and Mir, 2002, Prasad, 2005). Such text may also hold ‘hidden’ meanings 
where a particular ‘spin’ is being placed on the content of the document to hide or 
emphasise certain realities (Prasad, 2005, Prasad and Mir, 2002). Readers should 
approach a text both trusting the intention of the document, whilst also being critical 
(hermeneutics of faith and suspicion) (Prasad, 2005). 
 
‘Hermeneutics’ in this research is considered as the process of understanding texts from 
the perspective of the author or stakeholders who create the document (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007, Prasad, 2002). This requires that attention is focused on the wider context 
and history within which the documents being reviewed were produced and 
acknowledging the prior knowledge and expectations of the researcher (Prasad, 2002). 
Documents from the Department of Health, Monitor, the Healthcare Commission and 
Inquiry Reports were examined with the prior theoretical basis of the SWE model. The 
documents were assessed for the emphasis given to themes of finance, targets, staff 
workload and patient safety, relating to the boundaries of the envelope. The hospital 
Annual Reports and Trust Board papers were reviewed to provide background 
information and the importance attached to themes relating to the failure boundaries. 
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The hermeneutical analysis informed the inferences drawn about the SWE boundary 
and gradient constructs as outlined in Table 4.5. (The documents collected are detailed 
in Appendix 4.1) 
 
Quantitative content analysis of certain documents was undertaken (Neuendorf, 2002, 
Bryman and Bell, 2007). This is done to ‘quantify content in terms of predetermined 
categories and in a systematic and replicable manner.’ (Bryman and Bell, 2007) The 
predetermined categories used are developed from the boundaries of the SWE model. 
Words or phrases associated with each boundary were selected based on previous 
research and the hermeneutical examination of the documents. The documents were 
searched for the word or phrase. Where the context of the word or phrase fitted within 
the predetermined category it was counted. It is suggested that the frequency of 
occurrence of key words or phrases gives an insight into the value or importance of 
issues to the organisation producing the document (Bryman and Bell, 2007). The 
method can also be replicated to study documents published over a time period, as is 
done in this research.  
 
Allocating words and phrases into categories does require some interpretation by the 
researcher. The method also has other limitations as it does not examine the wider 
context within which documents are produced. Therefore, in this research, the 
quantitative content analysis helps to inform the hermeneutical reading of the 
documents. Further details are presented in Chapter 5 of how this data source provides 
evidence for the contextualisation and development of the SWE model. 
 
4.5.2 Semi-structured interviews 
During the period of high level demand for inpatient beds, semi-structured interviews of 
doctors, nurses, managers and directors were conducted and recorded (Kvale, 2008, 
Rubin and Rubin, 1995, Flick, 2007, Silverman, 1993). The semi-structured interview 
technique was chosen as it provides for the use of an interview guide, whilst retaining 
the flexibility to explore deeper into issues raised by interviewees (Rubin and Rubin, 
1995). Rubin and Rubin (1995), argue that the design of qualitative interviewing is 
‘flexible, iterative and continuous’.  For them that means: 
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‘that each time you repeat the basic process of gathering information, analyzing 
it, winnowing it, and testing it, you come closer to a clear convincing model of 
the phenomenon you are studying’ (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p.46).   
 
A research protocol with interview questions was developed from the SWE (v3) model 
(as detailed in Chapter 5) and the research objective (Appendix 4.2). An interview guide 
provides the initial questions and themes, although issues emerge during interviews that 
required exploration in line with process suggested by Rubin and Rubin (1995).  
 
Interviewees were purposefully selected as expert informants and stratified from the 
different professions and embedded areas of each hospital (see Table 4.6, 4.7 and 
Appendix 4.3) (Patton, 2002). Informed written consent was obtained from each 
interviewee. Interviews lasted between 30 to 75 minutes. A field notebook was used to 
record immediate reflections after each interview (Silverman, 2005). 
 
Level Manager Nurse Doctor Totals 
Board 4 1* 1** 6 
Directorate 7 4 2 13 
Ward 0 7 5 12 
Totals 11 12 8 31 
 
Table 4.6: Case study 1 number of interviewees by profession and embedded level in 
the hospital 
 (* Director of Nursing; **Medical Director) 
 
Level Manager Nurse Doctor Totals 
Board 4 1* 1** 6 
Directorate 3 1 1 5 
Ward 0 2 2 4 
Totals 7 4 4 15 
 
Table 4.7: Case study 2 number of interviewees by profession and embedded level in 
the hospital 
 
The recorded interviews were professionally transcribed and then checked by the 
researcher. Copies of the transcripts were sent to interviewees for them to review and 
amend as necessary. No changes were made by the interviewees. Analysis of the 
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transcripts was undertaken using NVivo 8. An initial coding tree was devised using the 
SWE model and the research objective. Further codes were added arising from the 
analysis of the text (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The coding tree hierarchies are 
presented in Chapter 6, which are used for data reduction and analysis of the interview 
transcripts. Data is presented in Chapters 6 – 8 to provide evidence of how it informs 
and populates the SWE model. 
4.5.3 Non-participant observation 
Non-participative observation of staff actions and meetings were undertaken. This 
method was used to provide an additional source of data, to gain background 
information for the interviews and to inform the system dynamic diagrams. A non-
participant style was chosen to avoid being drawn into the actual work, to allow a 
broader access to staff and locations, and to avoid complicating the ethical approval 
process. 
 
The observations included the actions of bed managers, management meetings, senior 
nurses, doctors rounds, the emergency department (ED), the medical assessment unit 
(MAU) (also known as the emergency medical unit - EMU), the process of patient 
admissions, transfers and discharges. Notes were taken at the time of observation in 
Field Notebooks (FN). Reflections and themes were noted shortly after the field work 
and links to theoretical concepts, such as ‘practical drift’ of the OP (Snook, 2000), were 
recorded. Such a note taking method is advocated to increase the reliability of 
observational data (Silverman, 1993). The observation and interview data informed the 
creation of the system dynamic diagrams. The observations also provided data for ‘rich 
descriptions’ of the competing dynamics and the individual stories and reactions (Stake, 
1995). Data from observations was used to triangulate with interview and statistical 
sources to provide evidence in the ‘rich picture’ and ‘actual design’ themes to populate 
the SWE model. 
 
4.5.4 Descriptive statistics 
Hospital administrative data provide the descriptive statistics relating to demand and 
capacity. (The list of statistical data gathered is set out in Appendix 4.1) This data is 
used to inform the wider case study by looking at trends over time using run charts and 
statistical process control charts (Wheeler, 2003). Triangulation of the data is 
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undertaken between the interviews, observations and the descriptive statistics. For 
example, one of the key measures used in CS 1 and 2 was the number of medical 
patients who are accommodated on non-medical wards each day. These patients are 
known as ‘medical outliers’. This statistic is used as an indicator of the ability of the 
hospital to meet the demand for inpatient beds and is one way to depict the pressure and 
location of the OP. Many of the dynamics that occur in relation to pressure on the OP 
happen over very short time periods of minutes and hours. The case study hospitals do 
not routinely collect the time of day the inpatient admission, transfer and discharge 
occur. Therefore, the implications of changes in demand at certain times of the day were 
gathered from observations, interviews and from the work of the information analysts in 
the hospitals. Historical data from a previous study that had gathered data by the hour 
was used [CS 1: xls 1.11]. 
 
4.5.5 Questionnaire 
A simple questionnaire was administered to every interviewee (Appendix 4.4). It was 
administered at the beginning of the interview and was designed to obtain 
demographical data and their perception of priority setting at different levels in the 
hospital in relation to the failure boundaries of the SWE model. This method is used to 
supplement the interview data and observations and to assist in triangulation particularly 
in examining the ‘boundary’ and ‘gradient’ construct of the model. 
 
4.5.6 Causal Loop Diagrams (CLD) 
CLDs are used as part of the data display (Miles and Huberman, 1994). They also 
provide an insight into the coupling and feedback loops between the parts of the 
hospital system that were observed and discussed in the interviews. The principles and 
conventions used in CLDs are set out in Appendix 2.1. In Chapter 8, CLDs are used to 
illustrate how the parts of the hospital are related. For example, when the admission rate 
into the MAU rises the admission rate to the wards also rises as the two department are 
linked in the flow of patients through the hospital. CLDs are used to show the direction 
of the relationship; in this example the same direction as both rates rise. When the flow 
of patients does not follow the planned route, then CLDs are able to show the 
consequences as new feedback loops are created. The diagrams can show where there is 
a delay in the feedback process. Delays make it harder for decision makers to 
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comprehend the relationship between a particular action and the resulting and 
potentially unforeseen consequences (Sterman, 1989, Dekker, 2011). 
 
A key function of CLDs is to demonstrate the type of the feedback loops that occur. As 
noted in Section 2.4.2, these are either reinforcing or balancing loops. When a system 
switches between types of feedback loop dominating it creates certain patterns of 
behaviour, such as oscillation (Sterman, 2000). CLDs provide a means to increase the 
understanding as to why the hospitals studied oscillate between stable and unstable 
states. 
 
4.5.7 Stock Flow Diagrams (SFD) 
SFDs are used to display the patient flows into and through the hospital and the location 
and links between the wards and departments (Lane and Husemann, 2008b). In Chapter 
8, SFDs are used as a qualitative method (Wolstenholme, 1999). This method is used to 
model the high level planned design of the hospitals. This is done to illustrate the 
separation of the flow of medical and surgical patients (Figure 8.3). The impact on the 
planned design, which occurs due to the change in the flow of patients, is illustrated 
with a SFD (Figure 8.10). The change in the direction of the flow of patients when 
stocks (wards) become full creates a coupling of the previously separated flows of 
patients. 
 
SFDs extend the SWE by conceptualising the dynamic interactions that occur between 
the parts of a hospital and how those change when there are perturbations due to high 
levels of demand. 
4.6 Ethical issues 
There are four main areas of ethical concern: whether there is harm to participants; lack 
of informed consent; invasion of privacy or whether there is any deception involved 
(Bryman, 2004). 
 
This study involved participants from the staff of the case study hospitals 1 and 2. No 
patients were directly involved in the study although staff working with patients were 
observed. The patient’s permission was sought when the researcher was present.  To 
ensure informed consent to participate and that there is no deception or invasion of 
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privacy, the researcher provided those being interviewed and observed with an 
information sheet about the research (Appendix 4.5). Written consent was obtained 
from those interviewed and those being observed for prolonged periods (Appendix 4.6). 
 
In summary the information sheet provided to each participant set out the following: 
• purpose and scope of the research 
• who is funding and undertaking the research 
• that contributions will be anonymised 
• that transcripts can be checked by participants  
• that interviews or observations can be stopped at any point without reason 
• that if patient safety is being found to be seriously compromised putting patients 
in immediate danger, the researcher has a duty of care to report that to the on-
call Director 
• how the results will be disseminated 
 
Given the nature of the research, it is feasible that staff actions being inquired about 
may have shown that patient safety was being compromised.  Therefore the following 
principles were adopted by the researcher to ensure that no harm was being done: 
 
• If during the study the researcher discovers processes, procedures or systems 
that might be putting patients in immediate danger he will raise it with the staff 
concerned, explaining his and their duty of care, and break the confidentiality of 
the research process and make the problem known to the on-call Director.  This 
action would be undertaken on the basis of the need for all parties to learn and 
that the staff involved would not be blamed. 
• If during the study the researcher discovers processes, procedures or systems 
that might be putting patient’s safety at longer term risk he will raise it with the 
staff concerned and then the Director with responsibility for risk management or 
the Chief Executive. 
• If during the study the researcher discovers areas within the hospital that are 
exemplars in improving or managing patient safety he will bring that to the 
attention of the Director with responsibility for risk management having sought 
the permission of the staff concerned.  
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• If during the study the researcher encounters staff that become upset or 
distressed in any way, the interview or observation would cease immediately 
and the staff member helped to find assistance as appropriate. 
 
The following ethical principles are applied.  
• The anonymity and privacy of those who participate in the research is respected 
and that personal information and research data is kept confidential.   
• The researcher is sensitive to the impact of the research on individuals and will 
seek to minimise any distress caused by participating. 
• All published work is anonymised unless otherwise requested and papers will 
detail the source of funding for the research.   
• The storage of electronic data will comply with the requirements of the Data 
Protection Act.  
• Any publications relating to the outcome of the study will acknowledge the 
financial support from NHS South West and that the researcher had been 
employed within the NHS as a senior manager including in one of the case study 
hospitals (1986-90; 92-97).  
 
Prior to the commencement of the research ethical approval was received from the 
University of Exeter and the local NHS Ethics Committee (Appendix 4.7) 
 
4.7 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is defined as ‘thoughtful, conscious self-awareness’ that examines not only 
the research methodology but also the interaction of the researcher with the matter being 
investigated (Finlay, 2002). Given the previous career history of the researcher (as a 
Chief Executive, Director and manager within the NHS for nearly twenty years, 
including employment in case study 1 hospital during 1986-1990; 1992-1997 ) and the 
participatory aspects in some of the research methods, there is the need for reflexivity 
(Holliday, 2002).  The researcher influences the collection and analysis of the data 
(Finlay, 2002). It is a subjective process that exhibits properties of co-production 
(Steier, 1991).  Therefore, the researcher must critically reflect on their own 
assumptions, views and actions related to the area of investigation.  Potter (1996) 
suggests three strategies to achieve reflexivity.  The first is to provide a transparent 
account of the research process and context which is available for audit purposes.  
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Second, to disclose any assumptions and bias that might influence the data collection, 
analysis and interpretation.  Third, for the researcher to reflect on the methods and take 
a self critical stance in relation to the data interpretation in the light of prior assumptions 
and potential bias (Potter, 1996). 
 
It is recognised that the presence of the researcher has an impact on the staff in the 
organisation being studied. The focus of the study is on patient safety and certain staff 
emphasised how safe the hospital is. Other staff used the presence of the researcher to 
highlight particular safety or operational issues. The researcher used triangulation from 
two or more data sources to balance this bias. 
 
The personal experiences of the researcher in the NHS up to 2007 include the emphasis 
on achieving targets and financial balance demonstrated by a tough system of 
performance management. Other experiences include significant patient safety failures 
in radiotherapy, breast cancer screening and hospital acquired infections. The researcher 
has also been involved in introducing systems to improve operational performance and 
patient safety in hospitals. 
 
This thesis does not present detailed reflexive analysis but does draw out in the 
discussion some of the personal bias that has influenced the research. 
 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter defends the suitability of pragmatic-critical realism for this research. The 
assumption is made that there is a reality independent from human understanding and 
that knowledge of that reality is derived by humans taking differing perspectives. Such 
a philosophical approach is suitable to investigate complex socio-technical systems and 
allows multiple sources of data to be used to gain the breadth of understanding needed. 
From social science the view is taken that ‘agents’ have a dynamic interactive 
(dialectic) relationship with social ‘structures’. Therefore, both ‘agents’ and ‘structures’ 
influence each other in a process of constant feedback. 
 
Case study is regarded as the most suitable research design as it can deal with the 
complexity and contextual basis of the research objective. The case studies are 
identified and eight methods of data collection and analysis proposed. The study takes 
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the approach of embedding the quantitative data within and informing the wider 
qualitative study. Thematic analysis of the data is undertaken to inform the population 
of the SWE model. There are limits to the research which are detailed in Chapter 10. 
The ethical and reflexivity issues are identified and the actions taken specified. 
 
In the next chapter the Rasmussen’s (1997) SWE model is developed and 
contextualised for application within the case study hospitals.  
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Chapter 5 - Contextualising the Conceptual Model 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The position reached at the end of Chapter 2 is the recognition that the extant literature 
lack explanatory power as to how the ‘system’ influences patient safety. Key features of 
systems, such as the coupling and interacting feedback between the parts, which creates 
the behaviour of the whole, are identified from system thinking. In Chapter 3 concepts 
are derived from the wider accident theory literature that takes account of systemic 
issues such as interacting parts, coupling and feedback. System resilience theory is 
suggested as a means to bring together, in a theoretical framework, the concepts from 
patient safety, systems thinking and accident theory. The SWE (Rasmussen, 1997) is 
identified as a model that takes account of the complex socio-technical aspects of 
healthcare with the many competing dynamics and the requirement for safe 
performance.  
 
At the end of Chapter 3 it is identified that there are some weaknesses with the SWE 
model. It does not take account of the ‘cross scale interactions’ (Woods, 2006) or the 
dynamic interactions created by the flow of work through the system. This chapter 
further develops the SWE to strengthen the model. 
 
The development of the model is done in two ways. The first is through the synthesis of 
the literature to incorporate the dynamic occurrences within the envelope, presented in 
Section 5.1. The synthesis involves bringing concepts from SD and social theory, 
together with the SWE, to create the SWE (version 2) that incorporates concepts from 
accident theory. 
 
The second development is the contextualisation of the model, set out in Section 5.2. 
The extension of the model is undertaken by examining the context within which NHS 
hospitals in England work. The contextualisation is achieved through a hermeneutic and 
content analysis of NHS policy documents. The result of this phase of the research 
clearly highlights the importance of performance targets for NHS hospitals. The original 
model provided by Rasmussen (1997) (SWE v1) is extended to incorporate ‘target 
failure’ as a boundary within the model. In addition to the ‘boundary’ construct, four 
other constructs derived from the developed SWE model are identified. The additional 
  Mike D Williams 
 110
insights into the system characteristics derived through the application of SD are 
illustrated.  
 
The chapter concludes by arguing that the constructs from the contextualised SWE (v3), 
and the concepts from the safety literature indentified in Chapter 3, provide the 
conceptual basis to analyse the case study data.  
 
5.1 Developing the conceptual model 
It is argued in Chapter 2 that healthcare operates within a dynamic complex socio-
technical system (Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001, Plsek and Wilson, 2001, Braithwaite et 
al., 2009, Sweeney and Griffiths, 2002). As noted, the extant literature is weak in 
providing a conceptual model to consider how the characteristics and dynamics of a 
socio-technical system influence patient safety. It is therefore, necessary to synthesise 
the literature to develop a suitable conceptual model that takes account of the dynamic 
and systemic characteristics that influence patient safety.  
5.1.1 Synthesising the literature 
There are a number of important concepts relating to safety arising from the 
characteristics of ‘systems’ that are found in the accident theory literature. However, the 
conceptual models used in healthcare situations, such as the Swiss Cheese model 
(Reason, 1997), are limited as they are do not fully take account of the dynamic non-
linear feedback that occurs in complex socio-technical systems (Roelen et al., 2010, 
Dekker, 2011). 
 
Rasmussen (1997) argues that for us to consider safety at a higher conceptual level, it is 
necessary to take account of the complex sociotechnical nature of the problem space. 
His SWE model is used by ‘resilience engineering’ theorists and applied to a limited 
extent to healthcare (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005, Miller and Xiao, 2007, Amalberti et 
al., 2006). For the purpose of this thesis, the SWE model provides a means to articulate 
two underlying themes. First, the model takes into account the complex and competing 
dynamics that occur in the performance of a system. Second, a resilient system can be 
conceptualised as one where the operating point is able to remain within the SWE at 
times of perturbation or continuous stress and is therefore more likely to keep patients 
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safe. The model therefore provides a ‘system resilience’ perspective to consider safe 
performance. 
 
The reader is reminded that the boundaries of the envelope depict the constraints within 
which the system is expected to operate. The performance of the system in relation to 
the boundaries is depicted by the movement and location of the OP. The dynamics 
under which the system operates is depicted by the gradients exerting competing 
pressures on the OP. The SWE model can also incorporate a number of the concepts 
drawn from patient safety and accident theory.  
 
At this stage there are four observations to make about the model. The first is that 
Rasmussen (1997), and subsequently Cook and Rasmussen (2005), identify three 
gradients that impact on the OP. These are the gradients of ‘management pressure 
towards efficiency’ ‘least effort’ and ‘campaigns for safety’ (see Figure 5.1). It is 
argued that these three gradients represent a range of variables and are therefore 
thematic rather than specific. For example, the gradient ‘towards efficiency’ can include 
a number of specific issues such as costs, income, the use of equipment and speed of 
working. This means that what might be found in a context specific situation is a 
multitude of influences which may not always fit neatly into the three thematic 
gradients.  
 
The second observation is that the envelope needs to sit within a wider context. Such a 
context has a bearing on the attention paid by the decision making agents to the 
boundaries and movement of the OP (Williams and Smart, 2009). The context also 
contributes to the type and strength of the gradients. The context of healthcare is a 
complex mix of social, political, financial and regulatory factors which result in 
conflicting and fuzzy policy (Ham, 2009, Klein, 1995). There is the potential for policy 
decisions to create latent conditions which have unforeseen non-linear interactions, 
delayed feedback with potential safety consequences. It is argued in Section 5.2 that the 
context influences the performance and decision making. 
  
The third observation is that the gradients can be a mix of downward and upward 
influences (‘scale interactions’), considered in Chapter 3,  which are part of the complex 
dynamic (Woods, 2006). Where there is downward influence, the system context 
influences the OP. Where there is upward influence it originates from the actions of the 
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staff where, in the face of the downward influences, they make trade-off decisions, find 
work around solutions or seek local optimisation. Scale interaction between decision 
making agents and the wider context can be incorporated by taking into account the link 
between SD and social theory. As noted in Chapter 4, the assumption made in this 
research is that the underlying social theory of SD is the contemporary dialectic 
relationship between the social structure and agency (Lane, 2001b).  
 
The fourth and related observation is that the movement of the OP is due to multiple 
and dynamic factors, not all of which can be understood or predicted (Stacey and 
Griffin, 2005). Currently, the model helps us to conceive of compensating actions to 
maintain the OP within the envelope in the face of competing influences. However, the 
model does not fully include the dynamics of the stocks, flows and feedback loops 
within the envelope. This means that the Rasmussen (1997) model does not address 
how the flow of work through the system creates a series of interactions with decision 
makers who are seeking to balance a number of competing priorities in a complex 
environment. 
 
To overcome some of the weaknesses observed, the SD approach is used to extend the 
SWE model to take account of the dynamics of stocks, flows, feedback, delays and the 
interaction with decision making agents. SD modelling can be used to illustrate the 
interrelationships between the parts of a system and the potential consequences of a 
change in those relationships. SD is used to incorporate the concepts of ‘coupling’ and 
‘feedback’ between the parts of the system, which in turn influence the behaviour of the 
whole system. When a system is disrupted or under continuous stress the dynamics 
generated by the relationships may change with potential safety implications (Cook and 
Rasmussen, 2005, Perrow, 1984). By depicting the potential change in the relationship 
of the parts through SD diagrams, further insights can be developed into the movement 
of the OP in relationship to the boundaries. 
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Figure 5.1: SWE (v2) model developed from synthesis of the literature 
 
5.2 Contextualising the Safe Working Envelope model 
In Section 5.1, a conceptual system resilience model is developed from a synthesis of 
the literature. Rasmussen’s (1997) interacting three boundary SWE model is extended 
using concepts from SD to create the SWE (v 2). The version 2 model takes account of 
the dynamic nature of complex socio-technical systems. The model also depicts the 
conceptual idea of a resilient system being where the OP of the system remains within 
the envelope during periods of perturbation or continuous stress. It is argued, that the 
SWE sits within a wider context. Therefore, to apply the model as a means to conduct 
research, it has to be contextualised.   
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The aim of this section is to set the conceptual model within the context of the NHS, 
and the operational management of hospitals in England. The contextualisation is done 
by a hermeneutic and content analysis of key documents published annually by the 
Department of Health in England.  
5.2.1 Policy Context 
The political and consequent policy context of the NHS influences how the hospitals 
work (Klein, 1995, Ham, 2009, Walshe and Smith, 2006). In particular, since the 
publication of the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000a) there is an increased 
emphasis on reducing the wait to access hospital services (Buchanan et al., 2007). There 
are a number of targets for hospitals to meet to reduce the time patients have to wait 
(Department of Health, 2005a, Department of Health, 2007, Bevan and Hood, 2006, 
Buchanan et al., 2007, Buchanan and Storey, 2010).  
 
Each year the Department of Health in England publishes the ‘Operating Framework’, 
which sets out the priorities and requirements indicating how the NHS will operate in a 
particular year. To ascertain the balance of priorities given by policy makers, a 
hermeneutical analysis was undertaken of four ‘Operating Framework’ documents 
(Department of Health, 2006a, Department of Health, 2007, Department of Health, 
2008c, Department of Health, 2006b) (See Appendix 5.1). The hermeneutical analysis 
shows that ‘targets’ are a major feature in the ‘Operating Framework’ documents 
alongside financial management. What is not known from that analysis is whether the 
emphasis on targets is sufficient to justify the explicit inclusion of a dedicated construct 
within the model and whether this provides explanatory insights into patient safety. To 
compliment the hermeneutical reading a content analysis was undertaken. 
 
The boundaries in the model are thematic in that they depict a range of influences. A 
coding protocol was devised based on the words or phrases related to the themes of the 
SWE boundaries (Neuendorf, 2002). The codes and themes were derived from prior 
research (Williams and Smart, 2010) and the hermeneutical reading of the ‘Operating 
Framework’ documents. The documents were searched to identify occurrences of codes 
relating to each thematic boundary. The semantics of each occurrence of a code within 
the text was checked to ensure consistency of analysis against each boundary theme. For 
example, when the word ‘finance’ refers to a job title, such as ‘Director of Finance’, it 
was excluded. The frequency of each code was calculated and the mean score for each 
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boundary theme was produced. The summary results of the mean frequency of codes for 
each boundary theme are presented in Table 5.1 (full results are in Appendix 5.2). From 
these results, it is noted that the frequency of occurrences of the ‘targets’ code is similar 
to ‘finance’. The staff workload code is low in occurrence but increasing over time.  
The number of codes relating to patient safety oscillates, but grows over time. These 
results suggest that policy makers make greater use of terms relating to targets and 
finance than the themes from the other boundaries. The substantially increased focus on 
safety in the 2009/10 document, is the result of the Darzi Review in 2008 (Department 
of Health, 2008b). This review placed ‘quality’, which includes ‘patient safety’, high on 
the policy agenda. 
 
Boundary Theme 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Financial 8.92 13.15 12.62 12.00 
Target 6.75 10.38 12.63 12.63 
Workload 0.31 2.23 4.69 6.38 
Safety 3.4 7.2 5 15.1 
 
Table 5.1: Mean frequency of codes by boundary type from content analysis of 
Department of Health ‘Operating Frameworks’ for the NHS in England 2006/07 – 
2009/2010 
 
The results from this analysis are consistent with previous research, which examines the 
risk assurance documents (Department of Health, 2003) from four NHS hospitals in 
England (Williams and Smart, 2010). Whilst this previous research is limited, it is 
interesting to note the degree of congruence between the documents examined. While 
the risks that concerned managers in the hospitals are wide ranging, there is a notable 
emphasis on financial management and achieving targets. Staff workload and safety 
appeared to receive considerably less attention (Williams and Smart, 2010). These 
results are in line with accident theory literature; the production orientated boundaries 
receive more management attention as they are seen as an ‘acute goal’(Woods, 2006). It 
is argued that the consequence of focusing on the ‘acute goal’ is that the relationship 
between the OP and the safety failure boundary is not well understood by decision 
makers. The importance of targets as a centrally driven means to improve performance 
is also highlighted in the literature which is considered next. 
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5.2.2 Extant literature on targets and performance 
There is a considerable literature examining performance measurement, management 
and the use of targets in the NHS and the wider public services in the UK over recent 
years. A key point that is often made is that what gets measured is what matters (Bevan 
and Hood, 2006) and those issues that do not have a target can therefore be 
disadvantaged (Gubb, 2009). The literature suggests that targets and the associated ‘star 
ratings’ of services are a public management policy, used extensively by the Labour 
Government (1997-2010). The often reported aim of developing and using targets is to 
improve the performance of public services (Bevan, 2006, Hood, 2006, Hood and 
Dixon, 2010, Barber, 2008, Radnor and McGuire, 2004). Whilst there has been a move 
towards using a balanced scorecard approach to judge performance (Radnor and Lovell, 
2033), personal experience is that certain waiting targets remain at the forefront of 
performance management in the NHS. However, there is also some evidence presented 
in the literature of organisations ‘gaming’ the system and ‘hitting the target but missing 
the point’ (Hood, 2006, Radnor, 2008, Mayhew and Smith, 2008). One study seeks to 
argue that performance dysfunction or gaming does not occur in relation to the 4 hour 
accident and emergency (A&E) department (Kelman and Friedman, 2009). However, 
the research takes a reductionist approach and does not take account of the implications 
to the wider hospital of admitting patients more quickly into inappropriate settings. 
 
Radnor (2008) sets the use of targets in a system perspective arguing that they are 
designed to provide feedback to the inputs of the transformative process of a public 
service. In some respects targets achieve the purpose of improving certain performance 
measures. It has been argued that targets have achieved the required improvement 
(Bevan, 2009). An example cited by Bevan (2009) is the considerable reduction the 
number of patients waiting more than six month for inpatient or day case treatment in 
England (77,000 in 1998 down to 8,000 in 2005). However, as has been noted, targets 
can create a number of unintended consequences as the interactions generated are not 
always appreciated. Gubb (2009) argues that targets, such as the 4 hour A&E target, 
create responses that are detrimental to patient care. He cites the movement of patients 
to clinical decision units, keeping patients waiting in ambulances, admitting patients 
unnecessarily and miscoding data. These tactics are used to avoid breaching the target 
and being shamed by ‘politically charged league tables’. Hood and Dixon (2010) 
suggest that the public, media or academics do not generally have a favourable view of 
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targets in relation to health or education. Their research found that it is primarily senior 
civil servants that speak favourably of the use of targets to improve performance. 
 
The targets of interest to this research are those that have a impact on patient safety in 
NHS hospitals in England. As set out in Section 6.6, there are five specific targets that 
have implications for the use of bed capacity. Three of these set waiting time targets for 
certain types of patients; emergency patients in the Accident and Emergency 
Department (A&E) (4 hours); elective patients to be admitted for treatment from time of 
initial referral by GP (18 weeks) and cancer patients (one month from diagnosis to 
treatment). Although these are time targets they translate into production volume targets 
within the hospital. The production volume targets arise from a combination of the time 
target and the number of patients in each particular queue (A&E; elective; cancer). The 
production volume requirement is constrained by the need to admit patients to single 
sex accommodation which reduces the flexibility of the bed capacity. A further 
interacting target is the limit (0.8%) of patients who are allowed to be cancelled on the 
day of their planned admission. Therefore, if a hospital has more than the expected 
number of emergency admissions it has to use those beds planned for elective patients 
to accommodate the emergency cases. Yet only a limited number of elective cases can 
be cancelled so other means of accommodating them are often found. Targets are not 
just about waiting time and the interactions between them create a set of dynamics 
within hospitals that needs to be taken into account. 
 
In conclusion, key policy documents from the Department of Health set out a number of 
key targets, which hospitals must meet. There is also a wide ranging literature 
acknowledging the use of targets as a public management policy in the UK, and 
especially in the NHS in England. There is also evidence that targets create unforeseen 
consequences. It is therefore important, when considering hospitals as complex socio-
technical systems with open boundaries to their environment that targets are taken into 
account. 
5.2.3 Developing the model 
To reflect the emphasis on targets, the interactive three boundary model (Rasmussen, 
1997) is developed by adding an additional boundary of ‘target failure’ (Williams, 
2008). The development builds on the work of Rasmussen (1997), Cook and Rasmussen 
(2005) and Miller and Xiao (2007).  Rasmussen’s (1997) boundary of economic failure 
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is split into the two boundaries of finance and target failure. The four boundaries of the 
developed SWE (version 3) are: financial failure, target failure, unacceptable workload, 
and safety failure (Figure 5.2).  
 
 
Figure 5.2: The four boundary SWE for NHS hospitals 
 
Rasmussen’s (1997) SWE has wide applicability. The developed version (v3) is limited 
to the specific context of the NHS in England. The developed and contextualised model 
can be described as a ‘mid-range’ model (Merton, 1968, Meredith, 1993) in that it is 
context specific. 
 
The SWE model uses the idea of gradients influencing the position of the OP in relation 
to the boundaries (Rasmussen, 1997). The gradient depicts the pressure that is exerted 
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on the OP to keep it away from the boundary. If all the gradient pressures are equal then 
the OP is held in the mid point of the envelope. The limitation of moving to a four 
boundary model is that it appears to place the gradients as directly opposing each other 
(Figure 5.2). However, it is important to note that each gradient can interact with any 
other. So for example, an increased pressure from the gradient towards an unacceptable 
workload can move the OP away from the workload failure boundary towards any of 
the other three boundaries. The direction that the OP moves in will depend on the 
dynamic of the competing pressures exerted. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Four boundary SWE with gradients 
 
Within the context in which NHS hospitals work there are a number of external 
influences that contribute to the gradients. The model seeks to show the constantly 
changing pressures that apply on the OP of a SWE for NHS hospitals. The SWE (v3) is 
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not exhaustive in depicting the external pressures. Figure 5.4 illustrates that there a 
number of stakeholders who place sometimes conflicting goals on NHS hospitals (Ham, 
2009).  For example, there is a strong political and managerial requirement to achieve 
financial balance or better, whilst at the same time experiencing additional pressure to 
meet waiting time targets (Department of Health, 2009b).  The independent regulator of 
NHS Foundation Trusts, ‘Monitor’ sets out clear requirements for meeting both 
nationally set targets / standards and achieving financial surplus (Monitor, 2008). 
Similarly, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) sets out the indicators which it takes 
into account when making assessments of NHS hospitals. These include the national 
targets / standards (Care Quality Commission, 2010) and the management of financial 
resources, which is undertaken by the Audit Commission (Audit Commission, 2009).  
There are nationally negotiated staff contracts that specify the working arrangements for 
staff, which limits the working hours of key groups, such as junior doctors (Department 
of Health, 2009a). There is a broader social context where the public has expectations 
both in terms of access to services alongside assumptions about the quality and safety of 
the services (Salter, 2004). It is argued that these external influences in a public 
healthcare system create some of the latent conditions and competing dynamics within 
which the hospital operates. 
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Figure 5.4: SWE set within the wider context of stakeholder influences 
 
It is suggested that these external pressures influence decision making agents within the 
hospital in both the setting and monitoring of the boundaries. For example, research 
within the NHS indicates that meeting performance and financial targets is a 
‘precondition to permit organisations to focus on quality and safety, since the pressures 
to meet targets compete for senior leadership time.’(Burnett et al., 2010)  Equally, there 
are internal dynamics, which combine with the external influences to create conditions 
that impact upon the stability and location of the OP in relation to the failure 
boundaries.  
 
The SWE (v3) model includes four boundaries set within a wider context of influences. 
In Section 5.1 the original Rasmussen (1997) model is extended by the use of SD and 
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social theory to take account of the combination of internal and external dynamics 
within the envelope (Figure 5.5). The construct that is depicted through the use of the 
SFDs and CLDs from SD is the system ‘structure’. In this context ‘structure’ consists of 
the feedback loops, stocks and flows, and nonlinearities created by the interaction of the 
physical and institutional structure of the system with the decision-making processes of 
the agents acting within it’ (Sterman, 2001). In a hospital a ‘stock’ depicts the place 
where patients accumulate, such as a ward or department. The ‘flow’ depicts the 
direction of movement between stocks. 
  
 
Figure 5.5: Four boundary SWE with SD diagrams to depict system ‘structure’ within 
the envelope 
 
SD can be applied to the context of hospital operations conducted within the boundaries 
of the SWE. Set out below are a contextualised SFD and CLD for hospital systems.  (In 
Appendix 2.1 examples are given of the basic conventions used in SFDs and CLDs.) 
Financial failure boundary 
Unacceptable workload  
failure boundary 
Target 
failure 
boundary 
Safety  
failure 
boundary 
Stock Flow Diagrams 
depicting the ‘stocks’ & 
‘flows’ in hospitals 
Casual Loop Diagrams 
depicting the ‘feedback’ 
  Mike D Williams 
 123
These are high level diagrams which are developed further in Chapter 8 to display data 
from the case studies. Figure 5.6 illustrates the basic design of a hospital system for the 
flow of emergency medical admissions. There are two routes into the hospital. The first 
is patients attending the Emergency Department (ED) where, once they have been 
assessed, they are either treated and discharged, or admitted to the Medical Assessment 
Unit (MAU). The second route in is via a General Practitioner who decides the patient 
needs direct admission to the MAU. From the MAU the patient is subsequently 
transferred to a medical ward for ongoing treatment. 
 
Emergency  
Department
Medical 
Assessment
Unit Wards
attendance
rate
admission
rate
transf er
rate
discharges
GP Ref errals
Dishcharges
 
Figure 5.6: Basic stock flow diagram of the emergency medical patient pathway into 
and through a NHS hospital 
 
SFDs can be used to illustrate changes in flows that can occur when the stocks reach 
capacity and patients have to be diverted. For example, Figure 5.7 shows an additional 
flow of diverted patients from MAU to ED. This occurs in hospitals when the MAU has 
no empty beds to accommodate GP referred patients. Modelling the stocks, flows and 
feedback loops provide an additional insight into the dynamics within the SWE. The 
implication of this type of event on the OP is explored in Chapter 7. 
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Figure 5.7: Basic stock flow diagram of the emergency medical patient pathway into 
and through a NHS hospital with diversion flow from MAU to ED 
 
A further insight into the feedback loops that are generated within the ‘structure’ can be 
illustrated by using CLDs. Figure 5.8 builds on the SFD in Figure 5.7 where there is a 
flow of diverted patients from MAU to ED. The CLD shows the relationship between 
the rate of inputs into the hospital system (attendance and GP referral rate) and the 
occupancy of ED and MAU. The relationship is in the same direction – if the referral 
rate increases the occupancy increases and vice versa. A reinforcing feedback loop is 
created between the ED and MAU when patients are diverted. This means that when 
there are diversions from MAU to ED the occupancy in ED will continue to rise until 
some balancing feedback loop is initiated. Such a balancing effect can occur by 
increasing the rate of discharges. Speeding up discharges may have safety implications 
as research indicates a high rate of adverse events due to poor communication and 
handover of patients leaving hospitals (Forester et al., 2003, Forester et al., 2004, 
Kripalani et al., 2007). 
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Figure 5.8: Causal Loop Diagram showing the relationship of the emergency medical 
patients rate of arrival to a hospital system 
 
A CLD can depict the consequences for other parts of the system, including the 
relationship to policy achievement. In this example, the link is to meeting the 4 hour ED 
waiting time target. When the ED occupancy increases, then the risk of breaching the 
target increases and vice versa. 
 
CLDs are used in this research to illustrate the changes that occur in the type of 
feedback loops that are found within a hospital when it faces continuous stress or 
perturbation. Such diagrams also help to show how decision makers seek to balance the 
system, whilst experiencing competing pressures from the gradients, by taking 
compensating actions to avoid the OP breaching a failure boundary. 
 
5.3 Applying the model 
In applying the SWE (v3) to the empirical research it is necessary to clarify the 
constructs being used. It is argued that the SWE (v3) has the following five constructs: 
• ‘boundaries’ – depicts the constraints within which the system is designed to 
work 
• ‘operating point’ – depicts the performance of the system in relation to the 
boundaries 
• ‘gradients’ – depict the competing pressures on the OP 
• ‘structure’ of the system and the relationships between the parts 
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• dynamic ‘feedback’ between the parts that contribute to the stability of the 
whole system 
 
The term ‘constructs’ is defined in this thesis as ‘an abstract form of concept which 
cannot be observed directly or indirectly but can be inferred by observable events’ 
(Meredith, 1993). This approach is in line with the pragmatic critical realist position 
adopted in this research. The five constructs derived from the four boundary SWE (v3) 
are explored empirically through the case studies. The investigation gathers data about 
the construct dimensions which were identified from the literature in Chapter 3. The 
aim of using this SWE (v3) model is to gain insights into the characteristics of the 
hospitals studied and how they influence patient safety. The five constructs are grouped 
into three sets which interact which create emergent system behaviour (Figure 5.9). 
These are examined in detail in Chapters 6 – 8. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Combination and interaction of construct sets depicted by the SWE model 
 
The SWE model is used in healthcare (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005) to consider the 
consequences for a hospital ‘going solid’ due to a bed crisis. The change in dynamics 
that occurs when a system becomes tightly coupled, for example, due to lack of bed 
capacity, is explored in this research through the application of the model. Cook and 
Rasmussen (2005) have not undertaken an empirical inquiry using the SWE in 
hospitals. The operations management literature on NHS hospitals and policy 
documents suggests a number of actions to both reduce and cope with peaks in demand 
in order to avoid a bed crisis (Klassen and Rohleder, 2001, Armitage and Raza, 2002, 
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Ham et al., 2003, Proudlove et al., 2003, Proudlove et al., 2007, Department of Health, 
2005b, Department of Health, 2010c). However, the link between the operations 
management of patient demand and patient safety is not usually made. 
 
It is argued that the SWE (v3) can be used to explore a number of concepts derived 
from the patient safety and accident theory literature that apply to systems. Using the 
safety theory concepts assists in explaining the influence that the system characteristics 
have on patient safety. The eight accident theory concepts, identified from the literature, 
are explicitly linked to the model in the following way: 
 
• the tension between production verses safety – through the boundaries and 
gradients; 
• blunt / sharp end – through the pressures generated by the gradients on sharp end 
staff and system performance depicted by the movement of the OP; 
• latent or hidden conditions – through the ‘conditions’ created by the competing 
pressures on the OP; 
• safety as a dynamic non-event – through the idea of compensating actions 
holding the OP within the envelope; 
• redundancy / buffer capacity – through de-compensation of capacity to hold the 
OP within the envelope; 
• normalisation – through staff accepting the shift in the position of a boundary or 
the OP; 
• practical drift – through the gradual movement of the OP or small movements of 
a marginal zone boundary; 
• trade-offs – through making the boundaries and the location of the OP explicit to 
decision makers. 
 
The boundary construct is explored in Chapter 6 through analysis of data from the three 
case studies. The gradients and OP are examined in Chapter 7 using thick description of 
three events in case studies 1 and 2. The design and implication of the ‘structure’ and 
‘feedback’ is presented in Chapter 8. The analysis seeks to conceptualise the findings in 
terms of both the model constructs and the safety concepts. This is done by indentifying 
the different SWE construct dimensions and how they incorporate the accident theory 
concepts. 
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5.4 Summary 
In this chapter the interactive three boundary SWE model (Rasmussen, 1997) is first 
extended using concepts from SD. Secondly the model is contextualised and developed 
with the additional boundary of ‘target failure’. This is included as a result of the 
hermeneutical and content analysis of the NHS ‘Operating Framework’ documents. 
Both experience and the analysis indicate a high level of attention to finance and targets 
and substantially less to staff workload and patient safety. The SWE (v3) depicts the 
context for NHS hospitals in terms of the failure boundaries and gradients that create 
dynamic influences on the OP. The safety concepts derived from the accident theory 
literature can be taken into account when using the SWE model. 
 
The five constructs of the SWE (v3) provide a conceptual basis on which to examine the 
system characteristics of hospital systems. The following three chapters combine the 
constructs of the SWE with the concepts derived from the safety literature to analyse 
empirical case data collected during periods of high demand for inpatient beds. 
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Chapter 6 – Investigating the Boundaries of a Safe Working 
Envelope 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the dimensions of the ‘boundary’ construct of the 
SWE (v3) model developed in Chapter 5. Each boundary within the model is informed 
by accounts of the competing constraints experienced by staff. The data from the 
interviews and observations (CS 1and 2) and inquiry reports (CS 3) is triangulated with 
the analysis of documentation, such as reports or policy papers from the Department of 
Health. The hospitals were studied during times of high demand for their inpatient 
services where staff managed complex interactions to keep the hospital functioning. 
Such situations provided data about how the prioritisation of competing demands was 
managed. While the boundaries are not a directly observable phenomenon in 
themselves, observable data relating to the articulation, measurement, and prioritised 
actions of staff relative to each boundary theme was studied.  
 
The ‘boundary’ construct is part of the wider SWE model. The boundaries seek to 
depict the constraints within which the system operates. In Chapter 7 the pressures, 
depicted by the ‘gradients’ on the OP are considered. Chapter 8 explores the dynamics 
that occur inside the SWE generated by the interaction of demand and capacity with 
decision makers. The data presented in Chapter 7 and 8 provides an insight into the 
position and movement of the OP. The three chapters set out the data from the case 
studies in such a way as to suggest that it is the combination and interaction of the three 
construct sets (constraints, pressures, the dynamics of demand and capacity with 
decision makers) that provide an insight into the behaviour of the system in relation to 
patient safety (Figure 6.1). This Chapter focuses on the ‘constraints’ depicted by the 
boundaries of the SWE and how they influence the behaviour of the system. It is 
recognised that the ‘constraints’ interact with the other construct sets which are explored 
in later chapters. 
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Figure 6.1: Combination and interaction of construct sets depicted by the SWE model 
 
The process of data reduction, display and conclusion is undertaken in an ongoing 
rather than linear process (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The data is reduced and 
displayed in relation to each boundary. The coding tree hierarchies are presented below 
for the SWE constructs and themes of ‘actual design’ and ‘rich pictures’ which are used 
for data reduction and analysis of the interview transcripts (Figures 6.2 – 6.4). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Coding hierarchy for ‘Safe Working Envelope’ 
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Figure 6.3: Coding hierarchy for ‘Actual Design’ theme 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Coding hierarchy for ‘Rich Pictures’ 
 
 
  Mike D Williams 
 132
The themes coded to ‘rich pictures’ and ‘actual design’ contribute to populating the 
SWE (v3) model. This is done in conjunction with data derived from the document 
analysis which examines the ‘planned system design’ and ‘context’ (see Figure 6.5).  
 
 
Figure 6.5: Relationship of themes to SWE (v3) model 
 
 
Sources of data are presented inside square brackets [ ]. The sources refer to 
observations notes in the Field Notebooks [FN showing the book and page number] (see 
Appendix 6.1), coded data (see Appendix 6.2); document or statistical data number [see 
Appendix 4.1), or interview transcript [case study interviewee number] (see Appendix 
4.3).  
 
Dimensions of the boundary construct of the SWE are identified from the literature in 
Chapter 3. For ease of reference, these are presented again in Table 6.1. 
 
Construct Dimensions quote from the literature 
 
Boundaries Visibility  
 
 
Movement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘making the boundaries explicit and known’ 
(Rasmussen, 1997) 
 
marginal boundary ‘creeps outwards to form a new 
normal’ (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005) 
‘…IT applications will move the unacceptable 
performance boundary outwards. The marginal 
boundary is malleable, however and these gains maybe 
offset by marginal boundary creep.’ (Cook and 
Rasmussen, 2005) 
 
SWE Model constructs (v3) 
Context: constraints, demands 
Planned system design 
Actual system design 
Rich picture; 
events, 
actions, 
decisions 
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Location 
 
 
 
Marginal zone 
(buffer 
capacity) 
 
‘The location of the marginal boundary is determined 
by sociotechnical processes.’ (Cook and Rasmussen, 
2005) 
 
‘…the marginal zone as a system’s capacity to cope.’ 
(Miller and Xiao, 2007) 
 
Table 6.1: Dimensions of the SWE ‘boundaries’ constructs derived from literature 
 
The data is used to investigate the dimensions identified (‘visibility’, ‘movement’, 
‘location’, and ‘buffer capacity’). The interrelationship between the boundaries, 
gradients and OP is also of importance, which is discussed in Chapter 7. Before 
presenting the data on each failure boundary Section 6.2 sets out the results from the 
questionnaire administered to the interviewees to gain their views about the priorities 
given to the competing goals. 
 
6.2 Staff views on the priorities of the boundaries 
Interviewees in Case Study 1 and 2 were asked, using a simple questionnaire (Appendix 
4.4), to give their view on how the trust board, divisional management teams, and 
clinical staff teams on wards, ranked the priorities of patient safety, finance, targets and 
staff workload.  The interviewees were asked to rank the different priorities in order of 
importance for decision making in the hospital. The results, based on the percentage 
ranked the highest priority for each level are shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. 
 
 Achieving 
Targets %  
Adequate 
staffing 
Patient safety Achieving 
financial results 
Trust Board 15% 0% 62% 23% 
Mgt Teams 38% 0% 54% 8% 
Clinical Teams 0% 31% 69% 0% 
 
Table 6.2: CS 1 - Ranking of the highest priority for different organisational levels 
 
 
 Achieving 
Targets %  
Adequate 
staffing 
Patient safety Achieving 
financial results 
Trust Board 20% 0% 47% 33% 
Mgt Teams 13% 0% 80% 7% 
Clinical Teams 0% 29% 71% 0% 
 
Table 6.3: CS 2 - Ranking of the highest priority for different organisational levels 
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While there are some differences in the apportionment of percentages between the two 
case studies, the patterns of prioritisation exhibit some commonalities. ‘Patient Safety’ 
is the highest priority at all levels. ‘Achieving financial results’ is second highest at the 
‘Trust Board’ level and ‘Achieving targets’ is the second highest at the ‘management 
team’ level. The ‘Clinical Team’ level results are very similar with around 70% ranking 
‘Patient safety’ highest. Interestingly in both results, ‘Adequate staffing’ is ranked 
highest by around 30%, whilst targets and finance do not feature as the highest priority 
for ‘Clinical Teams’. Of note is that ‘Adequate staffing’ is not the highest priority at the 
other two levels. The full results are in Appendix 6.3. 
 
The results presented above, whilst limited to the small number of interviewees, shows 
that ‘patient safety’ transcends each organisational level as the highest priority issue. 
The results also show that the interviewees perceive that the Trust Boards identify 
‘safety’ as a top priority area. The Boards are also thought to place considerable 
importance on the production components (finance and targets). Conversely, at the 
‘sharp end’ (Reason, 1990, Cook and Woods, 1994), the clinical teams particularly are 
perceived to focus upon the less well defined boundaries of patient safety and staff 
workload. A possible explanation of the emphasis placed on patient safety, within each 
of the organisational levels studied, is the Hawthorne Effect. The presence of the 
researcher investigating patient safety in hospitals will have influenced some of the 
interviewees to answer the questionnaire placing greater priority to patient safety.  
 
To guard against this bias interviews were subsequently undertaken with each of the 
staff groups. The interviews explored the actual experience of the staff in relation to 
themes represented by the boundaries. The data was analysed to draw out inferences 
about the relative importance of the boundary themes expressed through the 
prioritisation process. Interestingly, the interview data produced a different result. The 
results are set out below but in summary the themes relating to finance and targets, in 
particular, were found to dominate decision making. While patient safety and staffing 
constructs were relevant, they did not feature in the interview data to the extent 
anticipated by the questionnaire ranking results above.  
 
In the next section each boundary is discussed separately to identify data relevant to the 
dimensions of ‘visibility’, ‘movement’, ‘location’ and ‘buffer capacity’. It is recognised 
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that there is interaction between the boundary dimensions, which is also discussed and 
will be explored in greater depth in later chapters. 
 
6.3 Patient Safety Boundary 
The results presented above (Tables 6.2 and 6.3), indicate that patient safety is seen to 
be regarded as the highest priority at the three different organisational levels in both 
case study hospitals. An observation from these results, and from the interviews, is the 
priority given to both staffing levels and patient safety by clinical teams. Many 
described staffing levels as being crucial to achieving safety for patients.  
 
“…staffing numbers relates to the safety of the patients really that I think you 
need the patients there, the staff there, to ensure that patient safety is happening 
really because without the staff you can’t monitor that and you can’t, if you’ve 
got patients climbing out of bed and falling and you’ve not got enough staff then 
obviously that’s going to potentially happen and those patients are then at risk of 
you know injuring themselves really.” (Ward Sister CS 1) [CS 1: SWE; Patient 
safety] 
 
“… the situation on ward 12 is such that patient safety is being put at risk 
because of [a]shortage of staff. Since ward 12 was designated as the thoracic 
ward in December 2004 the number of nursing staff for ward 12 has dropped by 
over a third.” (Nurse CS 3) (Francis QC, 2010a) p.222 
 
(Further coded data about the boundary dimensions is presented in Appendix 6.2) 
 
In contrast, those with wider management responsibilities, after patient safety, were 
perceived to place a higher priority on finance and targets than staffing. However, when 
each of the staff groups were asked to explain what constituted patient safety and how 
they measured it, other than the control of infection, responses were generally vague. 
This suggests that aspects of patient safety failure boundary were not clearly visible. 
However, when particular patient safety themes were explored in more detail, a mixed 
picture emerges as to the ‘visibility’ dimension of the patient safety boundary.  
 
From observations at the clinical delivery level there were numerous safety checks in 
place, for example, checking the identity of a patient prior to a procedure. However, 
these checks were rarely mentioned in interviews. There were limited systematic 
methods of auditing the reliability of such procedures taking place. The most common 
reliability audit made was the compliance to hand washing standards by clinical staff 
[CS 1: Doc 1.5]. From a conceptual perspective, certain aspects of what constituted the 
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patient safety boundary at an individual patient level, was highly ‘visible’ to clinical 
staff. They have been trained in specific procedures that they carry out in order to keep 
the individual patient from breaching the safety failure boundary. There was clear 
evidence of clinicians engaging in specific identifiable actions, during patient 
consultations, which are undertaken to keep patients safe (FN 1-4). 
 
The interview data from both hospitals suggests that the main theme of patient safety 
was the need to eliminate certain healthcare acquired infections. There was daily 
monitoring of the number of new Meticillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) 
and Clostridium Difficile (C.Diff) infections [CS 1: Doc 1.6; FN 4]. There were also 
clear plans detailing how buffer capacity is to be used to isolate and contain any C.Diff 
or Norovirus (airborne sickness) outbreak [CS 1 Doc 3]. Patient screening for MRSA 
had become standard practice and new clinical procedures were implemented to reduce 
the risk of passing on infection [CS 1: Doc 1.5]. The identification of these plans is 
unsurprising as there are national targets for the reduction of MRSA and C.Diff 
(Department of Health, 2007, Department of Health, 2008c). (Although there are targets 
for the reduction of certain infections, as this is a patient safety issue rather than a 
waiting time target, the data relating to MRSA and C. Diff has been included in the 
patient safety failure boundary.) 
 
The setting of targets to reduce rates of certain types of infection illustrates the four 
dimensions of the boundary construct (Figure 6.6). First, the ‘visibility’ of the boundary 
is increased with clearly defined types and rates of infection set out as national targets. 
Second, the ‘movement’ of the marginal zone boundary inwards as a new norm of 
acceptability is determined. Third, the result of moving the marginal boundary is that 
there is an increase in the ‘buffer capacity’ deployed to reduce the number of those 
infections. Fourth, the new location of the marginal boundary emerges from a process of 
public concern, articulated by politicians and detailed in national standards (Department 
of Health, 2007). 
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Figure 6.6: Movement of the marginal zone boundary for control of MRSA and C.Diff 
 
However, there was evidence that other types of infection did not receive the same 
degree of attention, and rates of infection were not routinely monitored [CS 1: Doc 1.5; 
CS 2: Doc 2.10]. This situation is identified as a common occurrence for the NHS in 
England (House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 2009). The CS 1 Annual 
Infection Control Report for 2008/09 reported a reduction of 17% in MRSA and a 32% 
reduction in C.Diff on the previous year [CS 1: Doc 1.5]. However, the same report 
highlighted the multiple ward outbreaks of Norovirus stating that: “Spread of 
Norovirus, across multiple wards, is exacerbated by high bed occupancy and movement 
of patients and staff within the hospital setting.” This statement did not appear to bring 
any change to the bed management practices that were observed [FN 2.40-60]. 
Conceptually, it can be argued that infections other than MRSA and C.Diff did not have 
the same ‘visibility’ and therefore did not receive the same degree of attention. 
However, the measuring and monitoring of certain infections does suggest that parts of 
the patient safety failure boundary were well defined and therefore ‘visible’.  
Boundary of 
patient safety 
failure (MSRA; 
C.Diff only) 
Marginal zone 
(buffer capacity) 
Marginal zone 
boundary 
Buffer 
capacity 
The marginal zone boundary is 
‘moved’ inwards as a new norm 
is established and made ‘visible’ 
by national targets for MRSA and 
C.Diff only. The new ‘location’ 
creates more ‘buffer capacity’ 
that is deployed to keep the OP 
from breaching the marginal 
boundary. 
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Other measures of patient safety derived from the data are the number and type of 
incident reports. Patient falls, which create a significant level of harm and mortality in 
hospitals (Healey et al., 2008) were routinely reported [CS 1.9,13 CS 2.3]. However, 
from interviews and observations there was evidence of a general level of 
‘normalisation’ amongst nurses and other staff; falls had become ‘one of those things’ 
that occur in hospitals [FN 2.28-29] (Grenier-Sennelier et al., 2002, Williams et al., 
2009). For those staff who normalise the situation, it can be suggested that the marginal 
zone boundary is allowed to ‘creep’ or ‘drift’ outwards (as seen in point 1 in Figure 
6.2). One patient in CS 1 fell more than ten times before a final fall, which proved fatal. 
In CS 1 action to improve the situation was taken after two fatalities from falls 
(Williams et al., 2009). Such action to reduce the rate of falls can be viewed as seeking 
to ‘move’ the marginal boundary inwards to a position where a fall is considered 
unacceptable (as seen in point 2 of Figure 6.6). With the increased ‘visibility’ of the 
patient safety failure boundary relating to falls, nurses changed their practice. Part of the 
change in practice was dedicating more nurse time to the prevention of falls. This can be 
conceived of as creating greater ‘buffer capacity’ to prevent inpatient falls as the 
marginal boundary moves away from the failure boundary (Figure 6.7). 
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Figure 6.7: Movement of the marginal zone boundary for inpatient patient falls 
 
 
The only sure way for the safety failure boundary to be ‘visible’ is when an accident 
occurs (Cook and Woods, 1994). This is particularly stark when the accident generates 
an obvious consequence, such as a number of causalities. In healthcare systems, such as 
hospitals, incidents occur where it is clear that something has gone wrong and where a 
patient suffers an observable consequent harm or even death. However, the nature of 
healthcare is that acts of omission or commission that create harm are not always 
spotted or even counted (Olsen et al., 2008).  
 
Staff were encouraged to report incidents and investigations were conducted where an 
incident was considered serious. The Boards and Departments in both CS 1 and 2 
hospitals received serious incident reports together with analysis of the type of incident 
and the associated trend [CS 1: Doc 1.9; 1.13; CS 2: Doc 2.13]. The interviewees 
showed little appreciation of the likely number of incidents that are not reported (Sari et 
al., 2007a, Vincent, 2007, Waring, 2005, Olsen et al., 2008). Therefore, the inference is 
Boundary of 
patient safety 
failure (Inpatient 
falls only) 
Marginal zone 
(buffer capacity) 
Marginal zone 
boundary 
1. As staff normalise to patients falling the 
marginal boundary ‘moves’ slowly outwards 
to a new ‘location’ closer to the patient 
safety failure boundary. 
2. Following two clear breaches of the 
patient safety failure boundary (deaths) in 
CS 1, Senior Nurses act to make ‘visible’ 
the boundary and ‘move’ the marginal 
zone boundary inwards to a ‘location’ 
further from the failure boundary. 
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made that staff at the higher organisational level assumed that patients are generally 
being kept safe, as there were few contrary indicators [e.g. CS 1.7; CS 2.5.] 
Conceptually, the reported incidents provide ‘visibility’ to some parts of the patient 
safety failure boundary. However, the research literature clearly indicates that the 
majority of incidents in hospitals are not reported. Therefore, this ‘visibility’ must be 
regarded as incomplete, especially to the higher levels in the organisation.  
 
One possible explanation of why many incidents that occur are not spotted or reported 
is the workload of staff, which is covered in more detail in section 6.3. It is clear from 
the data that staff regarded the pace of work to be problematic. This created the 
consequent implications for them to be able to fulfil the needs of patients in a timely 
and effective manner and therefore guard against potential incidents. 
 
“I would say that staff are so overwhelmed with the number of patients they are 
actually not clearly focusing on what they need to be focusing on especially if 
it’s junior members of staff and I think it’s things like drug administration gets 
given late because they are worrying about getting patients to theatre so some of 
the routine things might just go aside and it’s not noticed straightaway because 
the patients would probably not instantly show any signs of suffering or of lack 
of care but actually over time if you continually don’t give drugs on time it 
might have a knock on effect to those patients but it’s almost an unseen risk I 
would say.” (Matron CS1) [CS 1:SWE; Patient safety] 
 
“I guess you know the speed that you are working at, you are working at an 
awful lot of speed so you are screening and filtering a lot of information quickly 
and that can incur error.  Things are being missed.” (Ward Sister CS1) [CS 
1:SWE; Patient safety] 
 
There are a number of interconnected issues surfaced by this data, which suggest that 
the model of a SWE has to include dynamic interactions between the boundaries. The 
first is the link between the number of staff and their ability to manage the workload of 
patients. The workload is influenced by both the waiting time targets and financial 
requirements placed on the hospital. The second is the unknown impact of delays in 
drug administration, or incomplete information at the point of patient handover from 
ward to ward, which illustrates the lack of ‘visibility’ of aspects of the patient safety 
failure boundary. Therefore, it is difficult to know if harm has occurred or whether the 
safety boundary has been breached. While a mortality rate, which exceeds expectation, 
may be used to highlight safety problems, the effectiveness of this indicator is critically 
debated. For example, the measurement of allegedly high mortality rates is what alerted 
the Healthcare Commission to investigate the Mid Staffordshire hospital. However, the 
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subsequent Inquiry, has raised doubts about the usefulness of such a measure (Francis 
QC, 2010a). 
 
In CS 1 and 2 there was a growing realization that other aspects of safety were 
important but few if any measures existed for doctors, managers and nurses to monitor 
patient safety in real time. The routine performance reports (during the study period) to 
the hospital Board in CS 1 did not include aspects of patient safety, other than the 
largely process standards required by the Healthcare Commission (now Care Quality 
Commission) [CS 1: Doc 1.19]. In CS 2 recent changes included the monitoring of a 
range of quality issues which started to be reported to the Board [CS 2: Doc 2.10]. 
There was an inbuilt assumption on the part of some board members that patient safety 
was not a risk issue: 
 
“…you assume that everything is fine because it is run by a senior manager and 
I am sure she would shove things up if there was a problem.  I am on the Risk 
Committee and patient safety does not figure as a risk because we have this 
operational team doing things, that’s our assurance you know there’s a team 
doing this.” (Director CS 2) [CS 2: SWE; Patient safety] 
 
The difficulty in defining, measuring and therefore making ‘visible’ the patient safety 
failure boundary, both internally to a hospital and externally by policy makers is also 
evidenced in the case study of Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust (FT). Monitor, 
the Independent Regulator of NHS Foundation Trusts, approved Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Trust to become a FT just months before reportedly high mortality rates at that hospital 
sparked an investigation. The subsequent investigation found serious shortcomings in 
the care of patients and in the leadership and governance of the hospital (Healthcare 
Commission, 2009a). In an internal audit report conducted by KPMG, on behalf of 
Monitor, they concluded that: 
 
“…whereas it was clear in 2004 what constituted the threshold for quality, it is 
now less clear what set of factors is regarded as the key data set for evaluating 
quality performance at an aspiring FT.” (KPMG, 2009) p.4 
 
The situation back in 2004 was that only NHS Trusts who had achieved ‘three star’ 
status could apply to become an FT (Department of Health, 2002). This approach was 
replaced in 2006 by the Healthcare Commission’s ‘Annual Health Check’ rating, which 
included considerable self-assessment and covers a wider range of issues (Healthcare 
Commission, 2006a). It is debatable as to whether the star rating system was any better 
at defining what constitutes the quality and safety requirements for patients. The star 
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rating method looked at a narrower range of target related performance and does not 
provide detail measures of quality or safety (Department of Health, 2002). 
 
The focus of Monitor in assessing Mid Staffordshire and other aspiring FTs was on the 
financial and performance management (KPMG, 2009). Monitor apparently believed 
that other supervising bodies would have flagged concerns around quality and safety 
(Monitor, 2009). Monitor has since changed the ‘Compliance Framework’ (Monitor, 
2008) to include the requirement for FTs to certify that: 
 
‘…the board is satisfied that it has and will keep in place effective arrangements 
to monitor and improve the quality of healthcare provided to its patients.’ (p.12) 
 
What is meant by ‘quality’ is not clearly defined by Monitor. The Darzi Review 
(Department of Health, 2008b), however, specifies ‘quality’ as containing three 
elements. First, patient safety and the concept of doing no harm to patients, second, the 
patient’s experience in terms of compassion, dignity and respect and third, the clinical 
effectiveness of treatment in terms of outcomes for patients. In 2009/10 there was a 
requirement placed on NHS Trusts to produce an annual ‘Quality Account’ covering the 
three quality elements. However, it should be noted that the content of such reports is 
left to local determination (Department of Health, 2010e). The initial Quality Accounts 
published by hospitals have been assessed. The research is limited due to the number of 
reports examined. However the literature does report many weaknesses, poor definition 
and measurement of quality, including patient safety (West, 2010, Foot, 2011). This 
means that there is wide variation in the type and range of measures being used and 
‘patient safety’ appears to remain as the broad concept of ‘no harm’. 
 
The subsequent Independent Inquiry into failings in the standards of care at Mid 
Staffordshire showed that there was widespread concern amongst clinical staff about the 
level of staffing and the standard of care being provided (Francis QC, 2010a, Francis 
QC, 2010b). There were poor systems of measurement and governance relating to 
patient safety and quality at the Trust. It may be suggested that senior leaders were not 
aware of what constituted the patient safety boundary and therefore did not respond to 
the chronic and even significant breaches in the ability to achieve acceptable levels of 
safety (Francis QC, 2010a). Data from the oral evidence given to the Francis Inquiry 
indicates that the sharp end staff made professional judgements about what ought to 
constitute safe care for the patients in Mid Staffordshire (Francis QC, 2010b). However, 
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there did not appear to be a unified view or set of measures that defined the safety 
failure boundary. The attention of senior managers was on the more ‘visible’ and 
therefore arguably, to them, the more important boundaries of targets and finance. 
 
While there were measures used to judge NHS organisations performance on patient 
safety (Healthcare Commission, 2008), it is surprising to note that no reference was 
made to them during the data collection interviews. An examination of the Healthcare 
Commission measures reveal that they are almost entirely process related. Checks are 
made to ensure that hospitals have processes in place to monitor incidents and to 
comply with policy and ‘safety alert’ recommendations on issues such as child 
protection and the use of medical devices. The only direct patient care criteria is about 
MRSA infection. 
 
To summarise, this data shows that the definition of what constitutes patient safety is 
often lacking or weak, both within healthcare organisations and across external 
agencies. Therefore, apart from some elements of patient safety such as certain 
infections, patient falls and reported incidents described above, there was a lack of 
‘visibility’ of the patient safety failure boundary and the associated marginal boundary. 
For the elements of patient safety that are ‘visible’, then it is possible to conceptualise 
the boundary ‘movement’, ‘location’ and ‘buffer capacity’. The examples described are 
summarised in Table 6.4.  Where there was a lack of ‘visibility’, as evidenced from the 
CS 3 data, the boundary of patient safety failure is vulnerable to being breached. 
 
Construct Dimensions Examples from the data 
 
Patient safety 
failure 
boundary 
Visibility  
 
National targets for MRSA and C.Diff infections 
 
Patient safety 
failure 
boundary 
Movement 
 
Staff normalise to patient falls moved the marginal 
boundary outwards. 
 
Patient safety 
failure 
boundary 
Location 
 
Senior nurses state that ‘no fall is acceptable’ 
which moved the marginal boundary inwards and 
providing a clear ‘location’ marker (no falls). 
 
Patient safety 
failure 
boundary 
Marginal zone 
(buffer capacity) 
 
Introduction of the screening of patients for 
infections and identification of resources to contain 
the spread of infection. 
 
Table 6.4: Dimensions of the SWE ‘Patient safety failure boundary’ construct with 
examples from the data 
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There has been a growing international effort to ensure that patient safety is clearly 
defined and managed as the scale of unintentional harm has become more widely 
known (Vincent, 2010). Patient safety campaigns, together with reports on failures in 
healthcare provision, have highlighted the problems inherent with a leadership focus on 
the productivity agenda (Healthcare Commission, 2006b). Following the Darzi Review 
(Department of Health, 2008b) a greater emphasis has been placed on all aspects of 
quality within the NHS. The publication of the Inquiry into Mid Staffordshire has also 
increased the development of measures of safety and the wider quality agenda. 
Interestingly, the evidence detailed below from the case studies shows that the other 
boundaries of finance, targets and workload tend to be more clearly visible. This has 
further implications for patient safety which will be explored in more detail in Chapter 
9. 
 
6.4 Unacceptable Workload Boundary 
The SWE model depicts a boundary relating to an unacceptable workload for staff. 
Individuals and groups have different capacities to do work, so defining what is 
acceptable is difficult. However, most organisations seek to make some form of 
capacity planning to identify the number, type, and skills of staff they need to meet the 
workload. NHS hospitals have many professional and other staff that form the team that 
care for patients. 
 
Data from CS 1 and 2 shows that managers plan the number of staff expected to work in 
clinical areas and in support functions [FN 1.54; CS 2.1]. Budgets were set according to 
the numbers and seniority of staff employed in each area. The overall staffing levels and 
day to day fluctuations were closely monitored and controlled by senior nurses, doctors 
and other managers. Where shortages of nurses occurred, for example due to sickness, 
then decisions were made about redeploying staff. 
 
“We have within our division we have a staffing template which we know how 
many staff we should have on each shift and we know on a day to day basis if 
the staffing drops you know how we can, you know whether that’s acceptable or 
not acceptable but we also have to think about what’s actually happening on the 
ward at the time so we’ll share staff around to make sure that every area is 
covered as you know as well as we can.” (Matron CS 2) [CS 2: SWE Staff 
workload] 
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Given the close attention to nurse staffing in particular, it can be argued from a 
conceptual perspective that for front line staff, the unacceptable workload boundary was 
‘visible’ and therefore clearly ‘located’. There was some flexibility to manage the 
situation. The ‘buffer capacity’ was created through the ability to call in extra nurses 
from the Nurse Bank or Private Nursing Agencies to fill gaps in the rota. However, at 
busy times or in holiday seasons, nurses were not always available in the required 
numbers [FN 1.78]. Nurse interviewees, in particular, made the link between the 
staffing numbers, the seriousness of the patients’ illness and safety. The senior nurses 
use their professional judgement to move personnel around to cover potential gaps in 
staffing [CS 1: Doc 1.20].  
 
There was less flexibility with junior medical staff as finding locum staff was often not 
possible. For example, during an outbreak of the Norovirus sickness bug some staff 
took sick leave, leaving wards with minimal doctor cover. 
 
“But junior staff wise, I don’t you just have to kind of grin and bear it essentially 
and at that time the staffing was very thin and I don’t know if that would have 
jeopardised patients’ safety a great deal, it meant that there were a whole lot of 
wards with one doctor on it.” (Doctor CS 1) [CS 1: SWE; Staff workload] 
 
Part of the context for the staffing of junior doctors is the European Working Time 
Directive, which has reduced the working hours of junior doctors (Department of 
Health, 2009a). The regulations result in junior hospital doctors working in shift 
patterns with a consequent reduction in continuity of care for patients and reduced team 
working with the same consultant.  
 
“Well I think that there is a huge problem with financial pressures, target 
pressures and also with the European Working Time Directive that is removing 
the continuity of care from patients which I think is highly detrimental to quality 
care and I’ve seen it personally, I’ve seen it with colleagues, I’ve seen it with my 
daughter where a failure of continuity of care has led to potentially a dangerous 
situation arising.” (Doctor CS 1) [CS 1: SWE; Staff workload] 
 
 
Changes in the training of junior doctors, the increase in the number of female doctors 
and the restrictions on the number of non European Union doctors, has meant that 
filling gaps in the rotas is often not possible [CS 1.25; FN 3.10]. When a hospital faces 
pressure to achieve targets or meet peaks in demand then the adaptive capacity of the 
key medical resource was stretched. 
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“One of the things is that everything is so target driven everybody is working 
extremely hard so money is being thrown at the system, consultants are being 
paid high rates to do additional clinical sessions and basically time shift there 
their professional development work into the evenings and weekends which they 
either do or don’t do but you know it’s their choice.  As a result of that they’ve 
got no capacity to step up and do extra work, so I’ve got two extra outlie wards 
I’ve got to look after.  So we’ve come down from 110 medical outliers to 60 but 
we are running the whole of ward 10 which is vascular surgery and the whole of 
ward 19 which is orthopaedics as medical wards.  So suddenly I’ve got to find a 
whole medical team to operate those wards so I am having to spread them thinly 
from elsewhere.  At the same time because I can’t fill posts I’ve got 8 vacancies 
okay some of which is driven by pregnancy so that’s another cause for less 
resilience in the system is a lot of the junior doctors are female and therefore 
we’ve got a high pregnancy rate.” (Doctor CS1) [CS 1: SWE; Staff workload] 
 
 
Conceptually, the marginal zone boundary for doctors was closer to the unacceptable 
workload failure boundary than for nurses (Figure 6.8). The reason for the different 
locations of the marginal boundary was the available ‘buffer capacity’ for the nursing 
staff, which was not present for medical staff. This leads to the view that there are 
multiple marginal boundaries to be considered for different staff groups. 
 
Figure 6.8: Location of the marginal zone boundary for nurses and doctors 
 
There was evidence that the sharp end nurses and doctors knew what constituted an 
unacceptable workload. An example of this were the comments made about the 
Boundary of Unacceptable workload failure  
Marginal zone boundary  
Buffer 
capacity 
The marginal zone boundary is ‘located’ 
differently for nurses and doctors. The 
Nurse bank provides ‘buffer capacity’ to 
cover gaps. Doctors ‘buffer capacity’ 
came largely from working harder. The 
staffing rotas and budgets make aspects 
of the boundary ‘visible’.  
(Doctors) 
(Nurses) 
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proposed changes to staffing levels by one senior nurse from CS 3: 
 
“... the impression I had was on some wards we would have three trained nurses 
trying to cover effectively two wards and probably a couple of untrained support 
staff. In my estimation that is nowhere near enough”. (Advanced Nurse 
Practitioner) (Francis QC, 2010a) p.211 
 
Often the limit of what was acceptable is stretched and efforts are made to support staff 
and provide replacements to fill gaps when that is possible. Senior managers in CS 1 
and 2 recognised that at busy times, the staff put in considerable extra effort [CS 1.4; 
1.15; CS 2.1]. Managers took action to ensure that there were no delays in recruitment 
to vacant nursing posts [FN 1.78]. In CS 1 the hospital Board invested money in new 
electronic beds and other equipment to improve the working conditions for staff.  
 
“…so we invested £5 million last year in terms of revenue, very much targeted 
at the clinical teams coming up with the things that would make life easier.” 
(Director CS 1) [CS 1: SWE; Workload] 
 
However, evidence from CS 3 shows that key decisions were taken to reconfigure 
wards and reduce nurse staffing levels (Francis QC, 2010a). Managers making those 
decisions did not appear to have listened to or acted upon the concerns of front line 
staff. The changes appear to have been largely motivated by the need to save money 
(Healthcare Commission, 2009a).  
 
“We noted from the figures for staff in post that the largest reduction in the 
number of nurses occurred between April 2006 and April 2007. The reduction of 
staff in post in that 12-month period was nearly 130 whole-time equivalent 
nurses.” (Healthcare Commission, 2009a) 
 
The dominant context for the managers in CS 3 at that time was to achieve FT status. 
As noted above, much of the assessment for FT status was related to the financial and 
operational management in achieving targets (KPMG, 2009). As the staff workload 
boundary is often a matter of professional judgement, it is less well defined and 
therefore, not as ‘visible’, to managers as the financial and target boundaries. In CS 3 
decision makers did not appear to make the balanced judgements to the same extent as 
those found in CS 1 and 2. 
 
However, in CS 1 and 2 there was little if any knowledge expressed about the human 
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factors implications for patient safety of high workloads, staff working long hours or in 
unfamiliar surroundings (Reason, 1990). For example, there is evidence in the literature 
that nurses and doctors who work long hours are much more likely to make mistakes 
(Rogers et al., 2004, Scott et al., 2006, Fahrenkopf et al., 2008). The working hours of 
junior doctors were monitored through a self reporting scheme which was open to under 
reporting the actual hours worked. The hours worked by other groups of staff was not 
measured. They were assumed to have worked the hours on the rota. Observation and 
interview data confirmed that many nurses worked longer and often missed breaks. 
 
“And they work you know but they are under pressure all the time, there are 
days where they, I mean and now they are just stopping for lunch. 
 
And it’s now 
 
Twenty past three.” (Ward Sister CS 1) [CS 1: SWE; Staff workload] 
 
In conceptual terms the unacceptable workload boundary is more visible closer to the 
sharp end of providing patient care. This was evidenced by the questionnaire results, 
interview and observational data. Nurse managers in particular know what levels of 
staffing should be in place [CS 1.15; 1.18; CS 2.7; 2.11]. Both doctors and nurses make 
judgements about how to use the staffing resources flexibly when required by changing 
circumstances. Senior managers often recognised that staff worked harder during peaks 
in demand but did not appear to appreciate the potential patient safety implications. That 
means that the marginal zone boundary can ‘drift’ outwards as staff and managers 
‘normalise’ to working harder.  
 
It is concluded that the marginal zone boundary related to the unacceptable workload 
failure boundary was not set in a fixed location either by the staff themselves or by the 
senior managers. The relationship of the unacceptable workload boundary to the patient 
safety failure boundary is conceptually more visible to front line clinical staff. Managers 
appeared to understand the link between staffing numbers and costs very well. They 
also made judgements about staffing levels and the ability to meet targets [e.g. CS 2.1].  
 
Whilst professional bodies make recommendations about what the staffing levels should 
be (Scott, 2003), it is apparent that the staffing levels are often negotiated internally. 
Planned changes to staffing levels were agreed through the business planning process. 
At times of perturbation the internal professional judgement of staff provided the 
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‘visibility’ for senior managers who sanctioned additional expenditure, on for example, 
agency nurses. Evidence from observation showed that senior managers in CS 1 and 2 
listened carefully to staff and made judgements about what was reasonable workload 
pressure. However, there were times when circumstances were beyond their control and 
the staff workload escalated.  
 
CS 3 is an example of where the judgement about staffing numbers and workload was 
influenced by the context of financial control. It may be argued that in CS 3 the 
reduction in nurse staffing levels ‘moved’ the marginal zone boundary outwards to a 
‘location’ close to the failure boundary, and therefore reduced the ‘buffer capacity’. The 
lack of ‘visibility’ of the unacceptable workload boundary in comparison to the 
financial and target failure boundaries is a likely conceptual explanation for the 
reduction in staffing levels. 
 
There are four conclusions to be drawn from this data: 
 
• First, that the ‘visibility’ of the unacceptable workload boundary and associated 
marginal zone boundary was greater for staff working close to providing direct 
patient care. The interrelationship between workload and patient safety was also 
more ‘visible’ to front line staff. 
 
• Second, that staff and managers normalised to having to frequently work harder, 
thus the marginal zone boundary ‘moved’ slowly outwards. 
 
• Third, that there were different marginal zone boundary ‘locations’ for doctors 
and nurses, due to the difference in the availability of ‘buffer capacity’. 
 
• Fourth, the interrelationship of staffing levels with finance and targets was more 
‘visible’ to managers and directors than the relationship of staff workload to 
patient safety. This is demonstrated in the next section. 
 
Examples of the dimensions of the unacceptable workload boundary are summarised in 
Table 6.5: 
 
 
  Mike D Williams 
 150
Construct Dimensions Examples from the data 
 
Unacceptable 
workload 
boundary 
Visibility  
 
Staffing rotas and budgets provided the basis for 
what is agreed as acceptable staffing levels. 
Unacceptable 
workload 
boundary 
Movement 
 
As staff normalised to working harder during busy 
periods the marginal boundary ‘drifts’ outwards. 
Unacceptable 
workload 
boundary  
Location 
 
The location of the marginal zone boundary was 
different for doctors and nurses. 
Unacceptable 
workload 
boundary  
Marginal zone 
(buffer capacity) 
 
The buffer capacity for doctors was largely created 
by them working harder / longer (“I am having to 
spread them thinly from elsewhere”)  
Nurses have the Nurse Bank and Agency Nurses to 
provided some buffer capacity. 
 
 
Table 6.5: Dimensions of the SWE ‘Unacceptable workload boundary’ construct with 
examples from the data 
 
6.5 Financial Failure Boundary 
Despite record levels of spending on the NHS, there was a period in the mid 2000s 
when financial control in some organisations was weak leading to an overall overspend 
for the NHS in England (House of Commons Health Committee, 2006). The situation 
led to a renewed emphasis in 2006/07 by the Department of Health on keeping 
organisations within budget and where possible to make a surplus  (Department of 
Health, 2006a). There are nationally set tariffs for clinical procedures and each hospital 
agrees a contract with their local Primary Care Trust (PCT). That contract forms the 
basis for the financial budget each year. 
 
The case study hospitals have different histories of financial management. CS 1 was a 
‘first wave’ FT with a strong record of achieving financial plans. CS 2 has a history of 
large financial overspends. Over the past three years the overspending has been reversed 
and budgets balanced. CS 3 faced some financial challenges and therefore sought to 
make large scale savings as evidenced from one of the inquiry reports:  
 
“The year 2006/07 was a challenging one for the NHS, as trusts were required to 
achieve financial stability. That year, the trust set itself a challenging agenda to 
meet national targets for cost improvement, stabilise its finances, and become an 
NHS foundation trust. The trust set a target of saving £10 million, including a 
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planned surplus of £1 million. This equated to about 8% of turnover. To achieve 
this, over 150 posts were lost.” (Healthcare Commission, 2009a)  
 
 
Financial management deals in numbers. Providing that there are reasonable processes 
in place to set budgets, attribute income and costs, then the defining and monitoring of 
the financial failure boundary is relatively straightforward. Therefore, the financial 
failure boundary is ‘visible’ to those with budget responsibilities. Trust Board reports 
for CS 1 and 2 show very detailed monthly financial reports. In CS 2, due to the history 
of overspending, all the non-executive board members were part of the Finance 
Committee of the Board which scrutinise the monthly reports. 
 
“Yes they are detailed and they are, we have a very lengthy finance committee 
meeting and go through the whole thing in great detail and at the Board it’s 
virtually a rubber stamp situation because we’ve gone through it all before.” 
(Director CS 2) [CS 2: SWE; Finance] 
 
There were clear processes of monthly, quarterly and annual reviews within the CS 1 
and 2 hospitals to monitor the financial position [CS 1: Doc 1.1; 1.2; 1.8; 1.9; CS 2: Doc 
2.2; 2.2; 2.14] . At a senior management level there were resources and processes in 
place to manage and monitor the financial situation including individual ward and 
department level. 
 
“It’s very clear we get the monthly income and expenditure reports that we’ve 
always had in exactly the same format as they have always been and also we 
have a very robust directorate and management accountant set up and probably 
the most robust that I have ever known is as much that we have a Divisional 
Accountant that’s a member of our team and very much dedicated to what we do 
so they get to understand what we do so that they don’t just record and report 
they advise into the whole set up…” (Senior Manager CS 1) [CS 1: SWE; 
Finance] 
 
 
In this case the boundary is highly ‘visible’ and therefore easy to ‘locate’ at different 
levels in the hospitals. As noted above, managers were very aware of the 
interrelationships between staffing and costs as over sixty percent of the budget was 
spent on pay. Linked to the boundary of unacceptable workload, managers balanced the 
financial implications of filling vacancies and covering sickness on the wards with the 
need for strong financial control [CS 1.18; CS 2.11]. Senior nurses and ward managers 
reported using their budget allocation flexibly. However, it is also clear that they had to 
account for any overspend and manage within their overall budget [CS 1: Doc 1.8; 1.9]. 
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This next quote is an example of where the staffing is considered primarily from the 
financial perspective by senior managers.  
“On a more operational level we run our monthly performance reviews which is 
our opportunity to sit down with the divisional teams and look at their monthly I 
and E position and the cumulative year to date and their year-end forecast 
position and we will have a number of not just the budget information but we 
would have a number of indicators that we would look at around agency staffing 
usage, vacancy control information and no vacancies get approved for filling 
without an exec team, they all come to the exec team every week and similarly 
agency usage is only approved by myself or the Director of Nursing and out of 
hours on call etc.  We have, we regularly review short and long term sickness 
levels and those sorts of things as indicators to underpin what’s going on with 
the pay position, the variable pay position.” (Director CS 2) [CS 2: SWE; 
Finance] 
 
The data indicates that CS 1 and 2 had strong financial management processes. They set 
a financial plan for the year and managed the within year variations as required. At 
times of high demand for services (or perturbation), financial considerations were not at 
the forefront of the decision making process. Nurses, doctors, managers and directors, 
in both case studies, made the similar point that in extreme situations staffing or safety 
considerations outweighed the financial consequences: 
 
“…whenever you are kind of up against it we never, we never make a decision 
based on let’s not cover a shift because it will save money and we would never 
not get agency in if we really felt it was needed for safety or get security if a 
patient is quite violent.  So we would always, so money is not part of the 
equation in terms of safety.  Not in the context you describe which is when the 
hospital is busy.” (Senior Manager CS1) [CS 1: SWE; Finance] 
 
 
Conceptually, there was some ‘buffer capacity’ used to meet the immediate costs in 
times of perturbation. Some flexibility was given to short term expenditure to keep the 
other boundaries from being breached. For example, during times of staff sickness or 
exceptional demand for inpatient beds, additional resources were spent to bring in bank 
and agency nurses. Additional money was paid to consultant medical staff to achieve 
targets. Long term increases in staffing required a full business case to argue for the 
additional expenditure, which then took time to be considered. There was a recognition 
that a balance had to be struck between the level of resources and safety. 
 
“…there’s no doubt about it if you had lots more nurses and you know more 
time and you didn’t have bed problems there would be fewer mistakes but it all 
costs money of course.” (Senior Manager CS1) [CS 1: SWE; Finance] 
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Short term safety issues, for example, staffing wards to cover gaps in the rota were 
funded. The short term decisions were accounted for later in performance management 
meetings. When longer term expenditure was considered to improve staffing levels and 
hence patient safety, it was often the financial considerations that took precedence. The 
concept of ‘bounded rationality’ helps to explain that decision makers are influenced by 
the immediacy and ‘visibility’ of the current needs when making choices (Sterman, 
2000, Booth Sweeney and Sterman, 2007). Future needs are weighed up using the 
available information on projected financial costs. The costs are easier to define and 
make ‘visible’ than the less well defined safety benefit. The investigation into the 
governance of the CS 3 Trust found that over a number of years the Board had focused 
on the more measurable aspects of finance and targets in the context of seeking FT 
status: 
 
“We analysed the minutes of the trust's board meetings from April 2005 to 2008. 
The minutes indicated that discussion at the board was dominated by finance, 
targets and achieving foundation trust status.” (Healthcare Commission, 2009a)  
 
The financial failure boundary was clearly defined and monitored in the CS 1 and 2 
hospitals at all levels of budget management from the Board to individual budget 
holders. Conceptually the boundary could be regarded as highly ‘visible’ across 
different levels in the hospital system. Financial management is largely judged by the 
end of year performance. The timing of the judgement allows for some ‘buffer capacity’ 
through the year. Overspends early in a financial year can be balanced by subsequent 
underspends [FN 1.48], thus borrowing ‘buffer capacity’ from the future potential 
underspends. In CS 2 the financial ‘buffer capacity’ was borrowed from under spending 
departments [CS 2.13]. The financial ‘buffer capacity’ borrowed from the future had to 
be paid back. This can be regarded as allowing the marginal zone boundary to move 
outwards with the plan to reinstate it to the original position later in the year. This 
possibility of borrowing from the future diminished close to the end of the financial 
year as the ability to find savings in the future runs out of time. Therefore, the boundary 
can be conceived as becoming more and more ‘visible’ and the marginal zone boundary 
‘location’ becoming ‘unmoveable’ towards the end of the financial year. 
 
CS 1 had a financial plan to make a budget surplus. When the number of patients treated 
was higher than contracted for, additional income was generated adding to the planned 
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surplus [FN 1.58; CS 1: Board Report 26.11.08]. In terms of the SWE, the additional 
income ‘moves’ the ‘location’ of the marginal zone boundary inwards, thereby 
providing an increased financial ‘buffer capacity’. During perturbations there was 
evidence of some relaxation of the budget constraints on staffing. This situation was not 
planned. From a conceptual perspective the surplus of income provided the financial 
‘buffer capacity’ to cover the costs of unexpected levels of activity.  
There are three conclusions drawn from the data: 
• First, the financial failure and associated marginal zone boundary were ‘visible’ 
with nationally set tariffs, contracts, budgets, monthly reports and performance 
reviews. 
• Second, the need for strong financial control dominated decision making except 
in extreme situations where the visibility of the immediate needs, for example 
nurse staffing, took precedence. 
• Third, the financial ‘buffer capacity’ was achieved from a number of sources 
such as additional income, borrowing from future underspends, or from under 
spending departments. There was some ‘movement’ in the marginal zone 
boundary which becomes restricted towards the end of the financial year. 
Some examples of the dimensions for the financial failure boundary are presented in 
Table 6.6. 
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Construct Dimensions Examples from the data 
 
Financial 
failure 
boundary 
Visibility  
 
Budgets, regular reports and performance reviews 
made the boundary very ‘visible’ to budget holders 
Financial 
failure 
boundary 
Movement 
 
There was limited movement inwards with 
additional income; outwards when borrowing from 
future under spends. Movement diminished as 
financial year progresses. 
 
Financial 
failure 
boundary 
Location 
 
Location was set by budgets and subsequent 
decisions. 
Financial 
failure 
boundary 
Marginal zone 
(buffer capacity) 
 
Expanded through net income above budget. 
Reduced through higher net expenditure than 
budget. 
Borrowed from future under spends. 
 
 
Table 6.6: Dimensions of the SWE ‘Financial failure boundary’ construct with 
examples from the data 
 
6.6 Target Failure Boundary 
Since the NHS Plan was published in 2000 there are a number of targets that hospitals 
have been required to meet (Department of Health, 2000a). As noted earlier, the NHS 
‘Operating Framework’ documents place a strong emphasis on the reduction of time 
patients wait to access hospital services. This section outlines the targets that focus on 
access to inpatient beds. It describes the priority of attention paid to the targets, how 
they are monitored and the attitudes of staff towards them. It is argued that the boundary 
of target failure was the most clearly ‘visible’ ‘located’,  least ‘moveable’ with the 
smallest planned ‘buffer capacity’, of all the four boundaries. This was largely due to 
the ease with which success and failure of achieving targets was measured and 
rewarded.  
At the time of the research (2008-10), the main targets that impact on hospital bed 
capacity were: 
• A maximum of waiting time of one month from diagnosis to treatment for all 
cancers.  
• Waiting time in Emergency Department (ED) – maximum of 4 hours for 98% of 
patients 
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• Waiting time from Referral To Treatment (RTT) – maximum of 18 weeks with a 
local ambition from the Health Authority to reduce to 15 then 13 weeks.  (This 
target relates to non-emergency patients) 
• Cancellation on day of admission rate of less than 0.8% (non-emergency 
patients) 
• All patients to be treated in single sex accommodation 
 
Whilst these targets may appear to be simple, some of them have complicated technical 
definitions and measuring requirements. For example, with the 18 week target there 
were definitional complications about what constitutes ‘treatment’ and therefore 
knowing when the clock stops for a patient in a pathway of care (Department of Health, 
2010a, Department of Health, 2010b). Even senior managers, who spent a lot of their 
time performance managing their organisations to meet the targets, confessed that rules 
being applied are not always clear or helpful. 
“As an organisation I think, the complexity of targets is something that I think is 
extremely difficult in the health service so I would say that the organisation 
knows the headline targets so the waiting and access targets.  Some of the 
underpinning targets I think are shrouded in mystery to, not only to them but to 
me at times so the 18 week is a real good example of that where we are 
achieving the 18 week target but we are failing on data completeness because 
the algorithm that they are using is a flawed algorithm.  So you know you can 
fail something even though you are doing the right things.” (Director CS 1) [CS 
1: SWE; Targets] 
 
Despite the complicated nature of the some of the definitional issues, targets in CS 1 
and 2 were highly ‘visible’ and received a high level of attention, particularly by 
managers. Observations show a hierarchy of importance linked to the immediacy of the 
target on the operational management of the hospital. The shorter the target timeframe, 
the higher that target came in the hierarchy of importance for managers. The 18 week 
target allowed clinicians and managers time to plan the workload and capacity. There 
was some flexibility and therefore limited ‘buffer capacity’ within which to manage the 
timing of patient admissions. With the cancer waiting time target the timescale was 
much shorter so the opportunity to be flexible was more limited.  
The ED target provided a very short time period within which to succeed or fail. 
Therefore, considerable attention was required to avoid unnecessary delays for the 
patients. The monitoring of performance against the four hour ED target was continuous 
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both within the department and by managers elsewhere in the hospital. Patients who 
were not admitted or discharged within four hours are known as ‘breaches’. The 
hierarchy of urgency is demonstrated by the frequency of reports given to senior 
managers, as illustrated by the following quote: 
“I am fairly obsessive about that [laughter] I get daily reports on some of the 
stuff.  So I get real time information on, four hour target, I get real time 
information of any breaches in particular, I get weekly information on where we 
are with our RTT position” (Director CS2) [CS 2: SWE; Targets] 
 
All the targets are ‘visible’ to managers through daily and more frequent reports. What 
the data demonstrates is that the ‘visibility’ is linked to the timescale and apparent 
hierarchy of importance of the target; the shorter the timescale the more visibility is 
required. For example, in CS 1 there was a large computer screen in the bed 
management office that was linked to the ED computer providing live performance data 
for each patient on the four hour target. The bed managers sought to manage the flow of 
patients through the hospital to ensure that there were empty beds to accommodate 
patients from the ED and other admission routes. Much of their time was spent finding 
empty beds to allow the ED to meet the four hour target.  
“…the Emergency Department position is highlighted every day and is part of 
this operational forecast you know and on a weekly basis, well on a daily basis 
we are looking at where we are against the kind of you know the position for 
that week so very much saying we need to be achieving 98% every week here.  
So that’s, and this forecast is circulated widely across the organisation every 
day.  At our 12 o’clock bed meeting we review all breaches for the previous day 
and try and identify any themes so that’s managed very much on a daily basis.” 
(Senior Manager CS1) [CS 1: SWE; Targets] 
 
The bed managers monitored the ED position in real time [FN 2.48]. Senior managers 
reviewed the situation regularly. When the ED became busier and the threat to the four 
hour target more imminent, then the situation was escalated and senior managers 
became actively involved in managing the bed capacity (FN 2.60]. The Chief Executive 
and other Directors were observed in CS 1 moving patients from the ED to avoid 
breaches [FN 2.60]. Directors in CS 2 reported taking direct interventions to improve 
the performance against the ED four hour target [CS 2.2]. The variety of actions taken 
to achieve the targets is explored in more detail in the next two chapters. 
Clinical and managerial staff expressed the view that the four hour target was necessary 
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to ensure timely and appropriate care for patients. 
“I know people might get obsessed about sort of you know breach times and 
four hour waits and it’s just a target but sometimes the time by which they are 
seen is a surrogate marker of quality…” (Doctor CS1) [CS 1: SWE; Targets] 
 
There was also strong performance management of the ED target in both CS hospitals. 
For example, the situation where the achievement against target was just under the 
required 98% could generate considerable management effort in taking corrective action 
particularly where there was no ‘buffer capacity’ available: 
“At the moment we are below 98% so we are working. 
How far below? 
When I looked just now it was 97.2% or something but still that does not give us 
a lot to year end.  I’ve met with the A&E consultants, I’ve met with the 
executive team because they are at the moment conflicting well not conflicting 
but there are financial concerns and A&E target concerns and we have discussed 
with the execs today neither of which we can afford to miss out on.” (Senior 
Manager CS 2) [CS 2: SWE; Targets] 
The interview data points to the interaction of the financial and target boundaries which 
have to be managed.  The data also demonstrates the level of ‘visibility’ given to those 
boundaries. This level of internal performance management is a reflection of the 
attention placed on the performance against targets by the Department of Health. 
Progress on targets was closely measured and monitored at the regional and national 
levels in the NHS (Department of Health, 2008a). During the winter months it was 
normal for non FT hospitals to have to make daily returns of performance achievement 
to the Department of Health, via the local Strategic Health Authority [CS 2.1]. Failure 
to achieve key access targets brought significant attention from either Monitor, as the 
independent regulator of FTs, or the local Strategic Health Authority [CS 1.6; 1.13; 
2.1]. A high degree of importance was therefore attached to achieving the targets by 
both clinicians and managers. These quotes point to the level of ‘visibility’ given within 
the hospitals to this boundary: 
“…at Christmas time we were teetering on the very edge of kind of target failure 
which for this Trust is the kind of ultimate a most heinous crime if you like…” 
(Doctor CS 1) [CS 1: SWE; Targets] 
 
“…we always deliver every target.” (Director CS 2) [CS 2: SWE; Targets] 
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“(the ED target) is a real priority for the Trust because to fail to meet the target 
will have significant implications for the Trust and some of the repercussions 
will have a real affect on the quality of patient care particularly where there are 
financial benefits involved and so I think the nursing staff particularly see the 
target as something they very badly need and want to achieve.” (Doctor CS 2) 
[CS 2: SWE; Targets] 
 
The Independent Inquiry into the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust explored the 
implications of failing to meet targets. The following extract from the Inquiry report 
shows the level of performance monitoring that was in place externally. Arguably, this 
can be viewed as the level of ‘visibility’ given to this boundary. 
 
“As will be seen, the Trust Board placed a high priority on compliance with 
nationally set targets, and, in particular, the four-hour waiting time target for 
A&E. The pressure to comply with such targets came from the Department of 
Health (DH), the strategic health authorities (SHAs) and the primary care trusts 
(PCTs), as explained by the then Chief Operating Officer:  
 
Q: But the consequence of failing to meet a target was essentially that it would 
reflect poorly on the Trust when compared with others?  
A: Yes but it would be more than that because it would be performance 
managed via both the PCT and the SHA at the time against what was happening, 
why the required standard wasn’t being met and what actions the organisation 
would take to improve and reach the required –  
Q: So your successor in the post at the SHA would be on the phone to you 
saying: why isn’t this target being met?  
A: Yes, and what are you doing about it, and similarly from within the PCT.  
Q: Was there pressure being brought to bear on you not only from within the 
Trust but also from the PCT and the SHA to ensure that these targets were met, 
or to explain why, if they were not met, that was?  
A: Yes, and beyond that because ... there was a team within the Department of 
Health which likewise was looking at any outlier performance and would expect 
through the SHA an understanding of what was happening and why it wasn’t 
being – why improvements weren’t being seen.  
Q. And with specific reference to the A&E target:  
I think we were all put under pressure to meet the four-hour target. It wasn’t just 
something that was unique to Mid-Staffs. And there was very much a sense from 
the SHA, the PCT, Monitor, the Department of Health, that that was a required 
standard that patients should be able to be clinically dealt with within the 
department within the four-hour threshold. I do not believe anyone used bullying 
tactics.” 
 
(Francis QC, 2010a) pp.162-3 
 
The pressure to meet targets at Mid Staffordshire was passed down the line to the 
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doctors and nurses working in the ED. From the SWE perspective, the highly ‘visible’ 
and non-‘movable’ marginal zone boundary is due to the potential consequences of 
breaching the boundary to the hospital’s ambitions to become an FT. A further extract 
from the report written by the Inquiry Chairman, Robert Francis QC, illustrates the 
attention given to the target failure boundary: 
 
61. An emergency physician told me:  
The nurses would go into that meeting and they were told in the meeting that [if] 
there were any breaches to – that is breaches of the four-hour rule – they would 
be in danger of losing their jobs. On a regular basis, and I mean a number of 
times per week, when I was on day shifts, I would see nurses coming out of that 
meeting crying.  
 
62.  The A&E consultant agreed that senior nurses would pressurise junior 
doctors to discharge patients to meet the target:  
 
[They would] say: look, come on, someone is going to breach in 10 minutes, and 
sometimes they would be asking the senior to go and sort out the mess or make a 
decision. 
 
(Francis QC, 2010a) p.165. 
 
There was no evidence of such pressure being applied in CS 1 and 2. However, the very 
limited or non-existent ‘buffer capacity’ and high ‘visibility’ of the ED target 
demonstrates the degree to which the boundary of target failure was monitored. The 
high level of monitoring was present for all the targets both informally and through the 
formal reporting mechanisms of the hospitals. There was a high level of engagement in 
monitoring achievement against the range of targets and attention by managers on 
actions required to resolve actual or potential failure. 
“it’s monitored monthly by the Board but you know sort of weekly and daily by 
other key members, divisional managers, Director of Ops, the Chief Executive, 
myself you know we are sort of keeping an eye on what’s happening throughout 
the month and then the Board formally monitors it on a monthly basis.” 
(Director CS 1) [CS 1: SWE; Targets] 
 
As noted above, the success or failure of not breaching the financial boundary was 
ultimately judged at the end of the year. Therefore, there was some flexibility to manage 
financial overspend and underspends across departments or over time. With waiting 
time targets that flexibility was much more limited due to the way failure was measured. 
The lack of flexibility provides an insight into the ‘buffer capacity’ related to this 
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boundary of the SWE: 
“I think it would be fair to say that targets are the most closely managed because 
you only have to have one or two kind of failures with a target and you can’t 
take them back whereas with your finances if you overspend in month one you 
can claw it back over the rest of the year.  If you have a breach of some 
description it sits there.  So targets are monitored all the time literally every day 
I will be looking at a range of target indicators.” (Senior Manager CS 1) [CS 1: 
SWE; Targets] 
 
The different targets created a set of competing requirements to admit patients to 
hospital within set time limits. There was a considerable management effort to 
understand the level of demand for access to the case study hospitals. In CS 1 and 2, 
historical data was used to help predict the number of emergency admissions [CS 1: 
Doc 6; xls 1.1; CS 2: xls 2.2]. The number of patients needing planned admission was 
constantly monitored and communicated to decision makers. The pattern of discharges 
from the hospitals was also monitored. Managers sought to understand what actions 
were required to meet the demand for treatment within the waiting time targets. This 
can be conceptualised as keeping the OP away from breaching the target failure 
boundary. 
 
In summary there are four conclusions to be drawn about the target failure boundary: 
 
• First, the target failure boundary was highly ‘visible’ with a series of nationally 
set targets combined with strong performance management at all levels in the 
NHS.  
 
• Second, consistent failure to meet targets brought considerable external attention 
and reputational damage.   
 
• Third, the hierarchy of urgency associated with the targets provides an insight 
into the varied ‘buffer capacity’ of this boundary. The RTT of 18 weeks had a 
longer time scale and therefore some buffer capacity could be created in 
comparison to the 4 hour ED target. When a hospital operated very close to the 
target, such as 97.2% of the expected 98% ED target, there was no ‘buffer 
capacity’ related to that boundary.  
 
• Fourth, due to the location of the marginal zone boundary close to the failure 
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boundary, considerable effort was expended to keep the OP away from the target 
failure boundary. Some of the efforts have been described as ‘gaming’ (Bevan 
and Hood, 2006). The compensating actions required to avoid target breaches, 
such as generating ‘buffer capacity’ by opening additional beds and outlying 
medical patients on non-medical wards, created a number of interactions with 
the other boundary constraints. These interactions created dynamics that will be 
explored in more detail in the next two chapters. 
 
The examples of the dimensions derived from the data are summarised in Table 6.7: 
 
Construct Dimensions Examples from the data 
 
Target failure 
boundary 
Visibility  
 
Nationally set, performance managed at national, 
regional, hospital and department level. 
 
Target failure 
boundary 
Movement 
 
Almost no movement of marginal zone boundary. 
Target failure 
boundary 
Location 
 
Marginal zone boundary location was close to the 
failure boundary. 
 
Target failure 
boundary 
Marginal zone 
(buffer capacity) 
 
Limited buffer capacity for RTT, often none for 4 
hour target. 
 
Table 6.7: Dimensions of the SWE ‘Financial failure boundary’ construct with 
examples from the data 
 
In terms of the SWE model, it is possible to depict the ‘target failure boundary’ as being 
a dominant factor in the decision making and actions within the hospital. This 
dominance can be explained because the target boundary was arguably the most 
‘visible’, clearly ‘located’ with least movement of the marginal zone boundary and had 
almost no buffer capacity. 
 
6.7 Summary 
Rasmussen (1997) developed the interacting three boundary SWE to depict the socio-
technical context of safety. The boundaries of the envelope define the constraints within 
which a system operates. Rasmussen (1997) does not go into detail about the 
dimensions of the boundaries, nor how different levels in an organisation might 
perceive them. When the model is contextualised and applied in the case studies, the 
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dimensions of each boundary were perceived in slightly differently ways, which 
generated different responses.  
 
For example, the unacceptable workload boundary had some flexibility and was less 
clearly defined further away from the ‘sharp end’ (Cook and Woods, 1994, Flin et al., 
2008). The patient safety failure boundary was only partially defined and measured. 
Breaches of that boundary were not always noticed. When staff normalised to certain 
situations, such as patient falls, the marginal zone patient safety boundary was moved 
outwards to where a new safety ‘norm’ is established (Vaughan, 1996). The financial 
failure boundary had some buffer capacity given that success was judged over the full 
year, although monthly monitoring occurred. Front line staff were less concerned about 
finance than about workload and patient safety. The target failure boundary, which is 
contextually specific to the NHS, was shown to be the most ‘visible’ boundary with 
little or no buffer capacity. The lack of flexibility associated with the target failure 
boundary created certain behaviours within the system. The timescale and therefore the 
hierarchy of urgency, within which human agents took actions and made choices to 
avoid target breaches, appears to have been much shorter than in relation to the other 
boundaries.  
 
The dimensions of the different boundaries are illustrated in Figure 6.9 
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Figure 6.9: The SWE with boundaries dimensions 
 
The boundaries depict the constraints within which the system is designed to operate 
(Woods, 2006). The boundaries create competing pressures on the OP of the system. 
What is shown by the case study data is that at periods of high demand, the dimensions 
associated with a boundary determined, in part, the priority given to actions to keep the 
OP from breaching the boundary. Interestingly, the more visible and less movable the 
marginal boundary, the greater the priority was given to the compensating actions that 
needed to be taken. 
 
The boundaries of the SWE are only one part of the model. The pressure created by the 
boundaries is linked to the gradients construct of the model that sets the conditions 
within which the OP operates. Part of what has been considered above is related to the 
gradients. For example, the Department of Health’s Operating Framework documents 
can be regarded as contributing to the gradients related to all four boundaries that 
Financial failure boundary 
Safety failure 
boundary 
Unacceptable workload failure boundary 
Partly visible & 
located; moveable; 
buffer capacity for 
visible parts.  
Very visible; clear 
location; some 
movement; time limited 
buffer capacity 
Highly visible, 
location of marginal 
boundary means 
little movement or 
buffer capacity 
Visible at sharp end; 
location of marginal 
boundary moves out, 
mixed buffer capacity 
Target 
failure 
boundary 
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influence the movement of the OP. In the next chapter the dynamic interactions created 
by the gradients influence on the OP are explored. 
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Chapter 7 – Investigating the Gradients and Operating Point 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores the dimensions of the ‘gradient’ and the ‘operating point’ 
constructs of the extended SWE (v3). The gradients depict the pressures on the OP. The 
issues explored in this chapter are both the pressures and the system behaviour as 
depicted by the OP (Figure7.1). 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Combination and interaction of construct sets depicted by the SWE model 
 
The dimensions of the gradient and OP constructs are derived from the literature in 
Chapter 3 and for ease of reference are presented in Table 7.1. The exploration of the 
dimensions is conducted through the analysis of three events from CS 1 and 2. The first 
event from CS 1 was an outbreak of a sickness virus in the hospital which closed a 
number of wards for just over a week. Conceptually this event depicts a sudden 
perturbation when the OP breached the patient safety boundary, which generated actions 
and interrelationships between the competing gradients. The second event from CS 1 
was a surge in emergency demand that lasted more than two weeks, which created 
significant operational problems. This event illustrates ‘continuous stress’ on the 
hospital, the shift of the marginal zone boundary location, and the ‘drift’ of the OP 
towards the patient safety failure boundary. The third event from CS 2 was the flow or 
emergency patients through the ED and MAU on one particular day. The data provides 
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an insight into how the dynamics of the gradients and OP movement, at a hospital 
system level, can impact at the micro patient experience.  
 
The three events provide data on the ‘movement’ and ‘location’ dimensions of the OP 
construct of the SWE (v3). As noted in Chapter 3, when small movements of the OP is 
combined with the location remaining inside the envelope, then the system is 
conceptualised as being highly reliable (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). Alternatively, 
when the movement of the OP is large and the location is in the marginal zone, or 
breaching a failure boundary, then it is regarded as a low reliability system. The reader 
is reminded that a resilient system is conceptualised as one where the OP can remain 
within the boundaries of the SWE in the face of perturbation or continuous stress.  
 
The gradients linked to the boundaries apply ‘pressure’ on the OP. Rasmussen (1997) 
argues that the gradients drive the OP towards the safety failure boundary. As such the 
gradients provide a ‘downward pressure’ on the OP, moving it away from the boundary 
associated with that gradient. However, in Chapter 3 and 5 the gradient construct is 
developed to take account of the ‘upward pressure’ created by the responses of the 
agents to the multiple interactions associated with the different gradients. The response 
by agents to the downward pressure is described as ‘cross scale interactions’ (Woods, 
2006). Therefore, it is helpful to explore both the ‘pressure’ and the ‘scale’; namely 
establishing whether the pressure is downward or upward. By examining the three 
events, understanding is gained into the ‘scale’, and ‘pressure’ dimensions of the 
‘gradient’ construct. It is argued that the constructs of the model provide insights into 
the characteristics in NHS hospitals in England, and how they potentially influence 
patient safety. 
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Construct Dimension Quotes from the literature 
Operating Point Location 
 
Movement 
‘…its distance from the marginal boundary’ 
(Cook and Rasmussen, 2005) 
‘At the moment there is little or no work 
directed at characterizing the location or 
movement of the OP of the system’ (Cook and 
Rasmussen, 2005) 
 
Gradients Scale 
 
Pressure 
 
downward and upward scale interactions 
(Woods, 2006) 
‘continuous pressure’ of the safety counter 
gradient ‘compensating the functional pressure 
of the work environment.’ (Rasmussen, 1997) 
 
 
Table 7.1: Dimensions of the SWE ‘operating point’ and ‘gradients’ constructs derived 
from literature 
 
The events are described and the evidence from the data collected is presented about the 
response by staff in the hospitals. The data presented has been reduced from interview 
transcripts, field notes of observations and hospital administrative data. Data source 
codes are shown in square brackets [ ].  
 
7.2  Event one – Norovirus 
In CS 1, an airborne sickness virus (Norovirus) in one ward spread to other wards.  
Within a few days the virus was present amongst patients and staff on twelve out of 
forty nine wards [CS 1: Doc 4]. The Control of Infection procedures for such an 
outbreak state is that the affected wards or bays are closed to new admissions. Only 
patients going directly home are allowed to be discharged.  Therefore, the transfer of 
patients to community hospitals or nursing homes was stopped, which slowed the 
discharge rate. The reduced discharge rate and the closed wards, created a perturbation 
in the normal running of the hospital. The virus closed eight wards to new admissions. 
Therefore, there was reduced bed capacity to accommodate both the emergency and 
elective patient admissions. Visitors were not allowed on the infected wards and staff 
movements were restricted to essential visits only. 
 
In conceptual terms the sickness virus created a rapid movement of the OP. It is argued 
that due to the level of harm to patients created by the virus, the OP breached the patient 
safety boundary (Figure 7.2). The downward pressure from the gradient towards 
production associated with the target failure boundary created the conditions where the 
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rapid spread of the sickness virus was more likely. As noted, the Annual Control of 
Infection Report [CS 1: Doc 5] implicated the high bed occupancy and movement of 
patients as contributing factors to the spread of Norovirus. The high bed occupancy, 
which created large number of outliers and the patient movement, was the result of 
pressure from the gradients towards efficiency and production. Further evidence of this 
is presented below. 
 
The buffer capacity of empty beds able to be deployed to meet the initial Norovirus 
outbreak was minimal due to the high bed occupancy and number of medical outliers. 
Conceptually, there was a rapid decompensation as the buffer capacity was quickly 
exhausted (Miller and Xiao, 2007), resulting in the OP breaching the patient safety 
failure boundary. 
 
Figure 7.2: The OP breaching the patient safety failure boundary due to the rapid spread 
of the Norovirus in CS 1  
 (+ = downward pressure moving the OP away from associated boundary) 
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The compensating action of closing wards to contain and eradicate the virus can be 
conceptualised as the patient safety gradient pushing the OP back inside the envelope. 
An analysis of the response to the outbreak is set out in the next section and the insights 
into the dimensions are identified. 
7.2.1 Response 
The on call Director took the view that it was not possible to close the hospital to new 
admissions for two reasons. First, patients would still arrive and staff would find it hard 
to turn them away and second, neighbouring hospitals did not have sufficient capacity if 
emergency patients were diverted to them [CS1.15]. A major focus of attention was the 
need to contain and remove the virus. Ward closures were strictly adhered to.  
“…the first thing that we have done is very clearly not compromised the areas 
that are infected so those areas have got to be closed and they are quite clearly 
closed, there’s no transfers out from them, there’s no admissions into them so 
the patients can be discharged from them but we are not moving them anywhere 
else so they have been very much locked down and for us this week that’s been 
kind of 8 ward’s worth.” (Manager CS 1) [CS1:RP; DM; Capacity] 
 
Over the following week a thorough cleaning programme of areas was used prior to 
reopening the wards. The hospital was closed to all visitors until the wards were 
reopened. A press release was given out to explain the situation [CS 1: Doc 1.4].  
At the same time the reduced bed capacity meant that there was a danger of the OP 
breaching the target failure boundary. The ‘pressure’ from the production gradient 
related to the target failure boundary then influenced decision makers to open beds in a 
reactive manner and spread medical and nursing staff more thinly to cover those areas. 
The dynamic interactions create the situation where the OP moves over time as 
illustrated by Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3: Movement of the OP following the outbreak of the Norovirus 
The next section provides evidence of the actions taken in response to the pressures 
exerted by the different gradient pushing the OP away from breaching the failure 
boundaries. 
7.2.1.1 Opening additional inpatient beds 
A number of compensating actions were taken within the hospital to generate new 
staffed bed capacity. These beds were needed to maintain the rate of admissions and 
avoid the OP breaching the target failure boundary. The actions included opening an 
area normally used as a pre-admission area in orthopaedics (normally only open during 
the working day).  This small 13 bed area was situated at the other end of the hospital 
from the medical wards. It was not equipped as an inpatient area; there was no drug 
trolley or inpatient beds [CS 1.15]. Patients already in medical beds, identified as being 
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well enough, were then moved to this area. A further area of 6 beds, known as the 
Clinical Decision Unit (CDU), was brought into use in an area beside the ED. This was 
a prefabricated building with no natural light. This was used for medical patients. Areas 
within medical and surgical wards that were normally used as day case beds were 
brought into service as inpatient beds.  
“So we’ve looked at every kind of area of capacity within the organisation and 
been a bit creative about how we can keep work going but by doing it in 
different ways.” (Manager CS 1) [CS1: RP Capacity] 
 
7.2.1.2 Increasing the rate of medical outliers 
The OP can be conceptualised as being in the middle of the envelope if all the gradients 
apply equal pressure. In such a situation all the patients would be in the correct bed 
within the target time, there would be sufficient staff on duty and the budget would be 
in balance. When there are a number of medical outliers the assumption is made that the 
OP is being pushed towards the patient safety failure boundary.  
 
A daily requirement for the midday bed meeting was for nursing staff on the medical 
wards to identify those patients they consider suitable to be moved to a surgical ward. 
“I mean you know if I’m honest we have been asked to number our patients 1 to 
28 with 1 being the most suitable to outlie and 28 being the least suitable and if 
necessary they would work down that list.” (Nurse CS 1) [CS1: AD; Medical 
Outliers] 
 
By moving medical patients into surgical beds it provided the capacity within the 
medical wards to accept transfers from the Emergency Medical Unit (EMU).  In turn 
then EMU could accept admissions from the ED.  To achieve the 4 hour target in ED 
there has to be a constant supply of beds being found in both EMU and the medical 
wards to be able to admit patients.  Staff planning to move medical patients onto 
surgical wards usually identified those patients who are fit enough to be sent home 
within the next day or two.  However, at times of high demand or where wards are 
closed, this was not always possible and less suitable patients are moved. This was 
explained by one of the site managers:  
“We would normally be looking for patients who are going home the next day or 
within 48 hours that have got a definite plan.  In times of extreme pressure we 
would be looking at patients that could be, but don’t have a definite discharge 
plan but could be safely nursed in another area. 
And who makes that judgement? 
Well we ask that the nurses on the wards the problem is when we had the 
sickness virus the number of wards that we could actually outlie from was 
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diminished so we were targeting those areas more and more daily.  Now the 
nurse in charge of that ward area was asked to put them in priority order you 
know on one particular day I recall that one particular ward was asked to give us 
12 names and prioritise those names as to you know 
And how many of those ended up moving? 
The whole lot.” (Site Manager CS 1) [CS1: AD; Medical Outliers] 
 
As can be seen from this quote there is a sense of normalisation (“We would 
normally…”) to having to find patients to move. Such actions have a potentially 
detrimental effect on patients. However, when there was a lack of ‘buffer capacity’ to 
meet the various targets as identified in Chapter 6, then the ‘pressure’ from the target 
boundary gradient meant that staff took actions that push the OP away from breaching 
the target failure boundary. There were potential implications for patient care from 
those actions, which can be viewed as pushing the OP towards the patient safety failure 
boundary.  
7.2.1.3 Implications for the patients 
The doctors were not routinely part of the decision making process to outlie patients 
even though one of the consequences can be that the care of that patient is handed over 
to another medical team {CS 1.17]. Staff who received medical outliers do not always 
have the expertise to look after them as pointed out by a specialist doctor: 
“Because often after the admission you recognise that somebody is a specialist 
patient, they have got ischemic heart disease and need an angiogram and they 
won’t get listed for the angiogram until they are on a cardiology ward.  They 
might be on a waiting list but they will be delayed if they are not on a cardiology 
ward.  If they are a respiratory patient they will not get the specialist consulting 
review.  If they are a diabetes patient and they are diabetic …and they have gone 
to a non-diabetic ward they may be there for you know they will be there longer 
because they won’t have their insulin changed of they might not have their 
insulin changed appropriately and also somebody with a diabetic foot somebody 
might not appreciate the seriousness of that because they are not trained for that 
disease.” (Doctor CS1) [CS 1: AD; Medical Outliers] 
 
Staff consistently expressed concerns about the care received by medical outliers. From 
the interview and observation data an inference is made that outlied patients are at 
higher risk of delays in treatment with potential associated effects on their safety. It is 
apparent that at times of high pressure patients could be moved at all hours during the 
night. The following is an extract from the Field Notes having copied the ED ‘Breach’ 
reports from the Site Managers working during the night: (ward names have been 
anonymised)  
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ED Breach of Four Hour Target Reports from overnight: 5/6 January 2009 
 
“00.53hrs – moved patient from Ward H to Ward O. Moved EMU side room to 
Ward H side room. EMU side room needed cleaning. When S/R ready on EMU, 
ED explained that patient needed 1:1 nursing. EMU could not give 1:1 nursing; 
patient went to ITU” 
 
“0216hrs had to transfer patient to side room on Ward L from EMU. EMU side 
room had to be cleaned before patient could be admitted.” 
 
“0256hrs Patient vomiting. Unexplained cause. Needed side room on EMU. Had 
to move patient out of side room on Ward T. Transfer patient from EMU. Clean 
EMU side room before patient could be admitted.” 
[FN 4.62-64] 
 
When patients were potentially or known to be infectious, side rooms were required to 
isolate them and prevent the spread of infection. The control of infection was regarded 
as being the priority patient safety issue. Side rooms were a scarce resource. The 
demand for them required a process of constant reassessment of priorities and 
reallocation to higher risk patients when appropriate, even if that is in the middle of the 
night.  
“I think it’s just always wrong to have outliers always wrong to move them 
unnecessarily you know we have had some truly catastrophic cases as you are 
probably aware of people in their nineties perhaps moved four or five times and 
you really you look back at the case and you think how did that happen you 
know at some point somebody would have said enough is enough but it’s 
because you’ve got a group of bed managers doing their best with a number of 
really bad conflicting alternatives making people stack up in ED when perhaps 
they are extremely vulnerable or on EMU or, and try to meet the infection 
control needs because that’s the other dimension you know when you, it takes a 
lot of flexibility out of the system if you have to move people into side rooms 
and so on and perhaps you know certain bays you can’t move people out of and 
so on.” (Doctor CS 1) [CS 1:AD; Medical Outliers] 
 
There was wide agreement among staff that outlying patients was far from ideal. It is 
inferred that the ‘downward scale pressure’ on the OP from the target and financial 
boundary gradients left them little if any choice. Therefore, moving large numbers of 
patients to wards not specialising in their care appeared to have become a ‘normal’ 
means of creating ‘buffer capacity’ for the target failure boundary. The patient safety 
consequences did not appear to be as important as the necessity to be able to admit 
patients in the timescales required. Conceptually, the gradient exerting pressure related 
to the control of infection was acted upon by closing wards. At the same time, the 
patient safety concerns of outlying patients were outweighed by the pressure exerted by 
the gradient towards greater production associated with the target failure boundary.  
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In CS 1, one of the triggers to initiate the ‘escalation plan’ was having more than twenty 
medical outliers [CS 1: Doc 3]. The escalation plan brought more senior decision 
makers into the bed meetings in an attempt to keep the hospital running smoothly. 
Therefore, conceptually it can be argued that, when there were more than twenty 
outliers it indicated that the OP was inside the marginal zone of the patient safety failure 
boundary. Figure 8.13 suggests that in CS 1 it had become ‘normal’ for there to be more 
than twenty medical outliers. As suggested by Wheeler (Wheeler, 2003), a moderate but 
sustained effect on the number of medical outliers was observed during the sickness 
virus period with ten consecutive data points above the mean but within the upper 
control limit  (Figure 7.4).   
Medical Outliers, before during and after sickness virus 
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Figure 7.4: Statistical Process Control Chart - Medical outliers before, during and after 
sickness virus 
 
At the bed meetings staff were under pressure to find bed capacity by encouraging 
discharges.  Site managers asked staff to identify patients approved by the doctors for 
discharge so they could “sit them out”.  This meant moving the patient to a chair to free 
that bed for the next patient. Doctors were encouraged to conduct extra ward rounds to 
see if more patients could be discharged. Conceptually, these actions are in response to 
the ‘downward pressure’ of the gradient towards increased production to meet the target 
requirements. The need to keep the ED patients being admitted within the four hour 
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target is explored next as an illustration of the ‘pressure’ to keep the ‘location’ of the 
OP away from the target failure boundary. 
7.2.1.4 Keeping ED flowing 
The managers and site management team worked hard with ward based staff to juggle 
the competing demands. During the Norovirus there was no question of not achieving 
the waiting time targets for patients [FN 1.32]. Often staff justified the four hour 
waiting time target in ED as being good for patients:  
“I don’t disagree with the like for example the ED target I mean it’s good that 
we do have a four hour turn round because you don’t want patients laying on a 
stretcher for more than four hours because that’s not in, in the extreme you are 
doing patients harm you know that’s, so it’s important to keep the flow going.” 
(Nurse CS 1) [CS 1: AD; Flow] 
However, the consequences of ensuring that the four target was achieved placed 
pressure on other parts of the system and particularly on EMU as explained by one of 
the nurses working there:  
“…overwhelmingly the momentum is driven by demand and capacity and flow 
and you know you learn that concept very quickly when you work on EMU.  We 
have to manage the admission process through the EMU we take those from the 
GP and also the emergency department.  At this time of year we are moving into 
the 55/60 every 24 hours, that’s a large number coming through, we are a 31 
bedded unit.” (EMU Nurse CS 1) [CS 1: AD Flow] 
 
 
Each morning EMU sought to discharge some of the overnight admissions to provide 
beds for emergency patients sent in by GPs. However, if demand was greater than the 
number of empty beds the ‘medical take’ (emergency admissions from GPs) was 
diverted to the ED. This became a daily occurrence during the working week of CS1. 
“Normally by about midday, it depends on the number of calls, but normally by 
midday if we have only been running with one bed, you know one patient in and 
one patient out normally by about midday/ 1o’clock ED are having to take 
because we are waiting for the GPs you see once they start their clinics you get a 
couple, probably one or two up until midday may be one or two from ED not 
much but as soon as GPs get off house calls that’s it then, once they are out on 
their house calls their numbers start shooting up and then you start to take quite 
a large number through.  So roundabout, they start their house calls about by 
midday and complete them by about 3 o’clock so between 12, 3 and 4 o’clock 
you start taking a large quantity of GP referrals.” (EMU Nurse CS 1) [CS 1AD; 
Emerg Adms] 
 
 
Observation data, confirmed in interviews, shows that at times during the afternoon 
ambulance staff queued with their patients in the ED corridor because the department 
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was full [CS1.28; FN 2.38; 56]. Pressure was then on EMU to discharge or transfer 
patients in order to receive patients in a timely manner from the ED. The movement of 
patients out of EMU allowed ED to accept patients from the ambulance crews. The 
drive to admit patient from ED within the fours hours did have other implications, as 
one doctor observed:  
“the four hour wait spews people out at any stage of investigation off into any 
bed that’s available at the time.” (Doctor CS 1) [CS 1:AD; Emerg Adms] 
 
 
The implications for the doctors of patients being moved rapidly to beds scattered 
across the hospital was that they could lose track of patients causing delays in treatment. 
The medical team admitting patients relied on a hand written sheet of patient names and 
locations kept up to date by the on-call Registrar or Senior House Officer [FN 3.24; CS 
1.31; CS 2.15]]. They struggled to keep the sheet updated when patients moved to 
unexpected locations.  
7.2.1.5 Not cancelling elective patients 
One of the actions that could have been taken to reduce the ‘downward pressure’ from 
the target boundary gradient on the system was to cancel elective admissions. Most 
elective patients occupy surgical beds. All elective patients have a maximum waiting 
time (RTT target). Achievement of such targets was an important issue for the hospital. 
When asked about the importance of the RTT target, one manager responded:  
“Well it’s yeah it’s one of the kind of key targets that as an organisation we are 
looking to achieve and we have kind of signed up to it, a 13 week referral to 
treatment time by the end of well by, through March of 2009 and so we are on 
the kind of trajectory to do that.  I think you know relatively as an organisation 
18 weeks and increasingly 15 weeks isn’t a big issue for us, 13 weeks is within 
orthopaedics all of those targets were a big issue.  So you know the pressure to 
kind of keep things going within all of those areas is really quite considerable.  I 
think within some of the surgical specialties we’ve got some flexibility about 
looking at deferring admission but it’s clearly a kind of key priority that you 
know and a cancellation is kind of you know a little way down the line. …We 
are still managing to put the work through but it’s being done by some of the 
creative solutions that are kind of suggested around…” (Manager CS1) [CS 
1:SWE; Targets] 
 
 
From a conceptual view this quote emphasises the importance attached to the gradient 
associated with the target failure boundary. It can be inferred that there was some 
‘buffer’ in certain specialities that were ahead in meeting the 18 week target. That 
capacity could have been used to cancel patients and relieve some of the pressure on the 
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staff and beds during the sickness virus. However, there was also a strongly held view 
that such elective patients should not be disadvantaged by being cancelled, as their 
treatment needs were of equal importance to the emergency patients [FN 1.32; CS 1; 
AD; Elect Adms]. Analysis shows that during the period of the sickness virus the 
number of elective admissions was slightly higher than for the same period the year 
before (Figure 7.5). 
Elective Inpatient Admissions 2008 Before, During and After Sickness Virus and 
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Figure 7.5: Elective Admissions 2008 Before, During and After Sickness Virus and 
2007 over same period 
 
In conceptual terms, the managers choose not to exercise ‘upward pressure’ on the 
gradient towards greater production by cancelling elective patients. The consequences 
of continuing to admit all the elective cases meant that there were more patients than 
beds available at certain points in the day. 
“So the throughput is phenomenal yet they haven’t got any beds for these 
patients and yet they are having to start theatre lists without having you know a 
bed for a patient.  So it’s each day trying to work how we can best make, it’s 
safe for the patients to go to theatre so the staff feel that they are looking after a 
full ward plus also a corridor of patients.” (Surgical Nurse CS 1) [CS 1: AD; 
Elect Adms] 
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The situation was made worse by the patients to be operated on that day often being 
asked to arrive at 8am. This created a peak in demand for beds at a time when the 
patients to be discharged that day had not been organised. Patients were observed 
waiting in corridors, waiting rooms on wards and being prepared for theatres in offices 
[FN 2.40-50] 
 
Part of the juggling act for the site management team was finding beds for surgical 
patients post operatively, whilst at the same time finding beds for emergency 
admissions [FN 1.44; 2.64]. The Recovery Room in theatre was often used as a holding 
area for patients waiting for a bed after their surgical procedure. On one occasion it was 
observed that a Recovery Nurse was asked, by a ward without any empty bed, to 
arrange the discharge of a patient home directly from the Recovery Room [FN 2.52]. 
She was unsure how to do this and required assistance with the process. 
 
Conceptually, the downward pressure from the gradient to keep the OP away from the 
target failure boundary can be inferred to be high. The consequent actions taken to meet 
the waiting time requirements can be regarded as ‘moving’ the OP into the marginal 
zone if not through the patient safety failure boundary. As noted in Chapter 6, harm to 
patients is not always obvious. Decision makers can therefore ‘stretch’ the system 
believing that patient safety is being maintained. When the hospital was overcrowded 
there was also an impact on the workload of staff which is explored next. 
7.2.1.6 Staff workload 
The daily bed meeting often included a subsequent meeting of nurses who kept each 
other informed about potential and actual staffing difficulties [FN 2.13]. Risk 
assessments were undertaken on staffing levels at various times during the day. 
Professional judgment was used to decide the allocation and mix of trained (registered 
nurses) and unregistered or agency staff to the wards. This resulted in staff being 
allocated to wards that they are not familiar with. During the sickness virus outbreak 
staff were classified as either ‘dirty’; having worked on a closed ward, or ‘clean’ and 
redeployed accordingly.  Nursing and medical staff were moved within the hospital to 
cover the newly opened bed capacity and temporary staff were sought from the Nurse 
Bank (internal provider of flexible staff) and Agencies (private sector providers of staff 
at higher cost) [FN 2.34].  
 
  Mike D Williams 
 180
Considerable effort was expended several times each day to manage the staffing levels 
to keep the bed capacity operational.  No areas were closed due to lack of staffing.  
Some areas were flagged as being at the limit of the staff’s ability to cope. In certain 
instances newly admitted acutely ill patients were ‘deflected’ from their intended 
destination and admitted to other areas to protect stretched staff.  Patients were 
sometimes admitted or transferred to areas were the staff were not specialist in their 
treatment. Medical staff along with nurses fell victim to the sickness virus. Doctors who 
worked on the wards affected by the virus were not allowed to visit ‘clean’ wards. The 
medical staffing was therefore disrupted. The doctors in the medical specialities were 
deployed with often just one junior doctor per ward rather than the normal two [CS 1: 
SWE; Staff workload]. 
 
Therefore, during this time of disruption the staff workload increased. Day case areas 
were used for inpatients but the patients requiring the short stay procedures were not 
cancelled. The consequence was that nurses had a much higher workload: 
“…it’s a very fast turnover here and the staff are having to clear beds, get people 
sat in waiting rooms so they have effectively if you’ve got like a double set of 
patients because they’ve got the ones that we are then putting into that bed, the 
ones that they are still looking after who are in the waiting room waiting for 
discharge that they are constantly checking on, doing their observations, making 
sure they are safe, so that you know they are safe.   So you’ve got you know 
almost a double compliment of patients all the time.” (Ward Sister CS 1) [CS 1: 
SWE; Staff workload] 
 
 
Senior nurses in particular focused a lot of effort on keeping staffing workloads at what 
they regarded as a safe level. Their actions can be conceptualised as applying 
‘downward scale’ pressure on the gradient to keep the OP away from both the workload 
and patient safety failure boundaries. However, the reality of the situation, especially for 
the doctors and nurses who had to move wards, was that they worked harder and 
sometimes in strange environments, which inadvertently, makes them more likely to 
make an error (Reason, 1990). The consequences for individual staff can be 
conceptualised as ‘upward scale’ pressure on the gradients ‘moving’ the OP ‘location’ 
towards the intersection of the unacceptable workload and patient safety boundaries. 
 
Finance 
The strong financial position of the CS 1 hospital meant that additional resources were 
spent to pay for staff overtime, bank nurses and agency staff. Budget holders were 
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expected to account for their budgets and the reasons behind additional expenditure at 
the routine performance management meetings. It is clear from interviews with senior 
managers that financial considerations were not to compromise the safety of patients in 
terms of staffing the hospital during periods of disruption [CS 1; SWE; Finance]. 
Conceptually, the OP was ‘located’ well away from the financial failure boundary and 
during this time of perturbation the ‘downward scale’ pressure on the gradient towards 
efficiency was relaxed to allow additional expenditure. 
7.2.2 The Operating Point and Gradient dimensions 
The description of actions, views and consequences can be related conceptually to the 
SWE (v3). It can be argued that the OP breached the patient safety boundary due to the 
high number of infected patients and the number of medical outliers. The actions to 
resolve the rate of infection brought the OP back inside the envelope. However, despite 
relaxing the financial gradient, the staff workload was higher than normal for nurses and 
doctors due to high sickness levels. The OP therefore can be regarded as being ‘located’ 
in the marginal zone at the intersection between the unacceptable workload failure 
boundaries. The pressure from the target failure boundary gradient had the consequence 
of making staff take certain action that increased their workload. More beds were 
opened, elective patients were not cancelled but allowed to be kept waiting in corridors, 
the number of medical outliers increased, staff were redeployed and doctors encouraged 
to find more discharges. Therefore, the OP ‘location’ was kept away from the target 
failure boundary.  
 
The dimensions of the OP are the ‘movement’ and ‘location’ (Table 7.1). When the OP 
was located inside a marginal zone then there is a danger of a resulting breach of the 
corresponding failure boundary. The sickness virus event described above illustrates the 
OP breaching a boundary and then being pushed back inside the envelope. The OP is 
then subject to considerable pressure to keep it away from the target failure boundary. 
The size of the ‘movement’ of the OP can provide an insight into the stability of a 
system (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). When there are large and sudden movements of 
the OP the system can be conceptualised as unstable. At the outbreak of the sickness 
virus event it is argued that there is a sudden movement of the OP outwards through the 
patient safety boundary. The actions taken to isolate the infection moved the OP back 
inside the envelope. However, the pressure from the target boundary gradient moved it 
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back into the marginal zone at the intersection for both the patient safety and 
unacceptable workload boundaries. 
 
From the analysis above it has been noted that there was an ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ 
pressure. For example, senior nurses applied ‘downward’ influence (pressure to move 
the OP away from workload failure boundary) by bringing in extra staff and moving 
nurses around. However, the actual work experience of many staff applied an ‘upward’ 
influence (moving the OP closer to the workload failure boundary) due to them 
overworking. During this event the gradient towards efficiency from the financial 
failure boundary exerted low ‘pressure’ in comparison to the apparent high ‘pressure’ 
given to the gradient related to the target failure boundary.  
 
Conceptually, there was a degree of ‘normalisation’ to the virus outbreak and the 
consequence actions and ensuing conditions. This was exemplified when a report about 
the Norovirus outbreak was brought to the Governance Committee of the hospital some 
weeks later. Despite the considerable disruption observed, there were no comments 
made about the report and the meeting moved on to next business [FN 1.74].  
The data from this event is conceptualised and displayed in Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.6: Event one – SWE (v3) with operating point and actions and consequences 
associated with gradients from each boundary  
(+ = compensating action to keep OP away from that boundary; - = actions or 
consequences that brought OP closer to boundary) 
 
From this data there are a number of conclusions to be drawn about the dimensions 
being investigated. The conclusions are summarised in Table 7.2 and 7.3. In Chapter 9 
these results are discussed in relation to the literature.  
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Construct Dimension  Examples 
Operating 
Point 
Movement Special cause increase in infection rate made the OP 
unstable. 
Rapid movement of OP evidenced by infection rate and 
the change in the number of medical outliers 
Operating 
Point 
Location Normal number of medical outliers >20 therefore in 
buffer area of safety failure prior to event 
During virus breached safety failure boundary due to 
the number of patients infected and number of outliers 
 
Table 7.2: Summary of the dimensions of the ‘operating point’ during Event 1 
 
Construct Dimension Examples 
Gradients Scale Mixed scale interactions as staff sought to respond to 
safety requirement to isolate wards and meet target 
requirements by spending money and staff working 
harder 
Gradients Pressure High pressure to control infection; low pressure 
towards safety implications for other patients 
High pressure towards achieving targets 
Some pressure to reduce staff workload – bought in 
additional nurses but accepted high workload 
Low pressure from finance gradient 
 
Table 7.3: Summary of the dimensions of the ‘gradients’ during Event 1 
 
7.3 Event two – post Christmas surge in emergency admissions  
There was a surge in the number of emergency admissions immediately after Christmas 
2008 in CS 1. The Site Management Team used a daily predictor for the number of 
medical emergency patients that they expected needed admission [CS 1: 1.1; CS 2: 2.2] 
(see Appendix 7.1). The predictor used historical data and took account of the day of the 
week, time of the year and other factors. It is regarded as being very helpful and in the 
reported experience of the site managers, ‘pretty accurate’. Table 7.4 shows that over 
period of 17 days commencing the 29 December 2008 the predicted volume of 
emergency medical admissions underestimated the actual number. There were 186 more 
medical emergency admissions then expected in 17 days.  
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Date Day Admitted  Predicted Medical Outliers 
29 Dec Mon 61 42 66 
30 Tues 51 40 77 
31 Wed 61 46 74 
1 Jan Thurs 39 41 No data 
2 Fri 55 41 71 
3 Sat 61 33 113 
4 Sun 37 30 109 
5 Mon 58 42 113 
6 Tues 47 41 109 
7 Wed 53 47 99 
8 Thurs 49 41 101 
9 Fri 59 41 105 
10 Sat 37 33 No data 
11 Sun 40 30 No data 
12 Mon 51 42 95 
13 Tues 55 41 100 
14 Wed 50 47 107 
  864 678  
 
Table 7.4: Medical Emergency Admissions and Medical Outliers (29th Dec 2008 – 14th 
Jan, 2009) 
 
The predicted number of admissions was used to calculate the upper and lower control 
limits. The statistical process control chart (SPC) (Figure 7.7) shows that the actual 
emergency admissions breached the upper control limit (UCL) of the predicted 
admissions on seven out of seventeen days. On all but three days, the actual admissions 
are on or above the mean of the predicted admissions. This analysis indicates the 
presence of special cause variation from the expected level of admissions (Wheeler, 
2003). From a resilience perspective, this type of variation can be described as a 
perturbation to the system due to the continuous stress of high levels of admissions 
(Wreathrall, 2006). 
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Figure 7.7: CS 1 Predicted emergency medical admission with control limits with actual 
admissions Dec 08 – Jan 09 
 
The rise in demand contributed to the situation where there were over 110 medical 
patients on non-medical wards by Saturday 3rd January 2009 (Figure 7.8). 
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Figure 7.8: Number of medical outliers by day May 08 – Feb 09 
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7.3.1 Response- staff workload and patient safety 
The additional capacity that had been opened during the sickness virus was again used. 
Daycase beds were staffed overnight for inpatients; the pre-admission areas had beds 
put in them and used for inpatients, and a orthopaedic and a surgical ward became 
medical wards. Staffing those areas was a constant problem. A medical consultant was 
allocated to look after the medical patients on each of the converted surgical wards, 
which doubled their inpatient workload [CS 1.25]. Junior medical staff were redeployed 
and nurses were moved from across the hospital to staff the orthopaedic ward, which 
had been closed for the holiday period [CS 1: SWE Staff workload].  
 
Providing nurse staffing to look after inpatient in the pre-admission area in 
Orthopaedics located at the other end of the hospital from EMU was not easy. EMU had 
responsibility for that overflow area: 
“You’ve got nurses who haven’t worked together before of course you know it’s 
a core of it in the EMU the other bit is made up from nurses in the medical 
division and bank nurses so you know they are not working together they don’t 
know each other necessarily and we are not having consistency with the same 
staff looking after the patients and the system has been put together quite 
quickly that ward was cobbled together two weekends ago and it wasn’t an 
operational area it was pre assessment area so even now we are still you know 
we haven’t got the right stores in place and the pharmacy’s not quite right 
because of course it’s not an established in-patient area.” (Senior Nurse CS 1) 
[CS 1: AD; Capacity] 
 
 
This is an example of the unacceptable workload gradient being relaxed in terms of 
putting staff in unknown and unsuitable environments to work in teams that were not 
used to being together. The safety implications of this type of situation did not appear to 
be a high priority. When staff were asked about the potential issues of patient safety for 
medical outliers there are no direct concerns expressed. One doctor commented: 
“I don’t know if you could demonstrate in any trial that they did less well than 
the people on a general medical ward yet it’s a pain having to go out and look 
after them and it creates more work but we are professional people so you just 
do the work in a professional way as it’s the same body of work.” (Doctor CS 1) 
 
 
There was an acceptance that the continuity of care was interrupted for those patients 
who are moved from one ward to another. A patient moved to a ward not covered by the 
consultant team who were treating them, would transfer to the care of the medical team 
on the new ward. As a doctor commented: 
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“…wherever they pitch up they become somebody else’s patient.  That’s one of 
the things that really dissatisfies everybody because there’s another team got to 
get to know the patient, they’ve got to go over the story again and it’s never 
going to be quite the same as having seen their illness evolve or hopefully 
resolve.” (Doctor CS 1) 
 
 
On one day it was observed on two separate occasions that a junior doctor finished 
writing up the medical notes following his assessment of the patient on EMU, turned 
around and found that the patient had been moved to another ward. He shrugged his 
shoulders and moved onto his next task [FN 2.39]. The patients had been transferred to 
another ward without their medical notes, which is the key means of communication 
about their investigations and treatment. Conceptually, this can be seen as an example 
of the gradient ‘towards increased production’ exerting pressure to keep the patients 
flowing through the hospital. The willingness to move patients without their medical 
notes suggests that the need to achieve the productivity requirements had a higher 
priority than the potential safety of the patient. Conceptually, the marginal zone 
boundary was shifted outwards as it became acceptable practice to move patients 
without their medical notes. Further evidence of the boundary shifting is explored 
further in Section 7.3.3. 
7.3.2 Response – decision making hierarchy 
Given the scale of the capacity problems an internal ‘major incident’ was initiated. A 
meeting led by the Chief Executive developed a decision making hierarchy for 
prioritising admissions. Emergency admissions had to be admitted and had to be 
‘admitted well and dealt with as well as we possibly can given the demand that we’ve 
got’ (CEO). The second priority was clinically urgent patients and  
“…then actually nothing else matters because that’s what we’ve got to achieve 
so if that means we cancel elective surgery we cancel orthopaedics, whilst it’s 
unpleasant for the patient that’s been cancelled they are actually not going to 
come to significant harm.  If we cancel somebody’s varicose veins it’s 
unpleasant but they are not going to come to significant harm.” (CEO CS 1) 
 
 
The hospital was ahead of the RTT target in most specialities except orthopaedics. This 
provided some flexibility in identifying non-clinically urgent patients to be cancelled or 
treated elsewhere without creating major target issues. Unlike during the sickness virus, 
senior managers took the decision to relax the pressure on the system by cancelling 
some elective admissions.  
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At certain points during this period it was noticeable how involved senior managers and 
Directors became in the micro management of patient movements. On several occasions 
Senior Nurses, Managers and Directors acted as porters in the late afternoon, early 
evening and even late at night to help move patients from the ED to EMU or from EMU 
to other wards. A ward sister was observed receiving a phone call from a manager who 
asked her to admit a patient from ED into the treatment room until a bed became 
available [FN 2.58]. The sister refused and expressed the view that to admit a patient 
into a treatment room was a line she was not prepared to cross. The site manager, who 
also observed the phone call, was annoyed as she had a plan in place for that patient. 
This is an example of what might be described as a collapsing hierarchy where senior 
managers intervene in the work of more junior staff in an effort to resolve a problem 
that is often already being addressed. Conceptually, it can be seen as a middle manager 
placing more importance on keeping the OP away from the target failure boundary than 
the patient safety or staff workload boundaries. 
7.3.3 Consequence – shifting the safety failure marginal zone boundary 
On the afternoon of Friday 2nd January 2009 it became apparent that the number of 
emergency admissions was going to be larger than expected and there were not enough 
empty beds [FN 2.26]. The rich data, captured during a short period during event two, 
shows how the ‘drift to danger’ can be accelerated as the marginal zone patient safety 
boundary is shifted due to the pressure to maintain production (Woods et al., 2007, 
Snook, 2000). 
 
The Lead Nurse for the Control of Infection had given advice at a previous bed meeting 
on the 29th December. She had stated clearly that medical patients should not be outlied 
on the gynaecology ward [FN 2.23]. The reason is that medical patients are at higher 
risk of having the Norovirus. The doctors who work on the gynaecology ward also work 
in the maternity unit helping to deliver new born babies. Therefore, if the Norovirus was 
to become present on the gynaecology ward, there was a potential risk of it spreading to 
the new born children and their mothers with severe consequences. Conceptually, the 
marginal zone boundary location had been clearly articulated by the Lead Nurse for 
Infection Control. 
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In addition to the infection control concerns the skills and experience of staff on the 
gynaecology ward was also an issue. The gynaecology ward deals mainly with female 
patients requiring surgery, who are otherwise well, and only stay for a few days. The 
staff do not expect to deal with complex medical patients and are not familiar with 
many of the drugs used for such patients. Up to this point in early January, when 
patients had to be outlied, female surgical patients had been selected to be transferred to 
the gynaecology ward [FN 2.23; 32]. 
 
On Friday the 2nd January 2009, there had already been an extra 3pm bed meeting. It 
was reported that the number of medical outliers was up to 71 and the anticipated 
emergency admissions was 10 more than the expected. The suggestion was made that 
the empty beds on the gynaecology ward would have to be used [FN 2.34]. It became 
clear that the surgical unit had already moved all those patients who were suitable to 
move. The view was voiced that “there may be medical patients who could move to the 
gynaecology ward”. It was decided to review the situation at the 4pm meeting.  
 
At the same time there was concern about staffing numbers for the weekend. Requests 
had been sent to agencies but there had been no response. The Lead Nurse for Medicine 
then asked permission to go outside the approved NHS contract for agency staff and 
contact a more expensive company that was not on the approved list. The Lead Nurse 
stated: “We won’t get quality but we can put them in areas and move others.” 
Permission was granted by the Director of Operations [FN 2.34]. This is an example of 
the financial (spend extra money) and patient safety (accept poorer quality staff) 
gradients being relaxed in an attempt to ease the workload for nursing staff. The action 
was also motivated by the needs to keep wards open generated by the gradient towards 
production. 
 
At the 4pm meeting the staff attending overflowed into the corridor. The CEO and 
Medical Director were present and the Director of Operations (DoO) ran the meeting. 
The hospital expected 18 more patients than they had beds for. The DoO asked the 
Control of Infection nurse who was present (not the Lead Nurse) for his view about 
moving medical patients onto the gynaecology ward. He said that “if there was no 
alternative then it would be OK”. The Medical Director, who was standing just outside 
the door in the corridor, then suggested some criteria about selecting medical patients 
for the gynaecology ward: “avoid elderly and those on anti-biotics” The response of 
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those inside the room was laughter and someone said: “There are no young patients” 
[FN 2.35]. 
 
The Lead Nurse for Medicine was observed at this time as she spent a number of hours 
micro managing the flow of patients from ED and EMU [FN 2.38]. After the 4pm bed 
meeting the Lead Nurse went directly to EMU. She asked the Matron to identify 6 
patients for transfer to the gynaecology ward; no mention was made of any selection 
criteria. Once the patients were identified, the Lead Nurse and a Senior Matron moved 
the patients, their belongings and notes to the gynaecology ward. One of the patients 
transferred was a cardiology patient. The Lead Nurse had to collect the required drugs 
for that patient from Pharmacy and take them to the gynaecology ward. She assumed 
the nurse knew how to administer the drugs. She told the nurse that other medical drugs 
would be available from a medical ward if required [FN 2.38]. 
 
Once the ‘no medical patients on the gynaecology ward’ line had been crossed, the 
following day (Saturday), when again the emergency admissions were much higher than 
expected, over twenty medical patients were transferred to that ward. When the Lead 
Nurse for Infection Control returned from leave the following Tuesday, she inquired 
who had made the decision stating that “You will live to regret that decision” [FN 2.66]. 
The Chief Operating Officer’s view of the decision was:  
“I think it was the right decision to make at the time but what we didn’t do was 
safeguard how those beds were going to be managed over the weekend and you 
know we should have and in fact I’ve been sought by the control of infection 
lead quite rightly and taken to task over it.” (COO CS1) 
 
There was a subsequent series of conversations and the criteria for selecting patients to 
move to the gynaecology ward was tightened to only surgical inpatients or medical 
female day case patients. Follow up information shows that the gynaecology ward has 
now been re-designated as a ‘woman’s surgical ward’. 
7.3.4 Analysis of event two 
The rich data gathered over of a few hours within the hospital describes the multiple 
factors that were involved as medical patients overflowed into all parts of the hospital. 
As demand outstripped the supply of empty beds the situation produced a response from 
decision makers in the hospital. In this event, as the cumulative volume of emergency 
admissions occupied the inpatient beds, there was a willingness to cancel selected 
clinically non-urgent elective admissions. It also illustrates the moment when the reality 
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of the situation, (more patients than empty beds in the right areas), forced managers to 
take a decision that in conceptual terms, shifted the position of the marginal zone 
boundary for patient safety towards accepting higher risks (Figure 7.9). Mangers felt 
that they had no other option other than to ‘trade off’ (Hollnagel, 2009a) the risks of 
using the gynaecology ward with the risk of not being able to admit patients from the 
ED.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.9: CS 1 Shifting the marginal zone boundary outwards 
 
The pattern of response to the situation is similar to the sickness virus. During this event 
there was some relaxation of the elective RTT in some surgical specialities so that the 
emergency patients could be admitted in a timely manner. The financial gradient was 
also relaxed to pay for additional staff. However, the need to open extra beds meant that 
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the staff workload increased and the number of medical outliers increased substantially. 
At points during the day when there were peaks in admissions the hospital system went 
‘solid’  (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). There were no empty beds and no admissions 
were possible until a patient was discharged. Senior managers became involved in the 
micro management of patient movements [FN 2.56, 58]. 
 
Whilst staff claimed that patient safety was their top priority, the evidence from the 
observations is that patient flow was their highest priority. Such evidence includes using 
the gynaecology ward to keep the flow of medical patients moving to allow admissions 
from ED. The assumption appears to be that it was ‘safer’ to have high numbers of 
medical outliers than not to be able to admit emergency and clinically urgent elective 
patients. However, the data does suggest that such a view is influenced by the need to 
achieve the waiting time targets. 
  
The situation over this period presented decision makers with difficult choices. There 
were no simple answers and under considerable pressure managers and clinicians 
sought to make the least worst choices. As no immediate harm appears to have occurred 
to medical patients who were outlied to the gynaecology ward, staff normalised very 
quickly to that practice. The Lead Nurse for the Control of Infection challenged that 
practice. It can be inferred that her job was focused on not shifting or breaching the 
patient safety boundary in relation to infections.  
 
The data display for this situation is shown in Figure 7.10: 
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Figure 7.10: Event two – SWE (v3) with operating point and actions and consequences 
associated with gradients from each boundary  
(+ = compensating action to keep OP away from that boundary; - = actions or 
consequences that brought OP closer to boundary) 
 
The dimensions during the surge in demand are summarised in Tables 7.5 and 7.6: 
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Construct Dimension Examples 
Operating 
Point 
(Event 2) 
Movement Special cause increase in medical emergencies made the 
OP unstable 
Rapid change in the number of medical outliers created 
rapid movement of the OP 
Operating 
Point 
(Event 2) 
Location Normal number of medical outliers >20 therefore in 
marginal zone of safety failure prior to event 
During event breached safety failure boundary due to 
wards used and number of outliers 
 
Table 7.5: Summary of the dimensions of the ‘operating point’ during the Event 2 
 
Construct Dimension Examples 
Gradients 
(Event 2) 
Scale Mixed scale interactions as staff sought to respond to 
safety requirement to admit emergency patients and meet 
ED target requirements. Spent extra money on staffing, 
staff working harder and cancelled some RTT patients 
Gradients 
(Event 2) 
Pressure High pressure to admit emergencies; lower pressure to 
safety implications for patients outlied 
High pressure due to ED target; flexible use of RTT 
target 
Some pressure to reduce staff workload – bought in 
additional nurses but accepted high workload and 
temporary ward environments 
Low pressure from finance – spent money on staffing. 
 
Table 7.6: Summary of the dimensions of the ‘gradients’ during Event 2 
 
7.4 Event three – the flow of emergency patients on one day 
The previous two events took place over a number of days. Data from CS 2 confirms a 
similar pattern of response to infection and peaks in demand. However, the smaller size 
of CS 2 meant that the medical outlier situation was more easily managed by both 
clinical and management staff. Therefore, the OP returned to within the envelope more 
quickly than in CS 1. Event three from CS 2 is a description of how emergency patients 
were managed during one day [FN 4.1-20]. This is used to illustrate how the capacity of 
the hospital to manage the admissions over a short period of time can impact on the 
patients. Observations were made of the Medical Assessment Unit (MAU) (similar to 
the EMU in CS 1) and the Emergency Department (ED) during the 29th December 2009. 
Interviewees were conducted to clarify and triangulate the observational data. Access to 
this hospital was limited and this day was chosen to replicate a similar observation 
exercise on the same day the previous year in CS 1. 
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7.4.1 The flow of patients 
The consultant ward round on MAU started at 8.30am. Fourteen medical emergency 
patients had been admitted overnight. There was one empty bed on MAU. One, and 
later two bays, had mixed sex patients (breach of single sex target). This breach was 
regarded as a consequence of prioritising patient care:  
“Now I think the executive made a clear decision last year earlier this year that, 
no last year sorry, it’s January, that patients’ care was not going to suffer as a 
result of the single sex requirement and largely that’s done but there are still 
times when you know an inordinate amount of shuffling beds just to fix one kind 
of problem.” (Doctor CS 2) [CS 2: SWE; Targets] 
 
The first patients seen by the consultant on the ward round were those admitted by the 
junior doctors who had been on the night shift. They ‘handed over’ their patients before 
going off duty. The patients admitted the previous evening by the late shift of junior 
doctors were reviewed later; on that day starting at 11.10am.  
 
The consultant reviewed each patient and decided on their treatment plan and likely 
length of stay. The nurse running the MAU accompanied the doctors and co-ordinated 
future actions with the junior doctors on the day shift. The nurse reminded the doctor 
that ‘there are no medical beds’ in the hospital so for him to consider alternative options 
to admission where that was feasible [FN 4.8]. By 9.50am there were two patients in the 
ED who needed to be admitted to MAU. The bed manager had found three beds in 
surgical wards for MAU patients. The nurse asked the consultant to identify any 
patients for admission who were suitable to go straight to a surgical ward. A patient 
who was waiting for an MRI scan, but otherwise had recovered from her acute episode 
of illness, was deemed suitable to move to an orthopaedic bed. 
 
At the 12.30pm bed meeting it was reported that the number of emergency admissions 
on the previous Sunday had been exceptionally high and that due to many doctors being 
on holiday, the number of discharges was lower than expected [FN 4.12]. There was no 
visual display of bed occupancy. The predictor of admissions for that day was e-mailed 
to mangers [CS 2: xls 2.2]. The on-call manager was present at the meeting and asked 
why the patient waiting for the MRI could not have been kept in a chair on MAU rather 
than occupying a surgical bed. The on-call manager took the view that “Now we have 
21 outliers we have lost the plot.” Medical teams were to be ‘chased’ to see the outliers 
[FN 4.14]. 
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By 2pm the ED was full. There were medical patients referred by their GP in the ED 
waiting room because the MAU was full. Two patients were in the resuscitation room 
inappropriately (they were not seriously ill but there were no other trolley spaces 
available). If a seriously ill patient arrived the resuscitation room had to be available for 
life saving treatment. In this situation it was full. As one doctor commented:  
“…there are times when every bed in the department is occupied and that clearly 
is you know potentially catastrophic if somebody comes in in cardiac arrest or a 
major trauma and there isn’t a bed to put them on and you know the reality is 
that in that situation somebody would be moved and the patient would be taken 
through to resus on an ambulance gurney and treated on that but you know that 
is clearly a very dangerous situation.” (ED Doctor CS 2) [CS 2: SWE; Patient 
safety] 
 
There were five patients on ambulance trolleys waiting in the corridor [FN 4.18]. There 
was a social worker available to ED who could fast track services for patients in the 
community to avoid hospital admission. She was unavailable for the next hour as she 
caught up with work done to help MAU. A large white board on the wall was kept 
updated by an administrator. This provided patient details including the time they would 
breach the four hour target. 
 
The Sister in charge of ED spent the next few hours micro managing the flow of 
patients [FN 4.18, 20]. When a patient in the minors section of the ED was discharged 
she moved a child and parents from the paediatric room into the vacant adult cubicle. 
Then she moved the medical patient from the waiting room into the paediatric room and 
got a doctor to assess the patient and then transfer them to MAU. In the meantime a 
paediatrician arrived and could not find her patient. The Sister assessed the ambulance 
trolley patients and sent one off for an X-ray. An extra trolley was found and put in the 
resuscitation room and one of the ambulance trolley patients was moved in there. The 
social worker arrived earlier than expected and arranged the discharge of a patient. The 
MAU were able to transfer some of their patients into surgical beds. The ED was then 
able to transfer a number of patients to MAU and the pressure within ED reduced.  
The Sister insisted that the first priority was patient safety and targets came second. The 
constant juggling of resources and moving patients did mean that staff were working 
hard. The four hour target influenced how resources were deployed in the department. 
The dynamics that occurred in the ED was very similar to the whole hospital system. In 
the ED those dynamics were more visible and occurred in a tight time frame. As one 
doctor commented: 
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“I think what  happens is that there is a slightly blurred tipping point where the 
department makes a transition from being busy to becoming I guess not quite out 
of control but certainly very inefficient and if I can give you examples of that to 
sort of bring to light what I mean. Often as a doctor you will see a patient and 
you will want things done for the patient to assist in making a diagnosis to start 
treatment or whatever and you need members of the nursing staff to execute 
those actions.  When the department gets very busy it can be very difficult to 
find the correct member of nursing staff or even a member of nursing staff who 
is able to attend to those jobs and so you can waste time in trying to find 
somebody and obviously because they are busy it takes longer for a job to be 
done and so a patient who might potentially be moved on through the 
department either to go home or to be admitted quite quickly will stay much 
longer and because they are there and their bed space is occupied the department 
can’t flow and there is as I say a tipping point when the department is sort of 
probably 90% full when all of a sudden it will go to 100% full and there will be 
a queue of ambulance trolleys in the corridor simply because we’ve reached a 
sort of gridlock situation… Basically what happens is that people work harder 
and I think they work harder and the nurses don’t get their meal breaks but they 
don’t work more effectively and there is no pressure release valve down here…” 
(ED Doctor CS 2) [CS 2: AD; Flow] 
 
In conceptual terms it can be argued that the ‘tipping point’ referred to in this quote is 
when the OP moves into the patient safety failure boundary marginal zone and the ED 
system goes ‘solid’ (no empty trolleys). In such a situation the ED as a system becomes 
tightly coupled and therefore, vulnerable to the OP breaching the boundaries of the 
SWE in any one of four directions. When the system becomes ‘very inefficient’ it is 
argued that the dynamics of the situation have changed due to the increased number of 
reinforcing feedback loops between the parts that previously had not been coupled 
together. The task of managing the situation becomes more complex. In Chapter 8 the 
changes in the dynamics are illustrated using CLDs. 
7.4.2 Implications for patients 
From the description of the flow of emergency patients there are a number of 
observations about the system behaviour and the implications for patients. It would 
appear that both departments were heavily dependent on the wider hospital to have 
empty beds. When there was a delay in accessing empty beds, the flow of patients 
through the hospital was delayed, and the OP moved closer if not through the safety 
failure and unacceptable workload boundaries. 
 
This data from ED and MAU suggests that the OP can move very quickly to a point 
where staff are overworked and patient safety is potentially compromised. However, 
both the ED and MAU are to a large extent dependent on the rest of the hospital system 
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to provide them with empty beds in the right areas in a timely manner. When beds are 
not available then the system becomes more tightly coupled with potential 
consequences.  
 
The data concerning a particular patient provides an insight about how the dynamics 
and interactions within the hospital system can impact on the outcome for individuals. 
In this incident, told by an ED doctor in CS 2 who investigated the situation, the patient 
does breach the four hour target in ED. However, it is a combination of the workload of 
the MAU, the inexperience of staff, poor handover of information and the difficulty in 
accessing a single room that created a poor outcome. 
“He was an elderly man who was admitted with atria fibrillation and diarrhoea 
and he came to the emergency department having been referred by a general 
practitioner but he came to the emergency department because the medical 
assessment unit was full and he came into one of our bays and the medical team 
on duty were told about him but were busy on the medical assessment unit and 
didn’t get to see him.  He arrived at around four o’clock in the afternoon and his 
wife who was with him was very unhappy for him really quite early on with the 
delay in seeing him although he was reasonably stable he certainly would have 
benefited from earlier treatment and he finally left to go to the ward at about ten 
o’clock in the evening.  He would have been free to go to the medical 
assessment unit at about eight as I understand it but because he had diarrhoea he 
needed a single room and the decision was made that he should wait and go to a 
single room on the ward rather than leave the single room down here and so it 
was about ten o’clock when he got to the ward which was just around the time 
that doctors handover and so he didn’t see a doctor until after the handover 
period and so the person who had spoken to the GP wasn’t the person who saw 
him and his treatment started then and certainly his treatment from that junior 
doctor was not as good as it could have been and the choice of drugs for atria 
fibrillation I would say was clearly wrong and it wasn’t corrected until the 
following morning because that was the first time he was seen by a senior.    If 
he had been handled seamlessly he would have gone to the medical assessment 
unit at four o’clock in the afternoon, would have been picked up on the 
consultant ward round at five thirty, started on the appropriate drugs at six 
o’clock and he would have been better as a result.  The eventual outcome for 
him was that he died.” (Doctor CS 2) [CS 2: SWE; Patient safety] 
 
 
There were a number of influences on the OP by the gradients working at different 
levels within this incident. At the micro level the patient breached the four hour target. 
Due to his diarrhoea, he was deemed to be an infection risk and was therefore placed in 
a single room in the ED rather than being transferred directly to the MAU for treatment. 
It would appear that the patient safety concern about infection was prioritised over his 
need for his heart condition to be treated. In maintaining the patient safety requirement 
to isolate the patient, a number of less explicit safety issues arose; delayed treatment of 
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serious underlying heart condition, poor handover of information, questionable 
prescribing and a delay in being reviewed by a senior doctor. 
 
At the meso departmental level the lack of capacity within MAU to accept an 
‘infectious’ patient meant that he was held in ED. The patient was not being treated by 
the ED doctors, because he was designated a GP admission. He was the responsibility 
of the specialist medical doctors on MAU who were busy looking after a ward already 
full of patients. The patient was therefore in a queue for MAU receiving nursing care 
but not medical treatment in the ED. The design of the admission system, the 
supervision of junior staff, the handover of information and the timing of senior review 
do not appear as important patient safety priorities in comparison to isolating potentially 
infectious patients.  
 
At the macro hospital level the reason that MAU could not accept the patient was 
because they could not move a patient from a side room to another suitable bed 
elsewhere in the hospital. Following high profile patient safety failures where 
organisations were found to be lax in controlling infections (Healthcare Commission, 
2006b), the Department of Health imposed targets to reduce health care acquired 
infections (Department of Health, 2007). Hospitals therefore prioritised isolating 
potentially infectious patients. Hospital buildings are not designed to have large 
numbers of single rooms and when a hospital is operating at over 90% capacity there is 
little flexibility to cope with peaks in the number of patients with infections.  
 
The European Working Time Directive influences the way hospitals deploy doctors. 
Most junior doctors work a shift system to limit their hours of work. The implications 
are that the junior staff are not working with the same senior doctors on each shift and 
the number of handovers of patients at the change of shift has increased. In the 
description of the ward round on MAU, the consultant started with the patients admitted 
by the overnight shift of doctors, to allow them to go home. The priority order of 
reviewing the patients was not based on clinical need but keeping the junior doctors 
working hours within the required limit. From a conceptual perspective this can be 
viewed as an ‘upward scale’ action to keep the OP away from the unacceptable 
workload boundary for junior doctors. The interrelationship of that action on the other 
gradients, do not appear to have been anticipated. For example, the delay in the 
consultant reviewing a seriously ill patient due to prioritising the time of admission over 
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clinical need. 
 
A key point to draw out from the analysis of this incident is that the gradients create 
influences often for the best of reasons. These include reducing healthcare acquired 
infections and the working hours of doctors. However, such gradients when combined 
with other influences, such as waiting time and infection control targets, can create 
conditions that impact the treatment of individual patients. Often the impacts can be 
positive; patients are kept safe from infection, admitted more quickly and are treated by 
doctors who are not over tired. Yet, it would appear that a system can equally be 
vulnerable to failures associated with not paying sufficient attention to the wider 
dynamics created by prioritising the isolation of infected patients, overcrowding the 
hospital to meet waiting time targets and reducing the hours of work for doctors.  
The dimensions of the OP and gradients constructs are summarised with examples from 
Event 3 in Tables 7.7 and 7.8. 
 
Construct Dimension Examples 
Operating 
Point 
(Event 3) 
Movement With high levels of occupancy the ED ‘tips’ into 
situation of inefficiency. The OP became unstable and 
could breach any boundary. 
Operating 
Point 
(Event 3) 
Location The lack of capacity to isolate infectious patients in a 
timely manner located the OP within the marginal patient 
safety zone. 
 
Table 7.7: Summary of the dimensions of the ‘operating point’ during Event 3 
 
Construct Dimension Examples 
Gradients 
(Event 3) 
Scale The European Working Time Agreement exerted 
downward scale gradient on the hours doctors work. 
Upward scale gradient in how ward rounds were 
conducted placing time of admission before clinical need 
to reduce junior doctors hours of work.  
National targets on infection control exerted downward 
scale pressure to isolate infected patients. Upward scale 
gradient of prioritising control of infection over other 
clinical needs of patient held in ED. 
Gradients 
(Event 3) 
Pressure The pressure to meet multiple waiting time targets 
increases the hospital occupancy making it harder to 
admit patients from ED in a timely manner. 
 
Table 7.8: Summary of the dimensions of the gradients during Event 3 
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7.5 Summary 
It is recognised that the constructs of the OP and gradients are closely linked to the 
dimensions of the boundaries discussed in Chapter 6. There are however, certain 
dimensions of the OP and gradients which can be inferred from the case study data 
presented above. Many of the conceptual points relating to the SWE (v3) model have 
been made in the analysis of each of the events. A brief summary of the key points are 
set out in the next two sections. 
7.5.1 Operating Point 
The OP depicts the working conditions of the system in relation to the performance 
failure boundaries. A key idea from the SWE (v3) model is that a resilient system is one 
that can remain operating within the envelope in the face of perturbations or continuous 
stress. The two dimensions of the OP construct, ‘movement’ and ‘location’ are derived 
from the literature and populated from the case study data. Cook and Rasmussen (2005) 
argue that it is these two dimensions that indicate the ‘reliability’ of the system. In the 
context of the model the ‘reliability’ is about the ability of the system to keep the OP 
within the envelope. 
 
The ‘movement’ dimension of the OP can be seen as representing the operating 
conditions of the system. When a system faces a disturbance there is the potential for 
the OP to move from a stable to unstable state (Taylor and Ford, 2006, Holling, 1973). 
Rapid and large movements are symptoms of low reliability (Cook and Rasmussen, 
2005). Rapid movement of the OP indicates problems of stability and reduces the time 
available to take compensating actions to avoid breaching a boundary. However, slow 
movement of the OP is not always safe. It can indicate a ‘drift to danger’ where new 
norms of performance are accepted over time and a breach of a boundary creeps up on 
decision makers (Snook, 2000, Vaughan, 1996, Amalberti et al., 2006). 
 
Closely linked to the ‘movement’ is the ‘location’ dimension of the OP in relation to the 
boundaries. The literature suggests that the cost of keeping the OP well away from the 
safety failure boundary is unsustainable (Reason, 1997, Cook and Rasmussen, 2005, 
Flin et al., 2008). The consequence is that, in most systems, the OP is usually located 
close to or in the marginal zone of the safety failure boundary. In reality there is no 
visible OP. Therefore, observations of what processes are in place to monitor 
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performance in relation to the failure boundaries are used to provide an insight into the 
location and movement of the OP. 
 
In this research the number of infected patients (Event 1) and the number of medical 
outliers (Event 1 and 2) are used as proxy measures for the location of the OP. When 
there are high numbers of medical outliers, which indicates overcrowding of the bed 
capacity, the location is conceived to be close to or breaching the patient safety failure 
boundary. These assumptions are based on the literature which indicates an association 
of higher mortality and patient harm with overcrowded hospitals (Cameron, 2006, 
Fatovich et al., 2005, Richardson, 2006, Sprivulis et al., 2006, Trzeciak and Rivers, 
2003). The data from the case studies suggests that staff regard medical outliers as far 
from ideal, but it is inferred that they became an accepted violation (Amalberti et al., 
2006). The level of harm generated by having medical outliers is not assessed nor 
visible to staff. Therefore, the benefit of having medical outliers is that the hospital can 
admit the very visible emergency and elective patients. This benefit is thought by staff 
to outweigh the largely unseen cost to patients of being treated in the wrong place. 
7.5.2 Gradients 
The gradients in the original SWE model are depicted as linear influences on the OP 
(Rasmussen, 1997). However, as noted previously, there is a dynamic set of 
interrelationships that occurs. Conceptually, the gradients can be regarded as influences 
derived from the ‘social structure’. However, within a system the ‘agents’ respond to 
the influences of the gradients. The responses in turn can change the influence exerted 
by the gradient. The two dimensions of ‘scale’ and ‘pressure’ indentified from the 
literature are investigated. These two dimensions each inform the other and are 
therefore regarded as different lenses on the same construct. 
 
Woods (2006) suggests that there are ‘scale interactions’ that create dynamic influences 
on the OP. He argues that there is a ‘downward scale’ influence that comes from the 
‘blunt’ end of the system. At the same time there is an ‘upward scale’ influence 
generated by those at the ‘sharp end’ of the system as they work in the context of 
competing downward influences. The influences on the OP from the gradients are 
therefore a complex set of interacting themes.  
 
A means of assessing the patterns of influence is to examine the ‘pressure’ from the 
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gradients on the OP through the actions and opinions of staff, and the policy 
requirements set out by the wider ‘social structure’. There does appear to be a 
conceptual link between the ‘visibility’ of a boundary, examined in Chapter 6, and the 
‘pressure’ creating the need to respond to the gradient relating to that boundary. The 
clear examples are control of infection and the four hour ED target. There was strong 
‘downward scale’ pressure from the gradients for both of these issues resulting from 
their associated boundaries having high ‘visibility’. A pattern that appears was that the 
control of infection requirements was the dominant gradient when dealing with infected 
patients in real time. However, from CS 1 it is noted that when decision makers face the 
situation of deciding between future infection risks and the need to create capacity to 
manage the rate of admissions by outlying patient on the gynaecology ward , the 
gradient related to targets appears to exert the greatest pressure in the short term. 
Other aspects of the patient safety gradient do not appear to have the same degree of 
visibility or immediacy. Therefore, they do not generate the same level of ‘pressure’ as 
infection control issues. Rather than the SWE (v3) model having just one gradient from 
each boundary, it is possible to argue that the influences on the OP are much more 
nuanced and numerous.  
 
The perception of ‘pressure’ in the eyes of the decision making agents influences the 
subsequent actions taken. Such actions can be planned, as is seen in the response to an 
outbreak of the sickness virus. Actions can also be reactive and generate their own 
momentum, as seen with the overflow of patients into the gynaecology ward.  
 
The data presented in this chapter shows that the there are a number of interacting 
influences on the OP which provide insights into the characteristics of CS 1 and 2. The 
gradient keeping the OP away from the patient safety failure boundary is largely limited 
to the control of infection. Other safety issues were less visible. The need to 
accommodate both emergency and elective admissions created large numbers of 
medical outliers as the medical beds became full. It is argued that such a situation 
conceptually pushed the OP close to if not through the patient safety boundary. As no 
obvious safety breach was observed, staff appeared to normalise to the practical 
necessity of the situation of having large numbers of outliers. Without the action to 
create medical outliers, then breaches in the target failure boundary would occur. Such 
breaches would be very visible in comparison to most patient safety breaches. The 
external and internal performance management and reward system reinforced the 
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acceptance of changes in practice to meet the practical requirements generated by the 
gradient towards production. 
 
The next chapter will examine the ‘structure’ and ‘feedback’ loop constructs of the 
SWE (v3) model. In Chapter 9 there is a fuller discussion exploring the characteristics 
of the hospitals derived from the constructs of the SWE (v3) model.  
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Chapter 8 – Investigating the Structure and Feedback 
 
8.1 Introduction 
One of the weaknesses of the Rasmussen (1997) SWE model is that it does not fully 
take account of the internal dynamics that are created by the flow of work through the 
system. The dynamics between demand, capacity and decision makers in working with 
competing pressures (gradients) and constraints (boundaries) need to be included 
(Figure 8.1). It is argued in Chapter 5 that using SD to compliment the SWE, those 
dynamics can be included in the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Combination and interaction of construct sets depicted by the SWE model 
 
 
This chapter explores the ‘structure’ and ‘feedback’ constructs from the SWE (v3) 
model detailed in Chapter 5. These two constructs are used to gain insights into the 
dynamics that occur inside the SWE (v3), which influence the location and movement 
of the OP. SD provides a way to investigate the ‘structure’, which includes the 
‘feedback’ loops that occur in the case study hospital systems. As noted, ‘structure’ 
‘consists of the feedback loops, stocks and flows, and nonlinearities created by the 
interaction of the physical and institutional structure of the system with the decision-
making processes of the agents acting within it’ (Sterman, 2000). In a hospital a ‘stock’ 
depicts the place where patients accumulate, such as a ward or department. The ‘flow’ 
System 
behaviour 
(Operating Point) 
Explored in this 
Chapter 
 
 
 
Pressures 
(Gradients) 
Constraints 
(Boundaries) 
System 
Dynamics 
between demand, 
capacity and 
decision makers  
  Mike D Williams 
 207
depicts the direction of movement between stocks. ‘Feedback’ depicts the 
interrelationships between the parts of a system. 
 
A Stock Flow Diagram (SFD) is used in Section 8.2 to illustrate the planned design of 
the patient flow in and out of CS 1 and 2 hospitals. The planned design is then amended 
in Section 8.3 to reflect the reality of the situation when the hospitals face the 
continuous stress of high levels of demand for inpatient beds. CLDs are used to show 
the feedback loops that result from the increased coupling between the parts of the 
system when the stocks are full and the direction of flows change. From the analysis of 
the data presented in the diagrams the conceptual dimensions of the ‘structure’ and 
‘feedback’ constructs are indentified.  
 
The first dimension of the ‘structure’ construct is the ‘coupling’ of the parts. This 
depicts how closely linked together the different parts of a system are. The second 
dimension is the ‘buffer capacity’ of the stocks to be able to accommodate the variation 
in rates of flow into and out of the system. The dimension of the ‘feedback’ loops is the 
‘type’ as to whether the loop is ‘reinforcing’ or ‘balancing’. The implications for the 
‘movement’ and ‘location’ of the OP of the model are discussed. 
 
8.2 The planned design of the structure 
The planned design of the patient flow through a hospital is partly constrained by the 
physical layout of the buildings. The way in which staff are deployed to meet the 
different requirements of patients is also a contributing factor to the design. NHS 
Hospitals tend to organise themselves to manage two types of patients; emergency and 
elective, across a range of specialities. The second major differentiation of patients is 
the split between medical and surgical specialities. This research concentrates at the 
higher level of design by considering the stocks and flows of the emergency / elective 
and medical / surgical work. The paediatric, obstetrics and cancer services have been 
excluded from the SFDs shown below. Medical specialities have a high level of 
emergency admissions and low numbers of elective patients [CS 1: xls 1.2]. Surgical 
specialities generally have more elective than emergency admissions [CS 1: xls 1.2]. 
Hospitals monitor the actual number of emergency and elective admissions against the 
planned number that has been agreed with the local Primary Care Trust (PCT) in the 
contract. For example, the Performance Report from CS 1  provided the Board with 
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graphs showing the actual number of elective and emergency admissions compared to 
the planned number (Figures 8.2 and 8.3). 
 
The graphs indicate that during the period of the study in CS 1 (Oct 08 – Feb 09) there 
were fewer elective cases and more emergency cases than expected. In Chapter 7 it is 
noted that some elective cases were cancelled to provide bed capacity for the 
unexpected peak in emergency admission in late December 08 and early January 09. 
The impact of this peak in emergency demand on the ‘structure’ is shown in the next 
sections. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: CS 1 Elective Inpatient Admissions, Plan vs Actual, Apr 08 – Sept 09  
(extract from CS 1 Trust Board Performance Report, September 2009) 
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Figure 8.3: CS 1 Emergency (Non-Elective) Inpatient Admissions, Plan vs Actual, April 
08 – Sept 09  
(extract from CS 1 Trust Board Performance Report, September 2009) 
 
 
The planned design of the hospital is a separation of the medical and surgical 
specialities. The wards are designated to treat patients with particular symptoms. For 
example, within the Department of Medicine there were separate wards with staff who 
specialise in treating cardiac problems, lung disease, diabetes or elderly patients with 
multiple illnesses. In the Department of Surgery there were separate wards that 
specialise in bowel disorders, vascular disease, ear nose and throat, orthopaedics and 
several others. The planned flow of patients with a particular condition was to the ward 
that has the specialist staff and equipment to meet their needs. The support services, 
such as radiology and pathology were shared by all the wards. The planned design of 
the CS hospitals was a loosely coupled system, which is illustrated by the SFD in Figure 
8.4. This illustrates the flow of emergency and elective inpatient admissions into the 
medical and surgical wards. 
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Figure 8.4: The planned stock and flow of surgical and medical patients in CS 1 
 
In this design there are no direct links between the flow of medical and surgical patients 
within the hospital, apart from in the ED. Therefore, at this level of analysis, the design 
is largely a loosely coupled system with few feedback loops between the medical and 
surgical stocks and flows. At a lower level of abstraction there are shared services and 
staff which do create some feedback loops such as diagnostic and support services. 
Staff, such as physiotherapists and pharmacists, work across wards. However, for the 
purpose of this research, the analysis will focus on how the higher level of system 
design changes when the hospital faces perturbation or a period of continuous stress as 
described in Chapter 7. 
 
8.3 Factors that affect the planned stock flow design 
The ability of the planned design to manage the demand for inpatient services is 
dependent on the capacity of the stocks (wards) to deal with variation between the rate 
of flow into and out of the hospital. As noted in Chapter 7 (Figure 7.5), there was a 
considerable daily variation in the number of elective admissions. There was also a 
considerable variation in the daily medical admissions and discharges as illustrated by 
Figure 8.5. The graph shows that for the medical specialities the daily number of 
admissions can be as high as 85 or as low as 11. There was also a weekly pattern with 
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lower numbers of admissions and discharges at the weekend and the highest peaks for 
medical admissions and discharges towards the end of the working week [CS 1 xls 1.7]. 
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Figure 8.5: CS 1 Daily medical admissions and discharges Dec 08 – Jan 09 
 
At the hospital level there were daily patterns with higher number of admissions than 
discharges on at the beginning of the week (Sunday) and higher numbers of discharges 
than admissions on a Friday and Saturday [CS 1 xls 1.11]. This pattern was influenced 
by the elective admissions which tend to be higher at the beginning of the week and 
day. This generated an hourly pattern where there were more admissions than 
discharges early in the day (see Appendix 8.1). Later in the afternoon the discharge rate 
increases after the consultant ward rounds were completed. Analysis of hourly and daily 
data for CS 1 using historical data for the period April 06 – March 07 provides the data 
to illustrate those patterns (Figures 8.6 and 8.7) (Updated data was not available but 
there was no evidence to suggest any major changes to the patterns.) 
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CS 1 Monday Median Elective and Emergency Admissions vs Discharges 
by Hour of Day
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Figure 8.6: CS 1 Monday Median Elective and Emergency Admissions vs Discharges 
by Hour of the Day 2006-07 
 
CS 1 Friday Median Elective and Emergency Admissions vs Discharges by 
Hour of Day
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Figure 8.7: CS 1 Friday Median Elective and Emergency Admissions vs Discharges by 
Hour of the Day 2006-07 
 
The number of patients accumulated in the ‘stocks’ of the hospital depends on the net 
difference between the rate of flow into (admissions) and the rate of flow out 
(discharges) of the hospital. The ‘stocks’ absorb the difference between the rates. The 
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variation between the rate of flow into and out of the system ranges from zero to 200, as 
can be seen from historical data presented in Figure 8.8.  
CS 1 Variation between Elective and Emergency Admissions vs 
Discharges Apr 06 - March 07
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For a system to be able to absorb the scale of variation identified, it needs to have a 
‘buffer capacity’ of empty beds in the ‘stocks’ (Bagust et al., 1999). When there is 
disequilibrium between the rate of flow into and out of the system, the hospital has to be 
able to accommodate the accumulation. As one manager observed: 
 
“So if you think about the patients being in for an average length of stay of may 
be five or six days on emergency if you have a peak here and another peak six 
days later that’s not a problem.  If you have a peak and then a peak two days 
later and another peak two days later that first lot of patients are still here. The 
next lot comes in, the next lot comes in that’s when we hit problems.  So it is 
how close together the peaks are occurring.” (Manager CS 2) [CS 2: RP; DM; 
Capacity] 
 
Data collected about bed occupancy (occupancy of the ‘stock’) in the NHS is based on a 
census taken at midnight each day and then averaged over a period of time. Such 
analysis does not provide the actual bed occupancy of a ward during the day and fails to 
capture the disequilibrium during the day and week of the in and outflows. 
 
Figure 8.8: CS 1 Variation between Elective and Emergency Admissions vs 
Discharges April 06 – March 07 
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Whilst observing the site management teams it was noticed that most wards were full 
during the first and middle part of the day with additional patients waiting in corridors 
or waiting rooms on the ward [FN 2.40-60]. On one particular medical ward the Sister 
made the following comments: 
 
“…we never go throughout a 24 hour period with a bed staying empty.”  (Ward 
Sister CS 1) [CS 1: RP; DM; Capacity] 
 
“We also have day cases on our ward so every day I have to deal with six to 
seven day case patients for which I never have any beds for so they end up sat in 
a corridor for a long period of time (Ward Sister CS 1) [CS 1: RP; DM; 
Capacity] 
 
An analysis of the data for that Sister’s ward [CS 1 xls 1.10] for the period Nov 07 – 
Oct 08 shows that the average midnight bed occupancy of the 31 bed ward for the year 
was 95.3%. An illustrative analysis of the ward data for October 2008 shows that the 
actual number of patients occupying beds during a twenty four hour period is usually 
greater than 31 patients (Figure 8.9). This is known as the ‘enhanced occupancy’ rate 
which is defined as the ‘number of patients per available beds’ during a twenty four 
hour period (Weissman, 2007). The average midnight occupancy for that month was 
97.2%, whilst the average enhanced occupancy was 120.8% (Figure 8.10). This detailed 
analysis is only for one ward. Observations and interviews indicated that the ward is 
similar to many of the medical wards in CS 1 and 2 in having an enhanced occupancy 
rate of over 100% [FN 2.40-60]. 
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CS 1- 31 Bed Acute Medical Ward: 'Enhanced' Occupancy 
Oct 2008
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Figure 8.9: CS 1 31 Bed Acute Medical Ward: ‘Enhanced’ Occupancy (number of 
patients on ward per day) in October 2008 
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Figure 8.10: CS 1 31 Bed Acute Medical Ward: Midnight and ‘Enhanced’ Percentage 
by day - October 2008 
 
 
In Chapter 7 there is evidence presented about the ED reaching a ‘tipping point’ when 
the department became inefficient when it moved close to 100% occupancy. On the 
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wards there was a similar pattern of the system ‘tipping’ into a situation of 
‘inefficiency’.  
 
“The problem I identify with is the lack of flexibility in the system to allow you 
to actually give optimum care and I mean the problem is the system probably 
works at its optimum best when you are running at 80-85% capacity if you are 
running at 100-105% possibly even 110% capacity that creates a huge 
inefficiency in the system and I think one of the problems is because of financial 
restraints and this is no criticism of anybody is that the capital investment 
required to bring in the flexibility has never happened.” (Doctor CS 1) [CS 1: 
AD; Flexibility] 
 
 
From this quote the conceptual view is that the system is ‘stretched’ by the need to meet 
the production (waiting time) targets without spending additional money to fund new 
ward capacity. The ‘inefficiencies’ will be explored later in terms of the interacting 
feedback loops that are created by the tight coupling that arises due to the lack of ‘buffer 
capacity’ in the medical ‘stocks’. 
 
Another factor which reduces the ‘flow’ of patients through the hospital is the design of 
the medical decision making process. Each patient is under the care of a consultant. The 
consultant usually has a Registrar, Senior House Officer (SHO) and House Officer (HO) 
in their team. The key decisions about the patient, particularly related to discharge, are 
taken by the Consultant or Registrar. In the medical specialities most consultants do two 
wards rounds a week, albeit there are more frequent Registrar rounds. (EMU has twice 
daily ward rounds to review recently admitted patients [CS 1: 1.31]) The medical 
decision making suffers from ‘batching’ which builds in delay to the flow of patients 
[CS 1: 1.31; CS 2:15]. The situation is made worse when the medical teams have an 
increased numbers of patients to treat, some of whom may be on surgical wards. As one 
doctor explained: 
 
“The system does actually become self perpetuating in terms of the log jam in 
that on EMU we go in every day at eight and we finish our ward round at around 
half ten/eleven and you can get the jobs done then so you basically create a 
volume of work investigations normally, take those down to you know the 
various agencies, CT scanning all these other places and in they are in those 
departments at ten, half ten whereas if you had the mother of all ward rounds 
you don’t finish that until half two/three later and actually the working day has 
gone and by the time you have identified that patient oh gosh they need X, Y, Z 
scan there’s absolute zero chance you are going to get that on the same day and 
they’ve you know that’s a big cause of concern and self perpetuating delay in the 
system.” (Doctor CS 1) [CS 1:AD; Efficiency] 
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This quote demonstrates that the ward round is the medical decision making process. A 
key point to note is that the decisions are acted on by the doctors at the end and not 
during the round. This type of working creates the ‘batching’ of work thus creating 
delay in the flow of patients and the wards are not able to discharge patients during the 
earlier part of the day. Such a situation has a compounding effect adding to the 
inefficiency. 
 
In summary, there are three issues that put pressure on the planned loose coupled stocks 
and flows. The first is the large variation in the numbers of patients admitted into and 
discharged out of the hospital. The second is that the medical wards (stocks) in 
particular have a high level of occupancy (lack of ‘buffer capacity’) making it difficult 
for them to be able to absorb the accumulations of the net difference between the flow 
rate, without over spilling into non-medical wards. The third is the batching of medical 
actions due to the ward round method of working. Batching of work creates delays in 
the flow of patients and creates peaks and troughs of activity for other parts of the 
hospital system. 
 
In Figure 8.3 the planned design is predominately loosely coupled. However, for the 
design to be maintained there is a need for stocks to be able to absorb the net difference 
between the flow rates. Such a ‘buffer capacity’ is required if the planned loose coupled 
system is to be sustained in the face of disequilibrium in admission and discharge rates. 
The evidence from the level of occupancy of the wards was that there is little planned 
buffer capacity and at times patients are queued to access beds.  In the next section the 
consequences of the very limited buffer capacity for the planned design of the stock 
flow is explored. 
 
8.4 Tipping from loose to tight coupling 
This section examines the impact on the design of the loose coupled system when the 
medical wards (stocks) do not have the ‘buffer capacity’ to absorb the net difference in 
flow rates. There are two changes that occur to the flow of patients when the medical 
wards become full. These changes are more fully described in Chapters 6 and 7. The 
first is the diversion of GP medical emergency patients from MAU to ED). The second 
is the outlying of medical patients onto non-medical wards and into day case and pre-
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admission areas. Conceptually, the medical wards are borrowing ‘buffer capacity’ from 
the surgical wards and day case facilities. The change in flow from medical stocks into 
surgical stocks increases the coupling between the departments of the hospitals. The 
hospital moves from being loosely coupled to becoming more tightly coupled with the 
consequent increases in feedback between the previously separated flows of work. 
These changes are illustrated in red in Figure 8.11. 
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Figure 8.11: Changes (depicted in red) to the planned design of the stocks and flow of 
surgical and medical patients in CS 1 and 2 when medical wards are full 
 
The implication of the diversion of medical emergency patients to the ED, which is a 
common occurrence in both CS 1 and 2, is examined first. The diversion generated a 
feedback loop into the ED which created pressure on the bed capacity, staff workload 
with potential implications for the safety of patients. The diversion is caused by a net 
gain of patients due to the disequilibrium of the rates of flow in and out of MAU. It is 
the lack of empty beds in the medical wards that prevents the transfer of patients out of 
the MAU. Therefore, the lack of capacity within the medical wards created a feedback 
loop to the MAU, which caused them to divert GP emergency patients to the ED 
 
The disequilibrium between the rates of flow in and out was too great for the medical 
wards to absorb. Two reinforcing loops (1 and 2 in Figure 8.12) dominated the hospital 
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operations at this point. These are illustrated by Figure 8.12 where the symbol  
depicts a reinforcing loop. The positive relationship between the variables in these loops 
means that when the referral rates goes up, so does the occupancy rate. The opposite 
also applies. Therefore, when the referral rate (rate of flow into the stocks) reduces, then 
over time, the occupancy of the stocks will decrease as the rate of flow out of the stocks 
becomes greater than the flow in. 
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Figure 8.12: CLD of reinforcing loops created in situation where medical ward 
occupancy is too high to absorb variation in demand. (Stocks in boxes) 
 
The following quote draws out some of the problems for the ED when medical patients 
are diverted. 
 
“So the medical patients instead of going directly to EMU come here. …The 
medical caseload, as I mentioned, have a much higher acuity on average than the 
emergency lot and that puts huge pressure on the system in terms of bed space 
so we have to nurse patients in the corridor, we have to monitor patients in the 
corridor which is particularly vulnerable and we don’t have the number of 
nurses to observe those monitors that we would have per patient should we not 
have the medical cases.  So our pressures primarily relate to the acute medical 
take.” (ED Doctor CS 1) [CS 1: SWE; Staff workload] 
 
The EDs in CS 1 and 2 are not staffed or equipped to manage GP emergency medical 
patients in addition to their normal activities. As one manager pointed out: 
 
“If we didn’t have the medical and surgical take, so if I could wave a magic 
wand tomorrow and we didn’t have that then I believe that we are staffed 
1 2 
  Mike D Williams 
 220
adequately and safely for the patients the ED patients that come through the 
department.” (Manager CS 1) [CS 1: AD; Staff workload] 
 
The previous year a GP admission medical patient waiting in the ED corridor had died 
in CS 1. An action following that incident was the purchase of mobile monitoring 
equipment in an effort to reduce the risk to medically unstable patients of being in the 
wrong place. It can therefore be argued that the diversion of medical admissions to ED 
has implications for the safety of the patients. 
 
The medical doctors responsible for the patients diverted to ED were based on the 
MAU, which in CS 1 is situated a quarter of a mile away. They had to move the initial 
assessment process from MAU to ED when patients cannot be admitted directly to 
MAU. The diversion of the flow from MAU to ED produced a feedback loop for the 
junior doctors. They had to geographically move location and therefore were not 
available to progress the treatment of the patients on MAU. One doctor described the 
situation for the initial assessment of patients (clerking) as chaotic: 
 
“On call it just means it’s more chaotic really because the amount of admissions 
have gone up so we are not really now clerking in MAU any more we are 
clerking in A&E (ED) and you’ve got everyone sort of going all over the place 
to try and see the patients and I think as the sort of senior person trying to 
control the whole situation you have to be really, you really clear about who’s 
clerking which patient, who’s sick because you can’t review every patient at the 
moment just because it’s just too busy.” (Doctor CS 2) [CS 2: SWE; Staff 
workload] 
 
The working conditions for the medical doctors from MAU/EMU in ED were far from 
ideal: 
 
“…there is a designated amount of doctors to admit people and that way they 
admit people onto the EMU and they are going to come down onto the ED and 
do it on there which is what effectively happens.  So it’s a stressful and horrible 
environment when it gets like that because it’s just chocker it’s like a bear pit, 
…you can hardly hear yourself above the roar but they still get through the work 
and yeah, but it will become more difficult.” (Doctor CS 1)  [CS 1: SWE; Staff 
workload] 
 
Conceptually, it can be argued that the unacceptable workload boundary for these key 
members of staff is in danger of being breached. As they made the initial assessment of 
the patients there was also a potential movement of the OP towards the boundary of 
patient safety failure. 
  Mike D Williams 
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The type of feedback loop generated by the diversion of patients was ‘reinforcing’. For 
example, the patients in the ED were subject to the four hour waiting time rule. The 
feedback loop generated by the diversion of the medical patients into the ED made the 
achievement of that target harder, with more patients to be moved through the 
department within the four hour period (Figure 8.11). The situation created in terms of 
the overcrowding of the department, staff workload and risk to the four hour target got 
worse until an action was taken to create a ‘balancing’ loop. A balancing loop is an 
action that either stops the diversion or allows the rate of flow of patients out of ED to 
increase. As noted in the two previous chapters, a potential threat to breaching the target 
boundary attracted considerable management attention and action to resolve the 
problem. The actions taken to meet the four hour target in these situations can be 
conceptualised as generating ‘balancing’ feedback loops to increase the flow of patients 
out of the ED. The actions included the transfer of medical patients to non-medical 
wards, the use of day case facilities for inpatients and increasing the discharge rate. 
These are explored in more detail in the next section. 
 
8.5 Increasing the rate of flow out of the medical wards 
In CS 1 and 2 the most common action taken to create capacity in the medical wards 
was to increase the flow of patients out of the wards. This was done either by increasing 
the rate of discharges out of hospital by encouraging senior doctors to conduct more 
ward rounds (Figure 8.12, loop 3), or by increasing the transfer rate of medical patients 
to surgical wards (loop 4). These actions created two ‘balancing’ feedback loops 
(depicted by ) that prevent the reinforcing loops (1 and 2) continuing to dominate 
the hospital system (Meadows, 2008). The balancing loops (3 and 4) are depicted in red 
in Figure 8.13. 
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Figure 8.13: CLD with balancing loops of increasing rate of flow out of medical wards 
 
The requirement to instigate the balancing loops was prioritised to the extent that 
discharges and internal transfers occurred late at night or even in the early hours of the 
morning. Such a situation is far from ideal for the patient and raised concerns for the 
staff. However, the staff appeared to recognise that without any buffer capacity to 
absorb the emergency admissions they had little choice but to move patients at 
unsuitable times. As one ward Sister commented: 
“I never feel comfortable about discharging someone elderly at eleven or twelve 
at night and you only do that if they are in agreement and the relative’s happy to 
pick up but, and equally you know you are moving patients off after midnight 
and they are sound asleep and then you are waking them to say look I am really 
sorry but we need a bed and we are moving you out to surgery and you want to 
avoid that if you can and I must say we do it in very small numbers and only 
when the admission numbers go up rapidly but generally our protocol is it’s one 
in one out and we identify those patients that are appropriate to move out, 
there’s nothing worse than you know waking up an elderly confused lady who 
has probably had sedation and transfer her to a completely different ward and in 
the morning she wakes up and she doesn’t know where on earth she is.  So you 
know there’s a lot of, there’s a lot of our patient care that just makes you feel 
you know I know why I’ve got to do it because obviously you know this lady’s 
fine, she’s got a plan, she’s stable, she’s well someone in ED sitting on a trolley 
in the corridor is not and needs this bed but equally it just feels uncomfortable 
what you are doing.” (Wd Sister CS 1) [CS 1:AD; Outliers] 
 
The empty medical beds made available by the actions to increase the rate of flow out 
are filled by patients from MAU. MAU is then able to accept patients from the ED 
within the four hour target period. The immediate bed occupancy problem of MAU and 
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ED is solved by increasing the rate of flow out of the medical wards. However, there are 
a number of consequences, not all of which were immediately obvious.  
 
Impact of increasing the flow out of medical wards 
There are a number of further ‘reinforcing’ feedback loops that were created by the 
creation of the ‘balancing loops’. These loops impacted upon the medical and surgical 
services plus the workload of staff. It is suggested that there are also implications for the 
safety of patients. 
 
In the medical department the primary function of the MAU is for the doctors to assess 
the patient and decide with them on the treatment plan. With the rapid movement of 
patients this primary function can be interrupted, which contributes to the inefficiency 
of the system. 
 
“I have had instances where I have literally been in the middle of the story with 
the EMU doctor and turned round and they’ve gone to another ward and we 
have had to wander off and that’s happened over and over and over and over and 
over again and the inefficiencies of that must be enormous.” (Doctor CS1) [CS 
1: AD; Efficiency] 
 
In the wider hospital there is a similar pattern to the characteristics of the ED presented 
in Section 7.4. When the hospital became overfull the efficiency of the system 
deteriorated. For example, a key part of organising the discharge of a patient is for the 
junior doctor to prescribe the tablets to take away (TTAs). The pharmacy uses the 
prescription to dispense the drugs to the ward prior to the departure of the patient. When 
ward rounds take longer due to doctors seeing medical outliers, there is a delay in 
completing the TTA form and getting it to the Pharmacy in time for the patient to be 
discharged that day. 
 
“When we are in a situation like we are at the moment and the whole of 
medicine becomes so inefficient with lots of patients all over the hospital junior 
doctors go all round their outliers and their in-patients with their consultants and 
they are delayed in getting discharges done and complete and of course we, our 
TTAs are on the back of the discharge summary.  So you know by the time the 
juniors get back at 3 o’clock in the afternoon to do a discharge summary.” 
(Manager CS 2) [CS 2: AD; Efficiency] 
 
Increasing the transfers out of medical wards may actually decrease the rate of 
discharges from the hospital. Using surgical beds for medical outliers does however, 
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provide a short-term solution to the capacity issues of the medical wards to accept 
patients from MAU. Figures 8.14 and 8.15 demonstrate that outlying patients is almost 
a daily occurrence. It is suggested that staff have normalised to the practice of 
borrowing capacity. The data from CS 1 shows that it was also an increasing procedure.  
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Figure 8.14: CS 1 Number of Medical Outliers Dec – June 2006-2009 
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Figure 8.15: CS 2 Number of Outliers Jan 09 – Jan 10 (with missing data points) 
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CS 1 Length of Stay of Medical Patients by Discharge Ward
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Figure 8.16: CS 1 Length of Stay of Medical Patients by Discharge Ward 
 
 
Medical patients who are outlied in surgical wards have a considerably longer length of 
stay than those who are not outlied (Figure 8.16) [CS 1: xls 1.9]. There are a number of 
potential reasons for that difference. One explanation is the selection of patients to be 
outlied can be biased towards those with a normally longer length of stay. Equally, it is 
recognised that the patients often change medical team when they move wards. When 
the handover of the patient occurs then it can take time for the new consultant team to 
get to know the patient and therefore manage their treatment efficiently. Therefore, the 
transfer of patients introduces the potential for delay and failures in communication. 
The change of medical team even from MAU to the medical wards was not always a 
seamless or timely process, raising concerns about the potential safety of patients: 
 
“What happens is I think the nurses get a handover the patient turns up on the 
ward and then the ward clerks allocate them a team but essentially they are not 
allocated a team before five or they can for four thirty they won’t actually have a 
team so they won’t be seen any of the juniors on the ward.  So you have to hope 
that they are sorted by the MAU and what you do sometimes find is that not 
everything is done on MAU and they are then seen the next day by us and as 
long as they are not sick that’s fine it’s just chasing things up but I suppose.” 
(Doctor CS 2) [CS 2: AD; Continuity] 
 
There was also the impact of medical outliers on staff workload. The physical bed 
capacity needed to absorb the net difference in rat
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medical wards from surgery. However, the ‘buffer capacity’ generated by this action 
also increased the workload of staff, particularly the doctors, senior nurses and 
managers. The key balancing loop of increasing the transfer and discharge rate from the 
medical wards often relied on asking staff to work harder, both in undertaking 
additional ward rounds, and then taking all the required actions to process the patient. 
The use of staff in this way can be conceptualised as borrowing buffer capacity from the 
staff by moving the unacceptable workload marginal zone boundary outwards.  
 
In CS 3 there is evidence from the inquiry reports that it was the shortage of staff in key 
stock areas (ED, MAU, Medical Wards) that created the conditions for breaches in the 
patient safety boundary (Francis QC, 2010a). Conceptually, the exhaustion of the buffer 
capacity associated with the unacceptable workload boundary allowed the OP to breach 
the patient safety boundary in that hospital as the staff did not have the capacity to 
maintain safe practice.  
 
Increasing the rate of flow of patients out the medical wards through medical outliers 
did create a number of consequences. The creation of the ‘balancing’ loops (3 and 4), 
generated a number of reinforcing loops, illustrated in Figure 8.17. 
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Figure 8.17: Reinforcing feedback loops generated by ‘medical outliers’ 
 
The first of the ‘reinforcing loops is created due to the increased staff workload for 
doctors in particular, having their patients on more than one ward (loop 5). Higher 
workload for staff is associated with increased fatigue which increases the risk of error 
(loop 6) (Hall et al., 2004, Rogers et al., 2004, Scott et al., 2006). When errors do occur 
the resultant harm usually means an extended length of stay for the patient (Sari et al., 
2007b). With a higher number of medical patients to look after spread around the 
hospital, the ability to see, treat and discharge patients slows down. After a delay this 
situation leads to an increase in the length of stay (see Figure 8.16), which impacts on 
the occupancy of the medical and surgical wards (loop 7 and 8). This situation has 
potential consequences for the elective surgical admission rate and associated RTT 
waiting time target and financial income. The threat to the RTT and financial income 
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was responded to by admitting more patients than there were beds for and using 
corridors and theatre recovery as temporary holding areas for patients [FN 2.40-60]. The 
safety considerations of these actions did not appear to take a high priority. 
 
Some of the other loops have delayed outcomes and are therefore not always noticed by 
decision makers or regarded as linked to the number of medical outliers (Booth 
Sweeney and Sterman, 2007). The feedback loops 5 - 9 in Figure 8.15 are interrelated. 
The explanation of the loops 5 - 9 is as follows: 
 
Loop 
Number 
Explanation of relationships 
 
5 Reinforcing loop : when the ‘number of medical outliers’ goes up the 
‘staff workload’ goes up. As ‘staff workload’ goes up their ability to treat 
patients efficiently decreases and there is a delayed increase in the ‘length 
of stay’ (LOS) for patients. When the LOS increases the ‘surgical ward 
occupancy’ increases. When the ‘surgical ward occupancy’ increases there 
is a delayed impact on the ‘medical ward occupancy’ as fewer surgical 
empty beds are available to transfer patients into. However, as the ‘medical 
ward occupancy rises’ so does the ‘transfer rate’ increase. The surgical 
wards are then forced to create additional stock capacity (see loops 8 and 9) 
 
 
6 Reinforcing loop : When the ‘staff workload’ increases the ‘staff 
fatigue’ increases which raises the ‘risk of error’ occurring. With an 
increased risk, there is the likelihood of an increased ‘number of errors’. 
Errors create harm for patients who then stay longer in hospital, increasing 
the ‘LOS’. Loop 6 then feeds into loops 7 and 8 
. 
 
7 Reinforcing loop : When the ‘LOS’ rises the ‘surgical ward 
occupancy’ rises which in turn increases the ‘staff workload’. 
 
 
8 Reinforcing loop : As the ‘number of medical outliers’ increase then 
the ‘surgical ward occupancy’ rises. When the ‘surgical ward occupancy’ 
increases there is a delayed impact on the ‘medical ward occupancy’ as 
fewer surgical empty beds are available to transfer patients into. This 
situation generates loop 9. 
 
 
9 Reinforcing loop : When the ‘surgical ward occupancy’ rises then, in a 
similar way to the medical wards, the rate of discharge increases (not 
shown) or additional inpatient capacity has to be created. This is depicted 
as the ‘use day case beds for inpatients’, ‘corridor occupancy’ and ‘theatre 
recovery occupancy’. When these additional ‘stocks’ are used it increases 
the ‘staff workload’. 
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When the ‘surgical ward occupancy’ rises due to the transfer in of medical 
patients, then there is the potential for the ‘elective surgical admission rate’ 
to decline, due to the shortage of beds. When the elective admissions 
decline the financial income for the hospital reduces and the risk of 
breaching the Referral to Treatment Time (RTT) increases. 
 
 
Table 8.1: Explanation of loops 5 – 9 in Figure 8.16 
 
 
Conceptually, it can be argued that the need to admit emergency medical patients and 
elective surgical patients to keep the OP away from the financial and target failure 
boundaries placed considerable pressure on decision makers to stretch the physical and 
staff capacity. Data from the staff indicate that it was the patient safety failure gradient 
that motivated them to prioritise admitting emergency patients within the 4 hour time 
period. However, the implications of this prioritisation in terms of the tight coupling and 
the nature of the feedback loops generated did not appear to be well understood.  
 
The ‘balancing’ loop of increasing the rate of discharges / transfers 
The ‘balancing’ loop of generating medical outliers created a series of dynamic 
interactions that allow reinforcing loops to dominate the hospital system. At a system 
level, the balancing loop that can bring the system back into a stable situation is to 
create a net reduction in the flow rate into the hospital. The rate of discharges has to be 
greater than the rate of admissions. 
 
The action to prevent the reinforcing loops domination is the action to create the 
‘balancing’ loop of increasing the discharge rate. This action can reduce the LOS of 
patients (increase the rate of flow out of the system) and consequently reduce the ward 
occupancy. This action stops the need for medicine to borrow ‘buffer capacity’ from 
surgery. There are a number of feedback loops that influence the ‘length of stay’ in the 
hospital system as shown in Figure 8.17. Figure 8.18 illustrates in more detail some of 
the feedback loops generated by the medical wards (stock) borrowing ‘buffer capacity’ 
from other parts of the system. The CLD illustrates that there are potentially four 
reinforcing feedback loops that will dominate the system without a sufficiently powerful 
balancing loop (loop 5).  
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Figure 8.18: Feedback loops generated by transfer of medical patients to surgical wards 
 
There was considerable pressure for the balancing loop to maintain the overall stock 
level with the capacity to manage the inflow of patients. At very busy times consultant 
medical staff increased the number of ward rounds and some seek to discharge patients 
slightly earlier than they would normally do so. Some doctors put safeguards, such as an 
early outpatient or diagnostic appointment, in place. 
 
“I think there’s a heightened awareness that we need to be getting patients out of 
hospital quickly and efficiently and so are often sending people out of hospital 
with and are more likely to build in an out patient follow up as a safety net 
because we are sending people home perhaps a bit earlier than we would have 
done.” (Doctor CS 1) [CS 1: AD; Flow] 
 
 
In both CS 1 and 2 there were a number of patients who are medically fit for discharge. 
However, factors beyond the control of the hospital, such as the lack availability of 
continuing care in community hospitals or nursing home beds, means that the patients 
remained in the acute hospital ‘blocking’ beds. Staff working in social services or 
community based NHS services did not easily perceive the feedback loop that the delay 
in their actions generate on the stock and flows in the acute hospital. Conceptually, the 
OP of the hospital system is therefore influenced by the management of stocks and 
flows in continuing care. Continuing care systems tend to have less production and 
more financial control focused priorities. 
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In the next section the conceptual aspects related to the SWE (v3) derived from this 
analysis are identified. 
8.6 Conceptual analysis 
In this section the dimensions of the ‘structure’ and ‘feedback’ constructs of the SWE 
(v3) model are indentified. The implications on the movement and location of the OP 
within the model are also explored. 
8.6.1  ‘Structure’ 
The first dimension of the ‘structure’ construct is ‘coupling’. As noted in Section 8.2 the 
planned design of a hospital was for a separation between the medical and surgical flow 
and stocks of patients. The planned design of the hospital can be described as loosely 
coupled. However, when the medical wards (stocks) were full, the flow of patients was 
diverted to the ED or into surgical wards. The planned design of separation was 
changed to one of the flows being linked together. Using SD terms, when the flows and 
stocks of medical and surgical patients become connected, the parts of the system move 
from ‘loose’ to ‘tightly’ coupled.  
 
The second dimension of the ‘structure’ construct is the ‘buffer capacity’. This 
dimension depicts the ability of the ‘stocks’ to absorb the net differences between the 
flows into and out of the system. As noted in Chapter 2, the stocks are the accumulation 
of the net differences between the rates of flows in and out. In Section 8.3 it is shown 
that there was considerable variation in the rate of flow into and out of the hospitals 
studied. It was also noted that the medical wards (stocks) in particular had a consistently 
high occupancy level. This means that the medical wards were often not able to absorb 
the variation in flow rates in and out without having to borrow ‘buffer capacity’ from 
other parts of the hospital.  
8.6.2 ‘Feedback’ 
As noted in Chapter 2, there are two types of feedback loops; therefore the dimension 
are either reinforcing (positive)   or balancing (negative) . There are 
implications for the movement and location of the OP from the type of feedback loop 
that dominates the system. 
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The OP in the SWE (v3) depicts the behaviour of the system in relationship to the 
boundaries. The connection between the structure and behaviour of a system is 
understood by linking the feedback process with the stocks and flows (Sterman, 2000). 
A system is in ‘dynamic equilibrium’ when all the flows in and out are in balance. 
However, few complex dynamic systems, such as hospitals, have such equilibrium due 
to the variation in flows. The ‘stocks’ accumulate the net rate of change in flows. Non-
linear feedback loops means that there can be a shift in the type of feedback loop that 
dominates the system.  
 
When a system has a ‘balancing loop’ dominant then the rate of flow out is greater than 
the rate of flow in. The system is in a ‘stable’ condition. When this is applied to the 
SWE (v3) model it can be argued that when the ‘balancing loop’ is dominant, then the 
‘movement’ of the OP is ‘stable’. However, the system can change into a situation 
where the ‘reinforcing’ loop dominates. This occurs when the rate of flow in is greater 
than the rate of flow out. The ‘movement’ of the OP can be conceptualised as being 
‘unstable’ when reinforcing loops dominate the system. The dimensions are summarised 
with examples in Table 8.2: 
 
Construct Dimension Examples 
Structure Coupling Planned design was loose coupling of medical and 
surgical stocks and flows. 
 
Medical outliers created tight coupling between 
otherwise separate stocks and flows. 
 
Structure Buffer Capacity Buffer capacity for medical patients was borrowed 
by the use of surgical beds.  
The staff worked harder to create and maintain the 
borrowed buffer capacity 
 
Feedback Reinforcing or 
Balancing 
Diversion of emergency medical admissions to ED 
and the use of surgical beds for medical patients 
generated a series of reinforcing feedback loops. 
Increasing the rate of discharges was the only 
system level balancing loop available to bring 
hospital back into a stable position.  
 
Table 8.2: Dimensions of the ‘structure’ and ‘feedback’ constructs of the SWE (v3) 
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8.6.3 Implications on the OP  
Where the rate of flow into a system is greater than the flow out, the stocks absorb the 
net difference until they reach capacity. As noted above, the CS hospitals became 
overfull until such time as rate of flow out became greater than the flow in. It was the 
ability of the staff to flex their workload that provided much of the buffer capacity to 
sustain the hospital working at above the physical bed capacity. There was often a delay 
in the ‘balancing’ loop becoming dominant, which created the situation where the 
hospital operated, for a period of time, at over capacity. This situation lasted for a matter 
of a few hours or days. Due to the delay, the ‘balancing’ loop can often over correct the 
state of the stocks. This results in the system oscillating between a ‘stable’ and 
‘unstable’ situation. 
 
When a hospital system experiences perturbation or continuous stress then it can reach a 
‘tipping point’. It is at that point that it switches from a dominant ‘balancing’ loop to a 
‘reinforcing’ loop, which can drive exponential growth (Sterman, 2001). Conceptually, 
the ‘tipping point’ can be depicted as the ‘movement’ of the OP switching from ‘stable’ 
to ‘unstable’. When the OP is ‘unstable’ it can move quickly and breach any of the 
envelope boundaries. 
 
Conceptually, this ‘tipping point’ can apply to parts within the hospital system. As 
noted in Chapter 6, one of the doctors in CS 2 described the ED reaching a ‘tipping 
point’ when it became overfull and consequently inefficient [CS 2.9]. The ‘stability’ of 
the ED OP was recovered in those types of situations when the ‘balancing loop’ of 
increasing the rate of flow out of the department reached the point where the number of 
patients coming in is less than those leaving. 
 
It is therefore argued that by assessing the stock, flows and feedback loops, valuable 
insights are gained as to the dynamic behaviour of a complex socio-technical system 
such as a hospital. By using SD as part of the SWE (v3) model it can take account of 
how the system behaves when the flow of work changes. Conceptually, insights are 
gained as to what happens to stocks, flows and feedback when decision makers take 
actions that keep the OP away from certain boundaries. The application of SD in this 
study is limited to a high level analysis and has not sought to develop a simulation 
model of the hospital due to the large number of variables involved. 
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8.7 Summary 
This chapter examines the ‘structure’ and ‘feedback’ constructs of the SWE (v3) model 
by exploring the stocks, flows and feedbacks found in CS 1 and 2. The planned design 
of the separation of the stocks and flows for medicine and surgery was compromised 
when the department of medicine stocks overflowed into surgery, creating tight 
coupling of the hospital. The overflow is the result of the medical wards not being able 
to absorb the net difference in the rates of flow in and out of their part of the hospital. 
There are a number of feedback loops that became active when the system becomes 
tightly coupled. Individual departments and the whole hospital reached a ‘tipping point’ 
when there was a switch from the ‘balancing’ to ‘reinforcing’ loop dominance. 
 
The dimensions of the ‘structure’ and ‘feedback’ constructs are identified. Two 
important conclusions about the characteristics of the hospitals can be inferred from the 
analysis. The first conclusion is the key role of ‘buffer capacity’. Where there is 
sufficient ‘buffer capacity’ to absorb the net difference in the rates of flow, then a 
system can maintain the planned design. The second conclusion is that the system can 
reach a ‘tipping point’ due to the dynamics of the flow rates creating a switch in the 
type of loop dominating the system. When ‘reinforcing’ loops dominate then the system 
is unstable and the OP can make large movements.  
 
In the case studies there was evidence of a chronic shortage of ‘buffer capacity’ in the 
medical ward stocks. The result is that ‘buffer capacity’ was frequently borrowed from 
the surgical wards and from the ability of staff to work harder. What was not perceived 
clearly by decision makers was the potential ‘drift to danger’ created by constantly 
flexing the unacceptable workload boundary to absorb the difference in flow rates and 
generate ‘balancing’ actions. 
 
In the next chapter the results and analysis presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are 
discussed in the light of the extant literature and proposals are made about how to 
improve patient safety from a system resilience perspective. 
 
  Mike D Williams 
 235
Chapter 9 – Discussion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The pragmatic critical realist position argues that it is legitimate to access knowledge 
through observing the effect of a directly unobservable phenomenon. The ‘system’ 
within the case studies is not directly observable. However, the actions of the hospital 
staff and workload were observed, analysed and are presented in Chapters 6-8. The 
constructs of the SWE (v3) model are identified and operationalised to provide insights 
into the characteristics of the system and their influence on the risk to patient safety. 
This Chapter makes the link back to the research objective and key points in the 
literature to set the context for the discussion about the characteristics of the system.  
 
The research objective is to explore, in NHS hospitals, how a systems approach can 
inform the development of patient safety theory. In Chapter 3 a system resilience model 
(SWE v1) is derived from the literature (Rasmussen, 1997). The limitations are noted 
and Chapter 5 sets out the development and contextualisation of the model to provide 
the vehicle to explore patient safety in the context of the NHS in England. Chapter 6 to 
8 present the analysis of the data from the case studies using the SWE v3 model. 
 
A major part of this research has been in the development and use of a system resilience 
model to gain an insight into system behaviours and how they might influence patient 
safety. Section 9.2 discusses the development and insights gained from the SWE v3 
model. In Section 9.3 the construct sets and their interactions are reviewed and 
propositions made about the emergent system behaviours. It is argued that some of 
those emergent behaviours are problematic for the safety of patients. Five patterns of 
system behaviour are proposed, four of which are considered to increase the risk to 
patient safety. Ideas as to how to improve the system resilience to reduce the risk are 
made. Finally, the contribution to knowledge is summarised. 
 
9.2 The development of the Safe Working Envelope model 
The development of the model has to be set within the context of the research objective 
which is to explore how a systems approach can be used to provide an insight into 
patient safety in NHS hospitals. There are a number of points from the literature which 
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have been incorporated into the development of the SWE v3 which are summarised. 
Using the constructs and dimensions of the SWE v3 model to conduct the case studies 
has provided a number of insights into some of the characteristics of the hospitals 
studied.  
9.2.1 Key points from the literature 
The extant system models found in the patient safety literature do not apply concepts 
from systems thinking to consider the implications of the dynamic interactions that 
occur in healthcare organisations. For example, the frameworks suggested by Vincent el 
al, (1998) and Donabedian (1966) provide long lists of system factors to be taken into 
account when considering patient safety but do not explore the potential interactions. 
The popular Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1997) takes a view of systems which is 
based on avoiding linear component failures. Therefore, the extant literature lacks 
explanatory power about patient safety in complex hospital systems.  
 
Complex socio technical systems have particular characteristics (Cilliers, 1998), which 
have to be taken into account when developing a theoretical framework to improve the 
understanding about how the ‘system’ influences patient safety. It is argued that insights 
from systems thinking, resilience and accident theory can provide a different theoretical 
framework through which to analyse safety failure. A systemic approach, rather than the 
linear component paradigm, provides greater explanatory power about how the system 
influences patient safety (Dekker, 2011). There are a number of points that arise from 
the synthesis of the literature about the characteristics of ‘systems’ that assist in 
developing the understanding of patient safety. 
 
The first is that healthcare organisations, such as hospitals, are complex socio technical 
systems with open and fuzzy boundaries. There are multiple interactions between the 
social and technical aspects. Therefore, insights about patient safety have to commence 
with the knowledge that safety is an emergent property of a complex set of interactions. 
Systems can be structured in ways that the resultant interactions produce problematic 
behaviour (Meadows, 2008)  The development of system resilience models, such as 
Rasmussen’s (1997) SWE, provides a means to gain insights into the behaviour of 
complex socio technical systems. 
 
The second point is that a rise in the numbers of interactions between the parts increases 
the complexity of the system (Perrow, 1984, Cilliers, 1998, Dekker, 2011). SD theory 
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provides a means to gain insights into the interactions of the parts and the presence of 
feedback loops (Sterman, 2001, Meadows, 2008). Increased complexity requires a 
corresponding rise in the adaptive capacity of those working in the system to avoid 
things going wrong (Woods et al., 2007, Woods et al., 2010, Ashby, 1961, Dekker, 
2011). As noted, the increased complexity also makes it more difficult for decision 
makers to appreciate the dynamic relationships due to the delays in feedback (Booth 
Sweeney and Sterman, 2007). 
 
The third point is that resilience theory provides a way to consider safety at a system 
rather than component or task level (Hollnagel et al., 2006). The ability of a system to 
anticipate, adapt, absorb and recover from a disturbance or continuous significant stress 
is taken into account. The SWE model includes the adaptive capacity of the system, 
depicted by the marginal zones of the envelope. Conceptually, the adaptive capacity is 
deployed through compensating actions in an attempt to hold the OP in a stable position 
inside the performance envelope. 
 
The fourth point is that the extant accident theory literature provides a number of 
concepts that help to explain why accidents happen. It is argued, that those concepts can 
be unified by the use of the SWE model from the ‘resilience engineering’ literature 
(Rasmussen, 1997, Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). As identified the SWE v3 provides a 
unifying model to incorporate the concepts derived from the accident theory literature. 
These are summarised in Table 9.1. 
 
Concept Principle 
Literature 
Model construct Examples from case 
studies 
Production 
verses safety 
(Reason, 1997, 
Flin et al., 2008, 
Dekker, 2005) 
Boundaries, gradients, 
location of OP 
Not cancelling 
elective admissions 
during sickness virus 
 
Blunt / front end (Reason, 1997) Pressure from gradients; 
response of staff 
EWTD on junior 
doctors; prepared to 
work longer to gain 
training opportunities 
 
Latent or hidden 
conditions 
(Reason, 1997) Competing pressures on 
the OP 
Combination of 
waiting time targets 
impact on patient in 
ED 
 
Safety as a 
dynamic non-
(Weick, 1987) Gradients and 
compensating actions 
Individual actions of 
clinicians to keep 
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event patients safe 
 
Coupling & 
feedback 
(Perrow, 1984, 
Diehl and 
Sterman, 1995) 
Stocks, flows & feedback 
loops 
Medical outliers 
increasing length of 
stay 
 
Redundancy / 
buffer capacity 
(Miller and 
Xiao, 2007) 
Location of the marginal 
zone boundary 
97.2% achievement 
against 98% ED 
target 
 
Normalisation (Vaughan, 
1999) 
Location of the OP Patient falls 
Practical drift (Snook, 2000) Movement of the 
marginal zone boundary 
Using gynaecology 
ward to outlie 
medical patients 
 
Trade-offs (Hollnagel, 
2009a) 
Making visible the 
boundaries and OP 
location 
ED admissions 
traded off with 
medical outliers 
 
 
Table 9.1: Concepts from accident theory and their relationship to the SWE v3 model 
constructs. 
 
9.2.2 Insights about the constructs and dimensions of the SWE v3 model 
The use of the SWE (v1) model depicts a complex socio-technical system operating 
within the constraints of the failure boundaries. However, the envelope model is limited 
and is therefore extended by the use of SD to provide an insight into the dynamics 
found inside the envelope that influence the operating point of the system. The principle 
underlying systems thinking is that the interactions between the parts of a system 
contribute to the dynamic of the whole (Forrester, 1961). In the extant literature, SD is 
used to study the operational management of hospitals but makes very limited if any 
links to the implications for the safety of patients (Lane et al., 2000, Lane and 
Husemann, 2008b, Winch and Derrick, 2006). This thesis develops and contextualises 
the conceptual model to allow the connection to be made between the system dynamics 
of operational management, the resilience of the hospitals to perturbation or continuous 
stress, and the resultant implications for patient safety.  
 
The SWE model is conceptualised as a ‘system resilience’ model (Rasmussen, 1997, 
Woods et al., 2009, Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). It is argued conceptually, that a 
resilient system is one that can keep the OP within the failure boundaries of the safe 
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working envelope. The extant literature assumes that the OP is normally located close to 
the marginal zone boundary for patient safety failure (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005, 
Miller and Xiao, 2007, Amalberti et al., 2006, Reason, 2008). There are a number of 
reasons for this assumption.  
 
• The costs associated with having the OP well away from the safety marginal 
zone are high in lost production and money (Reason, 1997) 
• The pressure exerted from the gradients towards efficiency (finance) and least 
effort (unacceptable workload) are stronger than the safety gradient (Rasmussen, 
1997) 
• The safety boundary is the least well defined in comparison to the other 
boundaries (Rasmussen, 1997) 
• The work required to maintain safety is often unseen by senior decision makers 
who stretch the system to ever greater efficiency (Woods, 2006) 
 
The findings from the empirical case studies agree with the literature on these points. 
This research also suggests that pressure exerted, from the target boundary gradient in 
particular, creates system dynamics that normally locate the OP inside the marginal 
zone of the patient safety boundary or move the marginal zone boundary outwards.  
 
SD can help to provide insights into the system characteristics that contribute towards 
the OP in CS 1 & 2 being normally inside the marginal zone. For example, a finding 
from the SD analysis of the case study data is that the MAU / EMU and medical wards 
do not have sufficient ‘buffer capacity’ to adapt to the variation in demand. Using SD 
terms; the ‘stocks’ do not have the ‘buffer capacity’ to accumulate the net difference 
between the in and out ‘flow’ rate. The lack of ‘buffer capacity’ makes the system 
vulnerable to having to borrow capacity. This finding is considered further in Section 
9.2.3. Medical patients flowing into surgical beds creates conditions of overcrowding 
that moves the location of the OP to be close to if not breaching the patient safety 
boundary (Fatovich et al., 2005, Sprivulis et al., 2006, Trzeciak and Rivers, 2003, 
Wears et al., 2008, Weissman, 2007, Cameron, 2006). 
 
Cook and Rasmussen (2005) use the SWE (v1) in a conceptual paper on patient safety. 
They note that there is little if any research ‘characterizing the location or movement of 
the OP of the system or reducing the size of the OP motions.’ They also suggest that 
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further research is needed into the ‘factors influencing the marginal boundary location’. 
This research provides empirical evidence to address that gap in the current state of 
knowledge. 
 
The extant SWE model has been developed by the synthesis of the literature to develop 
and add to the constructs and define their dimensions (Figure 9.1). The dimensions 
explored help to develop an understanding of the dynamic behaviour of hospitals as 
systems and the influence on patient safety. The specific contributions to knowledge 
relating to the SWE constructs are summarised in Table 9.2: 
 
 Boundary 
a. The empirical evidence shows that the characteristics of the boundary construct 
display differences that help to explain the location and movement of marginal 
boundary and the prioritisation of competing requirements by decision makers.  
b. The inclusion of marginal zone boundaries for all failure boundaries increases 
the explanatory power of the model in relation to the resilience literature. The 
location and movement provides insight into the ‘buffer capacity’ available to 
be deployed to adapt to situations of perturbation or continuous stress. For 
example, where there is little or no buffer capacity it helps to explain why rapid 
actions are instigated to avoid a breach of a boundary. 
 
 Operating Point 
c. Insights into the empirical data are derived through the synthesis of concepts 
from accident theory and systems thinking to explain how drift, tip, collapse 
and transition into failure can result from the dynamics interactions of the 
system characteristics. 
 
d. The empirical data presented on the movement and location of the OP provides 
evidence of the decompensation of buffer capacity. This builds on the extant 
literature, which only proposes such a phenomenon (Miller and Xiao, 2007, 
Cook and Rasmussen, 2005)  
 
 Gradients 
e. The explanatory power of the gradient construct is extended by the synthesis of 
  Mike D Williams 
 241
the literature to take account of the dialectic relationship between the ‘social 
structure’ and ‘agent’ derived from social theory. This allows insights into the 
dynamic interactive nature of the pressures exerted by the internal and external 
requirements and constraints. 
 
f. The gradients are not homogenous as implied in the literature (Rasmussen, 
1997, Cook and Rasmussen, 2005, Miller and Xiao, 2007). Particular issues, 
such as control of infection or nurse working hours exert more pressure than 
other issues related to the same boundary gradient. 
 
g. The difference in pressure exerted by the gradients is associated with the 
timescale of the issue. The link between pressure and the timescale of issues 
associated with gradients is not considered in the extant literature. 
 
 Structure and Feedback Loops 
h. SD provides a means to model and derive insights about the impact of the flow 
of work, the occupancy of the stocks, any changes in the designed flow and 
decision making. 
 
i. SD provides a means to explain the coupling between the parts and the types of 
feedback loops that influence the behaviour of the system. 
 
j. The use of SD expands the explanatory power of the model to show the 
vulnerability of a hospital when there is insufficient capacity to accommodate 
the net difference in flow rates 
 
 
Table 9.2: Summary of the contribution to knowledge from the development of the 
SWE model 
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Figure 9.1: The constructs of the SWE v3 model 
Gradients depict 
pressure on OP 
Boundaries depict 
the constraints on 
the system 
Stock Flow Diagrams 
depict flow and capacity 
within the SWE 
Causal Loop 
Diagrams depict the 
dynamic feedback 
loops that occur 
within the SWE  
Marginal zones 
depict the 
adaptive capacity 
The SWE sits within 
a wider context 
which influence the 
gradient pressures 
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The SWE v3 model takes account of the presence of adaptive capacity in the marginal 
zones of the envelope. The presence or absence of that resilient capacity is considered 
next. 
9.2.3  Resilience – the buffer of adaptive capacity 
The concept of resilience explains how adaptive capacity is deployed to hold or return 
the OP within the SWE during periods of perturbation or continuous stress. The buffer 
capacity (marginal zone) depicts the ability of the system to adapt (take compensating 
actions) to keep the OP from breaching the failure boundary. As noted, the presence of 
‘redundant’ resources added into the system to prevent failures can increase the 
complexity (Perrow, 1984, Sagan, 2004).  
 
However, it is very clear from this research that the definition, measurement and 
monitoring of the boundaries of patient safety failure and unacceptable workload in the 
hospitals studied is weak in comparison to the other boundaries. Therefore, the resilient 
capacity (ability to adapt) relating to patient safety and workload is poorly understood. 
This is because the marginal zone and failure boundaries are not well defined and there 
are no measures of what constitutes adaptive capacity. Equally there is evidence that the 
target and finance failure boundaries were clearly defined, measured and performance 
managed. As there was limited adaptive capacity associated with some of the waiting 
time targets, the vulnerability of that boundary influenced decision makers. 
 
Miller and Xaio (2007) argue that it is possible to measure the resilience of an 
organisation by identifying the location of the marginal zone boundary and the 
compensating mechanisms (buffer capacity) within the zone. For example, it is possible 
to measure the number of staff available to cover absences or the number of empty and 
staffed beds. As identified, not all the boundaries are homogenous or well defined. 
Building on the literature and the insights from this research, it is possible to propose a 
number of resilience indicators for each construct of the model (Table 9.3). Further 
work is needed to verify the indicators and to see if others are required.  As Miller and 
Xaio (2007) suggest, being able to measure such indicators can provide a means to 
assess the resilience of a hospital. 
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Construct Measurable indicators 
Patient safety 
marginal zone 
Number of patients with infections 
Number of beds available to isolate infectious patients 
Number of outliers 
Mortality and harm rates (indicators of harm and data collection 
methods to be established) 
 
Unacceptable 
workload 
marginal zone 
Number of unfilled gaps in front line staff rotas (Drs, nurses etc) 
Number of staff available at short notice to work 
Patient to Dr and patient to nurse ratio 
Acuity of patients (measure of how seriously ill patients are) 
Total walking distance of medical ward round 
Number of patients outlied from their expected ward 
 
Target 
marginal zone 
Performance against production / waiting time targets (ahead of 
target provides additional buffer leading to system resilience) 
 
Financial 
marginal zone 
Performance against budget (overspend creates less buffer leading 
to system vulnerability) 
 
Stocks Occupancy rate by hour, day, week, month and year 
Frequency of internal transfers for non-medical reasons (creating 
outliers) 
Flows Variation by hour, day, week and month 
Net difference by hour of flows in and out 
Feedback Planned design of the flow of patients compared to the actual 
Changes in the expected length of stay  
 
Table 9.3: Measurable indicators of the constructs to provide an insight into state of 
resilience of a hospital 
 
It is further argued that the ability to measure the proposed indicators can assist in 
overcoming the vulnerability of the current poor ‘visibility’ of the marginal boundaries 
and system dynamics of hospitals. 
 
Miller and Xaio (2007) in their empirical study do not observe any ‘decompensation 
events’. Decompensation occurs when the buffer capacity is exhausted (Woods and 
Cook, 2006). This study has observed and presented data on both chronic and acute 
decompensation. The outbreak of the sickness virus and frequent, although short lasting 
shortage of staffed beds, are examples of acute decompensation. The events within CS 3 
and the slowly rising need over three years to have more medical outliers in CS 1, is 
evidence of chronic decompensation. This research therefore provides evidence of 
decompensation events which adds to the literature. 
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The development of the Rasmussen (1997) model, and the subsequent application to 
undertake research exploring patient safety from a systems perspective, provides 
interesting insights into the characteristics and behaviours of the hospitals studied.  
 
9.3 Characteristics of the case study hospitals 
In this Section consideration is given to how the insights derived from using the SWE 
v3 model might be structured in a way to describe the system behaviours observed and 
their relationship to the risk of patient safety failure. The data gathered from the case 
studies provides some evidence about the performance of the hospitals in relation to the 
failure boundaries. This section draws on systems dynamics to help structure the 
discussion. 
9.3.1 Insights into system archetypes 
To explore how the system influences patient safety it is helpful to develop a theoretical 
framework that takes account of the points drawn from the literature. As set out above, 
it is proposed that the SWE (v3) model can provide insights into system characteristics, 
the resultant behaviours and the implications for patient safety. Meadows (2008) argues 
that taking a systems thinking approach seeks to understand the relationship between an 
‘event’, the resulting ‘behaviour’ (e.g. oscillation) and the ‘structure’ of the system. She 
states that system structures that create patterns of behaviour are known as ‘archetypes’.  
 
In developing and applying the SWE (v3) model three construct sets have been 
indentified that interact to create the operational performance of the system (Figure 9.2):  
• the constraints within which the system operates, depicted by the boundary 
construct of the SWE (v3) model (presented in Chapter 6);  
• the pressures on the OP, depicted by the gradients (presented in Chapter 7);  
• the dynamic interaction of demand, capacity and the decision makers within the 
hospital, depicted by the SD ‘structure’ part of the model (presented in Chapter 
8).  
 
The operational performance is depicted by the location and movement of the OP in 
relation to the failure boundaries. The ability of the system to avoid or recover from 
breaching a failure boundary is depicted by the marginal zones (adaptive capacity) of 
the SWE (v3). 
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The analysis of the results provides insights into the different emergent system 
archetypes. It is argued that the archetypes set the conditions for the movement and 
location of the OP of the system. The resilience of the system is considered as the 
ability to hold the OP within the envelope when experiencing particular system 
behaviours. However, the SWE (v3) also provides insights into the vulnerability of a 
system to ‘events’ that create problematic system behaviours. The exploration 
undertaken suggests that, in addition to ‘safe performance’, there are four system 
archetypes relating to behaviours that potentially create problems for patient safety 
(Figure 9.1). The four suggested provide examples of system behaviours which may 
increase the risk to patient safety through the changing dynamics that occur due to the 
type of feedback loops created. The term ‘failure’ is used to depict the idea of increasing 
risk to patient safety as the OP moves closer to the failure boundary (Dekker, 2011, 
Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). The five archetypes are considered in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Overview of the system construct sets and behaviour archetypes  
Constraints 
(Boundaries) 
 
 
 
Pressures 
(Gradients) 
Safe Unsafe 
System 
Dynamics 
between demand, 
capacity and 
decision makers  
2. Drift towards Failure 
4. Collapse towards Failure 
5. Transition towards Failure 
Performance 
 
3. Tip towards Failure 
1. Safe Practice 
Resilience – 
adaptive capacity 
- three characteristics of hospitals  
combine and interact to create 
five possible system behaviour 
archetypes (which interact with 
the adaptive capacity) that can 
influence patient safety. 
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9.3 System archetypes that may influence patient safety 
9.3.1 One – Safe Practice 
The outcome of safe practice is achieved where the interactions of the three construct 
sets create a dynamic equilibrium with the adaptive capacity. It is dynamic in that 
compensating actions are constantly required to maintain the safe practice. Without the 
actions an imbalance could occur, leading to an increased risk of interactions creating 
patient safety risks. In SD terms the balancing feedback loop/s dominate the system 
keeping the OP in a stable position. 
 
9.3.2  Two – Drift towards Failure  
There was clear evidence from the case studies of staff accepting small incremental 
changes to practice. For example, the gradually increasing numbers of medical outliers 
in CS 1, the movement of patients without their medical notes, the preparation of 
patients for theatre in offices, using day case beds for inpatients and the number of 
patient falls (Williams et al., 2009). This system archetype is that the performance 
standards are influenced by past performance (Meadows, 2008). Where past 
performance is perceived to be adequate, safe and required through practical necessity, 
then a reinforcing loop is generated that allows migration and violations to become the 
norm (Amalberti et al., 2006). 
 
The case study data provides strong evidence of staff normalising over time to the 
continual small changes in processes and practice. The extant literature describes 
constant acceptance of small changes as a process of ‘drift’ (Dekker, 2011, Snook, 
2000, Woods et al., 2010, Vaughan, 1996, Pidgeon, 1997). This research links the 
concept of drift to the interactions of the system constructs. Resilience theory helps to 
explain how the adaptive capacity can absorb the small incremental steps of practice 
change without any apparent safety concerns (Miller and Xiao, 2007). However, the 
chronic erosion of the adaptive capacity can result in the OP breaching the safety failure 
boundary.  
 
There is irrefutable evidence that the acceptance of the incessant small changes results 
in the acceptance of higher risk operational practices. In Chapter 7 data is presented 
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which may be constued as the marginal patient safety boundary being shifted outwards 
when medical patients were outlied onto the gynaecology ward. The decision to outlie 
patients to that particular ward was only a small change from what had occurred 
previously, without any apparent safety risk. Yet the Lead Nurse for Control of 
Infection had indicated the potentially serious implications if infection from medical 
patients spread through the staff to new born babies and their mothers. The decision 
makers who chose to use the gynaecology ward for medical patients did not wish to 
increase the risk of infection to staff and babies. However, the cumulative effect of the 
competing and interacting system construct sets left the managers little alternative. 
When justifying the decision, managers regarded the risk of not being able to admit 
emergency patients (pressure from the target gradient) as greater than the small change 
in the policy of outlying patients to the gynaecology ward (lack of pressure from the 
patient safety gradient). The practical requirements of the situation meant that a further 
small step in the process of drift to failure occurred. 
 
Analysis of the situation, using the SWE (v3) model facilitates the identification of the 
differences in visibility, buffer capacity and pressure from the target failure boundary, in 
comparison to the patient safety failure boundary, influenced decision makers. The stark 
examples of operational practice slowly drifting to failure can be conceptualised as the 
system being subject to periods of continuous stress, which pushes the OP towards the 
patient safety failure boundary. In the case studies, periods of continuous stress were 
observed. For example, the evidence of the constant variability of demand of patients 
requiring admission was driven by a number of factors. These include changes in the 
morbidity of the population (e.g. rise in breathing problems in cold weather), the 
waiting time targets and the availability of staff and resources to treat them. The 
response of decision makers to the pressures, constraints, workload and capacity 
dynamics influenced the degree of continuous stress experienced by the system. As 
noted in Chapter 8, the inability to accommodate the accumulation of the net difference 
in rates of flow, created the conditions where the systems drifted towards failure as the 
number of medical outliers increased. 
 
CS 3 provides substantial evidence of a long term drift to failure. The second Public 
Inquiry into the wider influences on the hospital will not be published until 2012. 
However, the first inquiry report includes many accounts of how the need to save 
money and meet targets influenced the decisions to reduce staffing. The accounts from 
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clinical staff show a process of drift and normalisation. The gradual decline in standards 
of treatment of patients is a clear example of the drift to failure. In CS 3, it is argued that 
conceptually the OP clearly breached the patient safety failure boundary on repeated 
occasions, often without staff noticing. 
9.3.3  Three – Tip towards Failure 
Cook and Rasmussen (2005) argue that the SD of an organisation can rapidly change 
when the system reaching a ‘tipping point’. They give the example of a steam boiler 
where the dynamics associated with steam are very different to water although the 
change in temperature between the two states is small. Sudden changes in the dynamics 
were found in the CS 1 and 2. The results present instances of departments and hospitals 
reaching a ‘tipping point’. At the tipping point the system changes from being 
reasonably efficient to where major inefficiencies where experienced.  
 
The system behaviour is where the system oscillates around the load carrying capacity 
of the system. Balancing feedback loops are required to act quickly to counter the 
reinforcing feedback loops and avoid a system overshooting the capacity to meet the 
demand (Sterman, 2001). When time delays occur in the feedback loops the system can 
be working above their capacity and reach a ‘tipping point’ where performance 
deteriorates rapidly. When the balancing feedback loops take effect, the system returns 
to a stable state, where further demand is experienced and the pattern is repeated.  
 
The examples found in the case studies relate to the capacity to deal with fluctuations in 
demand for services. The incidents arose as a result of either continuous stress (just one 
more patient) or a perturbation (sudden rise in demand, the loss of bed or staff capacity) 
to the system. Key bottleneck departments, such as the MAU / EMU, were evident in 
the flow of medical emergency patients. The bottleneck departments were often unable 
to accommodate newly arriving patients. Both CS 1 and 2 provide clear evidence of 
reaching a tipping point where the hospitals moved rapidly from having loosely coupled 
to tightly coupled departments and hospitals. One additional patient arriving in the 
MAU, when it was full, created a diversion of GP admissions to the ED or the outlying 
of medical patients into surgical beds. The diversions and outlying are examples of 
instigating balancing loops to return the bottleneck department to a position of being 
able to meet the demand. However, as clearly demonstrated in Chapter 8, a consequence 
of instigating the balancing loops for the MAU is that the hospital tipped into a tightly 
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coupled state. The number of reinforcing feedback loops in the hospital system then 
increased with detrimental effect on patients and staff working conditions. 
 
The tipping point for the system is often visible, for example when the destination of 
patient flow changes. The SWE (v3) provides a way to explain the longer term 
interactions that allow such a tipping point to be reached. The constraint and pressure 
over the longer term from the financial boundary seek to maximise efficiency and 
therefore, not to invest in additional capacity. The financial pressure combined with the 
short term constraints and pressure from the various waiting time targets and the 
variation in demand. The result was the inability to accommodate the imbalance of flow 
rates in and out of the hospital. When bottleneck departments are unable to 
accommodate the accumulation of patients created by the disequilibrium in flow rates, 
then the system is at risk of tipping into a reinforcing cycle of inefficiency. Data from 
interviews and observation provided repeated examples of doctors chasing after 
patients, breakdown in communication between clinical teams, delays in investigations 
and treatments and elderly patients being moved in the early hours of the morning. 
 
As noted, accident and systems theory argue that the number of interactions increase as 
organisations become tightly coupled (Perrow, 1984, Dekker, 2011). The complexity of 
the situation therefore escalates. In CS 2 the ED was observed when it experienced a 
tipping point. The department rapidly changed from a position where staff where able to 
manage the flow of patients to the point where patients were being held in the corridor, 
the waiting room and were inappropriately using the resuscitation room. The ED 
changed from a smooth running unit to being on the edge of chaos. It should be noted 
that sudden change in the dynamics of the system can be short lived or last several days 
(Wears et al., 2008).  
 
There was clear evidence that staff had normalised to the increased frequency of 
oscillating around the capacity limit. The resultant inefficiencies were regarded as 
inevitable by many interviewees. The implications for patient safety did not appear to 
take a high priority. Analysis using the SWE (v3) model would suggest that the lack of 
visibility of the patient safety failure boundary made it possible for staff to normalise to 
the tipping point. The constraints and pressures on the system, and lack of capacity to 
deal with perturbations or continuous stress, become accepted as the norm. The SWE 
(v3) model approach argues that short term capacity problems can be conceptualised as 
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the exhaustion of the buffer capacity (Woods and Cook, 2006). Where that exhaustion 
does not last long it is termed ‘acute decompensation; defined as the short-term 
exhaustion of compensatory mechanisms’ (Miller and Xiao, 2007)  
9.3.4  Four – Collapse towards Failure 
The sudden and unexpected breaching of the patient safety failure boundary by the OP 
was evident in the outbreak of the Norovirus in CS 1. Such a situation is an example of 
what can be described as ‘immediate decompensation’ of the adaptive capacity, or a 
collapse towards failure. The system behaviour is where reinforcing loops drive 
exponential growth until the sudden collapse of the performance of the system 
(Sterman, 2000). This can be caused by an external disruption or the gradual erosion of 
adaptive capacity, leading to a position where the system is quickly overwhelmed and 
suddenly collapses. Unlike the oscillating archetype, it takes time to rebuild the adaptive 
capacity; hence the term ‘collapse’ is used. 
 
The Norovirus outbreak overwhelmed the normal infection control practices and 
precautions with the rapid spread of the virus across a number of wards. As noted, rapid 
action to contain and rectify the situation took place, although it took many days to 
recover. The perturbation also impacted on the operational management of the whole 
hospital. The financial gradient was relaxed, to allow additional staff to be employed. 
However, there was an immediate capacity problem due to the beds being closed to 
control the spread of infection. The decision not to cancel elective admissions in this 
situation is a stark example of the target gradient taking precedent over other pressures 
and constraints. This exacerbated the pressure on the OP moving towards the patient 
safety and unacceptable workload failure boundaries. Keeping the production pressure 
on the OP meant that the reinforcing loops continued to dominate the system. 
 
The sudden increased numbers of admission in CS 1 after this Christmas period is an 
example of the system collapsing towards failure. The hospital capacity was rapidly 
overwhelmed and experienced immediate tight coupling as the system went 
‘solid’(Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). There was also a collapse in the hierarchy with 
Directors becoming involved as porters and in the management of individual patient 
movements. The rapid rise in the number of medical outliers was undertaken with little, 
if any regard, to the safety implications. Whilst some elective cases were cancelled, 
bank staff deployed and extra money spent, the production pressure dominated. This is a 
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clear example of the OP moving rapidly through the marginal zone at the intersection of 
the patient safety and unacceptable workload boundaries. The adaptive capacity was 
immediately exhausted as the medical outliers rose to over one hundred. Although there 
did not appear to be any reported major failures in patient safety, the literature suggests 
that error and harm may have occurred but was not noticed or reported (Tucker and 
Edmondson, 2003, Vincent, 2007, Waring, 2005, Godlee, 2007, Leape, 2002, Health 
Care Commission, 2009, Tucker, 2004, Healthcare Commission, 2009a, Healthcare 
Commission, 2009b). 
9.3.5  Five – Transition towards Failure 
The fifth system behaviour is proposed as means to describe the combination of 
interactions that lead to the system performance becoming unsafe. A characteristic of 
complex systems is the nonlinear interrelationships which can lead to unexpected 
consequences (Dekker, 2011). This system behaviour is the dynamic interaction 
between the reinforcing and balancing feedback loops that create a variety of potential 
system behaviours. 
 
Some of examples found in the case studies arise from a combination of underlying drift 
with chronic or acute decompensation (Miller and Xiao, 2007). However, there is 
evidence that there are numerous interactions that lead to safety failure. There is the 
case from CS 2 of the infected patient with an underlying heart condition being held in 
the ED and not being treated in a timely manner. The combination of strong pressure to 
contain the spread of infection, the immediate shortage of single rooms, the rota 
arrangements for junior doctors and the competency of staff and timing of review by a 
senior doctor, all contributed to the transition to failure. This provides an excellent 
example of compensating actions (isolate infected patients; reduce working hours of 
doctors) interacting with other factors in potentially unforeseen ways to transition 
towards failure. 
 
The concepts of latent conditions (Reason, 1997) or the incubation of disaster theory 
(Turner and Pidgeon, 1997) provide some explanation for the transition to failure. 
However, these explanations are limited as they focus on understanding the component 
conditions and how defences against component failure do not prevent an accident. The 
proposition of ‘transition towards failure’ adds to the explanatory power of extant 
literature by describing the interactions between the construct sets. Reason’s (1997) 
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argument that latent conditions combine with local operating conditions is not sufficient 
as it advocates a linear cause effect. The system behaviour of ‘transition to failure’ takes 
the dynamic feedback between the ‘structure’ and ‘agent’, found in social theory (Held 
and Thompson, 1989, King, 2004, Lane, 1999, Lane and Husemann, 2008a, Thompson, 
1989, Giddens, 1984), into account. 
 
The system archetypes presented have been considered at a hospital level. It is however 
feasible that such system structures and resultant behaviours occur in the working of the 
micro clinical teams, departments and the wider hospital (Mohr et al., 2004). This is 
evidenced in the example from CS 2 where the infected patient was held in the ED. 
There were a series of interactions at the different levels within the hospital. Such a 
view fits with the nature of complex systems (Cilliers, 1998) and the idea of nested 
cycles of adaptive capacity (Holling, 2001). However, detailed exploration of this idea 
is beyond the scope of this research.  
 
9.4  Proposals for improvement 
The pragmatic critical realist position of this research leads to a number of possible 
proposals about how to reduce the risk to patient safety. The discussion emphasises that 
a major influence on the behaviour of the hospital are the dynamics generated by the 
interaction of the construct sets of constraints, pressures, demand, capacity and the 
decision makers. The risk of systems experiencing any of the four archetypes of drift, 
tip, collapse and transition towards failure may be reduced if certain actions are taken.  
 
There are opportunities to change the system structure of interacting feedback loops to 
avoid the problematic system behaviours (Meadows, 2008). The first point of 
intervention in healthcare is to prevent the drift associated with the continuous 
production pressures. The second is to avoid the shift in complexity associated with 
moving from a loose to tightly coupled system.  
 
The first proposal addresses the system behaviour of ‘drift’. The chronic erosion of 
adaptive capacity often occurs as a result of the production and financial pressures on 
the hospital system. It is very clear from both the extant literature and this research that 
the lack of definition and consequent visibility of the patient safety and unacceptable 
workload boundaries are key in allowing ‘drift’ to take place. Safety performance 
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standards have to be made clear and externally benchmarked to the best in class, rather 
than compared only to previous internal performance. 
 
The resources allocated within the case study hospitals to define, measure and manage 
the financial and waiting time target performance was considerable. It is harder to 
define and measure the other boundaries. However, as suggested in Table 9.3, there are 
indicators that could be measured. The theoretical framework of the SWE (v3) does 
provide a means of visualising the balance between the competing dynamics that has to 
be achieved. However, this requires better definition of the boundaries to be made, 
understood and performance managed. The proposition is therefore made that the more 
hospitals clearly define, measure and performance manage patient safety and workload 
standards against external benchmarks, the risk to patient safety will reduce. 
 
The second proposal addresses the ability to manage the disequilibrium in the rates of 
flow into and out the hospital is a key point of intervention. The vulnerability of the 
system to creating potentially unsafe feedback loops is linked to the bottleneck in the 
flow of patients that occurs in MAU / EMU. When there is insufficient capacity to 
accommodate the accumulation in the net difference in rates of flow, the coupling 
between parts of the hospital increases. The overflow of patients into the surgical 
department occurs with many consequences for the hospital, staff and patients. It is 
important to note that the isolation stock (capacity to accommodate infectious patients) 
has also to be able to manage the net difference in flow rates. 
 
It is easy to propose additional capacity but most hospitals face financial constraints and 
pressure which prevent additional expenditure. However, failure to avoid moving to a 
position of tight coupling is a false economy. Not being able to accommodate the 
demand flow can create major inefficiencies and risks to patient safety, consequently 
increasing the costs of treatment (Blackstone, 2004, Colwyn Jones and Dugdale, 1998, 
Goldratt and Cox, 2004). Therefore, emphasis has to be placed on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the processes of assessment, investigation, treatment and transfer of patient 
from the MAU facility.  
 
There are a number of operational management techniques that can assist in managing 
the flow of patients. These include putting the senior expertise as close to the beginning 
of the process of assessment, investigation and treatment as possible (Seddon, 2008). 
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This can reduce the time delays that occur when junior doctors have to handover 
information to senior colleagues for decisions to be made. As evidenced by the case 
studies the handover and decision making is often done during ward rounds, with the 
resulting batching of work. As was evident from CS 1, batching and the delay in 
processing add to the inefficiencies and slow down the rate of flow out of the hospital. 
 
A technique derived from the theory of constraints is to set up a ‘buffer management’ 
process to protect the physical bottleneck (Gardiner and Blackstone, 1998, Goldratt and 
Cox, 2004). Amongst other benefits, buffer management can provide an early warning 
to decision makers of times when the MAU may not be able to accommodate the net 
difference in flow rates. Such a warning can allow compensating actions to be taken 
prior to an overflow of patients. The key point is that the avoidance of medical outliers 
and the diversion of patients from MAU to ED is a critical leverage point in improving 
the system behaviour and reducing the risk of unsafe practice. Therefore, the 
proposition is made that the more a hospital can absorb the net difference in flow rates, 
the risk to patient safety created by tight coupling feedback loops will be reduced. 
 
The implications of these proposals for policy makers and practitioners are explored 
further in Chapter 10. 
 
9.5  Summary of the contribution to knowledge 
The contribution to knowledge is in three areas. The first is the development of the 
literature on resilience and the SWE model in particular. Second, how the system 
characteristics influence patient safety and third, the proposals for improvement. 
 
The first area of contribution is that the research revealed the requirement to develop the 
Rasmussen (1997) SWE model. The model has been extended by the addition of a 
‘target failure’ boundary and the application of SD to gain insights into the dynamics 
that occur when demand and capacity interact with decision makers. The resulting SWE 
v3 model provides a new way to gain insights into the system behaviours of the 
hospitals studied. The contribution to knowledge is in both the development and the 
application of the model to consider patient safety from a reslience and dynamic rather 
than linear perspective. 
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Second, insights are gained and articulated that develop the understanding about the 
interactive and emergent nature of some of the system behaviours in NHS hospitals and 
how they influence patient safety. Those insights are viewed from the perspective of 
regarding patient safety as an emergent property of the dynamic interactions represented 
by the constructs used in the SWE (v3) model. Using the model provides a means of 
exploring the interactions and decision making that takes place. The analysis of the case 
studies using the SWE (v3) model develops the theoretical framework of the system 
construct sets and archetypes presented in Figure 9.1 and Section 9.3. The framework 
adds a different perspective to the extant patient safety literature. In particular the 
analysis using the synthesis of concepts from systems thinking, resilience and accident 
theory provides a new approach to considering how the ‘system’ influences patient 
safety. 
 
The third area of contribution is the propositions for improvement set out in Section 9.4. 
The proposals are derived from the analysis of the case studies using the SWE (v3) 
model. A working assumption, derived from the literature, is that overcrowded hospitals 
are associated with patient safety failure. Therefore, the key outcome of this exploratory 
research is that tight coupling and the lack of buffer capacity within hospital systems, 
makes them vulnerable to breaching the patient safety boundary. Hence the proposition 
is made that the more a hospital can absorb the net difference in flow rates, the risk to 
patient safety created by tight coupling feedback loops will be reduced.  
 
The measurable indicators of resilience presented (Table 9.3) develops the systems 
resilient approach to patient safety. This is a development of the literature (Miller and 
Xiao, 2007), which suggests that it is possible to measure the resilience of an 
organisation by identifying the location of the marginal zone boundary and the 
compensating mechanisms (buffer capacity) within the zone. The indicators proposed 
for each boundary allow an assessment to be made about the resilience of the hospital 
and the balance achieved by decision makers between the need to meet production 
pressures and to protect patients and staff. The proposition is therefore made that the 
more hospitals clearly define, measure and performance manage patient safety and 
workload standards against external benchmarks, the risk to patient safety will reduce. 
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9.6 Summary 
This chapter discusses the findings from the case studies and makes proposals. The 
research objective has been explored using a system resilience model (SWE v3) 
developed from the literature and empirical research. Three system construct sets of the 
hospitals examined have been identified. The interactive construct sets create five 
possible system archetypes, four of characterise conditions where patient safety 
decreases. Proposals for improvement are made which focus on helping hospitals to not 
drift or tip towards failure. The contributions to knowledge are summarised as being 
first, to the development of a new theoretical framework to better explain how the 
system level influences patient safety. Second, the proposals for improvement in the 
operational management that impact on patient safety, and third the development of the 
SWE model. 
 
The implications, limitations and potential opportunities for future research are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 10 - Conclusions, Implications and Limitations 
 
10.1  Introduction 
This chapter summarises the conclusions about using the SWE (v3) to gain insights into 
the systemic characteristics of NHS hospitals in England and how they influence patient 
safety. The implications of these conclusions for theory, policy and practice are 
presented. The limitations of the research are noted and proposals for future research are 
made. 
 
10.2  Summary of Conclusions 
It is argued in Chapter 2 that the extant patient safety literature highlights the need to 
consider the ‘system’ contribution to patient safety. However, there is little application 
of systems thinking in developing the explanation of how that influence occurs. This 
research uses a conceptual model that addresses safety in complex socio-technical 
systems (Rasmussen, 1997). The results provide evidence about the construct sets of 
NHS hospitals and how they interact to create system behaviours that influence the 
safety of patients. There are conclusions drawn in Section 10.2.1 about the adequacy 
and the development of the Rasmussen (1997) model. In Section 10.2.2 conclusions are 
presented from the research about patient safety in the case study hospitals.  
10.2.1  Conclusions about safe working envelope model   
The SWE (v1) (Rasmussen, 1997) provides a model that takes account of the 
constraints and competing pressures that influence complex socio-technical systems. 
The model depicts the conceptual idea of a resilient system as being one that can 
maintain the OP within the failure boundaries of the envelope. However, in Chapter 5 it 
is argued that for the model to be applied to the context of NHS hospitals in England, it 
needs development.  
 
The first development is the additional boundary of ‘target failure’. The main evidence 
for the need of an additional boundary comes from the examination of policy documents 
from the Department of Health. The documents place considerable emphasis on 
achievement of waiting time targets (see Section 4.2.1), which is supported by the 
extant literature. It is concluded that the addition of this boundary extends the ability of 
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the model to capture the complex influences created by patient demand. The influence 
of patient demand is otherwise difficult to take into account when using SWE (v1) 
(Miller and Xiao, 2007). 
 
The SWE (v1) model is used in the resilience and safety in healthcare literature (Miller 
and Xiao, 2007, Amalberti et al., 2006, Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). However, it is 
argued that the original model is weak in taking account of production pressures relating 
to targets, ‘structure’ and ‘feedback’ (Sterman, 2000). To overcome these weaknesses, 
in the second development, aspects of SD are used to extend the model (see Section 
2.5.1). The ability of the SWE (v3) model to take account of production pressures, 
structure and feedback is evidenced in Section 5.3 and Chapter 8. The contribution to 
knowledge resulting from the use of SD as part of the SWE (v3) model is presented in 
Table 9.2.  
 
The third development is using the concept of ‘cross scale’ interactions (Woods, 2006) 
being applied to the OP (see Section 3.3.1). The downward scale interactions assumed 
in the original model depict the gradients moving the OP away from the failure 
boundary (Rasmussen, 1997). By using upward scale actions it is possible to assess 
actions by staff that can create pressure to move the OP towards a boundary (see 
Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.8). The use of ‘cross scale’ interactions develops the model from 
depicting a linear pressure on the OP, to where it is possible to take account of the 
dialectic interactions between the gradient downward pressure and the response of staff. 
It is concluded that this development boosts the ability of the model to take account of 
the dynamic interactions within the system being studied. 
 
The fourth development is the explicit use of marginal zone boundaries associated with 
each of the four envelope boundaries. The findings suggest that the characteristics of the 
failure boundaries show some differences from each other (see Tables 6.4 – 6.7). These 
include differences in the visibility, movement and location of the marginal zone 
boundary and size of the buffer capacity. It is concluded that the differences provide an 
insight into the pressures from the gradients associated with each boundary. This insight 
helps to provide an explanation beyond that found in the extant literature as to why 
decision makers pay more attention to the financial and target failure boundaries than 
the others.  
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It is concluded that many of the concepts derived from the accident theory literature can 
be incorporated within the SWE (v3) model (see Section 3.4). The development of the 
model allows for the systemic concepts of coupling and feedback loops to be included 
(see Table 8.2). It is concluded that the development of Rasmussen’s (1997) SWE (v1) 
model does increase the explanatory power of why the pattern of systemic behaviours 
arise and influence patient safety in the case study hospitals. The implications of the 
model development for wider application are considered below. 
10.2.2  Conclusions about the systemic characteristics influence on patient 
safety 
The use of the SWE (v3) provides insights into the systemic characteristics of the case 
study hospitals. Any model seeks to depict reality but is limited. Therefore, the insights 
are not comprehensive. However, it is argued that the model does allow the 
identification of important construct sets and helps to explain the patterns of behaviour 
of hospitals, which may influence patient safety. Woods et al (2010) argue that safety is 
an emergent property of complex systems. Safety emerges from the adaptive capacity of 
the many actors in the system. The SWE (v3) provides a means to explain something of 
the complexity of the dynamic interactions that are associated with patient safety in the 
case study hospitals. It is concluded that some systemic characteristics of the hospitals 
arise from the interaction of the construct sets analysed.  
 
The argument of this thesis is that the dynamic interactions related to the three construct 
sets often create unpredicted feedback loops. Five system behaviour archetypes are 
identified, four of which have a negative influence on the safety of patients. Reinforcing 
feedback loops create pressure on the OP. A key finding of this research is that the 
competing pressures on the OP create the situation where the dynamic interactive 
complexity of systems can escalate either slowly (drift towards failure) or rapidly (tip, 
collapse or transition towards danger). This is demonstrated by the number and type of 
feedback loops that are created as the hospitals become tightly coupled.  
 
When hospitals have a high level of occupancy they appear to be more vulnerable to 
perturbations and continuous stress which move the hospital into being tightly coupled. 
It is argued that when the hospital becomes tightly coupled, then the resilient adaptive 
capacity of the staff to keep patients safe is stretched, which increases the risk of harm 
occurring (Woods et al., 2010). The vulnerability due to tight coupling provides a 
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greater insight than the suggestion of an 85% occupancy to avoid overcrowding (Bagust 
et al., 1999).  
 
When harm occurs to patients, it is normal in the NHS for an investigation to seek out a 
root cause through a process of linear analysis and hindsight bias (Dekker, 2006). As 
the likely cause of harm is the combination of dynamic interactions, such an approach 
does not provide the full explanation (Dekker, 2011, Hollnagel, 2004, Dekker, 2006). 
Therefore, a conclusion of this research is that a systemic understanding of the hospital 
is required to address the fundamental vulnerabilities to patient safety failure found in 
the case study hospitals. The argument is that the vulnerability and resilience of the 
system is related to the adaptive ability to maintain the OP within the boundaries of the 
envelope at times of problematic system behaviour. The SWE (v3) provides a 
mechanism to conceptualise insights into the adaptive or buffer capacity associated with 
the envelope boundaries and stocks in the system.  
 
When the marginal zone boundary is either located or moves close to a failure 
boundary, then the size of the buffer capacity that can be deployed to adapt to 
perturbations or continuous stress is reduced. For example, the evidence from the 
findings suggests that the location of the marginal target zone boundary is close to the 
failure boundary. The conclusion is drawn that the corresponding lack of buffer 
capacity, high visibility and performance management of the target failure boundary 
helps to explain the pattern of high pressure from the associated gradient. The 
dimensions of the target boundary also assist in understanding why consequent 
compensating actions initiated by staff often appear to take priority over other 
competing requirements. For example, admitting patients within four hours took a 
higher priority than finding the appropriate location for treatment. 
 
The extant literature suggests that the visibility (more easily defined, measured and 
monitored) of the production related boundaries (financial and target) is one of the main 
reasons why they are given greater priority over the workload or safety failure 
boundaries. This research supports this conclusion. However, it is argued that the 
location and movement of the marginal zone boundary depicting the buffer capacity, 
adds to the explanation (see Section 6.3.4). 
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Building on the work of Miller and Xiao (2007), there are some measurable indicators 
of the buffer capacity that can be proposed for each boundary (see Table 9.3).  Further 
work is required to substantiate the proposals. However, the use of the marginal zone 
boundary does add to the explanation about the resilience by being able to propose what 
constitutes buffer, or resilient adaptive, capacity for each boundary. 
 
A key conclusion is the need to have sufficient buffer capacity in the medical 
department stocks, especially the MAU, to prevent the flow of patients diverting into 
surgical department stocks. The need to borrow buffer capacity is shown to create 
conditions of tight coupling and reinforcing loops that increase the complexity of the 
system for staff. It is concluded that when reinforcing loops dominate the dynamics, the 
consequent system behaviours moves the OP towards the patient safety failure 
boundary. 
 
10.3  Implications 
There are implications of the outcome of this research for theory, policy and practice 
which are presented in this section. 
10.3.1  Implications for theory 
This research takes an exploratory and theory building approach (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
Meredith, 1993). It is argued that the extant patient safety literature does not have an 
adequate theoretical model with sufficient power to explain how the dynamic 
interactions within healthcare systems influence patient safety. The gap in knowledge is 
addressed by using concepts from resilience engineering and SD literature to extend and 
apply the SWE (v1) model. 
 
The contribution to patient safety theory is to suggest that the construct sets used in the 
SWE v3 model of hospital systems combine, interact and create five system behaviours 
that influence safe performance. The extant literature, explored in Chapter 2, lists 
numerous organisational factors that contribute to patient safety, but is limited in 
exploring the implications of the systemic interactions between the many factors. The 
Swiss Cheese theoretical model appears to be most popular in the literature to explain 
why patient safety failures occur. It is argued that such a model takes a linear and 
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barrier approach to safety and is therefore inadequate when seeking to explain systemic 
influences on patient safety.  
 
The workload of staff at an individual level is explored in the literature from a patient 
safety perspective (Reason, 1990). However, the SWE (v3) model provides a broader 
perspective. The model allows staff workload to be viewed within a systemic 
perspective with competing goals, tight coupling and dynamic feedback. The drive for 
efficiency in systems is accounted for in the extant literature (Reason, 1997). This 
empirical study depicts the implications of the requirement to reduce costs and increase 
productivity in terms of the location of the OP and the impact on the buffer capacity of 
the stocks and boundaries. 
 
There is an implication for theory in the link between staffing workload and patient 
safety. There are system level implications on the operational and staff capability of 
hospitals arising from high levels of patient demand. For example, the patient safety and 
staff workload implications of patients being outlied from medical wards have not been 
well researched. It is suggested that patient safety theory builds more explicit links with 
operations management and systems theory to address such issues.  
 
As noted, the ability of the SWE (v3) to incorporate concepts from accident theory, 
adds to the explanatory power of the model in considering the safety issues that arise in 
socio-technical systems. There are also implications for theory in considering patient 
safety from the perspective of the resilience of the hospital system. The SWE (v3) 
provides the conceptual model for considering the buffer capacity required to maintain 
the OP within the constraints of the envelope boundaries. This research has added to the 
knowledge about the system resilience of the hospitals investigated through the 
proposed indicators of buffer capacity. 
 
An implication for theory arises from the combination of concepts from social theory, 
SD and resilience engineering. Patient safety theory is multifaceted with theories 
derived from many academic disciplines (Vincent, 2010). It is often the synthesis of 
concepts from different viewpoints that create opportunities to develop theory. It is 
argued that the contribution to knowledge from this research results largely from the 
synthesis of ideas from different disciplines to develop and apply the SWE (v3) model.  
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The final implication for theory is the suggestion that the SWE (v3) may have wider 
application than the case study hospitals. It is suggested that the model can be adapted 
and applied to any system that has the combination of financial requirements, 
production targets, staff undertaking work, standards of expected performance and a 
flow of work through the system.  
10.3.2  Implications for policy 
There are implications for policy makers from the outcomes of this research. NHS 
policy in recent years has placed greater emphasis on patient safety as part of a wider 
quality agenda (Department of Health, 2008b). However, largely absent from that policy 
is the recognition of staff workload on patient safety and the influence of competing 
dynamics created by conflicting policy goals. Targets are set for specific types of patient 
safety failures, such as infections and high risk procedures (Department of Health, 
2009b, Department of Health, 2010d) which indicate a component rather than a 
systemic approach. There is little if any recognition in the documents that other policies 
associated with waiting times and financial management can interact to reduce adaptive 
capacity and increase the risks of harm to patients. The application of systems thinking, 
and an understanding of what constitutes system resilience, will assist policy and 
regulation in creating the conditions for greater adaptability by front line staff to avoid 
patient harm.  
 
With the current situation of the UK economy, the financial savings required across the 
NHS means that there is a renewed emphasis on the ‘faster, better, cheaper’ approach. 
Research indicates that such an approach can create conditions where deviance is 
normalised (Vaughan, 1996). The emphasis on efficiency can result in the buffer 
capacity being regarded as ‘waste’ and removed (Radnor and Walley, 2008, Smart et 
al., 2003, Lawson, 2001, Woods et al., 2010). The removal of so-called waste is often 
thought to be of practical necessity to meet the efficiency requirements. When no safety 
failure is evident, the action is thought justified and often repeated. However, the 
implications are that future costs will be higher, when things do go wrong (Woods et al., 
2010), as evidenced by CS 3. 
 
The current most popular theory used by policy makers, regulators and practitioners  to 
explain why accidents occur in healthcare is the Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1997). 
As noted above, this is not sufficient to explain the systemic interactions that occur in 
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complex systems such as hospitals. The use of the SWE (v3) model allows other 
insights to guide policy, regulation and practice. A key implication of adopting a 
different theoretical model will be a change in policy from the ‘root cause’ linear 
investigation of patient safety incidents referred to above to a more system based 
method (Dekker, 2006). 
 
In summary the implications for policy makers in the NHS are: 
• To take a system based approach to policy relating to performance management 
and targets to understand the interactive implications. 
• To place patient safety as a consistent core organising principle in key 
documents like the Operating Framework. Fundamental to achieving safety is 
the assessment of the resilient capacity of healthcare services to sustain safe 
practice in the face of high workloads and shrinking budgets. 
• To assess the impact of policies and subsequent contracts for providers on staff 
workload and the consequent implications for patient safety. 
• To revise the use of linear based models of investigating patient safety failures 
and adopt more system based methods (Dekker, 2006) 
 
10.3.3  Implications for practice 
The key implication of a system resilience approach to patient safety for hospitals is for 
safety to be embedded in the strategic and operational management of the institution. 
Hospitals are hazardous places for patients yet the vast majority are kept safe by the 
adaptive capacity and professionalism of the staff (Berwick, 1991, Woods et al., 2010). 
Failures are to be expected and learnt from as insights into the systemic characteristics 
of the hospital. Blaming individuals should be the exception rather than the expectation 
(Dekker, 2007). 
 
The case study hospitals have invested considerable resources in being able to define, 
monitor and manage their financial, waiting times and infection control target 
performance. The implication of this research is that a comparable resource should be 
deployed to achieve the same level of visibility and attention to staff workload and 
patient safety. The SWE (v3) does provide a model from which to build indicators for 
the location of the OP, marginal boundaries and assess the size of the buffer capacity of 
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the stocks and marginal zones. Table 9.1 presents the proposed indicators that could be 
measured. 
 
The operations management of the hospitals can be strengthened from using the ideas 
from SD about stocks, flows and feedback. A more sophisticated understanding of the 
occupancy and flows of work by hour of the day, day of the week and season is required 
to assist decision makers to balance and trade off the competing demands. These actions 
are required to avoid the system behaviours that lead to danger. Early warning of the 
depletion of buffer capacity in the stocks that are critical to the flow of emergency 
patients will assist in preventing the hospital reaching a situation of tight coupling with 
increasingly complex interactions. The stocks of the ED and MAU have to be sized and 
managed to accommodate the net difference in flow rates. The batching of medical 
work can be reduced to improve the flow of patients through the support departments of 
the hospital and therefore reduce the length of stay. 
 
In summary the implications for practitioners at different levels in NHS hospitals are: 
 
Trust Board:  
• To define, measure and monitor key indicators of patient safety and buffer 
capacity. These indicators should include the impact on patients of high staff 
workload and the safety of outlying patients due to overcrowding of the 
emergency bed capacity. 
• To benchmark safety performance against the best in class in order to avoid 
‘drift’ in standards and normalisation by staff. 
• To revise and simply the policy on reporting to encourage greater openness 
about actual and potential safety problems. 
• To revise the root cause approach to serous incident investigations to a more 
system based approach which seeks to understand why actions where taken and 
how the interactions occurred. 
• To monitor the frequency of borrowing bed capacity from outlying patients or 
using day case facilities for inpatients; the length of stay by patient groups and 
the admission and discharge patterns. 
• To size the bottleneck departments to be able to accommodate the net difference 
in flow rates. 
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• To increase knowledge about patient safety, human factors and accident theory 
and their relationship to the operational management of the hospital and 
contractual agreements. 
 
Department 
• To monitor and manage the flow rates to avoid having to outlie patients. 
• Seek to improve the continuity of care by clinical teams and avoid non-medical 
movement of patients. 
• Encourage reporting of system issues that create problems for clinical teams. 
• Develop key indicators of patient safety and staff workload. 
• Develop expertise in staff to take a system based approach to investigate 
incidents 
 
Clinical Teams 
• To increase knowledge about human factors and the causes of error and revise 
ways to investigate serious incidents. 
• Develop an awareness of a safe working envelope for the team and the ability to 
assess performance in relation to the failure boundaries. 
• Report concerns about safety and related system and capacity issues. 
• Be involved in any decisions about non-medical patient movement. 
10.3.4  Contribution to knowledge 
In summary, and as noted in more detail in Section 9.5, there are three main 
contributions to the extant knowledge. 
 
First, the analysis of the case studies develops the model of three interacting construct 
sets. The interactions of the constructs create emergent behaviours, some of which are 
problematic for patient safety. Five archetypes of system behaviour are identified, four 
of which increase the risk to the safety of patients. The SWE v3 model, construct sets 
and system behaviour archetypes adds a different perspective to the extant patient safety 
literature. In particular the analysis using the synthesis of concepts from systems 
thinking, resilience and accident theory provides a new approach to considering how the 
‘system’ influences patient safety. 
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Second, propositions are made about how to reduce the risk associated with the system 
archetypes. A key outcome of this exploratory research is that tight coupling between 
the parts of hospitals and the lack of buffer capacity makes them vulnerable to patient 
safety failure. Hence the proposition is made that hospitals must be able to 
accommodate the net difference in rates of flow into and out of the hospital to avoid 
medical patients being accommodated on surgical wards. The case studies show 
evidence of the gradual deterioration of standards of care that can occur when hospitals 
are under continuous pressure to meet targets and save money.  
 
The proposition is made that the safety standards have to be made more explicit and 
judged against high performing organisations and not internal past performance. 
Building on the extant literature, which suggests that aspects of resilience can be 
measured, a range of variables are proposed (set out in Table 9.1), to measure the 
adaptive capacity of hospitals relating to finance, targets, staff workload and patient 
safety. It is argued that the measures provide a means to assess the resilience of a 
hospital and the balance made by decision makers between production pressures and the 
need to protect patients and staff. 
 
Third, is the contribution to the patient safety and resilience literature through the 
incremental development of the SWE model. The development of the model through the 
synthesis of the literature provides greater explanatory power in the exploration of some 
of the interactive components found in NHS hospitals that influence patient safety. The 
case study evidence adds to the literature that has used the SWE model by providing 
data about phenomenon not previously explored empirically. For example, both the 
chronic and sudden exhaustion of adaptive capacity to prevent patient safety failure is 
found in the case studies, provides a deeper understanding as to how that occurs. 
 
10.4  Limitations of the research 
Whilst it is argued that new knowledge is derived from the analysis of the rich data 
collected during this research, it is necessary to set out the limitations of the methods 
employed and conclusions drawn. This section addresses the limitations and how some 
of the limitations were handled during the research process.  
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The limitations of case study design are addressed in the literature (Stuart et al., 2002, 
Voss et al., 2002) although some are disputed (Flyvbjerg, 2006). A number of strategies 
and research methods, set out in Chapter 4, are used in the case study design, data 
collection and analysis to ensure the validity and reliability of the research outcomes 
(Yin, 2003, Eisenhardt, 1989). This has included the testing of conclusions with other 
academics, with managers and clinicians from the hospitals and the wider healthcare 
community. The data has been analysed, reduced and presented within the thesis and 
compared to the extant literature. The mixed methods of data collection provide a large 
volume of rich material, which can be overwhelming and lead to complex and unhelpful 
theories. The SWE (v3) model outlined in Chapter 5 is used to provide the framework 
for the data collection, analysis and presentation to focus the research.  
 
Whilst any model has limitations this model is chosen to reflect the dynamic competing 
pressures that arise in complex socio-technical systems such as hospitals. However, it is 
not claimed that the model provides an exhaustive means to explore the characteristics 
of the hospitals. It does provide for a high level analysis of how the competing 
dynamics of finance, staff workload, waiting time targets and the flow of work can 
influence the safety of patients. As noted above, a limitation is the ability to know to 
extent to which patient safety is influenced by the interactions as many safety failures 
are either not noticed or not reported. The assumption is made that overcrowded 
hospitals increase the risk of patient safety failure. While this assumption is supported 
by the literature the limitation is that specific threats to safety cannot be set out or 
substantiated in detail. However, these are conditions in which it is possible to conduct 
the analysis, identify potential relationships between constructs and assess the 
explanatory power of the proposed model. 
 
The model is contextualised for application in NHS hospitals through the analysis of 
policy documents specific to the hospitals in England. Therefore, the conclusions 
relating to the influence of the target boundary and gradient on the systemic 
characteristics are particular to that context and time. The new government has made 
changes to the policy of targets, which makes it impossible to replicate the context of 
the study. However, the approach and methods adopted is repeatable. 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, there is a debate about the ability to generalise from case studies. 
The concern about being able to generalise arises from a particular paradigm view of 
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research which is criticised (Flyvbjerg, 2006). It is accepted that this research is limited 
in the number, scope and data gathered about the hospitals investigated. Three NHS 
hospitals with different characteristics were selected to be studied. The context of their 
local PCT and SHA were kept constant for CS 1 and 2 to reduce the variation in the 
external context of the hospitals where original data collection took place. CS 3 relied 
on secondary sources and therefore does not have the richness of data that is available 
from the different collection methods used in CS 1 and 2.  
 
The use of system dynamic modelling is limited in that mathematical models are not 
used to simulate the flows and stocks. It is argued that it is acceptable to use SD models 
in a qualitative manner to illustrate the flows and create CLDs (Lane, 2008).  
 
There is the limitation of the researcher reflexivity. Prior experience and personal bias 
can influence the data gathering and analysis (Finlay, 2002, Johnson and Duberley, 
2003). The personal career and interests of the researcher are explicitly recognised and 
acknowledged in the thesis. The triangulation of data and the sharing and testing of 
thoughts during the research process is a means to counteract such bias. 
 
The timing of the data gathering in CS 1 and 2 during the winter months provided a 
particular insight into hospitals working during periods of perturbation and continuous 
stress. The situations investigated do not occur every month. However, the research 
design enabled rich data to be gathered by a number of means to allow triangulation that 
increases the reliability of the results. Staff were on the whole very honest and willing 
to share their views, concerns and ideas. 
 
10.5  Further research 
There are a number of issues arising from this study that require further research, which 
are set out in this section. The issues are arranged into three areas. The first is to 
investigate in detail the proposition of the five system archetype behaviours, the second 
is the operational and patient safety matters found during the empirical inquiry and 
third, the further development of the model and its application. 
10.5.1  System Behaviours 
The argument is made in Chapter 9 that the interactions of the system construct sets 
create five emergent types of system behaviour. More detailed research is required into 
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articulating the markers of such behaviour and the key intervention points to prevent the 
system increasing the risk to patients. It is argued that the buffer management of the 
bottleneck resources is a point of intervention that will reduce the danger to patients. 
The argument needs to be tested. 
10.5.2  Operational and patient safety management 
There is little evidence of research examining the relationship between the operational 
management of hospitals and the impact on patient safety. This research provides 
evidence of the impact of the medical department having to borrow capacity from 
surgery by outlying medical patients. There is little if any literature on the relationship 
between medical outliers and the consequences for patient safety. Part of the further 
work required in this area is to research the impact on patients being moved for non-
clinical reasons and being looked after by staff without the expertise for their condition. 
 
There are potential safety implications of moving patients for non-clinical reasons. 
These include the potential for error occurring with more frequent patient handovers 
between wards and clinical teams and the increased workload of staff. There is also the 
need to assess the impact on the clinical care of patients. There is some evidence of 
delays in treatment but little systematic examination of the consequences of delays. 
 
The batching of medical work, both by GPs and medical staff in hospitals create peaks 
in the flow of patients through the hospital. There is little research into the 
consequences for the operational management of the hospital or the safety of patients 
from such an approach to managing the workload. 
 
The final area of future research in this area is to establish key measures of demand, 
stocks, flows and discharges for operational managers to use to better anticipate, plan 
for and adapt to perturbations and periods of continuous stress. 
10.5.3  Development of the model 
Rasmussen’s (1997) SWE is used widely in the literature. This research has developed 
that model and applied it in a particular context. Research is required to further assess 
the validity and reliability as a conceptual model in other hospitals in England and 
potentially more widely in health and other industries where there is a production and 
safety requirement. The four boundary envelope model is a development of the original 
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model with potentially wider application than NHS hospitals in England. Research is 
needed to see if that model provides greater explanatory power than the original one. 
 
Based on the idea from Miller and Xiao (2007) a number of measureable indicators of 
adaptive or buffer capacity are proposed in Section 9.3.6 as a way to assess resilience. 
These indicators are drawn from the case studies examined. Data on those specific 
indicators has not been collected in the detail necessary to assess whether they are valid, 
reliable and sufficient indicators of resilience as suggested. Different industries will 
have a variety of other indicators. Research is required to study whether there are 
specific and or generic indicators of buffer capacity as a means to assess resilience of a 
system. The use of quantitative SD models could be further investigated as a means to 
assess the required size of the buffer capacity of the key stocks in the patient admission 
pathway. 
 
One of the findings from the case studies is that staff at different levels in the hospital 
responded to the gradient pressures and boundary constraints in a variety of ways. It is 
suggested that a further development of the SWE is the idea of a hierarchy of interactive 
envelopes within a system based on the idea of ‘panarchy’ (Holling, 2001). Exploring 
this idea is beyond the scope of this thesis but provides potential for future work. 
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Appendix 2.1 - Conventions of System Dynamic models
Stock Flow Diagrams (SFDs) 
The clouds at either end of a SFD model depict the ‘sink’ or ‘source’ for the flows 
(Sterman, 2000) (Figure A2.1). A source is where a flow originates from outside the 
boundary, and a sink is where a flow drains into outside the boundary of the model. 
Inside the boundary are ‘valves’ which control the rate of flow. There are also 
information flows which denote policy and decision making. The information flows 
influence the rate of flow. ‘Stocks’ illustrate the amount of accumulation, namely the 
difference between inflow and outflow. 
Stock
Inf ormaton
Outf lowInf low
Figure A2.1: Basic structure of a ‘stock flow diagram’ 
Causal Loop Diagrams (CLDs) 
CLDs are used in SD to illustrate the dynamics of the system (feedback loops), 
(Sterman, 2000, Morecroft, 2007, Sterman, 2001, Senge, 1990). Such an approach is 
qualitative and cannot be used to build simulation models. The diagrammatical 
conventions in CLDs are for the variables to be connected by an arrow showing 
direction of the causal link. For example, the ‘birth rate’ causes the ‘population’ to 
change (Figure A2.2).  
Boundary 
Sink 
Boundary 
Source 
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Population Death RateBirth Rate
+
-+
+
Figure A2.8: Example of a ‘casual loop diagram’ showing the reinforcing loop  
generated by the birth rate being ‘balanced’ by the death rate loop.
Where a ‘+’ or ‘S’ is used in the notation, the direction of the influence is the same. For 
example, when the birth rate goes up the population goes up. Where ‘-’ or ‘O’ is used 
the direction of influence is the opposite. For example, when the death rate goes up the 
population goes down.  
In CLDs the polarity of the feedback loop is used to illustrate the type of feedback 
(balancing or reinforcing). Where there is an odd number of – or O, in the loop it has a 
negative polarity. This is known as a ‘balancing’ loop. For example, as the ‘population’ 
rises the ‘death rate’ rises. The direction of influence is the same so a ‘+’ sign is used. 
The loop is balancing because when the ‘death rate’ rises the ‘population’ decreases. 
The direction of influence is the opposite, so a ‘–’ sign is used. Within the loop a logo 
of a balance indicates that the loop is balancing. A balancing loop means that the system 
will find a state of equilibrium.  
In contrast, where a loop has positive polarity it is known as reinforcing, where 
exponential growth or decline is experienced. A logo of a snowball gathering speed is 
used. In large complex systems it is common to find a number of reinforcing loops. 
These are often counteracted by balancing loops. However, some systems may 
experience exponential reinforcing growth or decline for a period before the balancing 
loops take effect. 
In modelling systems it is possible to replicate key features of systems such as delay. 
Delay is another feature of ‘stocks’ in a system where the outflow is slower than the 
inflow. Sterman (2000) suggests that perception delays can also occur. This is where 
decision makers view of the world is influenced by the delay in measurement and 
reporting on aspects of the process. An example of this could be the perception delay of 
government policy makers in understanding the dangers to health from smoking. 
291
Figure A2.3 illustrates the features of a balancing loop where there are delays in 
perception, decision making and action. Decision makers experience a delay in the 
measurement and reporting of what is actual ‘state of the system’. There is also a 
potential delay due the time taken to use the information to perceive a difference 
between the actual and desired state of the system. Further delays occur in making 
decisions and undertaking the necessary corrective action. This can lead to over and 
under correction. A simple example is a shower with a time delay between changing the 
temperature control and the water temperature changing. It is common to over correct 
initially and for the corrections to become smaller over time. 
  
State of the
System
Discrepancy
Corrective Action
Goal (Desired State
of System)
-
+
+ +
Figure A2.3: Causal loop diagram of oscillating structure and behaviour caused by 
delays in the balancing loop (adapted from Sterman, 2000) 
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Appendix 4.1 - List of Documents and Statistical Data 
Collected 
Case Study 1 
Doc 
No 
Document Title Description Date of 
Publication
No of 
Pages
1.1 Annual Report 2007/08 Overview of activity and 
financial performance 
undated 52
1.2 Annual Report 2008/09 
and Summary Financial 
Statements  
Overview of activity and 
financial performance 
undated 66
1.3 Escalation Plan Operational plan to meet high 
levels of patient demand for beds 
9 November 
2007
5
1.4 Press Release Press statement about sickness 
virus and closure of hospital to 
visitors 
11 December 
2008
1
1.5 Annual Control of 
Infection Report 2008/09 
Report on infection outbreaks, 
compliance, audit and 
governance 
24 June 2009 63
1.6 Daily Bed State Report Operational report on occupancy, 
admissions, infections 
Daily 2
1.7 Quality Report First annual review of key 
quality data 
June 2009 15
1.8 Directorate 1 Quarterly 
Review Q3 2008/09 
Performance review data January 2009 34
1.9 Directorate SS Quarterly 
Review Q3 2008/09 
Performance review data January 2009 34
1.10   
1.11 Annual Plan 2009/10 Review of performance 
Future Business Plans 
27 May 2009 45
1.12 Our Forward Plans – 
Summary Strategic 
Directions 2007-2012 
National influences; mission and 
values; milestones and priorities 
undated 14
1.13 Governance Committee  Agenda and Papers for meeting 
on 3 December 2008 
3 December 
2008
100 +
1.14 Governance Committee Minutes of meeting held on 3 
December 2008 
December 
2008
9
1.15 Governance Annual 
Report 2007/08 
Update on achievements and 
plan for 2008/09 
11 
September 
2008
30
1.16 Governance Committee 
Decisions Briefing 
Briefing to Trust Board on 
decisions taken July – Sept 2008 
28 October 
2008
3
1.17 Assurance Framework and 
risk register  
Update to Trust Board 28 October 
2008
7
1.18 Healthcare Commission – 
Annual health check 
2007/08 
Assessment of ‘Quality of 
Services’ and ‘Use of Resources’ 
undated 12
1.19 Performance Reports Monthly reports to Trust Board 
2008 /09 
April 08 – 
March 09
13 - 
50
1.20 Matron’s Patient Safety 
Handover Tool 
Presentation slides introducing 
items on handover list 
11 February 
2009
7 
slides
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Case Study 2 
Doc 
No 
Document Title Description Date of 
Publication
No of 
Pages
2.1 Vision, Aims & Values Board statement 7 July 2009 4
2.2 Annual Report 2008/09 
and Accounts 
Overview of activity and 
financial performance 
undated 116
2.3 Annual Report 2009/10 Overview of activity and 
financial performance 
undated 53
2.4 Clinical Governance 
Report 2008/09 
Safety, Audit, Governance, 
Compliance, Patient focus, 
Environment, Public Health 
undated 33
2.5 Clinical Governance 
Report 2009/10 
Safety, Audit, Governance, 
Compliance, Patient focus, 
Environment, Public Health 
undated 49
2.6 Clinical Governance 
Committee Minutes 
Minutes of Sept and Oct 2009 
meetings 
3 November 
2009
19
2.7 Quality Account 2009/10 Vision, Values, Assurance 
statement, quality performance 
undated 37
2.8 Continuous Improvement 
Programme Report 
Report on 11 areas of 
improvement including finance, 
standards for better health, 
productivity and IT 
January 2009 14
2.9 Patient Safety Project Plan Draft Project Initiation 
Document 
4 February 
2009
15
2.10 Clinical Operations 
Performance Reports 
Report to Trust Board on KPIs, 
Care Quality Standards, MRSA 
and C.Diff, Standards for Better 
Health and HSMR 
Monthly 
(Nov 09 – 
Apr 10)
15
2.11 Infection Prevention & 
Control Report 
Report to Trust Board on C.Diff, 
MRSA and Hand Hygiene 
Monthly 
(Nov 09 – 
Apr 10)
5
2.12 Planning for Winter 
2009/10 
Description of management 
action to manage any increase in 
emergency admissions 
3 November 
2009
16
2.13 Patient Experience Report 
Q4 2008/09 
Patient feedback, complaints and 
themes 
2 June 2009 14
2.14 Finance Report Financial performance Monthly 
(Nov 09 – 
Apr 10)
7 - 10
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Case Study 3 
Doc 
No 
Document Title Description Date of 
Publication
No of 
Pages
3.1 Independent Inquiry into 
care provided by Mid 
Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust January 
2005 – March 2009 
Volume 1 
Report submitted to the 
Secretary of State for Health 
24 February 
2010
455
3.2 Independent Inquiry into 
care provided by Mid 
Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust January 
2005 – March 2009 
Volume 2 
Report submitted to the 
Secretary of State for Health 
24 February 
2010
367
3.3 Opening Statement by 
Council for Cure the NHS 
Statement by legal representative 
of local pressure group to 
Inquiry 
undated 17
3.4 Opening Statement to 
Inquiry by Mid 
Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust 
One page letter from CEO 
expressing apologies and 
welcoming Inquiry 
undated 1
3.5 Opening Statement by 
Counsel to the Inquiry 
Setting out background and 
themes of the Inquiry 
29 October 
2009
18
3.6 Summary of Patient Oral 
Evidence Week 1 
Summary of issues raised by 
patients or relatives 
undated 21
3.7 Summary of Patient Oral 
Evidence Week 2 
Summary of issues raised by 10 
patients or relatives 
undated 22
3.8 Summary of Patient Oral 
Evidence Week 3 
Summary of issues raised by 12 
patients or relatives 
undated 30
3.9 Summary of Staff Oral 
Evidence Week 1 
Summary of oral statements 
from 14 members of staff 
undated 22
3.10 Summary of Staff Oral 
Evidence Week 2 
Summary of oral statements 
from 12 members of staff 
undated 29
3.11 Summary of Staff Oral 
Evidence Week 3 
Summary of oral statements 
from 17 members of staff 
undated 32
3.12 Summary of Staff Oral 
Evidence Week 4 
Summary of oral statements 
from 4 members of staff 
undated 11
3.13 Closing Submissions 
Transcript 
Closing statements to the Inquiry 6 January 
2010
46
3.14 Joint statement from 
Monitor and the Care 
Quality Commission 
(CQC) on the current 
position at Mid 
Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust 
 24 February 
2010
2
3.15 Healthcare Commission 
Investigation into Mid 
Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Investigation report into 
apparently high mortality rates in 
patients admitted as emergencies 
to the Trust 
March 2009 176
3.16 Care Quality Commission 
Mid Staffs 3 month follow 
up report 
Assessment of changes and 
improvements made at the Trust 
17 July 2009 4
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3.17 Care Quality Commission 
Mid Staffs 6 month follow 
up report 
Assessment of changes and 
improvements made at the Trust 
Dec 09 24
3.18 Department of Health: 
Terms of Reference –  
Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust: Lessons 
Learned Inquiry 
Terms of reference for two 
reviews into lessons learnt 
Undated 2
3.19 Prof G Alberti Report A review of the procedures for 
emergency admissions and 
treatment, and progress against 
the recommendation of the 
March Healthcare Commission 
report 
29 April 
2009
21
3.20 Dr D C Thomé Report A review of lessons learnt for 
commissioners and performance 
managers following the 
Healthcare Commission 
investigation 
29 April 
2009
34
3.21 Government response to 
Alberti and Colin-Thomé 
Reports 
Summary of findings and actions 
to be taken at Mid Staffordshire 
Hospital and the CQC 
undated 9
3.22 Written Ministerial 
Statement – Mid 
Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Government accepts 
recommendations of the Alberti 
and Colin-Thomé Reports  
30 April 
2009
2
3.23 Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust: 
Confidence in Care 
Transformational 
Programme – Goals 
Report to Trust Board on actions 
being taken to improve standards 
of care 
17 November 
2009
29
3.24 KPMG: Learning and 
implications from Mid 
Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Internal Audit Report by KPMG 
for Monitor establishing lessons 
to be learnt 
5 August 
2009
24
3.25 Monitor: Management 
Response to the Internal 
Audit Report on Lessons 
Learnt from Mid 
Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Response and proposed actions 
resulting from the Internal Audit 
Report 
3 September 
2009
17
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Statistical data (Excel Spreadsheets) collected from Case Study 1 
xls 
# 
Data File Description Size
1.1 Daily bed state AM & PM Twice daily bed predictor, discharges, empty 
bed, ED breaches, ITU occupancy, MRSA, 
C.Diff (Oct 08 – Mar 09) 
120 – 
134KB
1.2 Length of Stay by 
Directorate 
Average Length of stay by month (April 06 – 
Feb 09) 
36.5KB
1.3 Outliers and plus 15 day 
length of stay 
Number of Outliers & Number of 15 day 
plus stays (Jan – Oct 09) 
418KB
1.4 Quality Dashboard 
September 2009 
Data on HSMR, Adverse events, Incidents, 
C,Diff, MRSA, Patient experience 
204KB
1.5 Bed Occupancy Bed occupancy by day and ward (2006-
2008) 
1,628KB
1.6 Same Day Hospital 
Cancellations 
Cancellations by speciality (2006/7, 2007/08, 
2008/09) 
86KB
1.7 Inpatient and Daycase Pivot 
Table 
Admission data by Directorate (April 06 – 
Nov 09) 
11.3MB
1.8 Discharges Discharges by Ward and Speciality (Oct 08 - 
March 09) 
368KB
1.9 Medical Outliers Length of 
Stay 
Average LOS by month for medical patients 
discharged from medical and surgical wards 
(April 06 – Feb 09) 
40KB
1.10 Acute Ward Data Daily admission, transfer, deaths and 
discharge data (July 99 – Oct 08) 
470KB
1.11 Hourly, daily, variation Admission and discharges by hour by day of 
week (2006/07) 
19.8MB
Statistical data (Excel Spreadsheets) collected from Case Study 2 
xls 
# 
Data File Description Size
2.1 Admissions Medical Admission and Outliers (Dec 08 0 
Jan 10) 
129KB 
2.2 Daily Bed Statistics Daily spreadsheet of admissions, empty bed, 
forecast admissions (Apr 04 -Jan 10)  
681KB
2.3 Average Length of Stay ALOS by ward (May 08 – Dec 09) 74KB
2.4 Discharges Discharges and ALOS by year (07/08 – 
09/10) 
16,337KB
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Appendix 4.2 - Protocol for on site data collection
Context 
area 
Unit of 
analysis 
Questions Data collection 
methods 
Nature of 
actions 
Directors / 
hospital 
wide 
processes 
What types of actions are taken 
to manage high levels of patient 
demand? 
Are they short or long term; 
planned / unplanned; formal / 
informal. 
How does a) finance, b) targets 
c) staff workload influence the 
nature of the actions taken? 
Interviews 
Budget reports 
Hosp admin data 
Board minutes 
Bed mgt records 
Observation  
Incident reports 
 Speciality As above Interviews 
Speciality budget, 
activity, performance 
& incident reports 
 Team As above Interviews 
Activity & incident 
reports 
Observation 
Reason for 
actions 
Directors Why do you take those actions? 
How would you describe the 
scale of the problem being faced 
in terms of running the service, 
minor – major? 
Are there some events for which 
you have planned responses to 
avoid problems occurring? 
Who decides/d to take the 
action? 
Who do you tell about the 
action? 
How did/does a) finance, b) 
targets c) staffing influence the 
reason for the actions taken? 
Interview 
Budget reports 
Performance reports 
 Speciality As above As above 
 Team As above As above plus 
Staff / patient ratio 
Staff skill mix 
Frequency 
of actions 
Directors How often do you take those 
actions? 
How do you define peaks in 
demand? 
How often do they occur? 
Interview 
Observation 
Activity & 
performance reports 
 Speciality As above As above 
 Team As above As above 
Outcomes Directors What do you consider are/were Interview 
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of actions the outcomes of the actions?   
How did those outcomes impact 
on a) patient safety b) finance c) 
targets d) staff workload? 
Would you do that action again? 
What would you do differently 
next time? 
Have there been times when the 
hospital has not been able to 
cope? 
Have the frequency of incidents, 
infections, staff sickness been 
affected by peaks in demand? 
Budget reports 
Patient activity data 
Board reports & 
minutes 
Bed mgt records 
Observation 
Performance Reports 
Infection control 
reports 
 Speciality As above As above 
 Team As above As above 
Boundary 
setting & 
monitoring 
Directors How do you define and monitor 
a) financial success/failure b) 
target success/failure c) 
un/acceptable staff workload d) 
patient safety failure? 
How do you measure the above? 
Are there examples of a new 
‘normal’ being established in 
terms of accepting what was 
previous unacceptable? 
Interview 
Risk Management 
Strategy & Policies 
Assurance Framework 
Risk Meeting reports 
& minutes 
Incident reports 
Governance 
Committee & Board 
Reports 
 Speciality As above Interview 
Reports & minutes 
Incident reports 
 Team As above Interview 
Incident reports 
Change 
learning & 
developing 
staff 
 How do you learn from events to 
which you have to respond? 
How is that learning recorded / 
shared? 
Are procedures / policies / ways 
of working / structures changed 
as a result of the learning? 
Are staff given the opportunity 
to reflect on incidents / events? 
Interview 
Incident reports 
Training records 
Procedures / Policies 
cited has having 
changed 
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Appendix 4.3 - List of Interviewees 
Case Study 1 
To insure anonymity names are not used. (* denoted those interviewees who were also 
observed; ^ denotes finding discussed with)  
Person ID Department Position Time 
in 
post 
(yrs) 
Time in 
NHS 
(yrs) 
Job 
Level 
No of 
interviews 
Duration 
(mins) 
CS 1.1 Medicine Nurse 1 13 2 1 42
CS 1.2 Medicine Nurse 3.5 30 3 1 27
CS 1.3 Medicine Nurse 3 15 3 1 32
CS 1.4 Board Director 11 27 1 1 54
CS 1.5 Board Director 0.5 15 1 1 33
CS 1.6 ^ Board Director 8 31 1 2 94
CS 1.7 Board Director 4 4 1 1 60
CS 1.8 Operations  Manager 1.5 11 2 1 48
CS 1.9 Operations Manager 6 6 3 1 61
CS 1.10 Medicine Manager 4 18 3 1 31
CS 1.11 Surgery Manager 13 40 2 1 37
CS 1.12 Medicine Manager 4.5 7 2 1 51
CS 1.13 Operations Manager 6 15 2 1 74
CS 1.14 ^ Medicine Manager 0.3 10 2 2 63
CS 1.15 ^ Board Director 6 25 1 2 55
CS 1.16 Surgery Nurse 7 24 2 1 38
CS 1.17* ^ Operations Nurse 1.5 16 2 1 56
CS 1.18* ^ Medicine Nurse 5 19 2 1 64
CS 1.19 Medicine Nurse 3 10 3 1 22
CS 1.20 Medicine Nurse 8 22 2 1 50
CS 1.21 Medicine Nurse 2 19 3 1 65
CS 1.22 Medicine Nurse 0.8 22 2 1 44
CS 1.23 Medicine Nurse 6 17 3 1 46
CS 1.24 Board Director 6 37 1 1 61
CS 1.25 Medicine Doctor 1 18 2 1 60
CS 1.26 Surgery Doctor 3 35 2 1 25
CS 1.27 Medicine Doctor 2.5 15 3 1 35
CS 1.28 Medicine Doctor 13 22 3 1 47
CS 1.29 Surgery Doctor 5 16 3 1 44
CS 1.30 Medicine Doctor 2 15 3 1 56
CS 1.31 ^ Medicine Doctor 0.5 13 3 1 38
In addition to the interviews observations of bed management meetings and processes, 
the Medical Assessment Unit, the Emergency Department, Senior Nurses, managers, 
doctors and patient movements, Board, Clinical Risk Committee and management 
meetings were undertaken over a five month period Oct 08 – Feb 09. 
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Case Study 2 
Access to interviewees was limited to 45 min appointments within which time informed 
consent was obtained. Some interviewees were either late or had to leave early which 
curtailed the interview time. 
Person ID Department Position Time 
in 
post 
(yrs) 
Time 
in 
NHS 
(yrs) 
Job Level No of 
interviews 
Duration 
(mins) 
CS 2.1 Board Director 5 22 1 1 33
CS 2.2 Board Director 3 28 1 1 36
CS 2.3 Operations Manager 10 12 2 1 30
CS 2.4 Medicine Doctor 1.5 14 3 1 35
CS 2.5 Board Director 3 14 1 1 29
CS 2.6 Operations Manager 3 8 2 1 18
CS 2.7 Board Director 4 26 1 1 34
CS 2.8 Medicine Manager 3.5 33 2 1 27
CS 2.9 Medicine Doctor 7 15 1 1 37
CS 2.10 Medicine Nurse 4.5 30 3 1 31
CS 2.11 Medicine Nurse 3 23 2 1 34
CS 2.12 Medicine Doctor 6 18 2 1 30
CS 2.13 Board Manager 3.5 19 1 1 17
CS 2.14 Medicine Nurse 2 18 3 1 31
CS 2.15 Medicine Doctor 1.5 6 3 1 22
In addition to the interviews observations of medical ward rounds, bed management 
meetings and processes, Medical Assessment Unit and the Emergency Department were 
undertaken over a three week period Dec 09 – Jan 10. 
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Appendix 4.4 - Participant Questionnaire 
All the information provided on this form will be kept confidential and all results 
anonymised 
Name (please print) ………………………………………
Job Title  ………………………………………
e-mail   ………………………@rdeft.nhs.uk Tel …………
Time in current post (yrs)   …………………  Time in NHS (yrs) ..…………
1. How do you think the Trust Board members rank the following priorities when 
making decisions: (Please put in rank order; 1 as highest – 4 as lowest) 
Achieving 
targets 
 Adequate 
staffing 
 Patient Safety  Achieving 
financial 
results 
2.  How do you think the Divisional Management teams rank the following priorities 
when making decisions: (Please put in rank order; 1 as highest – 4 as lowest) 
Achieving 
targets 
 Adequate 
staffing 
 Patient Safety  Achieving 
financial 
results 
3.  How do you think the clinical teams on wards rank the following priorities when 
making decisions: (Please put in rank order; 1 as highest – 4 as lowest) 
Achieving 
targets 
 Adequate 
staffing 
 Patient Safety  Achieving 
financial 
results 
4.  How do you think your line manager ranks the following priorities when making 
decisions: (Please put in rank order; 1 as highest – 4 as lowest) 
Achieving 
targets 
 Adequate 
staffing 
 Patient Safety  Achieving 
financial 
results 
5.  How would your staff think you rank the following priorities when making decisions:  
Achieving 
targets 
 Adequate 
staffing 
 Patient Safety  Achieving 
financial 
results 
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Appendix 4.5 - INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCH 
7 October 2008 
Title of Project:  System Resilience in NHS Hospitals
Name of Researcher:  Mike D Williams 
1.0  Introduction 
Your name has been suggested as someone who might be able to contribute to this 
research project.  Before you decide if you wish to participate you need to understand 
why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take time to 
read the following information carefully. You may ask me any questions about the study 
if you wish. 
Part 1 tells you about the purpose of the research and what it would involve for you.  
Part 2 provides more detailed information about the study. Ask us if there is anything 
that is not clear or if you wish further information.  Take time to decide whether or not 
you wish to take part. 
PART 1 
1.1  Purpose of the study 
The purpose of the study is twofold. 
1. To improve the understanding of a particular aspect of patient safety; namely 
how staff in hospital systems work to avoid things going wrong when under 
pressure. 
2. To fulfil the educational requirements of a PhD.
This will be done by conducting a case study in two NHS hospitals.  I will be studying 
what actions staff take, at various levels in the hospitals, during peaks in demand for 
beds.  The plan is then to develop the theoretical and practical understanding of how 
such actions constitute resilience within the hospital system and how resilience relates 
to safety for patients. 
1.2 Why you have been invited to participate 
Your name has been put forward because you have a particular insight and experience 
of the area being studied through the job you do in the hospital.  You have been 
chosen after discussions and agreement with the Director with lead responsibility for 
the study within the Trust. 
1.3 Do I have to take part? 
It is for you to decide; it is entirely voluntary.  I will describe the study and go through 
this information sheet which will then be given to you.  I will then ask you to complete a 
Consent Form to show that you have agreed to participate.  You are free to withdraw at 
any time without giving a reason. 
1.4 What will I need to do if I take part?
If you are asked to be interviewed that will last about 30-45 minutes. Interviews will be 
conducted at a place and time of your convenience. Permission will be sought to record 
the interviews to enable the researcher analyse your contribution. You will have the 
opportunity to see and comment on the transcription of the interviews.  If you are 
willing, you may be asked to comment on any conclusions that are drawn by the 
researcher. 
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If you agree to be observed, either in meetings you attend or doing other work during 
the project duration of three to four months, your continued permission will be sought.  
You may ask the researcher to leave at any point without giving a reason.  
A small number of staff (3-4) will be asked to participate in a short follow up interview 
(no more than 30 minutes) some six months later. 
1.5 Will the information I provide be kept confidential? 
The information you provide will be kept confidential and all interview recordings will be 
destroyed at the end of the study (no later than the end of 2011).  All data used in study 
results will be anonymised. 
If this information has interested you then please read Part 2 before making a decision. 
PART 2 
2.1 What happens if I decide to withdraw? 
You may withdraw at any point without giving any reason.  Any information collected 
from you before you withdraw will not be used in the study unless you give permission 
otherwise. 
2.2 What will happen to the results of the study? 
The main outcome of the study will be a PhD Thesis which will be stored electronically 
by the University of Exeter.  Academic papers will be published and conference 
presentations made to share the results. 
2.3 Who is organising and funding the study? 
The study is being organised by a member of staff (Mike Williams) within the University 
of Exeter Business School as part of his PhD.  The NHS South West is funding the 
research. 
2.4 Who has reviewed this study? 
The researcher’s supervisor, Professor R Maull, at the University of Exeter Business 
School has reviewed the study and given it University ethical approval.  The Director of 
Postgraduate Research, Professor I Ng, has undertaken a scientific assessment of the 
research proposal.  Comments made in that report have been accommodated in the 
current study design. 
The NHS Devon and Torbay Research Ethic Committee has also reviewed the study 
and given their approval. 
2.5 Researcher’s duty of care to patients 
The researcher, as well as NHS staff, has a duty of care to patients.  In exceptional 
circumstances should the research discover issues that raise concerns about the
immediate safety of patients, the researcher will discuss with you the need to break 
confidentiality and report the matter to a line manager. 
2.6  Further information and contact details 
If you wish to contact the researcher for any reason the details are: 
Mike Williams 07909 817228 or 01392 262595 / 262557 (University) or 
m.d.a.williams@ex.ac.uk 
2.7 Complaints 
If you wish to raise a complaint or concerns about the research please contact 
Professor Roger Maull, r.s.maul@exeter.ac.uk or Prof Andi Smart, 
p.a.smart@exeter.ac.uk or phone 01392 262557 
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Appendix 4.6 - CONSENT FORM 
7 October 2008 
Title of Project: System Resilience in NHS Hospitals 
Name of Researcher: Mike D Williams 
Please 
initial boxes 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information 
sheet dated 7 October 2008 (version 1.2) for the above study. 
I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have them answered satisfactorily. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason. 
3.  I understand that the researcher has a duty of care to patients. 
If under exceptional circumstances there are issues which 
give him cause for concern about the immediate safety of 
patients he will discuss with me the possibility of breaking 
confidentiality and reporting the matter to a suitable senior 
person in the hospital. 
4. I understand that any personal information will be kept 
confidential to the researcher and that all contributions will be 
made anonymous in any written outcome of the study or in 
any related publication. 
5. I agree to take part in the study. 
……………………………… ……………    ………………………………
Name of participant   Date   Signature 
Mike Williams   …………… ………………………………
Name of researcher   Date   Signature 
When complete 1 copy for participant and 1 copy for researcher 
Version 1.2 
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Appendix 4.7 – Ethical Approval  
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Appendix 5.1 - Summary of key points from NHS Operating 
Framework Documents (2006/07 – 2009/10) 
Research Memorandum – contents and key points from OF documents 
Hermeneutical assumptions: based on experience of working in the NHS, the influence 
of additional resources since the NHS Plan publication in 2000 meant that the waiting 
time targets had to be met. The political background was one of significant reform to 
the structure of the system on the back of the increased investment. In 2005/06 the 
achievement of targets appeared to take precedence in some organisations to the 
detriment of financial control. Therefore 2006/07 saw the increasing requirement to get 
the financial position stabilised. 
The NHS in England: the operating framework for 2006/7 
Contents  
Foreword from Sir Nigel Crisp.................................................................1  
1. Introduction and context.......................................................................2  
2. Priorities for 2006/7..............................................................................5  
3. Choice and commissioning in 2006/7...................................................9  
4. Providing NHS services in 2006/7......................................................12  
5. Payment by Results in 2006/7.............................................................17  
6. System management and regulation....................................................21  
Annexes 
A. Financial management in 2006/7........................................................24  
B. National targets and Local Delivery Plan (LDP) measures................25  
C. Demand management in 2006/7.........................................................28  
D. Interim SHA system management role in 2006/7..............................30  
E. Transition arrangements: January to July 2006..................................31 
The introduction speaks of moving the NHS from a top down target led service to one 
that has incentives to respond to patients. Annex B lists 34 targets although many others 
are listed in another document referred to. The main waiting time targets are 
highlighted are cancer waits and 18 week maximum wait. MRSA reduction target is 
also emphasised. 
The major focus of the document is on financial management and the structural reform.  
Nationally, we shall be putting a particular focus in 2006/7 on:  
achieving robust financial health;  
pushing forward the implementation of reform; and  
achieving six specific service priorities derived from the Planning and Priorities 
Framework.  
Six Priorities are: 
Health inequalities: to deliver the LDP trajectories that make the most progress 
in reducing health inequalities by 10% by 2010, focusing on life expectancy at 
birth. The initial focus will be on smoking cessation. We will establish systems 
for implementation and to track progress for 2007/8 on this and other key 
interventions, particularly in the spearhead PCTs. 
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Cancer 31-day and 62-day waits: to ensure the sustained delivery throughout 
2006/7 of a maximum waiting time of two months from urgent referral to 
treatment, and of one month from diagnosis to treatment, for all cancers.  
18-week maximum wait: to ensure that by 2008 no one waits more than 18 
weeks from GP referral to hospital treatment.  
MRSA: to achieve year-on-year reductions in MRSA levels, as set out in the 
agreed LDPs for 2006/7.  
Patient choice and booking: to ensure that every hospital appointment will be 
booked for the convenience of the patient (by implementing the Choose and 
Book system) and that every patient is offered a choice of at least four 
providers.  
Sexual health and access to Genito-Urinary Medicine (GUM) clinics: to 
deliver the 2006/7 LDP trajectories so that by 2008 everyone referred to a 
GUM clinic should be able to have an appointment within 48 hours.  
Apart from financial management structural reform dominates and is summarised in 
this table: 
Implementing reform: expectations of change by March 2007 
by March 2006 by March 2007 
Practice-based commissioning  20% of practices  Universal coverage  
Number of PCTs  303  120 to 160+ depending 
on consultation  
Choice of hospital  4+  Extended  
Choose and Book  25%  90%  
NHS Foundation Trusts  32 (acute)  65 to 80 including 5 to 
10 mental health  
Independent Sector Treatment 
Centre (ISTC) capacity  
18  24  
Payment by Results  £9 billion of services 
covered  
£22 billion of services 
covered  
More service delivered in the 
community  
The forthcoming White Paper will create new 
levers and incentives for shifting care  
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The NHS in England: the operating framework for 2007/08
Contents 
Foreword from David Nicholson, NHS Chief Executive       2 
1 Introduction and context          4 
2 Health and service priorities         8 
Development priorities for 2007/08         8 
Recovery action to improve mental health services     11 
Local action in preparation for 2008/09      12 
3 Reforms           14 
Patient choice and voice        14 
Commissioning         17 
Strengthening PCTs         22 
Strengthening providers        23 
Payment by results         24 
Information Management and Technology      26 
4 Moving to a modern financial regime       28 
Financial regime         29 
Application of resource accounting and budgeting to NHS trusts   29 
Replacement of cash brokerage with loans      30 
Capital finance         30 
Strategic reserves         30 
Efficiency improvements        31 
Central budgets         31 
SHA bundle          31 
Early notification of financial planning assumptions    32 
Annex A  Timetable         33 
Annex B  National Targets and Local Delivery Plan Requirements   35 
Annex C  Principles for the NHS       39 
Annex D  Roles, responsibilities and business processes (including special 
circumstances) for 2007/08         42 
New CEO for the NHS – Sir Nigel Crisp lost his job due to poor financial management. 
The new CEO sets out his view in the Foreword to include: 
“In order to ensure focus and consistency of purpose, there are no new national 
priorities for the service to deliver on for this year. But the operating framework for 
2007/08 does set out a number of changes in the way we expect the NHS to conduct its 
business that are significant. We are deliberately moving towards a much more rules 
based system which will bring some much needed rigour and transparency to the NHS. 
…The operating framework for 2007/08 provides consistency of purpose for the NHS, 
setting out the key targets that our staff need to focus on in order to improve patient 
experience, reduce health inequalities and achieve financial health. 
…The operating framework sets out the importance of tackling all healthcare associated 
infections, and instead of setting a new national target requires PCTs to engage with 
clinicians and to agree local targets for reducing levels of Clostridium difficile. 
Achieving 18 weeks is a national target, but we recognise that the degree of 
transformation required cannot be delivered from the centre, and that it is local 
clinicians and managers who need to drive this change.” 
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2007/08 is stated as being the second stage of system reform following the NHS Plan 
(2000). Given the financial problems it is not surprising that a major focus of this 
document is on tightening the financial management processes. Makes no mention of 
the workload of staff. Safety is mentioned x6; linked to the wider phrase of quality, 
safety, etc. The focus on MRSA is linked to the need to reduce avoidable suffering 
deaths. 
There are a series of actions to be taken – the impression given is that take all the 
actions and major improvements in the system will occur and the patients will benefit.  
Development priorities for 2007/08 
Four issues will require particular attention by all organisations in 2007/08 because of 
both the degree of challenge they pose and their importance to public confidence in the 
NHS. These are: 
• achieving a maximum wait of 18 weeks from GP referral to start of treatment 
• of patients; 
• reducing rates of MRSA and other healthcare associated infections; 
• reducing health inequalities and promoting health and well-being; 
• achieving financial health. 
Annex B sets out the many targets similar to previous year but now with delivery dates 
set out. The real emphasis is on the achieving the 18 week target and infection control. 
Annex C sets out the Principles of the NHS – which includes #3 ‘We will work 
continuously to improve quality and safety’. It mentions issues such as learning and 
reducing mistakes and complying with national inspection and regulation. 
#8 ‘We will support and value our staff’ – education, training and development. 
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The operating framework. For the NHS in England 2008/09 
Contents  
Foreword 2  
1 Overall context 4  
2 Priorities 8  
Overall approach 8  
National priorities for 2008/09 10  
Cleanliness and healthcare-associated infections 11  
Improving access 12  
Keeping adults and children well, improving their health and reducing health 
inequalities 15  
Experience, satisfaction and engagement 18  
Emergency preparedness 19  
Local priorities 20  
Recovery and preparatory action 20  
3 Enabling strategies 24  
Empowering patients – choice, information and personalisation 24  
World-class commissioning 26  
Practice-based commissioning 27  
Specialised services commissioning 27  
National contract 28  
Commissioning services for military personnel and veterans 30  
System management 30  
Provider development 31  
Leadership and workforce 33  
Information 35  
4 Financial regime 38  
PCT allocations 39  
Resource accounting and budgeting 40  
Financially challenged trusts 40  
Payment by Results 41  
Efficiency 42  
SHA bundle 43  
Central budgets 43  
Information for financial planning 43  
5 Business processes 44  
Contract implementation 45  
Roles and responsibilities 45  
The NHS’s contribution to Local Area Agreements 48 
Timetable 49  
Annex A: Existing commitments 50  
Annex B: Planning process timetable 52  
Annex C: System management timetable of products 53  
Annex D: Principles and rules for cooperation and competition 55  
Annex E: Contract 56
Priorities: 
• improving cleanliness and reducing healthcare-associated infections;  
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• improving access through achieving 18-week referral to treatment and better 
access to GP and primary care services;  
• keeping people well, improving overall health and reducing health inequalities;  
• ensuring we improve the patient experience, staff satisfaction and engagement; 
and  
• not being found wanting in our preparations to respond to emergencies such as 
an outbreak of pandemic flu.  
Section on enabling strategies which, as well as system reform, mentions workforce and 
the need for leadership and engagement. After a period of expansion benefits now need 
to be realised. 
Safety is mentioned once in relation to specialist commissioning. The emphasis on the 
targets to reduce MRSA and C.Diff is present as a means to lesson the harm to patients. 
Targets are a major feature with Annex A setting out more clearly than previous years 
the waiting time targets.
Annex A 
Whilst there is a need to focus on new priorities, it is essential that the levels of service 
set through previous commitments, which should have been achieved by April 2008, are 
maintained. We will ask the Healthcare Commission to feed the following specific 
commitments into its performance assessment of NHS bodies, alongside its 
performance assessment of other issues: 
• four-hour maximum wait in A&E from arrival to admission, transfer or discharge; 
• guaranteed access to a primary care professional within 24 hours and to a primary care 
doctor within 48 hours; 
• a maximum wait of 13 weeks for an outpatient appointment; 
• a maximum wait of 26 weeks for an inpatient appointment; 
• a three-month maximum wait for revascularisation; 
• a maximum two-week wait standard for Rapid Access Chest Pain Clinics; 
• thrombolysis ‘call to needle’ of at least 68 per cent within 60 minutes, where 
thrombolysis is the preferred local treatment for heart attack;13 
• guaranteed access to a genito-urinary medicine clinic within 48 hours of contacting a 
service; 
• all patients who have operations cancelled for non-clinical reasons to be offered 
another binding date within 28 days, or the patient’s treatment to be funded at the time 
and hospital of the patient’s choice; 
• delayed transfers of care to be maintained at a minimal level; 
• all ambulance trusts to respond to 75 per cent of Category A calls within 8 minutes; 
• all ambulance trusts to respond to 95 per cent of Category A calls within 19 minutes; 
• all ambulance trusts to respond to 95 per cent of Category B calls within 19 minutes; 
• a two-week maximum wait from urgent GP referral to first outpatient appointment for 
all urgent suspected cancer referrals; 
• a maximum waiting time of one month from diagnosis to treatment for all cancers; 
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The content page is very different – each heading is related to quality. This reflects the 
paper ‘High Quality Care for All’ which makes quality as an organising principle for 
the NHS. Complete contrast to previous year where safety did not feature other than in 
relation to infection control. 
Foreword sets out no new targets but an emphasis on reducing waiting times, tackling 
infections and financial stability. The NHS had made a surplus in 2008/09 but large 
scale value for money effort is needed in the light of wider economic difficulties. 
The challenge for 2009/10 
This Operating Framework therefore sets out a huge leadership challenge, as we are 
asking the clinical and managerial community to do four things simultaneously:  
• Continue to deliver on the national priorities that matter most to our patients and 
public, so that our progress in these important areas is sustained and improved.  
• Invest the additional resources wisely in order to prepare for the need to make 
substantial efficiency savings in 2010/11 and for a tighter financial climate 
thereafter.  
• Start to put in place the strategic enablers and foundations that will help deliver 
the ten SHA regional visions and put quality at the heart of all that we do.  
• Develop new ways of working and leading that reflect the evidence base and 
principles for driving large-scale transformational change.  
Set within the challenges the national priorities are not changed. 
Our five national priorities for 2009/10 were established through the last Operating 
Framework and remain: 
• improving cleanliness and reducing HCAIs; 
• improving access through achievement of the 18week referral to treatment pledge, and 
improving access (including at evenings and weekends) to GP services; 
• keeping adults and children well, improving their health and reducing health inequalities; 
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• improving patient experience, staff satisfaction and engagement; and 
• preparing to respond in a state of emergency, such as an outbreak of pandemic influenza. 
There is a strong approach to quality which has been defined as being: 
Defining quality: High Quality Care for All set out our ambition for a system wide 
focus on quality, by setting out a definition of quality covering three specific domains: 
• Safety–the first dimension of quality must be that we do no harm to patients. This means 
ensuring that the environment is safe and clean and tackling issues such as healthcare 
associated infections, where we have made great progress over the past year.  
• Effectiveness–this includes clinical outcomes, such as mortality and survival rates. 
Another important aspect of effectiveness is avoiding ill health and helping people to stay 
healthy. But just as important is the effectiveness of care from a patient perspective, 
measured through patient reported outcome measures (PROMs). 
• Patient experience– this includes the quality of care and the delivery of personalised care, 
focusing on the compassion, dignity and respect with which patients are treated and how 
easy it is for patients to access services, taking account of the need to promote equality for 
minority groups. (p.23) 
Interestingly, the safety domain focuses on infection and does not consider wider system 
issues. Effectiveness includes the clinical aspect but this can be seen as how effective 
clinical practice is, rather than on how the system of healthcare can be effective. The 
word ‘safety occurs x8 in the document. 
‘Never events’ are mentioned (p.43) in terms of reporting, management and payment 
regimes. Root Cause Analysis are required if a Never event occurs. It appears that the 
big stick approach will ensure that sufficient barriers are put in place to prevent the 
events happening. 
Leadership of the workforce is again emphasised (p.29) 3% cash releasing savings 
required (p.37) Workforce planning is encouraged (p.42-3) 
Annex C provides a large number of ‘Vital Signs’ some of which are linked to national 
targets. Print is so small to fit it on one page it has to be at 125% to read on screen. 
Summary: This OF is very different in content and style. Although the key issues on 
targets and finance are there they are set within a wider context of quality. 
Overall the OFs stress the system reforms; financial control; targets and control of 
MRSA and C.Diff. Although the workforce is mentioned in terms of planning and 
development, there is no mention of workload on staff or wider safety implications of 
the need for increased productivity. There is a shift over time as the financial position is 
stabilised, the reform agenda delivered and most of the targets delivered. The 
Department moved to a tiering system of targets – small number of national 
requirements and then more locally agreed performance standards built into contracts. 
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Appendix 5.2 - Results of the content analysis of the NHS 
Operating Framework documents 
NHS Operating Framework - Content 
Analysis   
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Financial Failure 
    
Financial  28 58 34 33
Finance 8 9 3 15
Savings 0 0 3 6
Budget 4 25 20 7
Cost 8 9 9 4
Overspend 1 2 2 0
Expenditure 0 7 6 2
Income 3 8 10 6
Pay / payment 18 15 21 18
Activity 10 17 23 9
Demand 8 2 4 3
Tariff 20 12 15 29
Surplus 8 7 14 24
    
TOTAL 116 171 164 156
Mean 8.92 13.15 12.62 12.00
    
Target Failure     
Target 17 28 22 18
achievement 0 1 3 5
standards 8 18 11 18
compliance 2 3 5 5
wait / waiting time 17 16 14 17
fail / failure 0 0 3 3
access 9 17 43 35
health check 1 0 0 0
TOTAL 54 83 101 101
Mean 6.75 10.38 12.63 12.63
 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
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Unacceptable 
Workload 
    
Staff / staffing 2 16 36 29
workload 0 0 0 0
workforce 1 10 16 36
working hours 0 0 0 0
human resources 0 0 0 1
admissions 0 1 2 2
stress / sickness 0 0 0 0
activity 0 0 0 0
occupancy 0 0 0 0
morale 0 0 0 0
turnover 0 0 0 0
training 1 1 6 7
education 0 1 1 8
TOTAL 4 29 61 83
Mean 0.31 2.23 4.69 6.38
    
    
Safety Failure 
    
Patient safety / 
safety 3 6 1 7
Infection / MRSA / 
C.Diff 6 23 19 21
Incidents 0 0 0 0
Quality 14 30 25 115
Harm / error 0 1 1 2
Medicines mgt / 
Presc error 0 0 0 0
Adverse events 0 0 0 0
Morbidity 0 0 2 1
Mortality 11 12 2 5
Deteriorating 
patient 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 34 72 50 151
Mean 3.4 7.2 5 15.1
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Appendix 6.1 - Extracts from Field Notebooks 1 - 4 
FN 1.24 Bed Mt: 2 pts in Ortho ready for transfer to community hospital. Site Mgr 
requested they be found place to be 'sat out' whilst waiting for transport. 
Those 2 beds immediately allocated to ED pts.  
No question of length of wait for transport or suitability of patients to be sat 
out. 
FN 1.32 “To cancel a patient is the ultimate failure.” Lead for Patient Flow 
FN 1.42 On call Manager: "Patient safety is paramount - never put an infected patient 
on a ward area - never over ride infection control. If pt needed to breach ED 
target that is what happens" 
FN 1.44 Site Mgt Office: Sometimes have 3 moves to create a bed on EMU; Surgery – 
we tell the wards to get the patient ready, send them to theatre. They may 
have to spend an extra hour in recovery. Recovery are used to that now - 
previously they would have objected but not now. We communicate with the 
wards (patients may start on another ward) and Recovery. The anaesthetists 
get upset when they can't find their patients 
FN 1.48 Targets monitored daily - 1 breach cannot be recovered; Finance x 2-3 per 
month –  
problem can be recovered; Staffing more difficult but bids are made for more 
staff  
(e.g. 8 in endoscopy); Patient safety - every 3 months review of incidents 
although  
the emphasise need to keep patient safe. 
FN 1.54 Staffing: showed me staffing spreadsheet on computer and talked about her 
methods of monitoring staff workloads and morale 
FN 1.58 Trust Board Meeting - Financial Report: £9M surplus planned = + 2,55M 
over; Income - moved by £1M but exp rise by £1,7M. 
FN 1.74 Governance Committee: Item 8.6 Norovirus outbreak report - no comments 
made. 
FN 1.78 "You can't knit nurses or doctors." Vacancy last winter of 150 WTE, now 
down to small # - still have sickness problems - more robust HR reports. 
  
FN 2.13 Lead nurses using patient safety handover sheet and brief on staffing to on-
call senior nurse 
FN 2.23 Empty beds on Gynae Wd; Infection Control require only surgical pts to be 
outlied as same doctors visit Maternity. Surgical pt less risk of NV. 
FN 2.28 Falls: intentional rounding - now 5 falls a fortnights was over 17 over 5 
wards. Attention paid to falls - Ward x had two fatalities resulting from falls - 
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leaders and staff committed to do something. 
FN 2.29 Reflection: Example of deviance of falls moving from being seen as 'normal' 
to 'not normal'. 
FN 2.31 3pm extra bed meeting chaired by COO. 71 outliers; high medical take, thin 
medical staffing; surgery face problems if ward xx remains medical 
FN 2.32 Pre-planned surgery pts to move to Gynae ward 
FN 2.34 Debate about types of medical patients that could be moved to Gynae ward: 
13 empty beds on Gynae; take 51 = 10 more than expected, therefore need to 
use Gyane ward. Surg has no pts available to move, There may be med pts 
who could move to Gynae. But those pts have had several moves. If we need 
to use those beds we may have to move again to survive. Review again at 
4pm bed meeting. 
FN 2.34 Nurse AA phoned medical unit co-ordinator to check staffing. Staffing gone 
to agency - nothing available. 'Have Bank done text to all?" Needing to 
consider going outside contract for agency staff, Need slack in the system, 
therefore, have to go to "KKKK" for x 2 every shift. We won't get the quality 
but we can put them in areas and move others. Asked COO; permission 
given. 
FN 2.36 Gynae Ward - use bay for medical pts. Medical Director advice "avoid 
elderly and those on antibiotics" - laughter 'there are no young patients' 
FN 2.38 After 4pm meeting went with Nurse B to: EMU; Ward B; ED; EMU; Gynae 
Wd; EMU; Gynae Wd; EMU; ED; her office; Gynae Wd; bed meeting. 
FN 2.38 Follow Nurse B to Office - collect bag + drug - go to Gyane Ward and 
advised Staff Nurse which Medical Wards would stock other drugs needed by 
medical patients. 
FN 2.38 7pm bed meeting: Whiteboard system showing 10 ED breaches 
FN 2.39 On EMU the intensity and speed of work was incredible - twice one SHO had 
Medical Notes but the patient had moved. 
FN 2.42 Day case unit keep 1 trolley / bed for inpatient list admission; Patients wait in 
day room.  YY Ward: 5 pts to go into 3 beds; will use day case bed x3 this 
day; 1 patient for this day case bed being admitted in examination room. 
FN 2.48 11.10am ED - 1 pt breached from majors waiting for relative; 1 pt breached 
from minors needing SAU bed. Surgical pt allocated to bed with med pt in ti 
waiting for medical review. 
FN 2.50 “Sit patients in Ward Y day room” (Site Mgr) 
FN 2.52 "Can you do that admission in the office?" (Site Mgr) 
FN 2.52 Recovery: Pt in recovery - Ward X request discharge from Recovery; the 
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staff nurse had not discharged before. 
FN 2.56 ED 15.45hrs: 4 ambulance crews waiting to handover; 6 patients in ED 
corridor; 10 patients waiting for beds. 
FN 2.56 Ambulance crews now held in ED - system gone solid. 'Speed up discharges 
and be ruthless on who sits out.' 
FN 2.56 Ward C - clearing equipment from bay to free up 3 beds; CEO and Director 
of Nursing going to help; 1645hrs 'can we help make beds' (CEO and DoN) 
FN 2.58 Dir Mgr on phone to Ward Sister trying to get patient onto ward (into 
treatment room) from ED. But already sorted by Bed Mgr. 
FN 2.60 Site Management Office: CEO watching site mgrs; CEO spots ED pt with 3 
mins to breach - site mgr phones ED. Assured x2 on route to EMU. Phones 
ED Majors - need pushers so CEO and Director of Nursing leave to do it. 
FN 2.64 ED Breach of Four Hour Target Reports from overnight: 5/6 January 2009 
00.53hrs – moved patient from Ward H to Ward O. Moved EMU side room  
to Ward H side room. EMU side room needed cleaning. When S/R ready on  
EMU, ED explained that patient needed 1:1 nursing. EMU could not give  
1:1 nursing; patient went to ITU” 
02.16hrs had to transfer patient to side room on Ward L from EMU. EMU  
side room had to be cleaned before patient could be admitted.” 
02.56hrs Patient vomiting. Unexplained cause. Needed side room on EMU.  
Had to move patient out of side room on Ward T. Transfer patient from EMU.  
Clean EMU side room before patient could be admitted.” 
FN 2.64 Site Mgt Office: Ward XX not willing to take cancer surgery patients." Site 
Mgr "cancer take priority - send to theatre and hold in Recovery until a bed 
comes up." 
FN 2.66 10.50hrs: Lead Nse for I/C "Who made decision and when about putting 
medical outliers on Gynae? Now got medical outliers from Ward C, EMU 
and other areas. You will live to regret that decision." 
  
FN 3.10 Junior medical staffing - running with 8 vacancies, indeed 1 x SHO to 15 
patients; reality 1 x SHO per ward plus F1 = 2 Jn Drs for 28 pts. System has 
no resilience due to lack of med staff and accommodation to be flexed to 
meet rise in demand. 
FN 3.24 No standardised system for developing 'admission list' 
  
FN 4.6 F2 runs take - generates list in his pocket; have to keep phoning to find out if 
patient seen. Trailing a joint piece of paper. 
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FN 4.8 11.10hrs Main round - see patient from late take (not overnight); Nurse says 
'Gp working practice - gets very busy at 4pm' 
FN 4.8 Pt with cardiac 24 hr tape; due off at 4pm. Needs to be analysised by 5pm. If 
OK then home. Consultant said may have to wait for analysis until tomorrow. 
Nurse pushed for discharge as no beds 
FN 4.8 Patient with history of 1 fit - MRI - outlie. Nse to doctor 'Happy to outlie' Dr 
to Nurse 'offered enough resistance' Nse to Dr 'you ain't seen nothing yet' No 
medical beds therefore outlie to Surgery. 
FN 4.12 Sun 27th high take 30 - low discharges as not many senior doctors as holiday 
period. Now backing up 
FN 4.12 Bed meeting: debate about patient with fit waiting for MRI - could they not 
be sat out rather than go to orthopaedics as an outlier? Why not escalated to 
duty manager? 
FN 4.14 Bed meeting: Outliers reviewed individually - plan for care / treatment / 
discharge. Emphasis - how to speed up discharge - "get on top of outliers; we 
will have no chance over New Year." "Now we have 21 outliers we have lost 
the plot." Dir Mgr 
FN 4.18 ED full; 2 pts in resus inappropriately; extra nurse in majors; trolleys in 
corridor x 5; medical expected (GP admissions) in waiting room. 
FN 4.18 Dr to see GP admission pt in Paediatric room - moved child and parents into 
adult minors 
FN 4.18 Sister triages all ambulance cases 
FN 4.19 Same pattern as MAU and wider hospital over shorter time period = 4 hrs 
FN 4.20 Sister went into resus to find bed space for ambulance trolley pt. Not needed 
as medical patient just got from waiting room to bay 1 has gone to MAU, 
therefore avoiding breaches. 
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Appendix 6.2 – Extracts from coded data 
Case Study 1 
Coded at CS 1: SWE; Patient Safety  
<Internals\CS1 Interviews\ 28; Doctor> - § 6 references coded  [9.95% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.10% Coverage 
Yeah, when we are under pressure the areas where patient  safety is definitely 
vulnerable and examples are we don’t have the time or the resources to do adequate 
observations or monitoring of the patient and therefore we sometimes do not recognise 
the severity of their complaint as early as we could have done. 
Reference 2 - 0.91% Coverage 
Clearly as in any other branch of medicine there have been instances of us committing 
drug errors, which in my view are sometimes but not always ascribable to the pressure 
of work and this desire to go faster and the lack of time to cross check what we are 
doing. 
Reference 6 - 3.44% Coverage 
We have unfortunately had two patients who during the periods when we have been 
very busy we haven’t been able to send a second nurse to triage and on one occasion a 
patient waited for it was just under an hour, this turned out it was a child who had 
meningitis and then there was an adult who within a few days who waited a similar 
period with serious septicaemia and as a consequence of that we have reviewed our 
policy in terms of when we double team triage and we will send a doctor to triage now 
or in fact we have been known to send a consultant to triage if we’ve got a spare 
consultant.  We sometimes have two consultants on during the day and the advantage 
of certainly a consultant who as they do it (a) hopefully accurately (b) very, very 
quickly. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 29; Doctor> - § 6 references coded  [10.00% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 0.60% Coverage 
I would expect is to see an increase in error rate and I think the harder people will 
have to work the more you will side step various safety aspects that are in place  
Reference 3 - 1.32% Coverage 
I think if you accept the assumption that an anaesthetist going to see the patient before 
the operation getting to know them and taking their history is designed to improve the 
safety of the anaesthetic conduct doing that assessment in inadequate environment 
under time pressure will encourage things to be missed.
<Internals\CS 1Interviews\ 22 Nurse> - § 18 references coded  [22.75% Coverage] 
Reference 5 - 1.48% Coverage 
there’s also the issue of what happens when somebody is sick on top of your normal 
staffing level or somebody is very confused and need so you know for each new thing 
that comes along the system is having to change and adapt to meet a changing need 
because a person falling over is at high risk of somebody who is very physically 
unwell and previously I wouldn’t say we had that emphasis you know before we had a 
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confused patient walking around and you know they fall over and that’s sort of at the 
point they fall over whereas now we are having to plan for caring for them. 
Reference 6 - 0.63% Coverage 
(Referring to outlying patients) It’s not good, it’s not good. The safest places for the 
patient to be in the right place with the right doctors looking after them so yes it is a 
risk but it has to be an evaluated risk. 
Reference 9 - 1.03% Coverage 
 Safety is not just the patients in the building it’s those coming through the doors and 
we have to create capacity for those coming through the doors.  By 8 o’clock this 
morning we did not have a bed empty anywhere  
Reference 11 - 1.11% Coverage 
…everyday you would be making decisions to do something, cut a corner or do 
something slightly differently or I haven’t got time to do that so that’s the bit I am not 
going to do. 
Reference 13 - 3.83% Coverage 
I think there are, well IV antibiotics would be an example.  In any sort of given 
medical ward you could have two patients on IV antibiotics with the same level of 
staffing but just as easily you could have 20 patients on IV antibiotics and each IV 
antibiotic has a set time it has to be given over, so for every patient that’s sort of five, 
ten, fifteen, twenty minutes’ worth of time, to cut the corner is that something that 
should have been given over four minutes with a nurse sat there giving it slowly is 
only given over two because (a) somebody is making the decision actually it’s safe 
and not causing, because apparently you won’t be but those nurses will probably have 
the knowledge that policy says they should be given that over four minutes. 
Reference 15 - 0.37% Coverage 
on the ward next to us they have a large day case list and those patients are prepped, 
cared for, clerked in the corridor until a bed comes up. 
Reference 16 - 0.73% Coverage 
 There’s not you know a suitable waiting area, there’s not a day case area for them so 
there’s a lot of care in the corridor, they don’t specifically go you know come back 
from their procedure to the corridor that doesn’t happen but they might go from the 
corridor to their procedure. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 04 Manager> - § 5 references coded  [18.10% Coverage] 
Reference 3 - 7.07% Coverage 
…you are always dealing with risks because actually even if you said we’ll close the 
doors it doesn’t actually change the risks the patients here are facing and it probably 
increases the risk for patients sitting outside on the ambulances.  …I don’t remember 
ever doing anything that we are knowingly, we knowingly do something that is more 
risky than it should be but we do do things that you wouldn’t choose to do if you 
didn’t have to. 
Reference 4 - 1.35% Coverage 
we had a series of falls and not just, falls where patients come to harm certainly on 
Ward K and Ward B and probably over a six to eight month period quite significant, 
quite a significant number so we started doing route cause analysis on all of them and 
really what came out of that is in terms of that they went through the governance 
Board and there’s a new programme in place on Kenn and Bovey where they do 
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specialist round in terms of the falls assessment which actually, so those sorts of things 
come through to the Board members and actually there’s a particular process that we 
are, we look at 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 19 Nurse> - § 10 references coded  [25.15% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 0.87% Coverage 
the care that’s given is good as long as they’ve got the right staffing levels. At times I 
would say when we really do drop down to low numbers due to sickness I would say 
that probably patients might I wouldn’t say they would suffer but they might not have 
as optimum care as we would like. 
Reference 3 - 3.43% Coverage 
I would say that staff are so overwhelmed with the number of patients they are 
actually not clearly focusing on what they need to be focusing on especially if it’s 
junior members of staff and I think it’s things like drug administration gets given late 
because they are worrying about getting patients to theatre so some of the routine 
things might just go aside and it’s not noticed straightaway because the patients would 
probably not instantly show any signs of suffering or of lack of care but actually over 
time if you continually don’t give drugs on time it might have a knock on effect to 
those patients but it’s almost an unseen risk  
Reference 5 - 3.23% Coverage 
There was the early warning score which is when you know the patient is deteriorating 
and we were finding that they weren’t either being done or if they were being done it 
was, they were going to the F1, most junior doctor and they weren’t getting past that.   
Reference 9 - 2.10% Coverage 
are there any things that you monitor on a regular basis in terms of where there’s 
mortality or morbidity? 
Well we have all of that but it’s, I don’t know it doesn’t sort of yet, somebody could 
tell me about all those figures but actually it’s, it’s, I think all the work that we are 
doing is influencing a lot of that but I wouldn’t be able to say well actually you know I 
think that we’ve made our mortality figures go right down I think that’s got to be a 
Trust wide, but I think all these little things that we are doing and a lot of it I think is 
very good work I have, you know I think will have an impact on the ultimate sort of 
Trust wide figure. 
Reference 10 - 4.43% Coverage 
Yeah but that’s given if you think about the amount of time I would say that we, say 
we had an hour for a quarterly review we would spend quarter of an hour, twenty 
minutes to half an hour talking about the finances and about how we are meeting 
targets or we did and then the actual bits would be at the end like this last time we 
really didn’t spend much time talking about that (Patient Safety) because there were 
some other issues around you know particular consultants so when I sat back and sort 
of listened because that’s what I tend to do there is I would say that end of the, at the 
end of the meeting the amount of effort that goes into discussing that is quite minimal 
I would say. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 18 Nurse - § 3 references coded  [4.47% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.37% Coverage 
as soon as you outlie a patient you begin to build in an inefficiency structure and you 
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end up with another handover and another handover and things break down you just 
don’t get that level of continuity. 
Reference 2 - 1.56% Coverage 
I think skill mix is for me a good indicator for patient safety  
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 31 Doctor - § 9 references coded  [23.56% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 0.85% Coverage 
It’s difficult if a patient can’t actually get in the door such is the log jam then that 
actually does seem to jeopardise patient safety and I certainly agree with patients 
being left in corridors that jeopardises safety but in spite of the quite severe pressure I 
don’t actually see that happening. 
Reference 3 - 2.90% Coverage 
what about the medical outliers?  What’s your view as to their safety? 
I don’t, I don’t know if you could demonstrate in any trial that they did less well than 
the people on a general medical ward yet it’s a pain having to go out and look after 
them and it creates more work but we are professional people so you just do the work 
in a professional way as it’s the same body of work. …but it doesn’t make that much 
difference so long as you adequately staff these places I think it’s all right. 
Reference 4 - 4.41% Coverage 
how do you measure whether you are keeping patients safe? 
I guess you could measure your calamity rate in terms of you get some unexpected 
deaths in hospital  
Reference 6 - 6.36% Coverage 
The problems we get then is if we get a kind of unidentified outlier at that time and 
that’s a risk because if we don’t know about him or her they can be forgotten about 
especially on a surgical ward and then you get the call that, you literally get a call 
sometimes at half past three/four o’clock will you come and see this patient on you 
know gynae is the classic ward for us but ….oh you’ve got a medical patient who 
hasn’t been seen post take and you go oh Christ why are you calling me now half past 
three?   
Reference 9 - 0.29% Coverage 
I guess that it’s your lone wolf patient on the surgical ward that is an issue in this Trust 
I guess. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 7 Director - § 7 references coded  [7.19% Coverage] 
are there other regular reports that you get related to patient safety? 
We get the normal performance reports against the targets that we’ve got essentially 
against those targets we get adverse events at the Governance and that’s the Board as 
appropriate.  We get the claims against the Board and if there are any exceptional 
issues that the Medical Director will bring to us if there’s anything unusual happened 
in the hospital and the Medical Director will report to us when those have occurred. 
Reference 7 - 0.47% Coverage 
if the operation isn’t done properly is there a longer recovery period or as a 
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consequence of that from the technical activity of the operation itself.  I am not sure 
that I see anything which tells me whether that’s good or bad at this hospital. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 6 Director - § 2 references coded  [9.05% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.67% Coverage 
so safety becomes more of an issue and staff I suppose we expect staff to overwork at 
this point in order to keep the patients as safe as possible 
Reference 2 - 8.38% Coverage 
We are, we are learning I think like most healthcare organisations of what is 
acceptable and if you use MRSA as the prime example of that where I don’t know 
three or four years ago MRSA was just a part of being in hospital and nobody could do 
anything about it and it was just you know you might have MRSA you might survive 
it or it might kill you but that was just about being in hospital and I think the attitude’s 
changed hugely to our tolerance of MRSA and whether it’s an acceptable consequence 
of healthcare. Similarly with C-Dif you know we were conscious that C-Dif was 
around but actually was that something that was manageable so those high profile 
healthcare acquired infection experiences I think have given us a real sort of hang on 
do we have to tolerate system failure in any of it and are we, how safe are we as an 
organisation, how do we compare to other organisations not least in health and so 
we’ve got a real sense of we want to reduce avoidable patient safety issues wherever 
we can.   
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 9 Manager - § 2 references coded  [2.23% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.03% Coverage 
They had this quarterly review which is from the executive group and they get grilled 
about the financial status of the directorate every quarter and the lead nurse for 
theatres said, how long in these quarterly reviews do you spend looking at  talking 
about risk issues and M B said, oh about 10 minutes. And A M, Assistant Directorate 
Manager said, that’s interesting; I’ve never been asked anything. 
Reference 2 - 1.20% Coverage 
it’s a vicious circle being busy, competing targets, demands, next set of issues and 
sometimes safety type issues slip down the agenda I feel.  
<Internals\CS1 Interviews\ 25 Doctor - § 13 references coded  [12.13% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 0.30% Coverage 
There are no decent systems to ensure patient safety. 
Reference 5 - 0.77% Coverage 
So if you said to somebody what is the level of patient safety in this hospital now and 
what is the individual performance of any member of staff with regard to patient 
safety nobody could give you that figure. They could give you clinical incident forms, 
they could give you governance issues but those are all systems that first of all tend to 
under report and secondly tend to only flag up the extremes  
Reference 7 - 0.53% Coverage 
so a very, very common safety issue is that medication is delayed because the nurses 
don’t get there you know if you want an audit of quality and timing of the drug round 
time from prescription to delivery of the drug would be an audit for me of safety if you 
collected that data 
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Reference 9 - 1.67% Coverage 
I’ve had something very simple like, right prime example of patient safety we have no 
system in this hospital for knowing for every emergency medical patient whether they 
have been seen by a consultant or not.  So if we have 70 people admitted one day that 
spreads to the far corners of the hospital we currently have no idea, no system for 
identifying where those patients are.  What we rely on is usually a junior doctor being 
around who has stuck a name on a piece of paper.   
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 24 Doctor> - § 6 references coded  [4.12% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 1.18% Coverage 
In the daytime you know again it’s just purely a matter of volume and it can 
sometimes get too much so that people wait too long and I think the other thing that 
happens is that the nurses, the nurses get too busy so you have delays which actually 
we  know can harm patients so you know in sepsis we know that every hour you delay 
starting the antibiotic carries a significant mortality so you know nurses just not 
having the time to get round to starting things probably and of course it follows on 
from the doctors delaying in seeing the patient really and giving a diagnosis.  So I 
think getting the right manpower to the people quickly enough 
Reference 3 - 0.14% Coverage 
you are always making the best of a bad job every time you outlie a patient. 
<Memos\Memo 021109 Bed management observations Dec 08; Jan 09 crisis point> - § 1 
reference coded  [1.04% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.04% Coverage 
Manager potentially moving the safety boundary to avoid a breach in ED target by 
asking for patient to be admitted to a ward treatment room.  
Coded at CS 1: SWE; Targets 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 04 Director - § 2 references coded  [2.21% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 1.11% Coverage 
I think as a Board you said you weren’t sure whether you were now at fifteen 
weeks or thirteen weeks RTT but you were assuming it was thirteen. Yes.  
So you were cracking on with that as it were.  Yes that’s the fact and we can do that 
because essentially it’s only a cash issue because every patient that’s thirteen weeks 
will become fifteen weeks two weeks later so they pay us two weeks late. Right.  
So what.  It’s only, it’s a cash flow debate it’s not a patient treatment debate. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 18 Nurse - § 3 references coded  [1.60% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.19% Coverage 
that’s why they opened up “L” (daycase) because of the four hour element and there 
was just nowhere else to go. 
Reference 3 - 0.89% Coverage 
I know where we are at for all of the targets for the division. I suppose in my position I 
need to know.  I know we are out with the healthcare standards, I know we are out 
with our Directorate Audit Healthcare standards because I am the one that’s pulled it 
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together I know that we are compliant.  I know where we are at with yeah with all of 
them but I need to know where we are at with all of them. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 31 Doctor - § 4 references coded  [8.16% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.06% Coverage 
at Christmas time we were teetering on the very edge of kind of target failure which 
for this Trust is the kind of ultimate a most heinous crime if you like so it was 
something that they would be very keen obviously not to step over and in fact you 
know at times at that time we stepped over the boundary of target failure. 
So which target are you thinking of? 
My particular area of course if the four hour A&E wait which is, I am part of that 
because I help to relieve that by getting rid of patients from the ward and thereby 
being able to accommodate them on the ward and also I can actually physically eject 
patients directly from ED or make sure they are appropriately seen to make sure that 
that doesn’t happen.  
Reference 3 - 1.18% Coverage 
what kind of pressure gets applied to you and your colleagues to discharge 
patients? 
We try and discharge patients early but it doesn’t actually trigger a kind of switch in 
my brain that says oh yeah I am going out today with a kind of decreased threshold to 
sending patients home do you see what I mean.  The same criteria still apply, we are 
guided by I guess our clinical skill and also accepted practice. 
Reference 4 - 2.27% Coverage 
I think, I’ve come here from two non-foundation Trusts and the difference, the big 
difference I guess is the hard nosedness of bed management I guess here in that, I 
don’t think for a minute they would jeopardise patient safety but you know the target 
is everything and it is rigorously enforced if you like. …You know it seems a very 
financially motivated Trust everyone is very much more financially aware as 
clinicians and kind of aware of targets, aware of you know what it is to be a 
Foundation Trust and what it means 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 06 Director - § 2 references coded  [6.94% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 3.31% Coverage 
As an organisation I think, the complexity of targets is something that I think is 
extremely difficult in the health service so I would say that the organisation knows the 
headline targets so the waiting and access targets.  Some of the underpinning targets I 
think are shrouded in mystery to, not only to them but to me at times so the 18 week is 
a real good example of that where we are achieving the 18 week target but we are 
failing on data completeness because the algorhythm that they are using is a flawed 
algorhythm.  So you know you can fail something even though you are doing the right 
things. 
Reference 2 - 3.63% Coverage 
Yes.  Yes and we do that as far as the divisions are concerned as well through the 
quarter reporting process.  So you know the specific targets that they have to be 
concerned with they are very clear about them.  They also have an understanding of 
everybody else’s the whole complex picture around targets as do the Board, as do the 
Council of Governors because in the performance report we give them an analysis of 
the Monitor’s targets, the sort of over arching Department of Health targets and the 
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locally agreed targets so that the three phase performance report that’s actually quite 
clear for the Board and Council of Governors about what those three things are. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 08 Manager - § 2 references coded  [5.22% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.59% Coverage 
Finance is less of an issue for us, targets are an issue but we are managing that and you 
know where it does tend to pop over is the whole issue of kind of over working staff 
or not having quite enough staff and spread things a little bit thinly at certain points in 
time. 
Reference 2 - 4.63% Coverage 
Well again the Emergency Department position is highlighted every day and is part of 
this operational forecast you know and on a weekly basis, well on a daily basis we are 
looking at where we are against the kind of you know the position for that week so 
very much saying we need to be achieving 98% every week here.  So that’s, and this 
forecast is circulated widely across the organisation every day.  At our 12 o’clock bed 
meeting we review all breaches for the previous day and try and identify any themes 
so that’s managed very much on a daily basis.  Our, the referral to treatment target is, 
we have a referral to treatment steering group and again the, we have information that 
goes around on a weekly basis to the clinical divisions you know saying where they 
are against that.  …Others, things that are kind of on the other side of that, I guess 
within here as well we also talk every day about our CI so actually the  C Dif 
infections so those, so we look at new cases that have come up within the last 24 hours 
and whether they are on the cohort ward or not and if they are not on the cohort ward 
what’s our plan going to be to move patients back to the right place and all of that is 
then summarised within our performance report which goes to the Performance 
Management Group and to the Trust Board monthly. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 11 Manager - § 2 references coded  [2.94% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.49% Coverage 
I know, well the target boundaries are usually set in the date and the targets that we 
are, 18 weeks, 15 weeks, four hour you know they are all very clearly marked so we 
know on a day to day basis where we are with the four hour A&E wait.  I know on a 
weekly basis where I am with the 18 week referral to treatment for admitted and non 
admitted because that comes to us and on a weekly basis how many patients are on our 
waiting lists and we know roughly how much it takes to do that level of work so on a 
very basic level we know whether the waiting list …….by consultant.  So the target, 
those targets are very clearly defined  
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 12 Manager - § 1 reference coded  [1.36% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.36% Coverage 
Even more tightly managed so I think, I think it would be fair to say that targets are 
the most closely managed because you only have to have one or two kind of failures 
with a target and you can’t take them back whereas with your finances if you 
overspend in month one you can claw it back over the rest of the year.  If you have a 
breach of some description it sits there.  So targets are monitored all the time literally 
every day I will be looking at a range of target indicators. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 26 Doctor - § 2 references coded  [3.19% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 0.90% Coverage 
I actually welcome targets I am probably one of the few doctors who welcomes targets 
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because I think it has forced the medical profession to change not just the medical 
profession the whole system to change the way we work, 
<Internals\RDE Interviews\ 17 Nurse> - § 1 reference coded  [1.49% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.49% Coverage 
I mean from our point of view within the operations directorate it’s very easy for us 
you know the analyst, “RB” etc are able to give us that information at the drop of a hat 
they are always reporting in on our meetings to say how we are doing and the 
challenge for me is obviously around the four hour target particularly.  Monitoring it 
quarterly you know we have our weekly target that we are always trying to beat 98% 
but we have our quarterly target that’s from an organisation perspective and it’s about 
communicating that to people because I don’t think they always realise and we have 
our own internal targets for instance our own targets to have no more than 120 fifteen 
day plus stayers. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 05 Director - § 1 reference coded  [1.59% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.59% Coverage 
Yes, yes it’s monitored monthly by the Board but you know sort of weekly and daily 
by other key members, divisional managers, Director of Ops, the Chief Executive, 
myself you know we are sort of keeping an eye on what’s happening throughout the 
month and then the Board formally monitors it on a monthly basis. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 24 Doctor - § 1 reference coded  [0.86% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.86% Coverage 
Well that’s interesting some of them not too difficult you know four hour wait and the 
18 week RTT was quite a challenge to people though and I think that’s why some of 
the early achievers actually didn’t because they were they didn’t understand the 
question.  RTT was a lot more complex and the stages of treatment a lot more complex 
than people realised at first I think.  I feel pretty confident now. 
Coded at CS 1: SWE; Finance  
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\29 Doctor - § 1 reference coded  [0.38% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.38% Coverage 
I think the organisation probably knows very well I think one of the things they do, do 
well is you know manage financially very stringently.  I have no idea. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 22 Nurse - § 3 references coded  [2.07% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.27% Coverage 
Money, not been mentioned, we spend what we’ve got to so staffing we are trying to 
get anything we can. 
Reference 2 - 1.26% Coverage 
It’s never mentioned.  We do whatever we’ve got to do, I’ve got two agency, you no 
question of it’s expensive or it’s you know a resource we shouldn’t be using we’ve 
gone through the normal, there’s an escalation try our own staff, try the nurse bank, 
we will go to agency and we will go sooner rather than later so that we can try and get 
anything that’s available. 
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Reference 3 - 0.54% Coverage 
It is an area that we are trying to plan for in the long term, we know that we are 
repeatedly opening these areas but in the short term it’s, we spend what we’ve got to 
make sure we’ve got staff to provide care 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 04 Director - § 7 references coded  [5.45% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.10% Coverage 
So if we were looking at the hierarchy of what was going those two the financial 
failure and target failure you would put in place before you would want to overwork 
the staff or go through that boundary or that boundary.  Now I think there’s a question 
in terms of when we are as busy as we are you are by default overworking the staff 
and there’s no option other than that.  You know you can use that financial situation, 
you try and alleviate that but in the short term it’s not possible. 
Reference 2 - 0.72% Coverage 
No that’s because we’ve got a big surplus it’s very unusual, I’m hiding money at the 
moment  
Reference 3 - 1.68% Coverage 
I think, I think we are in a different, we are in an unusual situation because everybody 
knows we are significantly ahead of plan and therefore the consequences of relapsing 
aren’t as important for us as other organisations or people who aren’t in that financial 
situation that we are in.  So I think people know that but they know that’s going to be 
in the context of that they will be held to account at the next quarter review for what 
they’ve done. So they won’t be, so they are going to have to be able to justify the 
shifts that have occurred but actually they can justify it in terms of pressure we’ve 
been under and it’s about maintaining quality and trying to do something about 
overworking the staff, that’s going to be an acceptable reason. 
Reference 4 - 0.45% Coverage 
And because they know that we’re, at a senior level we know what’s going on, they 
don’t have the fear that it’s going to come as a surprise to us that we’ve suddenly 
shifted the financial boundaries. 
Reference 5 - 0.56% Coverage 
So we’ve spent a lot of time and quite a lot of resource over the last couple of years 
just getting the infrastructure and the kit available to a level so that people aren’t 
chasing round looking for pumps, looking for the basic kit that they need. 
Reference 7 - 0.34% Coverage 
so we invested £5 million last year in terms of revenue, very much targeted at the 
clinical teams coming up with the things that would make life easier 
<Internals\RDE Interviews\ 18 Nurse> - § 1 reference coded  [1.08% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.08% Coverage 
No because I mean you’ve spent X amount of agency in a couple of months’ time we 
we’ll say actually that’s because we had to open up CDU for a two week period and 
on top of that we had better open [Ward] “C”, on top of CDU for a two week period 
and we had to use agency to, so I can go back and say the spend ‘cos they’ll say why 
have you got so much agency – but you know it’s not, I am not restricted in doing that 
it’s actually what would just make us safe. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 23 Nurse - § 1 reference coded  [0.17% Coverage] 
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Reference 1 - 0.17% Coverage 
I’ve got a budget to stick to and you know I have to work within in my budget 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 12 Manager - § 1 reference coded  [0.23% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.23% Coverage 
When you are on call and beds are really bad the pressure to save money doesn’t come 
into it at all. 
Coded at CS 1: SWE; Workload  
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 28 Doctor - § 7 references coded  [15.88% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 3.18% Coverage 
So the medical patients instead of going directly to EMU come here. Now clearly we 
have constraints in terms of the availability of space, bed space and we have 
constraints in terms of the number of available nurses.  Those beds space the 
calculations in terms of bed space and number of nurses are worked out on the basis 
that we are looking after the emergency department caseload and not the emergency 
department plus medical caseload.  The medial caseload as I mentioned have a much 
higher acuity on average than the emergency lot and that puts huge pressure on the 
system in terms of bed space so we have to nurse patients in the corridor, we have to 
monitor patients in the corridor which is particularly vulnerable and we don’t have the 
number of nurses to observe those monitors that we would have per patient should we 
not have the medical cases.  So our pressures primarily relate to the acute medical 
take. 
Reference 3 - 0.56% Coverage 
The nurses however have overall responsibility for the entire burden of patients so 
when we have the acute medical take the nurses are under phenomenal pressure 
Reference 6 - 3.40% Coverage 
Well in terms of personal experience previously before we had the medical take if I 
was the duty consultant I had the time and the ability to supervise the care of all the 
sick patients.  I didn’t provide that care but I was able to be involved in the care and 
have my juniors report to me.  Now when we have the medical take because I am 
doing effectively managing the department, trying to focus the resources in the most 
appropriate place, triaging patients, moving my doctors around, communicating with 
the management etc, I do very little of that which, and I am trained for the former, I 
am a bit trained for the latter but, so we’ve taken away the, what we lose in that 
situation is the consultant’s opinion, the consulting with the consultant and I am 
sufficiently arrogant to believe that I bring some value added in terms of quality. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 29 Doctor - § 6 references coded  [10.33% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 3.06% Coverage 
I think that then has a knock on effect so the targets produce a need for additional to 
be done in the Trust which produces a capacity issue.  So that work has to be done if it 
can’t be done at 9-5 it will have to be done outside of working hours.  So the Trust at 
the moment is doing an awful lot of additional work out of hours and at weekends. 
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Reference 2 - 2.47% Coverage 
If you were to start where you were two years ago and say right we are going to get 
down to eight weeks nobody would do it because you just can’t go from there down to 
there with as much, nobody would tolerate it but if you do it little by little by little you 
just find yourself running faster and faster and faster and faster gradually and you end 
up potentially starting to take on more than you should I think and what I don’t know 
at what point people say hold on we’ve gone too far here we are pushing people too 
far.  I mean you can look at I don’t know staff attendance rates, sickness rates or you 
could look at the adverse events that we look at.  I wonder if they are particularly 
sensitive markers my guess is they probably are. 
Reference 4 - 2.25% Coverage 
they can end up with you know literally space issues because they’ve only got so 
many bed spaces and people wanting to come out of theatre and there are physically 
no room for them to go into that’s happened on occasions but more commonly than 
not it’s puts a huge pressure on staffing levels particularly at the peak parts for 
recovery which tend to be later on in the day when all the lists empty out at five in the 
evening we are all going home thank you very much that’s when recovery have big 
issues trying to get people onto the ward because all ten theatres are emptying into 
main theatre recovery at that time.  So it, and it puts staff under a lot of pressure and 
particularly for example if you deliver a patient who needs airway support still has got 
a …or a mask in or they need a jaw thrust or something they may not be in a surround 
to accept a patient because they are running round looking after other patients. 
Reference 5 - 0.86% Coverage 
I think in terms of general volume of work and things I don’t think we, I can’t think I 
mean recovery staff would put in an incident form in if they thought their staffing 
levels were dangerous.  I’ve not seen any evidence of those through the governance 
committee either they are not putting forms in I don’t know.  I think they just kind of 
take it on. 
Reference 6 - 1.10% Coverage 
I think we have no data about that whatsoever.  How do you determine when staff are 
overworked?  I am not aware of any marker or …chart on trust that says this is our 
level of staff pressures at the moment but I could say to you, you could look at the 
sickness rates and say ……and things like that I think they are probably completely 
inaccurate so I don’t think we have any measure of that. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 22 Nurse - § 9 references coded  [11.49% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.27% Coverage 
Money, not been mentioned, we spend what we’ve got to so staffing we are trying to 
get anything we can. 
Reference 2 - 0.59% Coverage 
We’ve been very pro active we realised that staffing is the centre of that so we have 
been pro actively recruiting to the point that we are hoping that we’ve actually got 
people ready to start posts before somebody even leaves. 
Reference 3 - 1.48% Coverage 
there’s also the issue of what happens when somebody is sick on top of your normal 
staffing level or somebody is very confused and need so you know for each new thing 
that comes along the system is having to change and adapt to meet a changing need 
because a person falling over is at high risk of somebody who is very physically 
336
unwell and previously I wouldn’t say we had that emphasis you know before we had a 
confused patient walking around and you know they fall over and that’s sort of at the 
point they fall over whereas now we are having to plan for caring for them. 
Reference 4 - 2.08% Coverage 
I think nurses at ward level become extremely uncomfortable so for instance last night 
we were very short of beds, we had an escalation plan, we had outliers identified, we 
had beds identified that were coming up that we could move patients into potential.  
The next level was that we would have to open a further area to care for patients of 
which there were no staff for so we had to risk assess in each division, medicine, 
surgery, orthopaedic about if we needed more staff was there any area or where was 
the safest area so the nurses would be safe that we could pull from and bring that plan 
back to the senior nurse and site management who were obviously going to be the 
ones here on site doing that but part of that was whatever plan I made I had to go and 
communicate that to the nurses on the floor 
Reference 5 - 1.37% Coverage 
So in this case we assessed that the cardiology pod had six trained nurses within that 
environment with most pods only having four trained nurses within their environment 
so therefore that was the pod that we would back fill with an unregistered nurse if we 
had to take a registered nurse out of there.  So they weren’t happy because you know 
they’ve got their own pressures they could see their own workload, but they 
appreciated that actually it had been looked at across the whole of the medical division 
about where was safest. 
Reference 6 - 1.63% Coverage 
For me it meant that I had to staff core areas, that I had to find out what staff were 
actually working in those areas and what their pressures were.  Some decisions had 
already been made during the night of pulling staff out of areas to staff the extra areas 
that we’ve got open so by the time I came on this morning there were nurses in these 
extra areas moved from other areas someone had already made that decision. 
So apart from CDU what other extra areas? 
We’ve got ….which is an area within the orthopaedic department which we’ve got 13 
medical patients in being cared for by nurses supplied by the medical division. 
Reference 7 - 0.88% Coverage 
We have some flexibility in that the wards shut with the Noro virus have less patients 
in them so we’ve been able to move staff from those areas without compromising care 
or safety so we’ve had that buffer.  We have also planned ahead and we are already 
pre booked bank nurses to come into ….area because we knew that was going to be 
open. 
Reference 8 - 0.54% Coverage 
It is an area that we are trying to plan for in the long term, we know that we are 
repeatedly opening these areas but in the short term it’s, we spend what we’ve got to 
make sure we’ve got staff to provide care 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 04 Director - § 9 references coded  [9.24% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.60% Coverage 
 Now I think there’s a question in terms of when we are as busy as we are you are by 
default overworking the staff and there’s no option other than that.  You know you can 
use that financial situation, you try and alleviate that but in the short term it’s not 
possible. 
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Reference 2 - 0.10% Coverage 
If the staff are not there they are not there. 
Reference 8 - 0.86% Coverage 
So those are there now the difficulty with you get a subjective what’s going on and 
what’s been quite interesting this year compared to last year is it feels, to say it feels 
calm might sound daft it doesn’t feel calm in terms of what’s going on but actually in 
terms of people coping and managing it and working through it feels calmer because 
actually we’ve got more staff in post. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 16 Nurse - § 1 reference coded  [1.27% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.27% Coverage 
We have within our division we have a staffing template which we know how many 
staff we should have on each shift and we know on a day to day basis if the staffing 
drops you know how we can, you know whether that’s acceptable or not acceptable 
but we also have to think about what’s actually happening on the ward at the time so 
we’ll share staff around to make sure that every area is covered as you know as well as 
we can. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 18 Nurse - § 3 references coded  [2.88% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.23% Coverage 
over recruiting like we’ve done to give it a bit of a buffer, if we didn’t have that it 
would have been really catastrophic. 
Reference 2 - 0.15% Coverage 
But we still haven’t been able to fill every single person that’s gone off sick. 
Reference 3 - 2.50% Coverage 
So nursing sickness, medical sickness, spread of further infection you know what I 
mean so how and cross infection in particular across the template. Staff welfare you 
know I just think when things like this happen and particularly you know its not 
happened for a long time actually that we lose that many wards in one go but just staff 
welfare.   
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 06 Director - § 1 reference coded  [0.67% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.67% Coverage 
so safety becomes more of an issue and staff I suppose we expect staff to overwork at 
this point in order to keep the patients as safe as possible 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 20 Nurse - § 2 references coded  [2.21% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.47% Coverage 
I guess it’s the impact that has on the staff when they are working with that pressure 
day in and day out I mean I present it as a very neat little………oh well this happens, 
this happens, this happens it’s all very typical but what I am not also saying is the 
impact that’s having on the staff and it has a huge impact. 
Reference 2 - 1.75% Coverage 
EMU is a big burn out area a huge burn out.  So for nurses to be able to sustain that 
level of activity day in and day out has a huge impact on their work./life balance and 
on their health really.  So I am not an area that I can’t, I cannot usually recruit into I 
have to do a lot of work in terms of recruitment it’s not an area that’s popular 
internally to move into. 
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Coded at CS 1: RP; DM; Capacity  
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 28 Doctor - § 1 reference coded  [1.66% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.66% Coverage 
The medial caseload as I mentioned have a much higher acuity on average than the 
emergency lot and that puts huge pressure on the system in terms of bed space so we 
have to nurse patients in the corridor, we have to monitor patients in the corridor 
which is particularly vulnerable and we don’t have the number of nurses to observe 
those monitors that we would have per patient should we not have the medical cases.  
So our pressures primarily relate to the acute medical take. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 07 Director - § 2 references coded  [2.11% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.97% Coverage 
that’s the safety valve if you like to make sure that the resources that we have 
available are sufficient to look after a group of patients even though it’s a lot higher 
than normal we’ve released the pressure by not bringing in the ones that would 
normally come in and providing that the extra load is less than the elective patients 
coming in then it is possible to balance the management of the hospital in terms of the 
available beds and the resources but the sufferers are those that have a planned. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 09 Manager - § 2 references coded  [1.77% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.93% Coverage 
The CEO was in here one night at 12pm pushing beds round and I think that’s 
ridiculous. I mean you don’t pay the Chief Executives all that they get paid to push 
beds around at midnight and I know that looks good for PR for instance. Staff say – 
What’s the Chief Executive doing pushing beds around. I mean I don’t see that as a 
good use of the Chief Execs skills to be honest. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 23 Nurse - § 1 reference coded  [0.12% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.12% Coverage 
then we lost the day case unit because of bed pressures 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 08 Manager - § 6 references coded  [9.19% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.93% Coverage 
if we took the attendances into the Emergency Department as a proxy for that I think 
when I started here you know 18 months ago if we had a few days where we had over 
200 attendances we would be, you know we would be quite worried and feeling under 
pressure.  Now we are consistently in the 230 to 260 and you know 230 now is a 
normal day, 260 feels busy so there’s been you know a significant increase from that 
perspective. 
Reference 2 - 1.96% Coverage 
the first thing that we have done is very clearly not compromised the areas that are 
infected so those areas have got to be closed and they are quite clearly closed, there’s 
no transfers out from them, there’s no admissions into them so the patients can be 
discharged from them but we are not moving them anywhere else so they have been 
very much locked down and for us this week that’s been kind of 8 ward’s worth. 
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Reference 3 - 1.38% Coverage 
We looked earlier in the week at all the elective operating to see whether there’s any 
scope for doing that in different ways and certainly where we’ve had day case areas 
within specialties some of those areas have been used temporarily as in-patient areas 
to kind of accommodate patients pre-operatively and post-operatively until they can be 
put in the right places.  We’ve been looking very much at you know any patients who 
are coming in for surgery today who are not having surgery until tomorrow putting 
those patients off and we’ve had a contingency plan about who is it that we would 
cancel if we needed to cancel patients.  
Reference 4 - 0.78% Coverage 
Some of our medical day case procedures have been happening in our, in Cherry 
Brook which is our kind of oncology area so blood transfusions and things like that 
have kind of gone in there.   So we’ve looked at every kind of area of capacity within 
the organisation and been a bit creative about how we can keep work going but by 
doing it in different ways. 
Reference 5 - 2.24% Coverage 
We are still managing to put the work through but it’s being done by some of the 
creative solutions that are kind of suggested around, you know and clearly there’s a 
tension there but you know it’s interesting because I think that when people know that 
the organisation is in the kind of situation that its in at the moment they kind of pull 
together and it’s interesting ‘cos actually over the last two or three nights where we’ve 
had capacity and we’ve left, I’ve certainly left when I’ve left the building there’s been 
a plan of opening additional capacity over and above the orthopaedic ward, when 
we’ve come in the next day none of that’s been used and you know the discharges 
have come up but they’ve come up late in the day.  The day cases have gone home and 
we may have utilised some of that capacity over night but I think people do kind of 
push things on at a slightly different pace once they, when it’s clear that the 
organisation is under a significant amount of pressure than they might if that wasn’t 
the case. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 15 Nurse - § 10 references coded  [10.76% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.71% Coverage 
So what we knew was that we did have beds in the system and I can’t remember how 
many but it definitely equated to more than a ward but they were all over the place.  
So knowing that if we could cohort and create other beds could we then free capacity 
if we could get cleaners in knowing that on a Sunday that takes longer to do a terminal 
clean  
Reference 2 - 0.75% Coverage 
So what we looked at which we do it’s a fairly routine thing, is there any other area in 
the hospital that you can create that place and “C” day ward in orthopaedics has piped 
oxygen and suction, we know they hate it but can more readily be made into an 
environment that’s both safe and acceptable to patients, unlike some day case units 
where because they are trolleys 
Reference 3 - 2.02% Coverage 
the next issue was staffing if we were to do that how do you staff it and part of our 
problem was trying to keep what we call CDU open which is if you like an overflow 
but is not the best place to keep patients overnight so I’m not sure if you’ve seen it.  
It’s a modular type temporary area.  So what we came up with was actually a win/win 
would be if we could move those patients on CDU and compass those into the 
340
numbers which I think brought us up to the 13 which would give us capacity at least 
for the scores on the doors i.e. the predicted numbers but the nature of “C” was that 
you could then expand it, it can go to 25 beds if for whatever reason your cunning plan 
you know all patients came through the door that we know happens and it is actually 
easier to cover safely with staffing that way than open lots of little areas with one or 
two staff and in order to open another five beds you might just need to support with a 
healthcare support worker rather than trying to find a whole 
Reference 4 - 0.75% Coverage 
We knew that we probably needed to open it to 13 to empty CDU and leave the 
capacity to get through ED and get us in overnight but if everything went wrong to 
move the capacity on that ward to open to 25.  In order to do that though it sounds 
simple you’ve got to sort out your pharmacy store, staffing is the main thing and that 
took us probably about two hours to sort. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 14 Manager - § 3 references coded  [9.06% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 4.51% Coverage 
we’ve obviously got the two streams of work coming into the hospital of elective work 
and non-elective work and the elective work you can to an extent control but the 
extent to which you can control that is much reduced now compared to a position two 
to three years ago. 
Just explain to me why that is.  And the reason for that is the reduction that there has 
been in maximum waiting times so, and in that respect the introduction of base targets 
is driving how we manage the system so in other words now your maximum waiting 
times are about treating patients within 18 or 15 or 13 or 11 weeks of GP referral you 
don’t have a lot of time for patients to hang around on waiting lists and if you decide 
you are going to cancel elective surgery you are almost certainly compromising those 
waiting times and in addition to those waiting times you’ve also got waiting times for 
patient groups most notably cancer patients who have to be treated within 31 days of a 
treatment plan being agreed between the consultant and the patient. So your, your 
flexibility to switch elective work on and off is compromised.   
Reference 2 - 1.93% Coverage 
We’ve then got the non-elective work, the emergency work, and I guess your starting 
point for that would be how can you plan in for the emergency work because you 
don’t know what’s coming through the door.  And I think that over the past few years 
in this hospital we’ve actually moved to a point where we believe that if that view is 
not the case you can make a reasonable plan for what’s coming through the door, so 
you, you can run models which predict activity based either on seasonal patterns but 
you can apply to those levels of admissions and discharges that have happened to get 
both a picture of what’s likely to happen through the year but also more immediately 
what’s likely to happen over the month ahead and very crucially what’s likely to 
happen on every day.  So every day we go in, into the start of the day with a predicted 
number of emergency admissions which provides a real focus for the work that day. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 19 Nurse - § 5 references coded  [21.30% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.33% Coverage 
There are no days any more that we come in and there are beds. 
Reference 2 - 1.70% Coverage 
The story this morning was we have 13 patients who are out patients who come in for 
a mixture of procedures who will either stay overnight or will vacate the bed within a 
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few hours and I walked in this morning to bed 13 people into what would technically 
be three beds because that’s how many I had definitely going home. 
Reference 3 - 10.00% Coverage 
So you have no beds to start with. 
No beds to start the day with, so then I had to look at the ones who would have a 
procedure and vacate the bed, so I bedded those ones first so they had their procedure 
then we got patients ready whilst waiting for their beds and then some of the patients 
had to go into the bed that the first people who were diagnostic and went out of the 
bed had vacated, do you understand that? 
So what the patient who is having their procedure they vacated a bed which you 
would then use again. 
That I would use again for somebody else who was having a procedure that would 
then stay in the bed overnight.  So this morning any beds that I got were then blocked 
because people who stay overnight once they are in the bed the bed’s gone because 
you know they’ve got the bed and it’s booked.  So then to start the afternoon I had no 
beds at all again, fortunately some people are being discharged but it means people are 
waiting you know in waiting rooms waiting for beds that you are juggling to see 
whether they are going to come up or not. We also have to, because I govern the beds 
for the whole of the cardiology template you then have to think all the time with, you 
know with because we do a primary angioplasty service as well so somebody comes in 
and they go directly through to the lab, if coronary care is full you then have to think 
where on the template can I bed somebody to make a bed for the emergency if there is 
one and you always have to have a plan in the back of your mind if an emergency 
comes through the door this is what I will do and then you’ve got [Ward] “A” beds as 
well but unfortunately today there aren’t any you know early in the day coming up if 
any at all. So it’s just working out where you are going to bed people and if you can 
bed people. 
So that was today’s example, how often does that happen? 
Every day, every day. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 13 Manager - § 1 reference coded  [0.10% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage 
we just don’t have the physical capacity to be able to do the work that is there 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 20 Nurse - § 9 references coded  [13.85% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.92% Coverage 
…overwhelmingly the momentum is driven by demand and capacity and flow and you 
know you learn that concept very quickly when you work on EMU.  We have to 
manage the admission process through the EMU we take those from the GP and also 
the emergency department.  At this time of year we are moving into the 55/60 every 
24 hours, that’s a large number coming through, we are a 31 bedded unit.  So for the 
first part of the day when we are taking calls we are actually having to manage the 
emergency take ourselves because the wards won’t be discharging at that time of day 
and they won’t necessarily have the beds so therefore our, the EMU acute physicians 
have to really get busy with discharges. Now they have the first whip if you like in 
terms of they’ve probably got the best client group to discharge because a lot of them 
have come in overnight or night before, evening before and so we can aim to expedite 
some discharges that way. 
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Reference 5 - 3.14% Coverage 
Okay I can tell you actually because I went in and I was given that information so I’ve 
got 31 patients on EMU no beds available and two patients to come in.  We’ve also 
got 13 beds out on the orthopaedic ward which is pre-assessment and we have taken 
over 13 beds out there which is also EMU and we’ve also acquired but we are not 
managing 6 beds in the CDU, clinical decision making unit, which is I don’t know if 
you have been down there but it’s a little area in a portacabin which is tucked away in 
the emergency department so that’s an awful lot of beds that EMU have suddenly 
acquired geographically  
Reference 7 - 1.33% Coverage 
Well at that point its clearly escalated and the site practitioners are talking you know 
to start ….and so on and so forth and the divisional managers are in and the discharge 
team are in and they have to start making very challenging decisions I guess around 
elective work and you know freeing up day case beds and you know and elective beds 
and stuff like that and that’s when the other six beds in the emergency department so 
last night…so yes they are always looking for capacity where can we you know leave 
space for clothes if it’s a day case area so now we will have to open it as an in-patient 
area which then has a knock-on effect for the elective work for the next day.  So 
there’s a lot of decisions made with the on call teams after 4 o’clock in the evening 
and a lot of the decisions have to be made at a very senior level before we can act on 
anything. 
Reference 8 - 0.80% Coverage 
you’ve got these elderly frail patients because that’s really what the A&E medicine is 
about you know sat on trolleys and you’ve got four hours with which to bring them 
into an area.  Now they do have beds and they do transfer their patients on to beds so 
that they are comfortable but it’s not the right environment for them in that, you know 
and they are confused and unwell to be in the emergency department and ED is ED 
and it has to function in terms of its minor injuries, majors, resus and we are clogging 
it up with emergency care. 
Reference 9 - 0.33% Coverage 
it wasn’t an operational area it was pre assessment area so even now we are still you 
know we haven’t got the right stores in place and the pharmacy’s not quite right 
because of course it’s not an established in-patient area. 
<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 17 Nurse - § 6 references coded  [6.23% Coverage] 
Reference 5 - 1.64% Coverage 
the ones that have to be fast tracked to surgery obviously they are the ones that you 
know you have the list this big and you have that many beds and the patients are 
coming through for their fifteen / eighteen weeks the pressure is on you know and you 
know these patients need to come through the system but you just wonder if you will 
ever come to a state when you saturate when you actually reach the point where there 
is nowhere else to go.  I can’t imagine it happening because once we’ve opened up all 
the day case areas I can see us going into endoscopy and you know we will be using 
every physical space  
Reference 6 - 0.51% Coverage 
You know you’ve got your infection control looking at every option of cohorting 
patients that do have the virus to try and free up any little bit of capacity that’s safe to 
do so that you might look at cohorting two wards of patients providing you’ve got 
enough beds to do that. 
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<Internals\CS 1 Interviews\ 24 Doctor - § 7 references coded  [7.35% Coverage] 
Reference 3 - 1.18% Coverage 
 It also you know reputation wise it’s bad for the hospital it just causes so much upset 
cancelling operations so where we can we try and not do that and similarly we try and 
not cancel people who are due to come in for coronary arterial grams or anything that 
involves family disruption and anxiety but the price you pay then is people sitting 
about in corridors all day you know which is undignified and uncomfortable and 
perhaps not getting done at the end of the day after all anyway but I think it is, it is 
right to try and get them in if you can but it does produce a whole lot of stress and 
produces an unsatisfactory working environment  
Reference 7 - 1.47% Coverage 
I do think there is a genuine capacity problem here you know I don’t think that would 
be particularly contentious but I can understand the anxieties that whenever you open 
beds they get filled but you know I can’t quite see you know you can become more 
and more and more efficient but there has to come a point where demography just will 
overwhelm the place because it’s you know it’s sort of experiential rise of the very 
group who generate the longer stays the greatest morbidity and I don’t see how we 
could actually go on much longer without some sort of more definitive increase in 
capacity.  Now obviously the community hospital theatres might offer us a great 
opportunity as long as the surgeons are disciplined enough to actually just not admit 
any day case stuff here get it all done out there. 
<Memos\Memo 041109 CEO hierarchy of decision making during bed crisis> - § 1 reference 
coded  [2.03% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.03% Coverage 
So you’ve got to cancel and free up the beds that, so we’ve got that, at the moment 
we’ve got three surgical wards orthopaedic and surgical wards transferred across the 
medical wards. 
Case Study 2 
Coded at CS 2: SWE; Patient Safety  
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 01 Director - § 4 references coded  [8.45% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.55% Coverage 
all of the patient safety stuff obviously and MRSA and C-Dif and all of the infection 
control targets they are managed and in fact they are listed first, the patient safety stuff, 
on our performance dashboard the patients’ safety issues come first but people are 
clear that they manage all things and that they have to juggle all things and I guess 
that’s what the complexity of the NHS is isn’t it [laughter] you know it just comes with 
the territory. 
Reference 2 - 3.18% Coverage 
what other things that are on there that you count as awareness of patient safety? 
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Well we are briefed, because our numbers now of C-Dif and MRSA are so small, they 
are every single one is reported through a route cause analysis.  So we get a good deal 
of information on all of that.  Noro virus outbreaks are briefed to every head of 
department as they happen so that we have a standard email alert system that goes out 
for that.  Incident reporting is the methodology that we would use for any security or 
aggression incidents or any sort of patient safety incident  
<Internals\ CS 2 Interviews\ 03 Manager - § 3 references coded  [14.49% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 9.46% Coverage 
We have just in the last six months started to produce a first cut of a patient quality 
and, patient safety and quality indicators’ report.  This is the first time we’ve brought 
together such a wide range of information within the Trust.  We prepare that report on 
a monthly basis it’s shared with our finance and performance committee internally 
which is the executive and non executive directors.  We share that with the primary 
care trust through the commissioning and contracting route and it’s a means of us 
pulling together certain key indicators and being able to then demonstrate the trend 
performance over a period of time against those indicators. 
Yes so what type of things are you measuring? 
It picks up quite a wide range of indicators at the high level.  We are picking up 
hospital standardised mortality ratios, re-admission rates, we pick up information on 
incidents, serious incidents, general incidents and information on the levels of 
complaints that are being presented the organisation from patients and members of the 
public.  Information on things like pressure sores, we’ve just started now to collect 
data on VTE, information on accommodation so mixed sex accommodation so where 
we breach standards of accommodation that we pick up so we incidence form and 
analyse that, determine whether that is an acceptable level in the context of the 
numbers of patients coming through the system or not.   
Reference 2 - 1.84% Coverage 
They would all be reviewed monthly.  There are some instances for example on the 
mixed sex accommodation we measure that on a weekly basis, we get weekly data 
through and we provide an interim report to the executive team each week so that they 
can see whether we are on track with that, but most of them are reviewed monthly. 
Reference 3 - 3.19% Coverage 
I see the number of medical outliers on a daily basis I don’t specifically measure and 
report but basically the medical outliers are included on a daily bed state email that 
comes out every day.  We don’t provide additional information on medical outliers. 
…I am not aware that anything is actually presented to the executive team or to the 
Board on medical outliers. 
<Internals\ CS 2 Interviews\ 05 Director - § 11 references coded  [32.14% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 5.61% Coverage 
So then I was asking you about the information you get at Board level in terms of 
patient safety.  What things do you get? Well we get a very good report on infection 
control from the Director of Nursing.  …At Clinical Governance we have SUIS reports 
and there’s never been one in the last three or four years on patient safety issues all the 
SUIS have been something else, mostly clinical stuff you know.   
Reference 4 - 1.26% Coverage 
I am just wanting to clarify because when you said clinical issues as SUIS what 
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type of clinical issues are those then? Oh these are things like deaths in maternity 
things like that that you couldn’t really say was a, there was a failure of the 
organisation on safety grounds.
Reference 5 - 4.52% Coverage 
have there been failures in other grounds then do you think? 
Well I mean the SUIS are failures aren’t they so I mean there have been, oddly enough 
there have been three deaths on cataract operations in a very short space of time but 
again I mean the investigation on that was just coincidental you know it wasn’t a trend 
at the end of the day and the other thing is I get, you see these incident reports and we 
are encouraging the staff to fill in incident reports and we think if we are going up on 
that that’s a good thing because there’s a, you know people are reporting things and we 
only take the incident reports higher up to the Board or Clinical Governance if a trend 
is emerging.  You know if it’s just a one-off then that’s it and again patient safety has 
not been picked out as a trend, patient danger really [laughter] yeah has not figured as 
a major trend in the organisation.  So I mean those are the sorts of things that assure 
me at Board level that there’s a system underneath.
<Internals\ CS 2 Interviews\ 07 Director> - § 5 references coded  [13.06% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 7.00% Coverage 
what other kind of patient safety issues which are of concern and are measured 
and monitored? Well I should have brought a list.  [Laughs] well I suppose you can 
go from the very, very specific things which is like clinical practice things such as 
have they got a line in, when was it put it, is it dated, is it timed, is it checked, does it 
come out, so there’s very practical things around lines, catheters, insertions and things 
like that.  There is a kind of so process driven they are things like obviously hand 
hygiene you know which impacts on everyone, there’s your equipment have you got 
the right equipment, the right skills and competencies of the nurses caring for the 
patients, have you got the right moving and handling staff so, not that that’s about 
health and safety as well but if the patient moved appropriately there’s very specifics 
we do which is around obviously more infection control stuff, lots of measures in ITU 
looking at ventilator requirements, pneumonias, VTE risk assessments, compliance 
with ....completion I mean I could, do you want me to carry on? 
…[Laughs] I’ve got to go through my list now in my head and remember them all.  We 
do early warning scores, audits, we audit all the cardiac arrest calls, and with the other 
much more strategic stuff is we’ve, every clinical incident I review.  I get all the 
clinical incident forms and then we would do kind of an overview in terms of themes 
every three months and pick up any more themes the massive stuff that comes out and 
may be follow that up with a task and finish group if there is any specific things 
around that.  I mean patient transport we look at the safety of that.  
Reference 2 - 1.38% Coverage 
Well the level of harm I mean I can tell you what it was for last year through incident 
forms and I know that that’s a small percentage of the totality of reporting, 603 
patients from our review last year were harmed but that’s, they reckon it’s what only 
3% of you know what you might get so you can extrapolate up to thousands. 
Reference 3 - 0.75% Coverage 
Now rightly or wrongly what they will focus on is the MRSA infection which is 
probably you know it’s only two patients this year for us but we’ve probably got 102 
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that have had a urinary tract infection.  So I don’t think they’ve got the degree of harm. 
<Internals\ CS 2 Interviews\ 08 Manager - § 1 reference coded  [7.09% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 7.09% Coverage 
What’s sort of concern and what’s measured in terms of knowing what’s 
happening to the safety of the patients? I mean I think the concern is that when the 
organisation is under pressure everybody is like on a hamster wheel.  You know the 
acute physicians are seeing turnover of patients going through MAU and it’s about 
how we protect their ward round and their time to make sure that patients are being 
properly managed.  …So I think there is something about what pressure we are putting 
the consultants under.  The pressure we are putting the juniors under when they’ve got 
fifteen patients on their own ward and then they’ve got another twenty-five outliers 
and how those juniors get round and review.  I think the pressure on the consultants 
between elective work and in-patient work when we are saying you know you’ve got 
to get your waiting time to four weeks you know you’ve got to make sure your clinics 
are full and then the balance between and by the way you’ve got to make sure that you 
know all your patients are being discharged and they’ve got plans.   
<Internals\ CS 2 Interviews\ 09 Doctor - § 2 references coded  [9.00% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.06% Coverage 
Well for the patients they say they wait longer, they wait longer for everything.  They 
wait longer for actually get to a cubicle sometimes, they will wait longer for their 
initial assessment, they will wait longer for pain relief, they will wait longer for 
investigations and they will wait for is they are going to be admitted a member of the 
in-patient team to come and see them and make that decision and during that time there 
is a potential for their condition to deteriorate.  So this is not an issue of convenience 
or you know high quality service and you know people are seen promptly which is 
what people would like you know it’s an issue that people can deteriorate while they 
wait. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 10 Nurse> - § 2 references coded  [2.68% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 1.90% Coverage 
I mean clearly sort of patient falls is one of the main risks sort of within the area 
because we have quite high levels of confused, agitated patients that are elderly that 
have, they are taken out of their normal environment into our environment which is 
very busy and obviously they start to get agitated and the risk of falls is greater. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 11 Nurse - § 6 references coded  [12.67% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.73% Coverage 
I think in my mind I am always very clear that my message absolutely is patient safety.  
There are times when, with patient safety, I think we do need extra staffing or we do 
need to put the money where the need is.  There are times when I think we can work 
differently and work smarter to achieve that same patient safety.  When it’s working 
smarter I am very comfortable that we need to get on and do that, when it’s actually 
that we need the money because there’s no other way to manage this situation I do feel 
some conflict because sometimes it’s not easy to actually do that.  
Reference 5 - 0.47% Coverage 
The medical cover is an issue for us.  A real issue because we have to be safe but 
equally you have to come in on budget so that is a huge challenge for us. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 14 Nurse - § 2 references coded  [3.68% Coverage] 
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Reference 1 - 1.94% Coverage 
Because I think patient safety you know staffing numbers relates to the safety of the 
patients really that I think you need the patients there, the staff there, to ensure that 
patient safety is happening really because without the staff you can’t monitor that and 
you can’t, if you’ve got patients climbing out of bed and falling and you’ve not got 
enough staff then obviously that’s going to potentially happen and those patients are 
then at risk of you know injuring themselves really. 
Reference 2 - 1.73% Coverage 
other than falls what other patient safety issues are you, do you worry about? The 
infection control is a big thing if staff are rushing between patient to patient because 
they are short staffed they are not going to be doing their hand washing and therefore 
spreading infection especially you know with what we’ve got at the moment it’s you 
know hand washing is every important but if they are rushing or if a patient is climbing 
out of bed and they’ve got to run to get them and they’ve just dealt with another 
patient and it’s you know the risk yeah the spread of infection is very high there.
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 15 Doctor - § 3 references coded  [13.08% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 3.94% Coverage 
have you experienced or seen anything going wrong with patients as a result of 
them being on an outlying ward? Well I mean I think it’s all, I think it’s historical 
that we always think that patients aren’t being managed as well on a surgical ward.  
We have a lady at the moment with breathing problems who probably would have 
benefited from being on the respiratory ward but because its shut she can’t be there and 
although she is not deteriorating she’s not really getting any better and it might be as a 
result of the fact that they don’t give the medication quite at the right time that the 
nurses would know on a respiratory ward.  I think because we are quite careful about 
going to see and most of the teams are but going to see every one of the outliers that 
you do pick up what’s going on. 
Coded at CS 2: SWE; Targets  
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 01 Director - § 2 references coded  [8.46% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 4.31% Coverage 
How do you know where you are on targets and how often do you monitor that? I 
am fairly obsessive about that [laughter] I get daily reports on some of the stuff.  So I 
get real time information on, four hour target, I get real time information of any 
breaches in particular, I get weekly information on where we are with our RTT 
position and all of the bookings team manage that on a real time basis and there are 
weekly very operational meetings which I don’t attend unless something is going badly 
wrong around RTT and around cancer waiting times.  So the MDT coordinators and 
people at that level so the senior booking clerks will be part of that meeting to work 
with the patient level data.  We oversee it on a, I have a monthly what we call a 
planning contracting and performance management meeting which is, which I chair 
and that’s all of the general managers are in attendance with the performance 
management teams, IT and finance to try and bring all of the performance measures 
that are contracting issues together so we review that on a monthly basis and there’s a 
weekly PTL that goes to execs which includes ambulance handover breaches for our 
targets and the progress of the week for RTT.  So there’s quite an in-depth scrutiny 
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about that too. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 02 Director - § 1 reference coded  [0.11% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.11% Coverage 
we always deliver every target 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 03 Manager - § 5 references coded  [14.98% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 3.06% Coverage 
We have in place a performance management framework within the Trust whereby 
data is analysed at the lowest level and information from that data analysis is then 
communicated through the Trust at appropriate levels right the way through to the 
Trust Board on a regular basis.  Different levels of information at different or different 
detailed information at different levels within the Trust.  So the Trust Board will get a 
high level view. With further detail and exceptions, whereas the directorates at the 
lower level and various management teams may get a much more detailed view. 
Reference 2 - 4.96% Coverage 
And what’s the kind of timing of these reports, is it on a very regular basis?The 
minimum [pause] would be on a monthly basis where everything is performing as it 
would be expected but there are a number of areas that we review on a weekly basis, 
there are some areas that we review on a daily basis. 
…Yes information is assembled daily for example on the A&E four hour wait 
performance and that includes information on emergency admissions and ambulance 
handovers and that’s disseminated daily.  Information is disseminated weekly on the 
level of elective referrals coming into the Trust on the outpatient activity, elective 
activity, outpatient waiting lists, elective waiting lists all versus the planned positions.   
Reference 3 - 3.95% Coverage 
We may only disseminate it monthly under normal circumstances but by reviewing 
that information on a weekly basis I can raise exceptions up the line if I need to. So if I 
see anything that’s going astray that is in let’s say one of our more routine areas where 
we rarely have problems I can still get that escalated and attention given at the 
appropriate levels within the Trust. 
So do you have an example of having had to do that recently? Yes on cancer 
waiting times we have been struggling to achieve one of the cancer waiting time 
standards so although we generally only report that as a monthly position where we are 
normally on track where we’ve been off track then we’ve been reporting that through 
to the directorate teams on a weekly basis and having discussions with various 
members of the executive team. Just to make sure that our plans are strong and 
appropriate and delivering the improvement. 
Reference 5 - 2.04% Coverage 
Cancelled operations information is measured generally on a monthly basis but for 
example with the level of cancelled operations we’ve had going through in the last few 
weeks we’ve been measuring that several times a week.  So it’s all recorded on our 
cancelled operations database whereas I would normally seek that information on a 
monthly basis I’ve been pulling that information off every few days just to check what 
numbers of cancelled operations are going through. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 04 Doctor - § 1 reference coded  [1.49% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.49% Coverage 
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No I am more likely to find out that they are not meeting their targets in situations 
where the hospital is full and there’s a crisis if you like.  So I am more likely to 
become aware that those targets aren’t being met in crises. 
Not at other times when things seem to be okay. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 05 Director - § 1 reference coded  [4.05% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 4.05% Coverage 
I am very happy and comfortable with the information we receive on performance. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 08 Manager> - § 1 reference coded  [4.69% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 4.69% Coverage 
How did you do on the A&E department target during all this busyness? We had 
very little flexibility, we’d had quite a difficult time sort of around the autumn where 
we used up a lot of our lives, we put in a fairly major action plan around how we were 
going to bring our targets back and through the autumn things seemed to get better but 
because of the numbers of breaches on a few days because here because our numbers 
or emergency admissions although relative to us are high we haven’t got much room or 
much flexibility and we have kept our head about water until the last week or so and 
we are really struggling again.  At the moment we are below 98% so we are working. 
How far below? When I looked just now it was 97.2% or something but still that does 
not give us a lot to year end.  I’ve met with the A&E consultants, I’ve met with the 
executive team because they are at the moment conflicting well not conflicting but 
there are financial concerns and A&E target concerns and we have discussed with the 
execs today neither of which we can afford to miss out on. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 10 Nurse - § 2 references coded  [8.70% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 3.89% Coverage 
I mean generally A&E will constantly inform us and say this patient is coming up to 
their breach time sort of can we move them up and we try to work as effectively as 
possible sort of with them so either create the bed or if the patient is well enough we 
utilise our waiting area because we’ve got a clinic running with the waiting, next to the 
waiting area.  So there is a senior registered nurse in there so there’s the potential to 
continue to observe patients there and then bring them into the bed when we are able.  
Or review them in the clinic that’s the other opportunity. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 11 Nurse - § 2 references coded  [6.31% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 5.11% Coverage 
The position is we want to go forward as a Foundation Trust we want to continue the 
good work that this organisation has done. So the message was very clear you’ve got 
to meet your targets.  
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 12 Doctor - § 2 references coded  [2.87% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.02% Coverage 
there is a lot of pressure and we have a few sort of crisis points here.  Cardiology and 
gastroenterology are two specialities closest to the targets and closest to not hitting the 
targets so we do put on extra clinics and extra endoscopy lists sort of in addition to the 
standard work programme to facilitate us hitting the targets.   
Coded at CS 2: SWE; Finance  
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<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 01 Director - § 1 reference coded  [5.52% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 5.52% Coverage 
On a more operational level we run our monthly performance reviews which is our 
opportunity to sit down with the divisional teams and look at their monthly I and E 
position and they cumulative year to date and their year-end forecast position and we 
will have a number of not just the budget information but we would have a number of 
indicators that we would look at around agency staffing usage, vacancy control 
information and no vacancies get approved for filling without an exec team, they all 
come to the exec team every week and similarly agency usage is only approved by 
myself of the Director of Nursing and out of hours on call etc.  We have, we regularly 
review short and long term sickness levels and those sorts of things as indicators to 
underpin what’s going on with the pay position, the variable pay position. Because our 
experience over the last couple of years has been that that is the thing that affects our I 
and E the long and the short of it is so if you are not in control of your variable pay 
then you are not in control of your budget. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 02 Director - § 1 reference coded  [0.36% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.36% Coverage 
So one is the most important? I think it is still ‘cos it’s the legacy of the financial 
deficit. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 05 Director - § 3 references coded  [5.80% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 2.37% Coverage 
In terms of the reports that the Board get to back up the state of the finances.  
Yes they are detailed and they are, we have a very lengthy finance committee meeting 
and go through the whole thing in great detail and at the Board it’s virtually a rubber 
stamp situation because we’ve gone through it all before. 
Right.  Who is on the Finance Committee is it? All the, there’s all the non execs so I 
mean. So it’s a mini Board meeting. It is, it is yes.  So that focuses specifically on 
the financial position. Yes. 
Reference 3 - 1.54% Coverage 
what are the kind of key priorities for you as a Board? Well finance is obviously 
we keep that under control.   
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 08 Manager - § 1 reference coded  [4.09% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 4.09% Coverage 
There are issues around lack of income, if you do cancel surgery there’s the loss of 
income, there is the pressure on targets to achieve waiting times so then one of the 
consequences of that is Saturday operating to catch up on the cancels which costs.  The 
use of agency when we have to put up additional beds, in medicine we’ve got 
pressures on our middle medical rota at SPR level so we’ve got a real problem with 
covering every night with a senior doctor so we are having to do quite a lot of work 
around getting that covered and that can sometimes mean, because I’ve got no 
alternative, the use of expensive locums.  So that busy period has quite a significant 
knock-on effect  
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 11 Nurse - § 4 references coded  [12.96% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.77% Coverage 
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…when it’s actually that we need the money because there’s no other way to manage 
this situation I do feel some conflict because sometimes it’s not easy to actually do 
that.  Having said that if I absolutely believe that that’s the right thing to do then I will 
do it and I am very happy to stand up and be counted for that as I do so every month at 
the finance and performance. But I do feel we have a duty to come in on budget and 
work within our financial constraints where practically possible to do so. 
Reference 3 - 5.11% Coverage 
The position is we want to go forward as a Foundation Trust we want to continue the 
good work that this organisation has done. So the message was very clear …we’ve got 
to reduce our overspend.  So that message was very clear and we will do our level best 
to do that primarily in medicine we have done extremely well this year performance 
wise and finance wise.  The wards were notoriously or is the biggest overspend I am 
very proud to say that I have brought all of my wards in on budget other than the 
completely accountable expense where I’ve booked extra nurses and resources for 
specialist patients and I would stand by that because that is my patient safety focus and 
that’s legitimate.  Where our spends have been bad in medicine this year and I can’t 
speak for the other directorates because they are all different, would be medical cover 
obviously nationally there are shortages in middle grades and consultants and we feel it 
here in our locality so we’ve had a lot of locum use and that has literally our overspend 
is medical cover and on non-achievement of our CRES because our CRES that we put 
forward was to reconfigure the wards and we weren’t allowed to do that because we 
had to achieve the same set agenda and there just wasn’t the capacity to do both.  So I 
think if you were to look at our performance overall I think we’ve done extremely 
well.  The medical cover is an issue for us.  A real issue because we have to be safe but 
equally you have to come in on budget so that is a huge challenge for us. 
Coded at CS 2: SWE; Workload  
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 01 Director - § 3 references coded  [8.05% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.77% Coverage 
we would have a number of indicators that we would look at around agency staffing 
usage, vacancy control information and no vacancies get approved for filling without 
an exec team, they all come to the exec team every week and similarly agency usage is 
only approved by myself of the Director of Nursing and out of hours on call etc.  We 
have, we regularly review short and long term sickness levels and those sorts of things 
as indicators to underpin what’s going on with the pay position, the variable pay 
position. 
Reference 2 - 3.63% Coverage 
Yes, yes because we have now quite good information through our nurse rostering 
systems and through ESR so we can look at down to individual staffing levels about 
overtime. 
So just explain what ESR is. Electronic Staff Rostering System and our electronic 
payroll records so we can bring the two things together and look at how efficient the 
rosters are, where there have been gaps.  So if we haven’t had an appropriate person in 
charge at Band 6 or Band 7 it will highlight that and we can, we can force it to make 
judgements.  So we set appropriate boundaries, for example we would say that we 
would always expect a Band 6 or a Band 7 to be on, on certain shifts and if you go 
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outside of that through the E-Rostering then what actually happens as well as what’s 
rostered then it flags it.  So we have quite a good range of indicators that show what 
sort of pressures the clinical staff are working under at that level. 
Reference 3 - 2.66% Coverage 
So tell me what would happen then if there wasn’t a Band 6 when there should be 
a Band 6 what type of actions get taken?  Well on a day to day basis that would 
obviously be the responsibility of the Ward Manager and the Senior Nurse but if that’s 
consistently happening on a ward that would be flagged up to myself and the Director 
of Nursing well in fact the report goes to all the Exec Directors but it would be “C” 
and I who would take action about that because it was, it would obviously either mean 
that there was some sort of performance issue with the Ward Manager not running her 
rosters properly or some sort of sickness issue that wasn’t being picked up which 
meant that people were going off at a senior level and obviously that would indicate 
stress isn’t it. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 03 Manager - § 1 reference coded  [4.44% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 4.44% Coverage 
Within my team we do prepare workforce information which has some financial detail 
associated with it and that financial detail comes from the finance team as well. 
Yes so tell me about what information you have in workforce terms? We produce 
a workforce monitoring report that picks up information in respect of, at an overall 
level how far the Trust is from its budgeted position in terms of overspend or under 
spend. We pick up information on the amount of overtime being used within the Trust, 
information on the amount of agency staffing or bank staffing that we use.  We just 
track these things to make sure that we can understand if trends are changing that we 
understand the reasons for those changes and if there are adverse changes then we 
bring that to the attention of the right people at the right time. We pick up information 
on staff sickness rates and monitor that and produce more detailed information at 
individual department or directorate level and that goes out across the Trust on a 
monthly basis. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 04 Doctor - § 1 reference coded  [1.15% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.15% Coverage 
I think we probably are adequately staffed on the medical sector to deal with the 
workload but because the burden or the sometimes it feels the ...responsibility is with 
me as a consultant on the shop floor as it were and you can be, the urgency with which 
we need to crack on and move things faster falls to me as well 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 05 Director - § 1 reference coded  [4.07% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 4.07% Coverage 
what about staffing do you know how you fare on the staffing side of life? That’s a 
bit more mystical I think.  I mean we look at the graphs I mean all I can say is that for 
some reason every time there is a rise in expenditure on staffing, which must mean 
there are more staff somewhere.  I know there are pressures but again we’ve asked for 
a lot of information graphs, new graphs and things and I mean the Director of Human 
Resources two years ago had to leave the organisation there was a weakness there and 
we were getting duff information basically, or the previous Board was but no I, we are 
getting the information and probably, and we’ve started a, there’s a workplace 
planning organisation, there’s a committee now looking at workforce planning for the 
future. And I think it’s becoming more on the rails but it’s certainly not as efficient 
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information as we get on the financial side. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 07 Nurse - § 3 references coded  [4.79% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.92% Coverage 
…strategically I know the levels of staffing for each ward so they have an established 
level of staffing for each shift depending on what shifts they do in a day.  We have a 
cross wide risk assessment tool that’s used in all the wards which is called a Workload 
Assessment Tool which at the beginning of the shift a, the ward would rate their 
patients in terms of numbers they’ve got in total in their beds assuming they are not 
full, the care needs that they have so how many people on IV’s, how amber patients 
i.e. the sicker patients which would allow on a day to day basis to get an objective 
rather than a subjective sense of where the highest pressure points are which we use as 
a decision making tool in terms of if we have gaps in our staffing where we then re-
deploy to rather than he who shouts loudest gets is trying to be but it’s never going to 
be black and white but it tries to give some objective measure.  So strategically I know 
what numbers there are on a day to day basis.   
Reference 2 - 1.54% Coverage 
We also have an electronic roster system so that at any point in the day I could go on 
and look at any ward to see how staffed they were and the other way I probably get a 
better sense of it is to spend time on the wards and I do that and we do a patient safety 
walk around here which I know lots of other places do and quite frequently the 
questions will come up about staffing and you get a sense from that but out of that that 
picks up my point earlier is that I know professionally that we are well staffed in our 
areas 
Reference 3 - 0.33% Coverage 
 So if we have shortages on the ward I do generally know about it because all the 
agency request go through me. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 10 Nurse - § 1 reference coded  [2.61% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.61% Coverage 
So I feel that the unit has a very flexible workforce which is absolutely paramount for 
the type of work that we do and it’s not a case of when it gets busy it’s busy all the 
time so that the quiet periods are quite rare you know you generally expect to be very 
busy and then at times it can be extremely over busy and that is generally reasonably 
manageable as long as we have the staffing in place.  Once sort of we haven’t got the 
staffing because I think personally I feel that we’re staffed at the minimum levels that 
we can manage the workload safely.  Once we drop below that I feel that things 
potentially can be compromised and we obviously then have to re-prioritise what we 
do. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 11 Nurse - § 2 references coded  [2.38% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.54% Coverage 
I think we have a very good understanding here, we’ve done a huge amount of work on 
establishments.  It is actually a personal interest of mine and I have done a lot of 
corporate work on establishments workforce analysis and financial involvement of 
that.  So I think we’ve got it in a good place but I think the problem we still have 
within the NHS is our sickness levels are high and if you can’t cover sickness and 
short term absence then you then have got wards running short and that’s a long term 
problem within. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\14 Nurse - § 2 references coded  [5.41% Coverage] 
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Reference 1 - 1.94% Coverage 
Because I think patient safety you know staffing numbers relates to the safety of the 
patients really that I think you need the patients there, the staff there, to ensure that 
patient safety is happening really because without the staff you can’t monitor that and 
you can’t, if you’ve got patients climbing out of bed and falling and you’ve not got 
enough staff then obviously that’s going to potentially happen and those patients are 
then at risk of you know injuring themselves really. 
Reference 2 - 3.47% Coverage 
We have a working workload assessment tool which we use every day and that gets 
completed by the night staff and they put on there all the staffing levels and then we 
have the acuity of the patients, how many patients we’ve got on IVs, how many 
confused patients, dependent patients.  So you work out the scoring and it gives a 
green, amber or red and the staffing is the same you have either a green, amber or a 
red.  So if you have green staffing and amber patients potentially you can cope with 
that but if you’ve got amber staffing and amber patients you might struggle so 
therefore you can highlight that you know you’ve got both amber and you can say 
what you’ve done so you can look at your staffing levels then and say right okay I’ve 
got five people on you know I could perhaps move one, move person, we need people 
in the morning because we’ve got 25 dependent patients and therefore we will move 
somebody from the late shift to the early to do the washings rather than the afternoon.  
So we can look at that daily and that goes to the clinical site managers and obviously 
they are managed by “BC” as well so she looks at that as well but they are used across 
the whole of the Trust. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 15 Doctor - § 1 reference coded  [4.36% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 4.36% Coverage 
Well I think we just, we need more doctors and I think the nursing staff would 
probably say ideally they would want more nurses we just need more people actually 
on the wards and we don’t necessarily needs lots of people in senior reg positions we 
need actual sort of SHOs, house officers to be doing the sort of day to day duty with 
people supervising and I think at the moment we are really pushed here we are all 
doing a lot of sort of extra shifts and that’s taking us away from our day jobs and it’s 
leaving a lot of our junior people to look after patients without the sort of I think 
background knowledge and skills.  And I don’t think that’s really about that’s not 
really about money it’s just about getting people but for this hospital we are just not 
attracting enough doctors. 
Coded at CS 2: RP; DM; Capacity  
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 07 Nurse - § 1 reference coded  [2.07% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.07% Coverage 
last week we had some extra beds up so what I had to do was to obviously look at 
using the pool differently or re-deploying people. 
So where did you put the extra beds? We put them up last week in “Ward P” which 
is female ward and it has day case work so in the end we put beds up in there so they 
are in a ward. So there’s a day case facility on a ward became an inpatient beds. 
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Yes, yes. How many beds was that extra you put up? Last week I think it was up to 
24, it would be about. And is that a fairly common occurrence for you to have to 
do that? Not that common.  It was more common last winter. Right. But we’ve 
opened a winter pressures ward this year which I think has led it to be less. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 09 Doctor - § 3 references coded  [3.12% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.36% Coverage 
So they are all brought into the corridor waiting for a space and the impact for them is, 
I mean I think that is an appalling situation because from a clinical point of view there 
is not good monitoring in the corridor obviously but more importantly and from a 
privacy and dignity point of view you know people who are potentially distressed, 
vomiting, in pain, in a corridor with people walking past them there is absolutely no 
sense of privacy at all. 
Reference 2 - 0.89% Coverage 
When things are really bad we can certainly have five or six patients queuing and 
hopefully they wouldn’t queue for very long in that situation but certainly an 
individual from getting from the back of the queue to the front you know I mean there 
are times when they wait for an hour in a corridor.
Reference 3 - 0.87% Coverage 
a most common thing which tips us into the inefficiency that I talked about first and I 
mean in terms of the sort of set up what happens obviously the patients who would go 
to the medical assessment unit stay here and we very quickly fill up our beds and tip it 
to the out of control situation. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 10 Nurse - § 1 reference coded  [1.47% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.47% Coverage 
we try to work as effectively as possible sort of with them so either create the bed or if 
the patient is well enough we utilise our waiting area because we’ve got a clinic 
running with the waiting, next to the waiting area.  So there is a senior registered nurse 
in there so there’s the potential to continue to observe patients there and then bring 
them into the bed when we are able.  
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 11 Nurse - § 4 references coded  [7.21% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.03% Coverage 
So most people say to me you know medical outliers are not acceptable but yet 
they still seem to happen.  So what is it that’s allowing that to happen even though 
it’s recognised as poor care?  
Because the medical envelope of beds for whatever reason whether that’s you know 
we’ve still not got our processes right or our entrances of exits right in terms of what 
we do with GPs, the bottom line is on that given day you do not have enough medical 
beds for those patients, therefore those patients have to go somewhere so they go to a 
surgical ward and become an outlier.  So practically the other day that’s a nuts and 
bolts fit we have too many patients for our complement of beds. 
Reference 4 - 1.59% Coverage 
what’s it like on the medical wards itself trying to provide single rooms?  All right 
well there aren’t enough I mean we have a lot of data from infection control to know 
that we never have enough.  I don’t know where we sit as a comparable Trust with 
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other Trusts but I should think we are quite low actually on terms of our size and 
numbers and yes it’s a constant challenge and that obviously creates more workload 
because you are trying then to move patients in and out of side wards constantly but 
we certainly don’t have enough. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 12 Doctor - § 4 references coded  [5.90% Coverage] 
Reference 2 - 1.78% Coverage 
I mean what, well I think the managers expect from us is that we go and see the 
patients and make a clinical decision and that’s our side of the bargain.  It’s to be there 
as the senior clinician making a sensible decision for that patient.  If the patient has to 
come in, has to be admitted, then that’s the way it is.  I have never had the managers 
saying well you can’t do that we haven’t got any beds you know.  That would cause 
world war three I think. 
Reference 3 - 1.45% Coverage 
 it’s into the number of extra beds that have to be opened in order to as it were 
make that promise come true. 
Yes.  Yes, what’s the option though? [LAUGHS] Yeah you know you can’t turn away 
acutely ill patients so if it means you open extra beds and you have to cancel the 
routine work then that’s what has to happen and I think everyone within this Trust 
agrees with that. 
Reference 4 - 0.80% Coverage 
So an average physician will do two ward rounds a week and their registrar will do a 
ward round a week and then the other days are SHO led and when we are in melt down 
there’s often a physician in every day 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\13 Director - § 5 references coded  [14.31% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.74% Coverage 
We have an additional capacity to cope with winter for which we had reserved half a 
million pounds at the beginning of the year and so that is essentially an additional ward 
and additional junior medical cover and some additional portering for both A&E and 
MAU.  
Reference 5 - 1.61% Coverage 
We don’t have the diagnostics in the evening and that’s what we need to you know get 
the patients out so that we’ve got patients staying overnight who could probably 
manage with less than a twelve hour stay if they came in earlier in the day. 
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 14 Nurse - § 4 references coded  [5.33% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.11% Coverage 
It’s been extremely busy one of the reasons for the bed crisis is probable due to the fact 
that we’ve got an infection which happens to be on “G” Ward so G Ward’s been 
closed on several occasions so for us it’s not really affected us as much as it would 
have normally because we’ve not had to take any admissions because we’ve been 
closed to admissions due to the infection 
Reference 2 - 1.19% Coverage 
We’ve got nine beds empty at the moment on G but we have potentially got another 
three going home today, because patients can go to their own home but they can’t be 
discharged to any other healthcare setting.  So we are restricted to where they go but 
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we’ve got three going home so we will have eighteen patients today so, which gives us 
twelve empty beds. 
Reference 4 - 1.49% Coverage 
It depends what team of doctors it is really.  If it’s a team of doctors that are on your 
ward them it’s usually quite, it’s quite easy if it’s a patient that’s come up from 
medical assessment unit and they haven’t yet been seen by the consultant’s team then 
they are quite reluctant to see the patient because obviously they don’t know the 
patient and out of hours it’s very difficult to get, because the doctors have got so many 
admissions and things it’s quite difficult to get the doctors to see the patient  
<Internals\CS 2 Interviews\ 15 Doctor - § 2 references coded  [4.60% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.42% Coverage 
in the day you will have possibly a registrar, possibly an SHO and a few house officers 
so it’s probably about four of you as at five o’clock when it gets really busy clerking 
but the registrar often has to go on the ward round so there’s probably three people 
clerking and admitting the patients until 10 and then after that you have two people 
covering the whole of medicine and there are doctors on for other specialities but up 
to, we haven’t really developed a way of bringing them in.  
Reference 2 - 2.17% Coverage 
So I actually normally we just sort of cope.  I think probably what you are meant to do 
well what they said meant to do but is call in a surgical SHO the obs and gynae SHO 
and the psyche SHO but these are doctors who are quite reluctant to come and help if 
they are in a speciality that’s quiet and also they often haven’t done medicine for quite 
a long time and sometimes I find if you get them to see somebody it just causes you 
more work 
Case Study 3 
Coded at CS 3: SWE; Patient Safety  
Oral Witness B: The witness told the Inquiry that the unit (MAU) became known as 
“Beirut” throughout the hospital.  She said that the low staffing levels made the unit 
dangerous from a safety perspective. It also meant that staff were not able to provide 
basic care. Patients were left without pain relief for long periods and in soiled wet 
bedding. Help with food was not given and patient buzzers were left ringing. Staff 
handovers were also not performed correctly.  
Oral Witness C1: “My primary feeling, as is always the case when I am nursing, is 
would I want to be treated like this, or would I want a member of my family to be 
treated like this.  And nine times out of ten the care was so appalling it would be no”. 
On CDU, patients, according to the Witness, “would be forgotten about”. They would 
not be fed or given fluid or buzzers to ring for assistance. Medication was also 
routinely missed. 
Oral Witness E1: believes that A&E was chronically understaffed during this entire 
period. The department could never triage patients due to understaffing and instead had 
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to rely on receptionists to judge the seriousness of cases and call for a nurse if a patient 
presented looking particularly unwell. 
Coded at CS 3: SWE; Targets
Oral Witness C1: It was clear to the Witness that patients were moved in order to meet 
the four-hour target even when it was not in their best interest. The Witness said that  
patients, for example, were moved out of A&E when they were lying in soiled linen to 
prevent breaches. On another occasion, the Witness reported that a patient was 
discharged without being examined first by a doctor due to pressure from the Ward 
Sister. The patient returned to A&E the following morning where she died.  
The Clinical Decision Unit (CDU) was used by A&E as a “dumping ground” the 
Witness said. Patients would be sent to CDU purely to prevent breaching the four-hour 
target. 
Oral Witness G1: stated that the Trust was obsessed with achieving Foundation Trust 
(FT) status. In the Witness’s view, this obsession blinded the board to the problems 
with clinical care.   
Oral Witness A11: spoke about the blame culture associated with targets. He recalled 
that if targets were not met you were required to explain this ‘failure’ to the Strategic 
Health Authority (SHA) and to report to them regularly until the problem was 
rectified.
Coded at CS 3: SWE; Finance
Oral Witness B1: The Medical Division in the hospital was required to make a saving 
of £581, 000. As a result, a reconfiguration of the Medical Division was implemented 
and Wards 10, 11 and 12 were amalgamated into Floor 2. A reduction of 20.4 whole-
time equivalent posts (2 band 7s, 15.42 band 5 and 6s and 2.98 receptionists) was also 
proposed.  
Oral Witness K1: the pressure to tackle the deficit in 2006 was not related to the 
hospital’s application for Foundation Trust (FT) status.  The view at the time was that 
if the hospital was able to manage its finances and achieve FT status it would be given 
the freedom to allow it to manage its budget more effectively.   
Oral Witness N11: At the Hospital Management Board (HMB) in March 2006 the 
Witness, recalled that the Chief Executive reported that the cost improvement 
programme had identified 4.6 million but that a shortfall of £5.4 millions remained that 
had to be tackled immediately.  
Coded at CS 3: SWE; Workload  
Oral Witness B1 The staffing situation on floor 2 was ‘desperate’, Witness B1 states, 
and she accepts this made the care provided unsafe.
Oral Witness H1: recalled that the standard of nursing care also declined as a result. 
There were fewer nurses on the surgical ward yet a greater proportion of high 
dependency patients to manage. 
359
Oral Witness N11 (former Director of Finance): Trust did have information on 
establishment figures and on the number of people in post. Information was also 
available on the number of temporary staff who had been employed. 
Oral Witness C (former Director of HR): Sickness levels were high, particularly 
among the Medical Division.  Witness C said the Trust was also carrying around 200 
vacancies, which they found it hard to reduce.  She did not feel there was an adequate 
system for monitoring establishment figures because the payroll system was separate 
to the finance system. As a result, Witness C found it difficult to report precise figures 
about where vacancies existed within the hospital. 
Coded at CS 3: RP; AD; Capacity 
Oral Witness B1: Floor Two was originally intended to be a 64-bed floor. There were a 
number of contingency beds on the floor that were to be opened in the event of a bed 
crisis or if sufficient staffing for the beds was found. In reality, these additional beds 
were open for the majority of the time. Therefore, Witness B1 commented that the 
staff on floor 2 were expected to care for up to 82 patients as opposed to 64.   
Oral Witness A11: One of the attractions for implementing the floors initiative was 
that it would allow you to ring-fence surgical beds that were being blocked by medical 
patients. This would therefore reduce the number of surgical patients who were 
deferred or delayed.   
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Appendix 6.3 – Results of interviewee questionnaire
Case Study 1 Questionnaire results
          
Total # placing issue as highest 
priority (*NED not able to answer)       
      % % % % 
Question # Targets Staffing Safety Finance Totals Targets Staffing Safety Finance 
Board   4 0 15 9 28 14.3 0.0 53.6 32.1 
Div Mgt  11 1 12 3 27* 39.3 3.6 42.9 10.7 
Clinical 0 12 15 0 27* 0.0 42.9 53.6 0.0 
Line Mgr 5 2 19 1 27* 17.9 7.1 67.9 3.6 
You 4 5 17 1 27* 14.3 17.9 60.7 3.6 
Totals 24 20 78 14 136 17.6 14.7 57.4 10.3 
          
Total # placing issue as second 
priority       
      % % % % 
Question # Targets Staffing Safety Finance  Targets Staffing Safety Finance 
Board   17 0 2 9 28 60.7 0.0 7.1 32.1 
Div Mgt  11 2 5 9 27* 39.3 7.1 17.9 32.1 
Clinical 0 15 11 1 27* 0.0 53.6 39.3 3.6 
 Line Mgr 9 8 3 7 27* 32.1 28.6 10.7 25.0 
You 4 14 6 3 27* 14.3 50.0 21.4 10.7 
Totals 41 39 27 29 136 30.1 28.7 19.9 21.3 
          
Total # placing issue as third priority       
      % % % % 
Question # Targets Staffing Safety Finance  Targets Staffing Safety Finance 
Board   7 4 9 8 28 25.0 14.3 32.1 28.6 
Div Mgt  4 6 7 10 27* 14.3 21.4 25.0 35.7 
Clinical 19 0 0 8 27* 67.9 0.0 0.0 28.6 
Line Mgr 8 3 5 11 27* 28.6 10.7 17.9 39.3 
You 13 3 3 8 27* 46.4 10.7 10.7 28.6 
Totals 51 16 24 45 136 37.5 11.8 17.6 33.1 
          
Total # placing issue as fourth 
priority       
      % % % % 
Question # Targets Staffing Safety Finance Totals Targets Staffing Safety Finance 
Board   0 24 2 2 28 0.0 85.7 7.1 7.1 
Div Mgt  1 18 3 5 27* 3.6 64.3 10.7 17.9 
Clinical 8 0 1 18 27* 28.6 0.0 3.6 64.3 
Line Mgr 4 15 0 8 27* 14.3 53.6 0.0 28.6 
You 5 6 1 15 27* 17.9 21.4 3.6 53.6 
Totals 18 63 7 48 136 13.2 46.3 5.1 35.3 
Case Study 2 Questionnaire results      
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No ranked 1 (highest) Targets Staffing Safety Finance    
Trust Board 3 0 7 5 15   
Mgt Teams 2 0 12 1 15   
Clinical teams 0 4 10 0 14 * NED not  
Percentages      able to answer 
Trust Board 20 0 47 33    
Mgt Teams 13 0 80 7    
Clinical teams 0 29 71 0    
        
No ranked 2 Targets Staffing Safety Finance    
Trust Board 5 0 3 7 15   
Mgt Teams 4 6 1 4 15   
Clinical teams 0 10 4 0 14 * NED not  
Percentages      able to answer 
Trust Board 33 0 20 47    
Mgt Teams 27 40 7 27    
Clinical teams 0 71 29 0    
        
No ranked 3 Targets Staffing Safety Finance    
Trust Board 6 1 5 3 15   
Mgt Teams 6 4 1 4 15   
Clinical teams 11 0 0 3 14 * NED not  
Percentages      able to answer 
Trust Board 40 7 33 20    
Mgt Teams 40 27 7 27    
Clinical teams 79 0 0 21    
        
No ranked 4 Targets Staffing Safety Finance    
Trust Board 1 14 0 0 15   
Mgt Teams 3 4 1 7 15   
Clinical teams 3 0 0 11 14 * NED not  
Percentages      able to answer 
Trust Board 7 93 0 0    
Mgt Teams 20 27 7 47    
Clinical teams 21 0 0 79    
Targets = Achieving targets 
Staffing = Adequate staffing 
Safety = Patient safety 
Finance = Achieving financial results 
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Appendix 7.1 - Examples of Daily Bed Information 
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Appendix 8.1 – Case Study 1 – admission and discharge 
graphs 2006/07 (source CS 1 xls 1.11)
Case Study 1-  Elective and Non-Elective Admissions by Day of Week 2006/07
Median, Upper and Lower Control Limits
0
50
100
150
200
250
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Case Study 1 -  Elective and Non-Elective Discharges by Day of Week 2006/07
Median, Upper and Lower Control Limits 
0
50
100
150
200
250
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
366
CS 1 Monday Median Elective and Emergency Admissions vs Discharges 
by Hour of Day
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0
0
-0
1
0
1
-0
2
0
2
-0
3
0
3
-0
4
0
4
-0
5
0
5
-0
6
0
6
-0
7
0
7
-0
8
0
8
-0
9
0
9
-1
0
1
0
-1
1
1
1
-1
2
1
2
-1
3
1
3
-1
4
1
4
-1
5
1
5
-1
6
1
6
-1
7
1
7
-1
8
1
8
-1
9
1
9
-2
0
2
0
-2
1
2
1
-2
2
2
2
-2
3
2
3
-2
4
Hour of Day
P
a
ti
e
n
ts
Admissions Discharges
CS 1 
Tuesday Median Elective and Non-Elective Admissions vs Discharges by Hour of Day
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0
0
-0
1
0
1
-0
2
0
2
-0
3
0
3
-0
4
0
4
-0
5
0
5
-0
6
0
6
-0
7
0
7
-0
8
0
8
-0
9
0
9
-1
0
1
0
-1
1
1
1
-1
2
1
2
-1
3
1
3
-1
4
1
4
-1
5
1
5
-1
6
1
6
-1
7
1
7
-1
8
1
8
-1
9
1
9
-2
0
2
0
-2
1
2
1
-2
2
2
2
-2
3
2
3
-2
4
Hour of Day
Admissions Discharges
367
CS 1 
Wednesday Median Elective and Non-Elective Admissions vs Discharges by Hour of 
Day
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CS 1 Friday Median Elective and Emergency Admissions vs Discharges by 
Hour of Day
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CS 1 
Sunday Median Elective and Non-Elective Admissions vs Discharges by Hour of Day
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Patient safety: a casualty of target
success?
Mike Dermot Williams and Andi Smart
University of Exeter Business School, Exeter, UK
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to develop a conceptual resilience-based model that takes account of the
competing success factors of patient safety, finance, improvement targets and staff workload in NHS
hospitals in the UK.
Design/methodology/approach – A safe working envelope model was developed from the
literature and adapted for use in the NHS. The proposition that finance and targets receive greater
management attention was then tested by a pilot study using content analysis of risk management
documents of four NHS hospitals.
Findings – The need to succeed on finance and targets received greater attention in the risk
management documents than patient safety and staff workload.
Research limitations/implications – This is a pilot study only, using content analysis of risk
management documents from four hospitals to see whether the model developed from the literature
warrants further study.
Practical implications – Using the proposed safe working model will allow the setting and
monitoring of failure and marginal boundaries and make more explicit the pressures from the
competing success factors in public sector hospitals in the UK.
Originality/value – The development of the conceptual model using ideas from resilience
engineering and applying them to NHS hospital management provides a policy and practical approach
to improving patient safety.
Keywords Patients, Safety, Health care, Risk analysis, Targets, National Health Service
Paper type Conceptual paper
What counts as success in public sector health care? There is no shortage of
performance measures seeking to provide the answer. From a patient safety
perspective, there is an imbalance with the current emphasis of those performance
measures on finance and targets, within the National Health Service (NHS) in England.
Keeping patients safe from unintended harm is a significant issue and fundamental for
the both the patient and the delivery system providing treatment. Within the National
Health Service (NHS), as in other developed countries, there is a poor record for patient
safety (DoH, 2000).
The scale of the problem is significant. Adverse events have been described as
“incidents in which a patient is unintentionally harmed by medical treatment” (Vincent
et al., 1998). Vincent et al. (2001), in a retrospective case note study found 10.8 per cent
of patients suffering adverse events in two NHS hospitals, almost half of which were
judged preventable. Sari et al. (2007) in a similar study of a large NHS teaching
hospital, concluded that 8.7 per cent of admissions had at least one adverse event, of
which 31 per cent were judged preventable. The study showed that 15 per cent of the
adverse events led to impairment or disability that lasted more than six months and 10
per cent contributed to the patient’s death. The result for patients was a prolonged
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period of treatment leading to an increased mean length of stay by 8 days. In a more
recent prospective study focusing on an admission ward, the rate of adverse events
was found to be 11.4 per cent and potential adverse event or near miss to be 14.8 per
cent (Catchpole et al., 2008).
The seriousness of the issue was recognised by the Chief Medical Officer within the
Department of Health (DoH) in a landmark report, “An Organisation with a Memory”
(DoH, 2000). A consequence of this report was the establishment of the National Patient
Safety Agency (NPSA) which developed a national reporting scheme for errors and
near misses. Following an Audit Office Report on the lack of progress made on patient
safety (National Audit Office, 2005), the DoH issued a further report “Safety First”
(DoH, 2006a). As part of the drive to improve patient safety the DoH also set out “core
standards” of safety within the “Standards for Better Health” (DoH, 2006b). These are
standards that all health care providers must meet. Compliance with all the standards
is monitored annually by an independent body, the Healthcare Commission.
Given the serous nature of the problem and the considerable policy initiatives it
would be expected that significant progress would have been made in measuring and
reducing the level of adverse events within NHS hospitals. However, as will be shown,
the best intentions of making “safety first” has become a casualty of other more
pressing success factors, such as waiting times and financial balance.
Competing priorities in public sector services and particularly in health care, is
nothing new. What is needed is a way to conceptualise those priorities and understand
how the resulting competing success criteria are described and measured. Such a
conceptualisation needs to take account of the complex interactions of priorities within
the system of public healthcare in such a way as to give sufficient weight to safety for
patients. This paper sets out a “system resilience” approach to understanding patient
safety within the wider context of competing priorities in NHS hospitals.
Literature
Healthcare systems have multiple professional and stakeholder groups, low reliability
processes (Resar, 2006), macro and micro system interactions (Mohr et al. 2004),
fragmented leadership, diffuse power and multiple goals (Lozeau et al., 2002). Reason
(1997) argues that to achieve improved safety, attention has to be paid to the sharp and
blunt end of the system. Those at the sharp end are those people delivering patient
treatment. They are human and are likely to make mistakes (Reason, 1990). Equally
those managers with responsibility for the organisation make decisions at the blunt
end (removed from direct delivery), which create the conditions where mistakes can be
made more easily by staff at the sharp end. Sheridan (2008), reviewed the ideas behind
the traditional approaches to risk and found considerable weaknesses in their ability to
consider future safety issues. He suggests that the resilience engineering paradigm has
strengths in viewing safety from an organisational process perspective. Resilience in
this context is about anticipating, mitigating and preparing to recover from unsafe
events (Sheridan, 2008).
Woods and Hollnegal (2006) suggest that resilience engineering is an approach to
safety that “focuses on how to help people cope with complexity under pressure to
achieve success”. It is not about just counting “error” and then acting to reduce that
count but rather putting safety as a core value in an organisation. Woods (2006) in the
context of healthcare describes “resilience” as meaning “a work system’s ability to
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buffer, adapt to, absorb and prevent adverse patient outcomes in the face of
disruption”.
Resilience is a proactive approach to safety which, if successful, means that the
system can keep operating in what resilience engineering theorists describe as an
“operating envelope” within which the system is designed to function (Rasmussen,
1997; Woods, 2006). Rasmussen (1997) describes three interacting boundaries to the
safe working envelope; the boundary of economic failure, the boundary of unacceptable
workload and the safety boundary of unacceptable performance. The model suggests
that there is a marginal boundary or zone inside those boundaries which if breached
would create the conditions for failure (Figure 1). The “operating point” can be
described as where the competing pressures reach a theoretical position of equilibrium.
Woods (2006), states that unanticipated problems occur either because the three
boundary model is limited/wrong or the environment changes which bring pressures
to bear on the level of functioning in the system. The pressures from the two
boundaries of economic failure and workload may push the system’s operations,
known as the “operating point”, into the marginal zone either through a process of
“drift” or through rapid change that may then result in an accident (Figure 2). This
could also be described as there being incremental or step change in the location of the
“operating point”. Decisions made by any number of stakeholders in a public service
can create pressure on the operating point, even when those decisions are made at a
level far removed from direct patient care (Barber, 2008). Within the NHS this can mean
that the pressures which are “in focus” are the management of finance and targets.
Decision makers live in a world of conflicting goals with many consequential
dilemmas. To choose one side of a dilemma (e.g. production to achieve targets) can
create a hidden condition in the system on the other side of the dilemma (e.g. safety)
(Reason, 1997). Those making such decisions do not always examine the consequence,
or sacrifice, of their decisions before making them as they maybe over focused on
achieving certain success criteria. Nor is it often easy to understand what the result
might be even if time was given to such consideration. The result may be that nothing
Figure 1.
Rasmussen’s modified
three-boundary safe
working envelope
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untoward happened when production is favoured against safety. However, the system
may well have moved closer to the boundary of unsafe operations where a new
“normal” way of working is established. This unobserved movement of the operating
point towards the boundary is a concept that has been termed “drift to danger”
(Rasmussen, 1997).
Vaughan (1996) shows that normalisation of deviance is key issue for safety. Her
study of the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster illustrated that the system within which
people work can produce a culture where, through small incremental steps, new
situations are seen as “normal”. This is described as the “native view”. Outsiders
looking at the situation are more likely to see the situation as deviant, not acceptable
and therefore potentially dangerous. Waring et al. (2007) point to types of behaviour by
health care workers that illustrate “taken for granted assumptions about clinical
risk . . . ” Such behaviours “normalize risk” and as such mean that risk of harm to
patients is not addressed. Waring (2005) suggests that medical staff regard error as
“inevitable” which can lead to errors being seen as “normal”. These errors may not be
reported as incidents and therefore do not provide the basis for improvements in
safety. Normalization in the context of the safe working envelop can be regarded as a
“drift to danger” of the operating point. Equally, normalization can be conceived of as
shifting the safety failure boundary to a new but more dangerous position.
The Healthcare Commission (2008) has looked at lessons learnt from undertaking
fourteen investigations into failures in NHS services. It concluded that some boards of
NHS trusts are “particularly vulnerable to being consumed by the business of
healthcare, in the form of mergers, reconfiguration of services, financial deficits and
targets”. They were surprised by the extent to which organisations did not have
adequate systems in place to know about potential quality problems. The report argues
that patient safety should not be compromised by other objectives.
Cook and Rasmussen (2005), use Rasmussen’s safe working envelope model to
examine safety problems for hospitals that are overfull. They suggest that it is normal
Figure 2.
Pressure on the operating
point
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for healthcare systems to work at the limit of their capacity and for Hirschhorn’s “law
of stretched systems” to apply: “every system always operates at its capacity. As soon
as there is some improvement, some new technology, we stretch it . . . ”. Stretch in this
context means that the system is thought to be capable of that new level of
performance. The underlying strain on the human aspects of the system is not always
taken into account.
When systems are under resource and/or performance pressures, the benefits of
change are taken in increased productivity or efficiency. The efficiency pressure on the
operating point is such that it is moved closer to the boundary of unacceptable
performance – namely safety failure. Woods and Cook (2002), describe this as systems
moving back to the “edge of the performance envelope”. Studies have shown an
association, but not proven causation, between hospitals that have high occupancy
rates and an increase in mortality and adverse events (Richardson, 2006; Sprivulis et al.,
2006; Weissman et al., 2007).
Miller and Xiao (2007) have built on the ideas of Cook and Rasmussen (2005). They
recognise that when “bed gridlock” occurs patients wait longer at different points in
the system which increases the chances of adverse events such as delayed diagnosis.
This in turn is likely to increase the length of stay, thereby increasing the complexity in
terms of the number of patients to be treated within the organisation and the bed
capacity problem. Miller and Xiao studied the strategies used by staff to respond to
high patient demand in a large trauma unit. They suggest that staff undertook
“compensating actions” such as flexible rotas and schedules, to keep the operating
point close to the marginal boundary of safety failure. Their theory is that “backup
behaviours that make up the marginal zone may act as measures of the system’s
resilience”. In other words, the marginal zone is the area in which compensation actions
occur. Such actions constitute what has been described as “resilience”, and they argue,
as such can be measured (Figure 3).
Figure 3.
Compensating action in
the marginal zone return
the operating point to
within the safe working
envelope
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Proposed descriptive model of resilience for NHS hospitals
Building on the work by Cook and Rasmussen (2005) and Miller and Xiao (2007), we
develop a descriptive model to explain the resilience of NHS healthcare systems in their
wider context by proposing four boundaries of a “safe working envelope”. The
development of the model seeks to reflect the additional aspect of the politically driven
improvement targets (Barber, 2008) which combine with the pressures described by
Rasmussen (1997). The four are the boundaries of financial failure, target failure,
unacceptable working conditions, and failure of safety (See Figure 4). The financial
failure boundary sets the limit of the organisation’s budget. To move outside that
boundary means a deficit situation has arisen. The target failure boundary covers the
numerous waiting time and other improvement targets set nationally and locally.
Failure to meet any of those takes the operating point outside the boundary. The
working conditions boundary relates to the pressure on staff to work above their
contracted hours or at an unsustainable pace. Defining and measuring that boundary is
far less clear than the first two. The failure of safety is when something goes wrong for
a patient or groups of patients. That boundary is not always easy to clearly identify.
This descriptive model seeks to explain the constantly changing pressures that
apply to the concept of a safe working envelope for NHS hospitals. It is not exhaustive
in showing the external pressures but seeks to illustrate that there are a number of
stakeholders who sometimes place conflicting goals on NHS hospitals. For example, to
achieve high quality and safe care means providing treatment for patients in the most
Figure 4.
A descriptive model of a
safe working envelope for
an NHS hospital
Patient safety
421
appropriate setting in a hospital. The waiting time targets can mean moving medical
patients within the hospital, including in the early hours of the morning, to surgical
wards in order to create suitable vacant beds for emergency medical patients to be
admitted to within the four hour target from the Accident and Emergency department.
Within the wider context there is a strong political and managerial requirement to
achieve financial balance or better whilst at the same time reducing waiting times to
meet the targets. At the same time there are nationally negotiated staff contracts that
specify the working arrangements for the staff which limits the availability of key
groups, such as junior doctors.
For NHS hospitals to manage their risk in a way that takes account of the dynamic
pressures that occur in complex organisations they need to establish a means of
knowing where their operating point is located in relation to the boundaries of the safe
working envelope. One way of doing this is to make the pressures influencing the
operating point and the subsequent responses from managers and staff explicit. It is
also possible to know when certain boundaries have been breached. For example, data
for when the boundary of safe working is breached is obtained when errors occur
(Woods and Cook, 2006). Most NHS hospitals have a system of reviewing and learning
from incident reports, yet this has limitations. Many incidents go unreported and
others are unrecognised as failures (Olsen et al., 2007). Therefore, just examining
incident reports is not a reliable means of knowing when the operating point has
breached the safety boundary. Resilience, being a proactive concept of safety, means
that other more predictive measures are required. Theoretically if we can measure
what compensating actions are being undertaken in the marginal zone, then we can
build a picture of where the operating point is located.
Compensating actions as a measurable indicator of resilience
From the work of Miller and Xiao (2007) we propose examining the nature and extent
of “compensating actions” at different levels in the system as a means to find where the
operating point is located. For example, we could suggest that when there were
sufficient beds empty in the medical unit at the beginning of the day to accommodate
the expected maximum number of medical emergencies and there were no medical
patients in surgical beds (outliers), then the operating point would be regarded as being
well within the safe working envelop. If this situation was normal each week then we
could suggest that the operating point was also stable inside the envelop. If, however,
at the beginning of the day there were no empty beds but sufficient expected
discharges to accommodate the maximum number of expected medical emergencies
and no medical outliers; then we could suggest that the operating point was close to
breaching the marginal boundary.
With the process of normalisation there then may be some dispute as to when the
operating point crosses the marginal boundary. In many hospitals a new “norm” has
been observed where is it common to have medical outliers. Therefore staff would
consider the operating point in those circumstances to be within the safe working
envelop as the situation is “normal” (Waring et al., 2007). However, in theoretical terms
once compensating actions take place, such as putting medical patients in surgical
beds (outliers) or “stacking” at home the emergency admissions being requested by
General Practitioner (GP) as a means to cope with demand (Proudlove et al., 2003), then
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it could be suggested that the marginal boundary had been crossed using GPs as buffer
capacity.
We could suggest that there is a breach of the safety boundary when “bed gridlock”
occurs, all beds are full and admissions are waiting in corridors or ambulances with the
consequent increased tight coupling across the system. In such situations the impact
on staff working at the sharp end is such that the patients care is more likely to be
compromised (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). Compensating actions can be formal and
widely communicated and therefore be monitored by management through a
traditional performance management route. However, there are also numerous
informal compensating actions that staff take, often known as “work arounds” which
are not measured or monitored and could be hiding the movement of the operating
point into the marginal safety zone.
Boundary setting and monitoring as a method of quantifying resilience
Recognising the competing and dynamic priorities that occur in healthcare systems
(Woods, 2006) and the potential for the operating point to “drift to danger” (Rasmussen,
1997), it is necessary for managers to be able to describe what constitutes the marginal
and failure boundaries. From the literature on stretched systems (Cook and
Rasmussen, 2005, Woods and Cook, 2002), the competing priorities (Woods, 2006) and
the NHS Operating Framework 2008-2011, (DoH, 2007), we can make the proposition
that the boundaries of financial failure and target failure in NHS hospitals would be
more clearly described and monitored than the other boundaries. To clarify this
proposition we undertook a pilot study that involved content analysis of key risk
management documents from four NHS hospitals.
NHS hospitals have risk management systems set out by the Department of Health
(DoH, 2003). They are designed to allow hospitals to identify their key objectives and
the risks associated with achieving them. Within the risk management system there is
an “Assurance Framework”. This is defined as “a structure within which boards
identify the principal risk to the organization meeting its principal objectives and map
both the key controls in place to manage them and also how they have gained sufficient
assurance about their effectiveness” (DoH, 2003). The Assurance Framework is then
monitored at hospital board level on a regular basis through the year.
Content analysis of risk assurance frameworks of NHS hospitals
Method
The pilot sample was chosen by using the Dr Foster Report on NHS hospital mortality
rates (Dr Foster, 2007). A hospital was chosen from each of the reported high, medium
or low mortality rate categories. One other hospital was chosen that had featured in the
Healthcare Commission Report on investigations into mortality (Healthcare
Commission, 2008). Their Assurance Frameworks were accessed via the internet.
Data collection
A protocol was devised using the four boundary model. For each boundary a number
of key words where identified as coding themes (see Table I). These codes were derived
deductively from the literature on safe working envelopes, patient safety campaign
interventions (Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2008), the NHS Operating
Framework 2008-2011, (DoH, 2007). Congruent with a grounded theory approach
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Table I.
Assurance framework
content analysis of failure
categories
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(Strauss and Corbin, 1990), codes were also identified inductively to include words or
phrases found in the Assurance Frameworks. It was recognised that some of the codes,
for example “access”, could apply to more than one boundary. Where this was found to
be the case, the context was carefully examined before allocating to the appropriate
boundary category. Certain elements of the Target Failure category, such as parts of
the Standards for Better Health (DoH, 2006b), have components of patient safety within
them. Where elements where explicitly safety related, such as control of infection, they
were allocated to the safety failure category. Within the Financial Failure category
“activity” was used to describe the financial risk of reduced activity (fewer admissions,
therefore less income) due to changes in strategy by local purchasers of hospital
services.
Data analysis
The content analysis involved searching for and analysing the frequency of the
identified codes in each Assurance Framework document. The protocol was used to
guide the inclusion, exclusion and allocation of codes to boundary themes. Where the
context of the code related to an area of risk being monitored it was included in the
analysis. Where the code was part of a job title, such as Director of “Finance”, or
referred to a committee, such as the “Infection” Control Committee, these were
excluded. Each occurrence of the code was checked against it’s context. Where the
context related to managing a risk issue it was included in the count. The mean of all
the counts was calculated for each risk boundary category.
Results
The results support the proposition that in the four hospitals the boundaries of
financial and target failure feature more in their Assurance Frameworks than the other
boundaries. The summary of the means for each boundary category are set out in
Table II. The inclusion of risks related to staff was very limited. Patient safety did
feature in general terms and more specifically in regard to infection control which has
nationally set targets to be achieved. Aspects of patient safety derived from patient
safety campaigns such as “medicines management” or the “deteriorating patient” did
not feature. Given the known rate of “adverse events” and “harm” that occur in NHS
hospitals (Sari et al., 2007) it is surprising that they did not feature significantly. Whilst
“quality” was used in the document, it was found to be a general term without any
meaningful definition.
The results were discussed with the Director responsible for patient safety in one of
the study hospitals. They confirmed the high level of focus on targets and achieving
Hospital Finance Target Staff workload Safety Dr Foster mortality rating
A 7.0 4.38 1 2.62 High
B 1.42 7.25 0 0.69 Medium
C 1.0 19.50 0.45 0.15 Low
D 3.75 8.13 0.73 1.77 Investigated
Note: Hospitals B and C mean for “Target” is significantly higher at p , 0.05
Table II.
Assurance framework
content analysis – mean
for each category by NHS
hospital
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the requirements of Standards for Better Health (DoH, 2006b), (Orzell, 2008).. That
focus had helped the hospital to be rated as “excellent” by the Healthcare Commission
for both “quality of services” and “use of resources”. Although the Assurance
Framework is the key risk management document for the Trust Board according to the
Department of Health (DoH, 2003), other reports and meetings were used in that
Hospital to consider aspects of patient safety and staffing (Orzell, 2008).
Discussion
We can theorise that where the financial and target failure is more clearly articulated,
the pressure on the operating point to keep away from those boundaries means that the
system will be operating closer to the boundaries that receive more limited
consideration. This can be illustrated using the descriptive model and the results from
the content analyses of Hospital C’s Assurance Framework (see Figure 5). The results
can do no more than illustrate where management attention is focused. However, by
showing such focus it draws attention to potential blind spots or instances of
normalization where the system may be more vulnerable to breaching the marginal
zone.
The NHS hospitals studied do not appear to use the Assurance Framework to focus
their efforts on setting a safe context for front line clinical treatment. Extant literature
suggests that the pressure on the operating point at times of peaks in patient demand is
a risk issue both for staff workload and patient safety (Weissman et al., 2007). Human
error within the context of unsafe systems is a well known phenomenon (Reason, 1990).
The risks associated with high volumes of activity, their impact on staff and other
Figure 5.
A Descriptive model of a
safe working envelope for
NHS Hospital C
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patient safety issues, does not receive the same degree of attention as finance and
targets in the key risk management document for Trust Boards in this pilot study.
The management focus in the Assurance Frameworks is predominately on the
corporate risks associated with financial and target failure. These are risks more
associated with an impact on the organisational management and less on the clinical
safety of patients. Vaughan (1996) argues that the “production of culture” can occur at
the macro level and heavily influence the “normalization of deviance” at the micro
level. The Department of Health, at the time of this study, had issued an “Operating
Framework” which focuses on financial management and targets with almost no
mention of patient safety (DoH, 2007). It is therefore perhaps not surprising that a
Department of Health mandated document for risk management, the Assurance
Framework used by Trusts (DoH, 2003), focused on the risk related to the priorities set
by the higher authority.
Drug errors are one of the most common adverse events that occur to patients
(NAO, 2005). The fact that “medicines management” or “prescribing errors” was not
included in any of the Assurance Frameworks illustrates that the focus of the
documents was on corporate rather than patient or clinical risk. Given the nature of
hospital work it would not be unreasonable to expect that risks to patients from
prescribing errors be regarded as a “principle risk” (DoH, 2003), to the achieving the
objectives of the hospital.
Conclusion
The NHS hospitals studied adopt an approach to risk management at board level
which focuses predominately on the corporate risk related to finance and improvement
targets. Such “active” priorities have to be balanced by the “chronic” or maintenance
priorities of patient and staff safety (Woods, 2006). Without this balance patient safety
will remain a casualty of the emphasis on meeting other priorities and targets. The
current measurement systems appear to be a product of the productivity and efficiency
culture. This is inadequate in a healthcare context. Given the primary function of a
hospital is first to “do no harm” to patients, there is an imbalance in the way priorities
are set, measured and monitored. This pilot study provides support for the proposition,
developed from the literature, that the failure boundaries for finance and targets would
be more clearly set out and monitored than those associated with safety.
At an organisational level, a conceptual four boundary model of a safe working
envelope can bring to mind the concept of an “operating point” and the conflicting
pressures that can occur to move the operating point into the marginal zone with the
potentially to breach a boundary. If the wider and dynamic pressures, such as the
pressure created by peaks in demand, are not taken into account when making
decisions then senior managers are in danger of developing hidden conditions that
create the environment for accidents to occur (Reason, 1995). By developing the work of
Cook and Rasmussen (2005) into having four, rather than three boundaries, we are
taking account of the particular circumstances of a politically led NHS with a very
strong target and financial control culture which can place substantial pressure on the
operating point (Barber, 2008; Healthcare Commission, 2008). The idea of
compensating actions constituting the marginal zone, with the potential for such
actions to be measured, can be developed and tested as an indicator of the resilience
concept.
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For practitioners the conceptual model will assist them in recognising the
conflicting pressures that they work with. Such a resilience model may also stimulate
the setting of boundary measures and finding a mechanism to monitor the location and
stability of the operating point at various levels within a hospital. This could
potentially be done through a combination of setting boundary marking standards for
all four boundaries, examining the nature and frequency of compensating actions and
learning from incident reports. The Assurance Framework could be developed to
provide a more balanced perspective on risks and hence design greater resilience into
the system.
Limitations and future research
The pilot study using a content analysis methodology has limitations. The sample is
too small to provide generalisable data and looked only at the Assurance Framework
of each hospital. It was limited in the examination of other documentation. The words
and phrases used, whilst developed from the literature and reading the Assurance
Framework documents, cannot cover all aspects of risk management. However the
exploratory research has developed the conceptual model from resilience engineering
in relationship to patient safety and has highlighted fundamental issues for further
research
Empirical work using an embedded case study mixed method approach is now
being undertaken to build on the conceptual ideas put forward in this paper. The
research is examining the setting and measurability of boundary standards and
exploring the nature and measurability of compensating actions in relation to the
safety boundary.
References
Barber, M. (2008), Instruction to Deliver: Fighting to Transform Britain’s Public Services,
Methuen, London.
Catchpole, K., Kreckler, S., Mishra, A., New, S. and McCulloch, P. (2008), “The fundamental
importance of bottom-up interventions in the system of surgery”, Proceedings of
Improving Patient Safety Conference, The Ergonomics Society, Cambridge, 16-18 July,
pp. 15-19.
Cook, R.I. and Rasmussen, J. (2005), “‘Going solid’: a model of system dynamics and
consequences for patient safety”,Quality and Safety in Health Care, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 130-4.
DoH (2000), An Organisation with a Memory. Report of an Expert Group on Learning from
Adverse Events in the NHS, Stationery Office, London.
DoH (2003), Building the Assurance Framework: A Practical Guide for NHS Boards, Stationery
Office, London.
DoH (2006a), Safety First: A Report for Patients, Clinicians snd Healthcare Managers, Stationery
Office, London.
DoH (2006b), Standards for Better Health, Stationery Office, London.
DoH (2007), Operating Framework, 2008/2009, Stationery Office, London.
Dr Foster (2007), The Hospital Guide, Dr Foster, London.
Healthcare Commission (2008), Learning from Investigations, Commission for Healthcare Audit
and Inspection, London.
IJPSM
23,5
428
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (2008), Five Million Lives Campaign, available at: www.ihi.
org/IHI/Programs/Campaign/ (accessed 10 April 2008).
Lozeau, D., Langley, A. and Denis, J. (2002), “The corruption of managerial techniques by
organisations”, Human Relations, Vol. 55 No. 5, pp. 537-64.
Miller, A. and Xiao, Y. (2007), “Multi-level strategies to achieve resilience for an organisation
operating at capacity: a case study at a trauma centre”, Cognition, Technology & Work,
Vol. 9, pp. 51-66.
Mohr, J.J., Batalden, P. and Barach, P. (2004), “Integrating patient safety into the clinical
microsystem”, Quality and Safety in Health Care Vol. 13, pp. ii34-ii38.
National Audit Office (NAO) (2005), A Safer Place for Patients: Learning to Improve Patient
Safety, Stationery Office, London.
Olsen, S., Neale, G., Schwab, K., Psaila, B., Tejal Patel, E., Chapman, J. and Vincent, C. (2007),
“Hospital staff should use more than one method to detect adverse events and potential
adverse events”, Quality and Safety in Health Care, Vol. 16, pp. 40-4.
Orzel, M.N. (2008), personal communication.
Proudlove, N.C., Gordon, K. and Boaden, R. (2003), “Can good bed management solve the
overcrowding in accident and emergency departments?”, Emergency Medicine Journal,
Vol. 20, pp. 149-55.
Rasmussen, J. (1997), “Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem”, Safety
Science, Vol. 27 Nos 2/3, pp. 183-213.
Reason, J. (1990), Human Error, CUP, Cambridge.
Reason, J. (1995), “Safety in the operating theatre – Part 2: human error and organisational
failure”, Current Anaesthesia and Critical Care, Vol. 6, pp. 121-6.
Reason, J. (1997), Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, Ashgate, Aldershot.
Resar, R. (2006), “Making non-catastrophic health care processes reliable: learning to walk before
running in creating high reliability organisations: Pt II”, Health Service Research, Vol. 41
No. 4 pp. 1677-89.
Richardson, D.B. (2006), “Increase in patient mortality at 10 days associated with emergency
department overcrowding”, Medical Journal of Australia, Vol. 184 No. 5, pp. 213-16.
Sari, A.B-A., Sheldon, T.A. and Cracknell, A. (2007), “Extent, nature and consequences of adverse
events: results of a retrospective casenote review in a large NHS hospital”, Quality and
Safety in Health Care, Vol. 16, pp. 434-9.
Sheridan, T.B. (2008), “Risk, human error, and system resilience: fundamental ideas”, Human
Factors, Vol. 50, pp. 418-26.
Sprivulis, P.C., DaSilva, J-A., Jacobs, I.G., Frazer, A.R.L. and Jelinek, G.A. (2006), “The association
between hospital overcrowding and mortality among patients admitted via Western
Australian emergency departments”, Medical Journal of Australia, Vol. 184 No. 5,
pp. 208-12.
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1990), Basics of Qualitative Research, Sage, Newbury Park, CA.
Vaughan, D. (1996), The Challenger Launch Decision, Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL.
Vincent, C., Neale, G. and Woloshynowych, M. (2001), “Adverse events in British hospitals:
preliminary retrospective record review”, British Medical Journal, Vol. 322, pp. 517-19.
Vincent, C., Taylor Adams, S. and Stanhope, N. (1998), “Framework for analysing risk and safety
in clinical medicine”, British Medical Journal, Vol. 316, pp. 1154-7.
Waring, J.J. (2005), “Beyond blame: cultural barriers to medical incident reporting”, Social Science
& Medicine, Vol. 60, pp. 1927-35.
Patient safety
429
Waring, J., Harrison, S. and McDonald, R. (2007), “A culture of safety or coping? Ritualistic
behaviours in the operating theatre”, Journal of Health Services Research and Policy, Vol. 12
(Suppl. 1), pp. 3-9.
Weissmann, J., Weissmann, J., Rothschild, J.M., Bendavid, E., Sprivulis, P., Cook, E.F., Evans,
R.S., Kaganova, Y., Bender, M., David-Kasdan, J., Haug, P., Lloyd, J., Selbovits, L.G., Muff,
H.J. and Bates, D.W. (2007), “Hospital workload and adverse events”,Medical Care, Vol. 45
No. 5, pp. 448-55.
Woods, D.D. (2006), “Essential characteristics of resilience”, in Hollnegal, E., Woods, D. and
Leveson, N. (Eds), Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts, Ashgate, Aldershot.
Woods, D.D. and Cook, R.I. (2002), “Nine steps to move forward from error”, Cognition,
Technology & Work, Vol. 4, pp. 137-44.
Woods, D.D. and Cook, R.I. (2006), “Incidents – markers of resilience or brittleness?”, in Hollnegal, E.,
Woods, D. and Leveson, N. (Eds), Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts, Ashgate,
Aldershot.
Woods, D.D. and Hollnegal, E. (2006), “Resilience engineering concepts”, in Hollnegal, E., Woods,
D. and Leveson, N. (Eds), Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts, Ashgate,
Aldershot.
Further reading
Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust (2007), Risk Management Strategy, Royal Devon
and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust, Exeter.
About the authors
Mike Dermot Williams is currently NHS Senior Research Fellow at University of Exeter Business
School and a member of the core team for the National Patient Safety Campaign in the UK. Prior
appointments have been as Chief Executive and Director of NHS Teaching and District Hospital
Trusts in the UK. Mike Dermot Williams is the corresponding author and can be contacted at:
m.d.a.williams@ex.ac.uk
Andi Smart is a Research Fellow at the University of Plymouth. From 1998-1999 he was
Research Fellow, Department of Business and Management, School of Business and Economics,
University of Exeter. From 1999-2003 he was Lecturer in Management, Department of Business
and Management, School of Business and Economics, University of Exeter. From 2003-present
he has been Senior Lecturer in Operations and Process Management, Exeter Centre for Research
in Strategic Processes and Operations (XSPO), School of Business and Economics, University of
Exeter.
IJPSM
23,5
430
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: reprints@emeraldinsight.com
Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
387
Publication 2 
Williams, M. D. & Smart, P. A. (2009) System resilience and patient safety during a 
bed crisis in an NHS hospital in England. 16th Annual EurOMA Conference, Goteborg. 
388
System resilience and patient safety during a bed crisis in an NHS hospital in England 
Mike D Williams  
Andi Smart 
m.d.a.williams@exeter.ac.uk 
University of Exeter Business School 
Rennes Drive 
Exeter 
EX4 4PU 
Abstract 
A resilience based conceptual model of a four boundary safe working envelop was 
developed and used in a case study in a NHS hospital to develop theoretical 
explanations about the actions and decisions of staff in terms of how they deal with 
competing requirements. A mixed method of data collection was used during a bed 
crisis. Evidence of a process of normalization relating to capacity problems was 
found; a focus on what was easily measured in terms of finance, waiting time targets, 
and staffing predominantly drove operational behaviour. Patient safety may be 
compromised by the process of normalisation through the theoretical concept of ‘drift 
to danger’. 
Keywords: resilience, normalisation, patient safety 
Introduction 
Hospital managers and clinicians face many competing demands. These include the need to 
meet patient expectations in terms of effective, safe and timely treatment whilst meeting the 
organisational expectations, including remaining within budget. The publically funded 
healthcare system in the UK, through the government, sets hospitals a number of standards 
and waiting time targets that hospitals have to meet. A conceptual model, derived from 
resilience engineering, was developed to help explain how staff actions keep hospital 
patients safe during periods of high levels of patient demand and competing pressures 
(Williams, 2008). This model was applied within a case study of a UK hospital to develop a 
systems resilience theory to explain the actions and decisions of managers and clinicians in 
relation to patient safety during a period of bed capacity constraint and high patient 
demand. Patient safety in hospitals throughout the world is a major issue with adverse 
events occurring to over 9% admitted patients (De Vries et al, 2008). Developing theory 
that will assist in reducing harm to patients during busy periods in hospitals has potential 
practical impact. 
Literature
Resilience engineering is a developing field within the literature (Hollnagel et al, 2006). It 
seeks to take a systems and proactive perspective on safety. The definition of ‘system 
resilience’ in this paper relating to healthcare is the ‘work system’s ability to buffer, adapt 
to, absorb and prevent adverse patient outcomes in the face of disruption’ (Woods, 2006). 
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The resilience literature includes the idea of a ‘safe working envelop’ within which a work 
system seeks to remain to avoid failure. Rasmussen (1997) describes three interacting 
boundaries to the safe working envelope; the boundary of economic failure, the boundary 
of unacceptable workload and the safety boundary of unacceptable performance.  The 
model includes a marginal boundary or zone inside those boundaries which if breached 
would create the conditions for failure.   
Cook and Rasmussen (2005), use Rasmussen’s safe working envelope model to 
examine safety problems for hospitals that are overfull.  They suggest that it is normal for 
healthcare systems to work at the limit of their capacity and for Hirschhorn’s ‘law of 
stretched systems’ to apply: ‘every system always operates at its capacity.  As soon as there 
is some improvement, some new technology, we stretch it…’. When that capacity is 
reached, failure or restructuring has to occur (Woods and Wreathrall, 2008). When systems 
are under resource and or performance pressures the benefits of change are taken in 
increased productivity or efficiency.  Studies have shown an association, but not proven 
causation, between hospitals that have high occupancy rates and an increase in mortality 
and adverse events (Richardson, 2006; Sprivulis, et al, 2006;  Weissman et al, 2007).   
Building on the work by Cook and Rasmussen (2005) and Miller and Xiao (2007), we 
developed a conceptual model to explain system resilience of NHS hospital systems in the 
wider political and administrative context by proposing four interacting boundaries of a 
‘safe working envelope’ (Williams, 2008).  These are the boundaries of financial failure, 
target failure, unacceptable working conditions, and failure of safety (Figure 1).  This 
model seeks to explain the dynamic pressures that apply to the concept of a safe working 
envelope for NHS hospitals. 
Figure 1:  A conceptual model of a ‘safe working envelope’ for an NHS hospital
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Vaughan (1996) shows that normalisation of deviance is key issue for safety. Her study 
of the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster illustrated that the system within which people 
work can produce a culture where, through small incremental steps, new situations are seen 
as ‘normal’.  This is described as the ‘native view’. Outsiders looking at the situation are 
more likely to see the situation as deviant, not acceptable and therefore potentially 
dangerous. Waring et al (2007) point to types of behaviour by health care workers that 
illustrate ‘taken for granted assumptions about clinical risk…’ Such behaviours ‘normalize 
risk’ and as such mean that risk of harm to patients is not addressed. Waring (2005) 
suggests that medical staff regard error as ‘inevitable’ which can lead to errors being seen 
as ‘normal’. These errors may not be reported as incidents and therefore do not provide the 
basis for improvements in safety. Normalization in the context of the safe working envelop 
can be regarded as a ‘drift to danger’ of the operating point. Equally, normalization can be 
conceived of as shifting the safety failure boundary to a new but more dangerous position. 
Method 
A case study approach was used in an NHS hospital during an outbreak of a sickness virus. 
The case study approach was chosen because it is suitable to investigate phenomenon 
within their context Yin (2003) and where there is complexity in the subject matter (Stuart 
et al, 2002).  It is also used where the boundaries between the phenomenon are unclear, 
where multiple sources of evidence are needed to converge, and where there is a theoretical 
background to guide the data collection and analysis (Yin, 2003).  Case studies do suffer 
from the weakness of being context specific and therefore transferability of findings to 
other situations is problematic.  However, when case studies are used to draw out key 
points of an explanation they can be a powerful contribution (Nightingale et al, 2003). 
The case was chosen as an example of a high performing teaching hospital with a stable 
leadership team where the externally validated track record would suggest an ability to 
manage both the external and internal competing pressures. A period of intense pressure on 
bed capacity (a sickness virus that closed wards and increased staff absence) was studied as 
a means of magnifying the competing pressures, the staff actions in response to those 
pressures and the implications for patient safety. Full NHS ethical approval was gained. 
Within the case study the unit of analysis is the whole hospital as a system. There is an 
embedded approach (Yin, 2003), using a stratified purposeful approach (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) to examine three within case units of analysis to build a picture of the 
wider hospital.  The reason for choosing an embedded approach is to overcome the 
weakness of a holistic case study design.  Yin (2003) argues that a holistic approach may 
mean the study is conducted at an abstract level as the researcher may not get into the 
operational detail.  One of the reasons behind selecting three embedded areas is to cover 
both the formal and informal actions that occur, to understand the macro context and then 
the managers and individual team members (micro) response. The three units were: 
Organisational: Trust Board and hospital wide operational processes 
Sub unit:  Division of Medicine 
Team:   Ward / Consultant Team / Department members
A mixed method approach using the simultaneous collection of qualitative and 
quantitative data was used (Creswell, 2003; Bergman, 2008).  The underlying pragmatic 
philosophy is that to obtain a better understanding of the phenomenon, a range of 
epistemological perspective were used.  Multiple sources of data collection were utilized. 
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This assists in achieving triangulation in data collection, the interpretation and subsequent 
theory development.  A concurrent nested approach to gathering data through quantitative 
and qualitative means was employed to allow different questions to be addressed during the 
study.  Such an approach allowed different perspectives to be obtained about the hospital 
being studied and by bringing the data together during the analysis phase. This helped to 
increase the validity of the findings (Creswell, 2003).  The collection of quantitative data 
was nested within and informed the wider qualitative study (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007). 
Data was collected from a number of sources. Initially there was analysis of both 
internal and external context setting documents to provide the contextual overview. 
Hospital administrative data provided the descriptive statistics relating to demand and 
capacity before and during the sickness virus.  During and after the period of high pressure 
semi-structured interviews of eight doctors, nine nurses, ten managers were conducted, 
recorded and transcribed. Non-participative observation of staff actions and meetings were 
undertaken over a four month period. A grounded theory approach was used in the analysis 
to develop categories and concepts from the different data sources using NVivo (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990).  Thematic analysis of the concepts was used to interpret the data to 
identify phenomena about the competing priorities and the failure boundaries (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). 
Case study hospital 
The hospital studied is a 760 bed NHS teaching hospital serving a largely rural population 
in England. The nearest acute hospital is over twenty miles away. The main targets that 
impact on hospital bed capacity are (DoH 2007): 
• A maximum of waiting time of one month from diagnosis to treatment for all 
cancers.  
• Waiting time in Emergency Department (ED)– maximum of 4 hours for 98% of 
patients 
• Waiting time from Referral To Treatment (RTT) – maximum of 18 weeks with a 
push to reduce to 15 then 13 weeks (This target relates to non-emergency patients) 
Patient routes into the hospital   
Where cancer is suspected then the referring General Practitioner (GP) uses a rapid access 
route to ensure that the patient has an outpatient appointment within 14 days and then, 
where necessary, treatment commences within 31 days. 
Emergency patients enter the hospital through the ED, or if they have been seen by a 
GP prior to attending hospital, they will be sent directly to the surgical assessment unit 
(SAU) or emergency medical unit (EMU). Ninety eight percent of those patients arriving at 
the ED must be treated and admitted or discharged from ED within four hours. There are no 
targets relating to patients sent directly to the SAU or EMU. 
Non-emergency and non cancer patients are referred by their GP to a consultant in the 
hospital. The usual pathway is for a consultation in an outpatient clinic either before or after 
some diagnostic tests. Once a decision on treatment is made, the patient may be admitted as 
a day case or inpatient for treatment. Ninety percent of such patients being admitted have to 
have their treatment started within the RTT target.   
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The three target areas can create competing dynamics within a hospital service.  For the 
ED to succeed on admitting patients within 4 hours depends on other parts of the hospital 
having the capacity at the time required. However, at the same time the SAU/EMU receives 
patients directly from GPs. Once these patients have been assessed, they need to be 
accommodated in suitable specialty wards (Proudlove et al, 2003). Those patients on the 
RTT pathway also have to be admitted within the target of 18 weeks and also consume bed 
capacity.   
The high pressure event 
The case study focused on before, during and after a specific incident in the hospital. An 
airborne sickness virus in one ward that then spread to other patients and staff.  Within a 
short time the virus was present in eight wards (around 30% of total bed capacity). The 
Control of Infection Team procedures for such an outbreak means the affected wards were 
closed to new admissions. The reduction in bed capacity continued for the following two 
weeks with ward-based capacity being reintroduced following sterilization and 
confirmation of the elimination of the virus.   
Findings 
Identifying the four boundaries of the safe working envelop 
Analysis of the performance management documentation and interviews showed that both 
the financial and target boundaries were easily measured, monitored and strictly 
performance managed. The financial performance was reviewed at least monthly in 
substantial detail. The four hour target was monitored continuously at busy times and other 
targets at least weekly. Staff numbers were linked to budgets and monitored monthly for 
turnover and sickness rate. Schedules of expected numbers of doctors and nurses per ward 
per shift were in place and staffing was monitored informally each day. The measurement 
of patient infections was undertaken daily and regarded as the primary patient safety issue. 
‘Patient falls’ and incident reports were formally monitored retrospectively each month. 
Within certain areas senior nurses reviewed incidents of patient falls within a week. Apart 
from infections and number of serious incidents no other patient safety measures where 
reported to the Hospital Board on a routine basis. Financial and target performance were 
reported to the Board in detail each month. Staff turnover and sickness rates were reported 
every quarter. 
Pressure on the ‘operating point’ 
Theoretically ‘operating point’ is the location of the system within the safe working 
envelop. Dynamic pressures influence the location of the operating point and can push the 
system towards a boundary of failure. The case study hospital was in a strong financial 
position with a projected large surplus for the year. The interviews confirmed that staff did 
not feel pressure to make decisions that might compromise targets, staffing or patient safety 
due to budget considerations.  
The combination of the four hour ED, Cancer and RTT targets did create substantial 
pressure. Any NHS hospital has to be able to manage peaks in emergency demand whilst at 
the same time maintain the pattern of non-emergency (elective) admissions from both the 
cancer and RTT pathways. Bagust et al (1999) showed that for a hospital to be in a position 
to manage peaks in demand the bed capacity should not exceed 85% occupied.   
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The hospital managers at the outbreak of the sickness virus had taken the decision that 
it was not feasible to divert emergency patients. Therefore, the remaining potential action 
available was to cancel non-emergency admissions to help relieve pressure. From the 
interviews there appeared to be a strong view that non-emergency patients are equally 
deserving of admission.  
“The non-emergency patient has a problem that needs treatment. …From the 
patient’s perspective a bed crisis is not their problem – they just want to be 
admitted.” (Nurse) 
As well as the patient perspective from observations and interviews it was clear that to 
cancel an elective patient on the RTT pathway created a capacity problem in trying to 
rebook the patient within the target period. Also there was a government target of the 
percentage (<1%) of patients that could be cancelled on the day of admission for non-
medical reasons. The competing dynamics led to a process of tight coupling where 
operational problems in one part of the hospital impacted adversely on other areas (Cook 
and Rasmussen, 2005). This generated considerable pressure on staff to find innovative 
ways to maintain the flow of patients through the system by seeking to accelerate patient 
discharges.  
Data analysis showed there was no significant change in the level of elective 
admissions during the bed capacity crisis (Figure 2) compared to the same period the 
previous year. Without a change the level of non-emergency admissions, other actions 
relating to capacity, particularly maintaining the flow of patients, became the focus for 
attention. 
Non-Emergency Inpatient Admissions 2008 Before, During and After Sickness Virus and 2007 
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Fig 2 Elective Admissions 2008 Before, During and After Sickness Virus and 2007 over 
same period 
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A number of actions where taken to generate new staffed bed capacity (overflow 
capacity).  This included opening an area normally used as a preadmission area (normally 
only open during the working day) in orthopedics.  This small 13 bed ward is situated at the 
other end of the hospital from the medical wards. Patients already in medical beds, 
identified as being well enough, were then moved to this area. A further area of 6 beds was 
brought into use in an area close to the ED for medical patients. Areas within wards that 
were normally used as day case beds were brought into service as inpatient beds.  
Staffing the additional areas combined with the short-term sickness of doctors and 
nurses due to the virus pushed the operating point towards the staffing boundary and an 
inadequate level of staff in ward areas. Concerns where expressed about staff having to 
move to cover sickness and open additional beds. Staff where unfamiliar with certain types 
of patients and ward areas which lacked key equipment.  
Infection control measures were applied rigorously. Wards with the sickness virus 
remained closed until all the patients and staff were symptom free for forty eight hours and 
then the areas thoroughly cleaned. Emergency patients admitted with an infection where 
placed in a side room. These actions maintained the patient safety boundary in respect of 
infection but then created pressure on the remaining bed and staff capacity. That pressure 
on the remaining bed capacity meant that medical patients were transferred onto surgical 
wards (medical outliers). By moving patients into surgical beds it provided the capacity 
within the medical wards to accept transfers from EMU.  In turn then EMU can accept 
admissions from the ED.  With the 4 hour target there has to be a constant supply of beds 
being found in the hospital.  During the sickness virus period both the EMU and sometimes 
the SAU would not have any empty beds. Emergency patients requiring admission after 
seeing their GP, were then diverted to the ED. This created a reinforcing loop (Sterman, 
2000) by creating more patients to be processed within the four hour target which meant the 
need to create more empty beds in the hospital within a short time frame. As the majority of 
emergency admissions were medical patients, current medical patients were moved to 
surgical wards (medical outliers) in increasing numbers to create the bed capacity in the 
‘right place’. 
“Sometimes you have two or three bed moves to create a bed on EMU to get an ED 
patient in. …The medical patients that move are not always suitable.” (Nurse) 
As suggested by Wheeler (2006), a moderate but sustained effect on the number of 
medical outliers was observed during the virus period (Figure 3).   
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Fig 3 Statistical Process Control Chart - Medical outliers before, during and after sickness 
virus 
Interviews and observation confirmed that bed capacity and flow problems were 
common and regarded as ‘normal’. There was evidence of admitting and preparing non-
emergency patients for procedures in corridors and waiting rooms. NHS hospitals count the 
bed occupancy at midnight. In 2008 the midnight occupancy for all wards in the case study 
hospital was 89%. The medical wards occupancy ranged from 90-98%. The midnight 
census underestimates the bed occupancy during peak period of activity during the day. 
Occupancy for many wards during the day was above 100%. Staff had learnt to accept the 
pressure on the system and had found innovative ways to manage the situation.  
Discussion 
From the literature on safety theory and stretched systems (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005; 
Miller and Xiao 2007; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997; Sheridan, 2008; Woods and Cook, 
2002, Woods, 2006), we can conceptualize that the operating point would be close to the 
safety boundary for a hospital experiencing capacity and production pressures. In the case 
study only three out twenty seven staff interviewed believed the operating point was within 
or near the marginal zone. Most regarded the hospital as operating in a way that prioritized 
the safety of patients. Previous (albeit limited) studies suggest that hospitals that have high 
occupancy rates, experience an increase in mortality and adverse events (Richardson, 2006; 
Sprivulis, et al, 2006;  Weissman et al, 2007).  It is therefore surprising that more staff did 
not regard the hospital as being unsafe during this period. It can be argued that the hospital 
system experienced a period of ‘drift to danger’ (Rasmussen, 1997).  
There was evidence that the buffer capacity and flexibility required for a resilient response 
was present only on the financial failure boundary. The admission process in terms of beds 
and staff became brittle (no flexible capacity) and tightly coupled (Woods, 2006; Cook and 
Rasmussen, 2005). 
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Role of culture 
Vaughan (1996) describes how the decision to launch the ill fated shuttle, Challenger, was 
as much about culture as it was about technical systems going wrong. Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2003) point to the importance of a safety culture, defining culture as ‘what we expect 
around here’. There was considerable evidence from the observation and interview data of 
staff normalizing to the pattern of actions that maintained the level of admissions.  They 
appeared to make sense of the situation by placing importance on not canceling patients 
who needed non-emergency admissions.  We can theorise that the reality was more likely 
the system pressure on staff to achieve multiple targets. As Vaughan (1996) suggests: ‘We 
reconstruct history every day, not to fool others but to fool ourselves, because it is integral 
to the process of going on.’ 
In the NHS waiting times and measurable infection control targets have been given a 
high priority backed by a strong performance management ethos.  This contributes to a 
culture of finding all possible ways to meet the targets. The wider NHS culture also allowed 
a process of normalizing by staff to levels of risk previous thought to be unacceptable. 
Safety being a dynamic non-event (Reason, 1997), and not as clearly defined or measured 
as finance and waiting time targets has received far less management attention. The second 
aspect is the culture of production. Staff in the hospital had normalized to being extremely 
busy to compensate for the constant pressure of competing demands and the need to find 
beds for admissions.  The focus on maintaining flow of patients through the and out of the 
hospital has become hard wired into the system in terms of staff attitudes, processes and 
structures. 
Conclusion 
The conceptual model of a safe working envelop for an NHS hospital has provided the 
framework through which to explore the compensating actions staff take in the face of 
competing pressures.  The research has led to the articulation that the system pressures and 
failure boundaries influence the attitudes of staff and consequently the culture which drives 
the actions. This conclusion may relate to what Weick and Sutcliffe (2003) describe a 
process of cultural entrapment – ‘…the process by which people get locked into lines of 
action, subsequently justify those lines of action, and search for confirmation that they are 
doing what they should be doing.’  
The need for the safe working envelop model to include the wider system is needed to 
conceptualize the impact of externally generated pressures both on the production of culture 
and the culture of production. To extend this approach, to explain the impact of conflicting 
pressures on patient safety, further research incorporating additional cases is needed.  A 
single case study has limitations. The situation of an NHS hospital facing the pressures 
described is particular to England.  With those limitations in mind the development of the 
conceptual model to a particular system wide context, does facilitate the articulation of 
compensating actions as a response to competing pressures.  
From a practitioner perspective the model helps illustrate the dynamic nature of the 
competing pressures and the need to set clearer boundary measures in the area of staff 
workload and patient safety. Policy makers, performance managers and regulators may be 
able to appreciate better the impact their decisions have on the actions of front line staff in 
hospitals and the potential impact this, in turn, has on patient safety.  
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Abstract 
Patients who fall in hospital can suffer significant harm. This case study in an NHS hospital 
using interviews, observation and content analysis looked at how nurse leaders ‘rebelled’ 
against the norm of accepting patient falls as inevitable. A checklist approach combined 
with the intentionally checking high risk patients each hour was introduced. Initial results 
were good but not sustained. Obstacles to improvement included many competing 
demands, high levels of incremental normalisation supporting the theoretical position of 
practical drift away from set operational policies with patient safety implications. 
Key words: patient falls, intentional rounding, checklist 
Introduction 
There are a significant number of patients who suffer adverse events in healthcare systems 
(De Vries et al, 2008). An ‘adverse event’ is defined as ‘any unintended event caused at 
least partly by healthcare and which resulted in harm’ (Sari et al, 2007). One of the most 
common causes of harm to patients in hospital are when they fall. A fall is defined as ‘all 
situations in which a patient suddenly and involuntarily came to rest upon the ground or 
surface lower than their original station’ (Oliver et al, 1997). In England, patient falls are 
more routinely reported as incidents than medication errors or adverse drug reactions 
(NAO, 2005). Historically staff in hospitals regarded patient falls as one of the 
complications that arise in hospitals and that there was little preventative action that could 
be taken. Therefore, a relatively high number of patient falls in hospital was regarded as 
‘normal’. However, in recent years there has been a change of attitude and approach. This 
paper reports the outcome of case-based research in an NHS hospital, which has been 
undertaken to articulate the factors instigating this change of attitude. The study also 
identifies the specific interventions and actions undertaken by staff at the hospital to 
prevent patient falls.  
Literature 
Patient falls in hospital are common. The reported rate ranges from 3 to 14 per 1000 bed 
days, and are associated with a range of injuries and an increased length of stay in hospital 
(Healey et al, 2008, Oliver et al, 2007) In England from September 2005 to August 2006, 
some 200,000 falls were reported to the National Patient Safety Agency. Analysis of the 
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reported incidents of falls shows that 65% of patients resulted in no harm, 31% in ‘low 
harm’, 3.6% in ‘moderate harm’ and 0.6% in severe harm with 26 reported deaths (Healey 
et al, 2008). However, it is well recognised that there is serious under reporting of incidents 
in hospital (Olsen et al, 2007). 
A systematic review and meta-analysis of studies to prevent falls and fractures suggested 
that there ‘is reasonable evidence that using a multifaceted intervention for hospital 
inpatients may have a modest effect on falls but not on fractures’ (Oliver et al, 2007). 
Interventions included risk assessment, medication review, care planning, and education. 
The literature supports the view that patient falls is a complex issue and that there appears 
to be no simple solution (NICE, 2004). 
Vaughan (1996) shows that normalisation of deviance is key issue for safety. Her study of 
the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster illustrated that the system within which people work 
can produce a culture where, through small incremental steps, new situations are seen as 
‘normal’.  This is described as the ‘native view’. Outsiders looking at the situation are more 
likely to see the situation as deviant, not acceptable and therefore potentially dangerous. 
Waring et al (2007) point to types of behaviour by health care workers that illustrate ‘taken 
for granted assumptions about clinical risk…’ Such behaviours ‘normalize risk’ and as such 
mean that risk of harm to patients is not addressed. Waring (2005) suggests that medical 
staff regard error as ‘inevitable’ which can lead to errors being seen as ‘normal’. These 
errors may not be reported as incidents and therefore do not provide the basis for 
improvements in safety. Grenier-Sennelier et al (2002) suggests that in hospitals, staff can 
regard patient falls as an inevitable part of the rehabilitation process. Such a view may then 
influence the reporting of such incidents (Healthcare Commission, 2009). 
Merton (1968) provides a framework of how social structures exert pressure on individuals 
to conform to patterns of cultural goals and institutional norms. ‘Rebellion’ is one of the 
five modes of individual adaptation to goals and norms proposed by Merton (1968). The 
rebellion by key leaders to goals and norms is used as the theoretical explanation of the 
change of attitude creating a reversal of the normalisation of deviance. 
There is a developing science and methodology of improvement in healthcare. It is largely 
based around the idea of small change which is then tested and refined before being spread 
to generate larger scale change in practice. The bedrock method is the cycle of plan, do, 
study, act (PDSA), (Langley et al, 1996).  
Research questions 
What were the drivers that caused the staff to change their view of ‘normal’ in relation to 
patient falls? What and how did the staff change their behaviour and practice to improve 
the safety of patients? 
Method 
A case study approach was used as being the most appropriate to gather the contextual 
detail needed (Yin, 2003) and where there is complexity in the subject matter (Stuart et al, 
2002). A criticism of case studies is that of being context specific and therefore 
transferability of findings to other situations can be problematic.  However, when ‘they are 
used to contextualize key points of an explanation, and the explanation, and not the cases, 
carries the argument, case studies can be very powerful (Nightingale et al, 2003). 
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A mixed method approach using the simultaneous collection of qualitative and quantitative 
data was used (Creswell, 2003; Bergman, 2008).  The underlying philosophy is that to 
obtain a better understanding of the phenomenon a range of epistemological perspective 
were used.  Multiple sources of data collection were utilized. This assists in achieving 
triangulation in data collection, the interpretation and subsequent theory development.   
An 760 bed NHS hospital was chosen as the case study where an improvement 
methodology was being used and significant change was beginning to occur in the level of 
falls prevention. The case studied was five medical wards where a new approach to falls 
was being implemented set within the context of the wider hospital. Those wards 
specialised in care of the elderly (48 beds), stroke (30 beds) and neurology (24 beds). 
The hospital reported 1631 in-patient ward falls in 2008. The five wards had 568 (34%) of 
that total. On admission patients were assessed for the risk of falling. A scoring system of 
over 30 indicates that the patient is at very high risk of falling.  The hospital Falls 
Management Policy in place at the beginning of 2008, required that certain actions must be 
taken by staff for any patient with a risk assessment score greater than 13. 
Twenty seven staff (doctors, nurses and managers) were interviewed as part of a wider 
study using an interview protocol and then six further semi structured interviews were 
conducted with nurses working within the five wards focusing on the issue of patient falls. 
Meetings about patient falls were observed, papers and reports analysed and data on falls 
plotted using statistical process control charts (Wheeler, 2003).  The interviews were 
transcribed and then coded using NVivo 8 to develop themes which were triangulated with 
the observational data and content analysis of meeting papers and reports. 
Findings 
The analysis showed that during the first part of 2008 there were different histories within 
the wards of staff attitudes to patient falls. The histories were related to the leadership of 
the ward areas. On two of the wards (A & B) the attitude was described as falls “just being 
one of those things that happens in hospital”. Risk assessments often were not done and 
when they were, little if any action was then taken. There had been a gap in the senior 
nursing leadership on those wards and for other nurses the situation was described as rather 
“chaotic”. The other three wards (C – E) had more stable senior nursing leadership at ward 
level. The attitude to falls was that they were “not what you want to happen but an 
inevitable part of getting patients mobile”. Risk assessments were undertaken and actions 
put in place especially when mobilising patients. There was little if any awareness of the 
national initiatives to reduce harm from patient falls (DoH, 2001; NICE, 2004). 
At the end of 2007 and within the first few months of 2008 on wards A&B there were two 
falls incidents where both patients subsequently died. Root cause analysis (RCA) of the 
incidents were carried out.  In one case a confused patient climbed over the bed rails (raised 
in this case inappropriately to help prevent the patient getting out of bed) on two occasions 
the same night and had fallen. That patient subsequently died from a head injury sustained 
from the second fall.  The other incident concerned a confused patient who had fallen some 
twenty times over a number of weeks on the ward without any significant action being 
taken. That patient sustained a fractured hip and subsequently died. Both RCAs showed 
systemic failure within the wards. The hospital Falls Management Policy did not appear to 
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be well known by staff and therefore poorly implemented and supervised. This situation 
was set within the context of the hospital achieving the highest rating for its services from 
the Healthcare Commission and with a Hospital Standardised Mortality Rate (HSMR) 
below the expected rate. 
Following the RCAs the Lead Nurse with overall responsibility for all the medical wards in 
the hospital felt ‘ashamed that these patients had died’ and then led the ‘rebellion’ against 
regarding patient falls as a ‘normal’ part of a hospital stay. Her primary lever was to engage 
with the emotions of staff by presenting the patient stories. Most staff were not fully aware 
of the potential level of harm that can result from a patient fall. Staff were also shocked and 
some visibly upset that these incidents could have occurred. There were also many 
competing demands on staff time and preventing falls was regarded as just one among a 
number of priorities. 
QUALITY: Patient Safety–Falls
For patients with a falls risk score of >30, please enter either ‘A’ = achieved or ‘V’ = variance in columns.
Record reason for variance and action taken overleaf.
THIS PATIENT REQUIRES OBSERVATION EVERY ……………. MINUTES
INITIALS
9.IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE I 
CAN DO?  Because I’ve got the time
8.BED TO FLOOR
7.BED RAILS DOWN
6.CALL BELL WITHIN REACH
If you need me, press this button
5.DRINK / MOUTHCARE
Would you like a drink?
4.POSITION / COMFORT
Are you comfortable?
3.ORIENTATION – fully alert=FA; 
mildly     confused/disorientated=MC; severe 
confusion/disorientation=SC; asleep=A 
2.PAIN Do you have any pain?
1.CONTINENCE
Do you need to go to the toilet?
TIME
DATE:
Figure 1 Intentional Rounding (IR) checklist 
As well as engaging with the emotions of staff to shock them out of normalising falls in 
hospital, the Lead Nurse with a colleague developed a tool for staff to use to improve their 
care of patients at high risk of falling.  The tool combined two patient safety techniques; a 
‘checklist’ approach (Frank, 2006) and ‘intentional rounding’ (Owensboro Medical Health 
System, 2008). The checklist was a simple list of questions and actions (Figure 1) for staff 
to undertake with any patient who had been assessed as having a high risk of fallings (score 
>30). The ‘intentional rounding’ (IR) is the requirement to go round the ward and speak to 
those high risk patients every hour using the checklist. A simple checklist form was devised 
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for staff to use which then became part of the medical record for that patient. Using the 
PDSA methodology IR was tested by one nurse on one patient on one ward on one shift. 
Amendments to the checklist form were made before the tool was then disseminated to 
other nurses and then the whole ward team. A training pack was developed which helped 
the tool to be implemented in other ward areas within a short period of time. 
In wards where a number of patients were assessed to be high risk then they were cohorted 
in a six bedded bay and a nurse allocated to that area all the time. This made the process of 
IR much quicker and focused staff resource towards the higher risk patients. The use of bed 
rails was also questioned and staff were reminded of the need to carefully risk assess and 
document their use. The checking of the bed rail status was then incorporated into the 
intentional rounding checklist. For many patients bed rails can increase the risk of harm 
from falling so should be used selectively. 
There was some opposition to the introduction of IR. The concern was whether staff had 
the time to dedicate to IR given the many other priorities on a busy ward. The principle of 
PDSA was again employed and nurses realised that in some ways it helped them in 
prioritising and managing their workload. PDSA was also used to introduce IR to Care 
Assistants who provide much of the practical hands on care for patients. Registered nurses 
could then delegate IR to them and focus their attention on those tasks requiring their skills, 
such as dispensing medications. 
The Lead Nurse set up weekly then monthly meeting to review progress with wards that 
implemented IR. As more wards took on the tool they were invited to the meeting. The 
reliability of the tool being used was tested informally by senior nurses visiting the wards 
and looking at the medical records of high risk patients. 
Initial results from the first two wards to use IR (Wards A&B) were encouraging. The staff 
attitude towards patient falls changed, the number of falls reduced (Table 1) and there was a 
determination to learn from those incidents that did occur. The hospital incident form was 
supplemented by asking for further information as nurses suspected from studying the 
results, that patients with risk scores of between 20-30 and who had some form of cognitive 
impairment, could also benefit from IR.  
The IR tool was spread rapidly from wards A&B to C-E and then within two months to a 
further four wards. Using the PDSA methodology what became evident during this rapid 
spread was that the training of staff was diluted and results were not sustained. Even on the 
initial wards (A&B) it was found that a patient had been assessed on seven occasions with a 
score greater than 30 but had not been put on IR because the nurses believed she was bed 
bound and therefore unlikely to fall. However, that patient did fall although was not 
injured. There was also a case of one patient who despite being on IR, fell a number of 
times and caused a ‘blip’ in the ward A results. 
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SPC - Wards A & B weekly number of patient falls
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IR of all high 
risk patients 
commenced
Initial success
Weekly meetings 
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Lead Nurse
Cohorting 
patients 
commenced
One very 
confused patient
Table 1 Statistical process control chart - number of patient falls on wards A & B 
Discussion 
The ‘rebellion’ signifies the rejection of the ‘normal’ cultural goals; the rejection of the 
institutional means of acceptance and mechanical reporting of falls combined with minimal 
preventative action. Staff who engaged in the ‘rebellion’ put in place new goals (any fall is 
unacceptable) and institutional practice (staff using a checklist approach every hour to 
speak to patients at high risk of falling). It is accepted that to achieve no falls for patients in 
hospital is not a feasible goal. However, the unquestioning acceptance (normalisation) of 
the likelihood of falls in hospital results in a failure to implement systematic methods to 
reduce the risk for certain patients.  The adoption of the changes required considerable 
leadership, education, training and persistent communication. However, even with the level 
of leadership given, the initial improvements were not sustained to the level desired. Using 
the PDSA methodology lessons were drawn as to why the initial improvement was not 
sustained as the new practice was spread. A number of changes to the training and auditing 
of results have since been put in place. 
The findings support the theory of practical drift from a designed way of working (Snook, 
2000) as set out in the ‘Falls Management Policy’. Staff drifted from the ‘Policy’ due to the 
competing priorities and finding practical ways to achieve their workload. In doing so they 
traded effectiveness for thoroughness (Hollnagel, 2004) and normalised their position as 
acceptable (Vaughan, 1996; Weick and Sutcliffe 2003). The danger of using a root case 
analysis approach to investigate those patient falls that result in significant harm, is that 
such a method often fails to look at the broader systemic issues such as practical drift and 
trade offs which are endemic amongst staff due to the competing pressures (Dekker, 2006). 
Senior managers can be left with the impression that the problem is isolated to particular 
wards rather than being a system wide issue that relates to more than one safety policy area. 
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Whilst PDSA is a powerful tool to achieve change, the cultural norms that have been 
established incrementally over many years, it takes a sustained effort by leaders to install 
rebellion. Regular meetings with staff were necessary plus constant feedback and learning 
when falls did occur. Those staff in this study who had been directly involved or felt 
responsible for a patient falling with a serious subsequent injury engaged with the change 
process at a much deeper level supporting the theory that ‘emotions can act as drivers or 
motivators, of subjects’ engagement with discourses’ (Garrety et al, 2003). 
Conclusions 
Improving patient safety in the midst of many competing demands requires considerable 
effort. Despite national initiatives and a revised Falls Management Policy staff in the case 
study hospital which was externally assessed as ‘excellent’, largely accepted the cultural 
norm that patient falls were part of being a patient in hospital. Theory relating to change in 
clinical practice to improve safety must take account of the strong cultural bias for staff to 
accept what is regarded as ‘normal’ and not challenge the status quo. Ways to encourage 
‘rebellion’ include engaging with staff about the emotional stories of individual patients 
who suffer harm through a lack of proactive action.
Whilst there are limitations to this single case study there are aspects that have relevance to 
the wider practitioner interest in improving patient safety through cultural and practice-
based change. From a theoretical perspective it seeks to build on the literature by 
developing the understanding of the drivers that reversed the normalisation of deviance and 
how safety was improved for patients in hospital.  
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 Chapter 51 
 Safety, systems, complexity, 
and resilience: What makes 
organizations safe? 
 Kieran  Sweeney and  Michael D.  Williams 
 Key points 
 u Healthcare organizations are complex adaptive systems consisting of inter-related 
sub-systems of micro-communities of individuals. 
 u Emergent properties of healthcare systems can be explained by complexity theory. 
 u Individuals make errors but good teams can reduce their number and impact. 
 u Resilience refers to an organization’s ability to maintain its systems whilst adapting 
to external pressures. 
 Introduction 
 In this chapter it is proposed that when viewing the activities of a hospital, it is helpful 
to see that organization as a complex adaptive system (CAS). Complex organizations 
are constructed of inter-relating subunits (like departments), and those subunits, in 
turn, consist of micro-communities of individuals (like doctors and nurses). The 
reciprocal interaction of these micro-communities co-creates the culture of these 
subunits and, by scaling up, the culture of the organization itself. In this chapter, 
healthcare organizations are viewed as complex adaptive systems, requiring the appli-
cation of systems thinking, and safety is seen as an emergent property of the inter-
relationship of subunits and the individuals within them. 
 Safety, governance, and emergent properties 
 Safety is part of clinical governance, which was rather opaquely defined by Scally and 
Donaldson in 1998 as: 
 a framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously improv-
ing the quality of their services, and safeguarding high standards of care, by creating an 
environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish. 
 Seven pillars of clinical governance were identified – clinical effectiveness, risk man-
agement, patient experience, communication effectiveness, resource effectiveness, 
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strategic, and learning effectiveness. Once established however, these domains tended 
to spawn silos of enthusiastic people scurrying about doing their best to spread the 
word. NHS organizations became governance aware, acutely so in some cases, when 
visited by the Health Commission, but not much excellence was flourishing. It became 
apparent that it was the inter-relationship between these domains that could lead to a 
culture more conducive to excellence, but to achieve this, leadership, teamwork, good, 
clear communication, and above all systems awareness were needed. 
 It became apparent that the pillars should not be seen as separate domains at all – 
this was like thinking about the weather, and considering temperature, pressure, 
humidity, and local geography separately, whereas each of these parameters, although 
measurable independently, is inter-dependent on all the others. 
 For healthcare, it is crucial to see safety as an emergent property of the interaction 
of all the seven domains of clinical governance, co-creating a quality environment. To 
grasp this idea theoretically, an understanding of systems, and their complexity and 
adaptability is required. 
 Healthcare organizations as complex adaptive systems 
 Early management approaches to strategy in the NHS regarded organizations as 
machines operated from the centre and, more importantly, predictable in their 
responses and outputs. The introduction of systems thinking into NHS management 
in the 1990s changed this. In systems theory, one accepts that a system (here, an 
organization like a hospital) consists of a collection of subunits, which interact with 
one other to produce an output that is greater (and more complex) than the outputs 
of the individual subunits. Theoretically, there are four features of systems that help us 
consider how they operate. These are shown in  Table  51.1 . 
 While these four features are not mutually exclusive, it is easy to see that hospitals 
are better thought of as soft, pluralistic organizations generating a range of problems, 
some of which can be solved algorithmically, and others which need a different kind 
of more organic management approach. 
 Over the last decade, complexity theory has been increasingly used to describe how 
large healthcare organizations work. Complexity theory helps our understanding of 
the challenges inherent in managing such organisations, and why they frequently fail. 
The key ideas underpinning complexity in organizational theory are organic: organi-
zations grow, they need to be fertilised with creative conversations, their roots lie in 
 Table 51.1 Characteristics of systems 
 Feature of the 
system 
 Comment 
 Hard  Expressed in a rigorous, usually numerical manner 
 Soft  More ambiguous, fluid and evolving, less easily defined numerically 
 Positivist  Permitting one undisputed interpretation of events 
 Pluralistic  Accepts that there are multiple views, each legitimately held within the 
system 
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the continuous interaction of all the people who work in them, and the pattern of their 
behaviour marks the ‘culture’ of the organization – in what is termed its emergent 
properties. 
 Complexity is one of four ways in which a system evolves dynamically (and here a 
‘system’ means a set of agents, their interaction, and sense of purpose). A ‘system’ can 
be understood to evolve, dynamically, in four ways. 
 Systems can be: 
 1. Static – there is no dynamic evolution 
 2. Ordered – exhibiting rhythmic predictable dynamic movement, like a combustion 
engine 
 3. Chaotic – appearing to change randomly, but predicated on hidden rhythms and 
patterns, which can be computed mathematically, like the weather. 
 4. Complex – complex systems operate in the state of dynamic evolution between 
order and chaos, like the tube of the surfer’s wave, before it crashes (chaotically) 
onto the beach. 
 A complex adaptive system (CAS) has five stages, or activities: 
 1. Receptive context 
 2. Complex responsive processes 
 3. Self-organization 
 4. Adaption or co-evolution 
 5. Emergent properties 
 For a system to evolve creatively, the agents in it needs to have first a  receptive 
context – a general set of values the agents understand and accept. Then, the agents 
need to interact continuously in both predictable and unpredictable ways, in what is 
termed a series of  complex responsive processes. The patterning of these processes gives 
rise to self-organization, essentially the patterns of behaviour by which the organiza-
tion can recognize itself. The most often quoted example of self-organizing behaviour 
is when birds form a flock – flocking is self-organizing behaviour. Clearly, organiza-
tions don’t just self-organize within their own boundaries, they will interact 
with other organizations in their environment, and change some of their activities 
accordingly. In complexity theory, this is called  adaption or co-evolution , the 
fourth principle of complexity. In turn, the patterning of these self-organizing and 
adaptive activities gives rise to the ‘feel’ or ‘culture’ of the organization, called the 
organization’s  emergent properties ; if flocking is the self-organizing behaviour, then 
the flock is the emergent property. By the same token, a wave is an emergent property 
of water. Emergence is a higher order feature of complex adaptive systems, and has 
been defined as 
 ‘the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the 
process of self-organization in complex systems’. 
 It therefore refers to the potential within such systems to create properties that 
could not have been predicted by understanding the nature of each separate element 
in the system. 
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 It is proposed that, in thinking about safety, errors, near misses, or beneficial patient 
outcomes in a hospital, it is helpful to see that organization as a complex adaptive 
system (CAS). A blame culture often fails to see an NHS organisation as complex; 
individuals are not isolated free-standing agents who just slot into a system some-
where. They are embedded in one system, for example their ward nursing group, 
which in turn forms part of a larger group, the intensive care department, which again 
exists within a particular directorate of the hospital, and so on. These units in the 
organization are interconnected, the agents engage in a complex responsive process 
continuously, and in so doing self-organize themselves (into rotas, for example), and 
interact with others (e.g. managers in the system). The output of all the interaction, 
within and between all the levels of the system, will be the emergent property of the 
system. This could be called the ‘feel’ or ‘culture’ of the hospital – what it feels like to 
work there. 
 Safety, safety culture, and high-reliability 
organizations (HRO) 
 Safety culture is hard to define. Safety expert Charles Vincent suggests we summon up 
our own experience in organizations, like hospitals, and remember wards in which the 
atmosphere was relaxed, but where the staff were conscientious, and standards uni-
formly high. Equally, we can recall more slapdash wards, where risks were run, and 
potentially dangerous practices might have been developing beneath the surface. 
Vincent asks us to consider the ‘culture’ of such wards, and suggests 
 culture points to the powerful influence of social forces in moulding our behaviour; we 
are all more malleable than we like to think and to some extent we develop good or bad 
habits according to the prevailing ethos around us. 
 From the explanation of CAS above, it should be clear that the ‘moulding of our 
behaviour’ will take place via the complex responsive processes, and that the ‘ethos’ of 
the organization will be one of its emergent properties. 
 Ever since the 1940s high-reliability organizations (HROs), like aviation or the 
nuclear industry, have developed a systems approach to error. HROs accept that 
errors are inevitable, and are likely to be the outcome of a systematic failure within the 
wider organization, rather than the blameworthy behaviour of a single person. Many 
of the lessons learned in the aviation industry, where most accidents are attributable 
to human factors, have been usefully transferred to clinical practice. Although Vincent 
himself warns against seeing the parallels too pervasively, there is no doubt that 
looking at how HROs learn from errors has been helpful to some key areas of medical 
practice. This is especially important where clinical professionals work in close-knit 
teams, as in operating theatres. Teams, like individuals can create or erode safety. 
A landmark study by Lingard in 2004 concluded that about 25 % of all communica-
tions in an operating theatre could be classified as communication failures, either 
unclear, incomplete, or just plain wrong. Working poorly, a team multiplies the pos-
sibility of error; working well, the team creates an environment which is safer than the 
combined efforts of the individuals; safety becomes, in those circumstances, a defining 
property of the system. 
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 Error detection and management have always been central features of training pro-
grammes for cockpit crews in civil aviation. Human vulnerability to stressors, the 
nature of error, and how to respond to it are studied to achieve three aims: 
 1. Good teamwork 
 2. A culture of problem solving through good communication. 
 3. Reducing the possibility that the crew will make errors 
 Key to this is that the aviation industry has a culture, which accepts 
 u that errors are inevitable; 
 u that systems failures or weaknesses often contribute to them, and 
 u that being open about the proneness to error, by fostering good communication, is 
an essential way of reducing their incidence. 
 Unfortunately this contrasts with the culture within medical practice. This differ-
ence between the cultures of the two industries was highlighted in a study by Helmreich 
in 2000. Junior cockpit crew were asked if they should be able to question decisions 
made by senior colleagues; unanimously they said yes, and that this was, quite simply, 
another defence against error. When posed the same question, one quarter of senior 
consultant surgeons said that junior surgeons should not question their seniors. 
 The issue of a hierarchy of communication is not simply of theoretical or academic 
importance. In 2001, Wayne Jowett died after he had been given an intrathecal injec-
tion of vincristine, a drug that should only be given intravenously. The subsequent 
investigation showed a myriad of tacit assumptions about the roles of the two junior 
doctors involved, which, while not completely unreasonable, led to an interaction 
between the two, which was literally fatal. In particular, when the more junior doctor 
was asked why he did not challenge the registrar about the second, fatal syringe, which 
contained vincrinstine, but was referred to as methotrexate by the registrar, he said, ‘I 
was a junior doctor, and did what I was told by the registrar  … I assumed he had the 
knowledge  … and I did not intend to challenge him.’ When sentenced to 8 months 
imprisonment, the registrar said, ‘I know it’s a lame excuse, but I am a human being’. 
Everybody is, which is precisely why solid systems, good teamwork, and open com-
munication are needed to protect us from our own fallibility. 
 Resilience 
 The idea of resilience is a key element in understanding why NHS organizations have 
a poor patient safety record, and understanding how that situation might improve. 
 Resilience is a proactive concept of safety. In healthcare, it refers to an organiza-
tion’s ability to absorb and adapt to increasing pressure, to prevent adverse patient 
outcomes in the face of near disruption. In resilience, an operating envelope is imag-
ined, within which the system is designed to be competent. Speculation then occurs as 
to how the system can maintain such competence in the face of pressures, such as ris-
ing demand for emergency care, which move it away from this safe operating enve-
lope. Four boundaries to the operating envelope have been proposed: 
 1. Financial failure 
 2. Target failure 
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 3. Unacceptable working conditions 
 4. Failure of safety. 
 There are obvious managerial and political pressures on healthcare organisations to 
achieve financial balance, and at the same time reduce waiting times. This promotes a 
strong productivity culture, which has to be balanced against proper working arrange-
ments for key staff, like junior doctors. These three influences act interdependently, 
continuously challenging the fourth, safety boundary. 
 To promote and maintain an acceptable safety culture, and to manage risk appro-
priately, healthcare organizations have to know where their operating point lies in 
relation to the boundaries of this safe operating envelope. Recent work demonstrates 
that NHS organizations are predominantly influenced by the first two of the four 
boundaries described; financial and target failure. When organizations are seen as 
organic, flexible and adaptive, it is clear that in order to ‘protect’ these two boundaries, 
the other two (working practices and safety) may come under increasing pressure. 
Work is currently underway to develop more robust metrics to describe all four 
boundaries to help balance the dominant influence of the measures used to monitor 
the finance and targets boundaries. 
 Summary 
 Humans are fallible, and error is inevitable. Safe organisations accept that errors will 
occur, and try to reduce their number and effect by building systems to protect the 
people working within them. 
 Complexity theory helps us to understand how organizations operate, how they are 
simultaneously predictable and unpredictable, and how the interaction of the people 
working within them is fundamental to constructing the ethos, or culture of the 
organization. 
 The notion of resilience allows us to imagine how organisations evolve within a safe 
operating envelope, and what pressures impact on such organisations to move it out 
of this safe buffer zone. Clinicians need clear communication, good teamwork, and a 
supportive infrastructure to work safely. 
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